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Ideas in Practice: the Political Economy of Chinese State Intervention 
during the New Policies Period (1068-1085) 
 
Abstract 
I take the New Policies period (1068-1085) to be a critical juncture in Chinese 
history during which, for the first time, the Chinese state initiated systematic 
intervention into the market. This period witnessed the failure of plans to shape the 
collective action of bureaucrats and coordinate market actors through a host of 
organizing mechanisms. I explain why the policy makers in this historical process 
failed to incorporate and organize the ideas and interests of social actors, political 
HOLWHVDQGUHOHYDQWEXUHDXFUDFLHVLQWRWKHVWDWH¶VDXWKRULWDWLYHDFWLRQ  
I argue that this failure was an outcome of the interaction between the political 
philosophy of the drafters of the New Policies and their historical context. In 
SDUWLFXODULWZDVDUHVXOWRIWKHLQFDSDFLW\RIWKHGUDIWHUV¶ZRUOGYLHZWRFRUUHFWO\
explain and resolve unexpected problems in the policy environment, including the 
influence of political philosophies that were in fundamental conflict with the ideas of 
Wang Anshi, as well as the reaction of political elites to the New Policies, the 
rationales and behavioral modes of bureaucrats in financial markets and state 
monopolies, and unpredictable changes in the marketplace that bedeviled bureaucrats.   
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 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men you must first 
enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to 
control itself. 
-James Madison 
 
In the early summer of 1944 the Vice-President of the United States, Henry 
Wallace, paid an official visit to China, a country that had experienced a century¶s 
turmoil, disease, warfare and disasters, yet sought her rejuvenation amid the hard 
times of the Second World War. As a key member of President Franklin Roosevelt¶s 
New Deal movement, Wallace had been noted for his initiation of the ³ Ever-Normal 
Granary´ plan that distributed farm loans while he was the Secretary of Agriculture 
(1933-1940). The plan represented the first systematic intervention by the U.S. 
government into the agricultural credit market to stabilize commodity prices, oversee 
farm income goals and provide non-recourse loans to farmers.1  
On 22 June 1944, Wallace gave a speech at the luncheon party hosted by the 
Chinese National Government. We have some notion of his comments from a Chinese 
translation published in a contemporary newspaper, which quotes him as stating, in 
part,  
It was ten years ago that I learned for the first time about the famous 
Chinese New Dealer who lived about 900 years ago, Wang An-shih. Under very 
great difficulties he was faced in the year of 1068 with problems which, 
allowing for the differences between historical periods, were almost identical to 
the problems met by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1933. The methods that he 
                                                        
1For an introduction to Henry Wallace and his policies, see Derk Bodde, ³Henry A. Wallace 
and the Ever-Normal Granary´, The Far Eastern Quarterly, 5 no. 4 (1946):411-26 
 2 
employed were strikingly similar. Wang An-shih inaugurated a system of crop 
planning, rural credit interest adjusted to the capacity to pay, a public works 
program and a number of other acts which reflected the interests of the common 
people. I know that due to the absence of democratic institutions in the political 
system of Wang An-shih¶s time, the reforms initiated by the government could 
not receive support from common people. Wang An-shih¶s reform therefore 
ended up being frustrated in its implementation. Nevertheless, Wang An-shih 
left an enduring impression in the Chinese tradition of statecraft, and what was 
beyond the reach of the paternalistic regime nine centuries ago is within the 
reach of democratic regimes today.2    
 
Some may be surprised that a Vice-President of the United States had admitted to 
an intellectual affinity with an eleventh Chinese Grand Councilor and reformer. Not 
coincidently, Wang Anshi¶s New Policies had also attracted the attention of Vladimir 
Lenin and Georgi Plekhanov, the Russian revolutionary state-builders. In 1906, they 
had a serious debate on how to build the economic foundation for the Soviet state. 
Plekhanov presented Wang Anshi as an example to illustrate that land collectivization 
would only restore the tradition of the absolutist state, one that exercised its coercive 
power through control of the land and labor forces because of state advantage in 
comparison with other social classes. Collectivization was therefore doomed to fail 
because it would block the development of new social classes. Lenin refuted this 
argument by stating that the historical circumstances between eleventh century China 
and twenty century Russia were fundamentally different. The peasants in Russia 
would build their own organizations to manage their economic affairs successfully 
                                                        
2 This translation is based on the Chinese version of this speech, which was published in 
Xinhua Daily, 1944.6.23. The translation used here comes from that of Li Chaomin ³The 
Influence of Ancient Chinese Thought on the Ever-Normal Granary of Henry A Wallace and 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act in the New DeaO´ in The History of Ancient Chinese 
Economic Thought, ed. Cheng Lin et al (London and New York: Routledge Press 2014 ), 
216,223. Several grammatical corrections have been made to the translation. 
 3 
under the support of the new state.3  
Despite their varied political views, those figures shared DQLQWHUHVWLQ:DQJ¶V 
New Policies in comparative perspective, and considered their significance for 
statesmen who faced some of the same challenges as eleventh century Chinese 
reformists. The questions that guided their reflections included how to explain the 
failure of Chinese reformists to achieve their purposes, and how the historical 
experience of Chinese reform might enrich their theories of state-building. Behind 
those questions lay the puzzle that James Madison has asked: how could the 
government, having control over others, control itself?  
 
The Puzzle on the History of the New Policies Period (1068-1085) 
 
In 1067, the nineteen-year-old Emperor Shenzong (1048-85) ascended the throne 
with an ambition to redress the military, economic and social crises that beset his state. 
In the second month of 1069 Shenzong appointed Wang Anshi (1021-1086) as Vice 
Grand Councilor and initiated a series of New Policies designed by Wang. The 
wide-ranging reforms covered fields including the state-market relationship, labor 
force mobilization systems, social welfare, the bureaucratic system, state institutions 
at the grass-roots level of society, education and the civil examination system, state 
economic organizations, and military institutions.4 The goal of these social and 
                                                        
3
 See Liening quanji ࡇሗޘ䳶, v12 (Beijing: renmin chubanshe 1975) ,226 
 
4
 For a comprehensive description of the new policies, see Paul Smith, ³Shen-tsung¶s Reign 
and the New Policies of Wang An-shih 1067-1085´, in The Cambridge History of China v5 
 4 
economic policies was to repress the engrossing families and rebuild the social and 
market order to benefit the common people and small market actors while increasing 
productivity.  
State activism during this period had a philosophical grounding that inspired the 
New Policies drafters¶ vision of the coherence between people¶s subjective world and 
the external environment, and shaped their scheme to build an order not only for the 
state but for people¶s minds. Such a vision gave the Chinese reformists great 
confidence that their policies represented the only choice capable of overcoming all 
the crises the dynasty was facing. They also believed that the economic problems that 
they met could be resolved by forging a bureaucratic system capable of attaining high 
degrees of efficiency, collectivity and creativity. The measures they designed and 
practiced were based on a firm belief that they could discipline the minds of 
bureaucrats through their construction of the institutional environment. Their goal was 
to build an economic order by building the order of people¶s minds, and they believed 
that overcoming any policy deviations in the economic field was possible even 
without knowledge of the economic system, using the enforcement of mental 
correction via education and material incentives.  
My dissertation focuses on three cases to show how such ideas interacted with 
the real historical context to produce the actual modes by which the Song state 
governed the economy. The New Policies provoked great debate among the political 
elites at the court in the first three years of the Reform Era (1069-1071) when the rural 
                                                                                                                                                              
Part One: The Sung Dynasty and Its Precursors 907-1279, ed. Denis Twitchett and Paul 
Smith, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 347-478 
 5 
credit policy began its implementation. The opponents included statesmen and some 
of the most important political thinkers of the mid-eleventh century, who also had 
great influence over the Chinese tradition of political philosophy. These figures had 
established their own systematic visions of political order; they addressed similar 
questions regarding the way of ruling as Wang Anshi faced, but they provided 
different answers to those questions. Their worldviews guided them to oppose the 
entire range of New Policies. The repercussions of the New Policies in the intellectual 
world reflected the ontological diversity that had long existed in the tradition of 
Chinese political philosophy.  
The result of these debates was the construction of factional alliances, the 
clarification of irreconcilable attitudes between factions, and the purging of critics 
from decision-making circles. This marked a change from the existing deliberation 
mechanism that was characterized by policy makers¶ ideally unbiased incorporation of 
different opinions, full responsiveness to policy feedback and strong capacity to shape 
collective choices. Such a policy formation mechanism had taken shape since the 
early Song dynasty, at least in an idealized conception. Even though Emperor 
Shenzong¶s original intention was to keep on following this path-dependency, the 
policy formation mechanism fundamentally changed after 1071, when the debate on 
economic policy led to political exclusion based on factional lines.   
After the tenth month of 1076, Wang Anshi resigned from his leadership position 
and Emperor Shenzong began to take full control of the reform process. The Emperor 
also launched a campaign against the Tangut Xi Xia in 1081, which increased the 
 6 
fiscal pressure on the Song state. Local governments close to the frontier 
uncontrollably expanded their local debt to buy war materiel and relied on the central 
government for repayment. The over-issuance of local debt caused serious 
depreciation of bonds such as salt vouchers. The central formulators of the New 
Policies tried different ways to resolve this problem, but their measures only 
aggravated the financial crisis. They found no way to integrate the interests of local 
government with the central bureaucracies, and the competition between 
bureaucracies made the central leaders lose their autonomy in making policy.      
This great fiscal pressure also motivated the central leaders and bureaucrats to 
increase revenue rather than continuing their previous social protection policies. In the 
economic field, policy implementation at the local level had deviated from the 
original intention of repressing ³engrossing´ families, protecting small market actors 
and increasing productivity. The court could not exercise efficient control over local 
bureaucrats. Government agencies and state monopolies abused their power in order 
to gain benefits in the marketplace. They built alliances with powerful merchants to 
manipulate the market. The competition between bureaucracies at both central and 
local levels also intensified due to their squabbling for economic interests. Although 
the drafters of the New Policies had used their plans to deal with those problems, the 
interaction between those plans and real context caused their failure to resolve those 
deviations.  
In the third month of 1085, Emperor Shenzong died and Emperor Zhezong took 
the throne under Dowager Empress Xuanren as regent. The opponents of the New 
 7 
Policies came back to the court, abolishing most of the policies and purging those 
who had supported them. The New Policies were only restored after the death of 
dowager empress Xuanren, at the beginning of Zhezong¶s personal rule in 1093. The 
Song state continued these policies until it was defeated by the Jurchen state and 
collapsed in 1127. 
 
  I take the New Policies period as the critical juncture in Chinese history during 
which, for the first time, the Chinese state initiated systematic intervention into the 
market. This period witnessed the failure of plans to shape the collective action of 
bureaucrats and coordinate market actors through a host of organizing mechanisms. I 
explain why the policy makers in this historical process failed to incorporate and 
organize the ideas and interests of social actors, political elites and relevant 
bureaucracies into the statH¶s authoritative action. I argue that the interaction between 
the New Policy makers' political philosophy and their historical context produced 
such an outcome. In particular, this failure was the result of the incapacity of the New 
Policy makers¶ worldview to correctly explain and resolve unexpected problems in 
the policy environment, problems that included the competition of political 
philosophies that were in fundamental conflict with Wang Anshi, the reaction of 
political elites to the new policies, the real rationales and behavioral modes of 
bureaucrats, and unpredictable changes in the marketplace that bedeviled bureaucrats.   
   
One question that had guided my research is: how might we interpret their failure 
 8 
by using theoretical perspectives that foster dialogue between the fields of scholarship 
on state building that span temporal and spatial lines? As I will show in my literature 
review, such a goal can be attained through conducting historical research on various 
historical questions, constructing mechanisms to explain these puzzles by using the 
concepts that have been employed in the scholarship of comparative politics, and 
challenging or enriching the existing theories that have commonly concerned scholars 
across disciplines.5 
 In the next sections, I will first discuss the perspectives that have been used in 
previous scholarship to explain the conundrums of the New Policies period. I will 
discuss phenomena that are not explained by those studies due to the limits of their 
perspective. I will discuss current approaches that scholars in other fields adopt to 
resolve related theoretical puzzles, and the limits of their methodology and arguments. 
I will then introduce my new approach, demonstrating the contribution that the 
research at hand can make to this literature.   
The Passive-State Perspective and Its Application in Studies of the New 
Policies 
Scholars adopting the passive-state perspective tended to understand the policy 
                                                        
5 My approach is different from the one that seeks the causual inference by conducting 
multi-cases studies. For some classic works on new advances in the methodology of 
single-case studies and historical approaches in the field of comparative politics, see Gary 
King, Robert Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) ; Peter Hall, ³6\VWHPDWLF
process analysis: when and KRZWRXVHLW´ European Management Review 3 (2006), 24-31. 
For a discussion on methods of historical sociology, see Theda Skocpol, Vision and Method in 
Historical Sociology ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1984). Daniel Ziblatt and 
Giovanni Capoccia, ³The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research 
Agenda for Europe and Beyond´ Comparative Political Studies, 43(2010):931; Marcus 
Kreuzer, ³+LVWRULFDO.QRZOHGJe and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of 
3URSRUWLRQDO´ APSR 104 (2010):369; Dan Slater ³ Introduction: The Contributions of 
Southeast Asian Political Studies´ in Erik Kuhonta, Dan Slater and Tuong Vu ed., Southeast 
Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative Analysis (Stanford University Press, 
2008) 
 9 
making and implementation process as an interactive dynamic between social and 
political actors, such as classes, elite groups, bureaucratic groups, social groups, 
factions, interest groups or even individual policy participants. As Theda Skocpol has 
summarized,  
³Government was viewed primarily as arena within which economic 
interest groups or normative social movements contended or allied with one 
another to shape the making of public policy decisions. Those decisions were 
understood to be the allocation of benefits among demanding groups.´6 
  
Such a perspective assumes that policies and their outcomes are the reflection of 
the interests of certain actors who have won in competition with other actors. It 
implies the exclusive characteristic of the policy process because the actors who lost 
the competition would be excluded from the policy making process and their interests 
would be sacrificed in the course of policy implementation. The rulers would only 
respond to the requests of some actors but ignore other actors. Scholars therefore 
overlook independent mechanisms that could translate the interests of competing 
actors into collective goals and organize those actors to implement those goals.7 In 
explaining the motivation of such competition and cooperation, scholars such as the 
behaviorists and those who advocate the game-theory approach take people¶s pursuit 
of self-interest as the foundation for explaining the relationships of the actors. The 
result of the competition was taken as determined by the comparative advantage in 
                                                        
6
 Theda Skocpol, ³Bringing the State Back In: Current Research´in Bring the State Back In 
Ed. Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1985), 6 
 
7
 For introduction to this perspective, also see Stephen Krasner, ³ Alternative Conceptions 
and Historical Dynamics´ Comparative Politics, 1(1984) :223 
 10 
controlling resources.8  
The tradition of the society-centered perspective on the state can be traced back 
to the European republican theorists from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, and 
it was further developed by scholars from John Locke to Karl Marx. All of these 
scholars, despite using different terminologies, depicted a common concept of the 
state that amounts to nothing more than a reflection of the interests of social groups 
and the sovereignty of the people.9 For example, the Marxist and Neo-Marxist state 
theories insisted that the state is inherently shaped by class and class struggle, as well 
as its function to preserve and expand the modes of production.10  
In contrast to Marxist class theory, scholars following the pluralist theory did not 
single out class as the only social division. Instead, they adopted multiple 
categorizations such as interest groups, factions and cliques. Using this perspective, 
Eric Nordlinger pointed out that ³the civil society is made up of a plethora of diverse, 
fluctuating, competing groups of individuals with shared interests.´11 The state was 
                                                        
8
 For introduction to these approaches, see Gerardo Munck, ³The Past and Present of 
Comparative Politics´ In Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative Politics, E Munck et al, 
ed.(Washington D. C: John Hopkins University Press, 2008 ) ,41 
 
9
 For example, see John Locke, Two Treatises of Government. Ed.,Laslett P. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1967). For a discussion on this issue, see Quentin Skinner, 
³State´ in Political Innovation and Conceptual Change, ed., Terence Hall, James Farr and 
Russel Hanson, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 112-119 
 
10
 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The German Ideology (Including These on Feuerbach and 
Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy) (New York, Prometheus 
Books,1998).Theda Skocpol, ³Bringing the State Back In: Current Research´,5. For the 
important works adopting this perspective, see Perry Anderson, Lineage of the Absolutist 
State (London: New Left Books, 1974). Goosta Esping-Anderson, Roger Friedland, and Erik 
Olin Wright. ³Modes of Class Struggle and Capitalist State´ Kapitalistate, 2-5 (1976) , 
186-220 
 
11
 Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1981 ),151 
 11 
viewed primarily as an arena within which different social, ethnic, economic, political 
and gender groups contended or worked together to shape public policy decisions.12 
Scholars, therefore, focused more on the allocation of power and benefits among 
different groups than on other state functions, such as the management of social 
affairs and the mobilization of social resources.13 This pluralist model can be applied 
to the study of American and Western European democratic states because of the 
existence of intermediate channels through which social groups influenced the 
policy-making process.14  
Such a way of understanding the state has been prevailing among scholars in 
both Japan and China since the 1950s. Based on their grand theories of the changing 
relationship between classes, social and political groups, scholars divided Chinese 
history into different periods and argued that the coherent features of each period were 
shaped by the dominant classes or social groups. The origins and consequences of the 
New Policies have also been explained from this perspective. Despite their differences 
in defining the actors, they have shared similar views in explaining the failure of the 
New Policies as the outcome of the competition between social and political actors.     
Miyazaki Ichisada, an influential figure in the Kyoto school, introduced the 
                                                        
12
 For the classic Pluralist works, see Robert Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven Conn: Yale 
University Press, 1961). Raymond Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (Englewood Cliffs: N.J: 
Prentice-Hall, 1974). Nelson Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Heaven: 
Yale University Press, 1961). Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuba 
Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971). Morton Halprin: Bureaucratic Politics and 
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C: Brooking Institute, 1971) 
 
13
 Stephen Krasner, ³Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Historical 
Dynamics´ Comparative Politics 16 no2 (1984): 224 
 
14
 Suzanne Berger ed., Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and 
the Transformation of Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 1-27 
 12 
scholar-official (shidafu) as an important element in his interpretation of the 
macro-level Tang-Song transition and the micro-level outcome of the New Policies. 
Miyazaki Ichisada differed from scholars who defined the unchecked personal power 
of the Emperor as the essential characteristic of ³oriental despotism´ instead focusing 
on the existence of governmental agencies occupied by scholar-officials as the 
instruments of the (PSHURU¶s absolute rule. This bureaucratic structure was the 
essential element of ³Kunjyu dokusei ੋѫ⦘㻱.´15 The Song government in 
Miyazaki ,FKLVDGD¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQwas similar to early modern European absolutist 
governments in their disempowerment of the aristocracy through the creation of 
unified bureaucratic systems.16   
 In Miyazaki ,FKLVDGD¶s argument, the social foundation of the absolutist state in 
early eleventh-century Song lay in the alliance between the scholar-official class and 
the Emperor. The expansion of the civil examination system caused not only the 
demise of the aristocratic class, whose status had originated from their clan pedigrees, 
but also the emergence of the new scholar-official class, whose social status depended 
on success in the examinations and occupation of official posts in the government. 
The scholar-official class became the dominant class in early modern China because it 
                                                        
15
 0L\D]DNL,FKLVDGD³'RQJ\DQJGHMLQVKL 㜙㲳䘬役ᶾ´&KLQHVHWUDQVODWLRQLQRiben xuezhe 
yanjiu zhongguo shi lunzhu xuanyi㖍㛔⬠侭䞼䨞ᷕ⚳⎚婾叿怠嬗, (Beijing, Zhonghua 
shuju chubanshe, 1992),191 
 
16
 For a brief introduction to the characteristics of the absolutist state, see John Miller 
ed.,Absolutism in Seventeenth-Century Europe (London: Macmillan Press,1990) Gianfranco 
Poggi, The Development of Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. (California University 
Press, 1978). James Liu also substituted ³DXWRFUDF\´ for ³DEVROXWLVP´to emphasize the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIWKHJUDQGFRXQFLORUVDVWKH(PSHURU¶VVXUURJDWHV6HH-DPHV/LXChina 
Turning Inward, Intellectual-Political Changes in the Early Twelfth Century (Cambridge: 
Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University 1988) 
 13 
simultaneously controlled the land resources, commercial capital, and cultural 
resources while occupying government posts. The new scholar-official class was fully 
obedient to the Emperor, but its members did not hold absolute authority at the local 
level. Clerks, who also had literary knowledge but were often accused of pursuing 
their private interests, filled the resulting power vacuum. The absolutist state could 
not satisfy the social demands of the peasantry and other social groups who were 
excluded from public discourse. In order to fulfill their demands, these groups could 
only use violence to overthrow the imperial government and establish a new dynasty. 
Even dynastic turnover, however, could not shake the dominant status of the 
scholar-official class in the government. The interaction between these classes would 
inevitably result in increasing social inequality because the scholar-official class 
would use its existing advantages to squeeze more resources from the lower classes. 
Chinese history was therefore deeply involved into the dynastic cycle.17 In 
Miyazaki¶s conception, the Northern Song dynasty was the first to predominately 
reflect the interests of the scholar-official class and the autocratic Emperor, and this 
power structure remained stagnant until the end of imperial China.  
   In his explanation, the New Policies represented an effort taken by some 
members within the scholar-official class to prevent the increase of social inequality. 
Such reform could not shake the economic foundation of the scholar-official class, 
however, as it would deploy the political, cultural and economic resources that it 
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tightly controlled.18 In the court, the faction that opposed the New Policies 
represented the voice of the scholar-officials whose economic interests had been 
damaged by the New Policies. The opponents at the court shaped a unified discourse 
to formulate a negative moral judgment of the new policies.19 The resistance from the 
economic field was also serious. All these factors determined the failure of the new 
policies.20   
 Chinese Marxist historians have viewed the Song dynasty as one part of the 
Chinese feudal period which lasted until 1840. The dominant class throughout the 
entire feudal period was the landlord class, and the conflicts between landlords and 
peasants lasted throughout this period. Based on such a view, they take the failure of 
the New Policies to be the outcome of the conflict between the small landlord and the 
big landlord classes, as well as between the landlords and peasants. Scholars such as 
Qi Xia have argued that the New Policies represented the economic interests of the 
small and middle landlord class; failure came because of opposition from the big 
landlord class.21 Other scholars like Meng Wentong and Wang Zengyu disagree on 
this point. According to Meng Wentong¶s argument, the New Policies represented the 
entire landlord class¶s collective choice to exploit the peasant class. Due to the 
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resistance of the peasants, the New Policies failed.22  
   Scholars ZRUNLQJIURP4L¶VSHUVSHFWLYHVD\WKDWWang Anshi¶VVWDWHGJRDOVfor the 
policies provide the evidence to support their argument that the New Policies tended 
to repress the interests of the scholar-official or big landlord class. As these scholars 
have emphasized, Wang Anshi emphasized that the new policies protected the small 
merchants and repressed the economic interests of the ³engrossing families ެ֥ѻ
ᇦ´ These scholars therefore equate the engrossing family with the scholar-official or 
the big landlord. They further assume that these social classes had gained great 
advantages and thwarted the successful implementation of the New Policies.  
Scholars like Meng and Wang, who take the New Policies to reflect the interests 
of the entire landlord class, can also find evidence to support their argument. They 
focused on the real implementation of the policies, arguing that their implementation 
process seriously damaged the interests of the peasants and therefore inspired great 
resistance.  
   Despite their different arguments, these scholars shared a common focus on 
economic policies, using them as evidence to show how they damaged or benefited 
the interests of different social classes. However it is impossible to put any class label 
on the whole body of political thought belonging to either supporters or critics of the 
New Policies. Class is a term used to categorize people¶s position in the economic 
system. It is impossible to assume that people with similar economic positions will 
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share the same political thought. As we will discuss, both the drafters of the New 
Policies and their critics worked from their own ideological positions that integrated 
issues such as human nature, moral principle, and specific policies into their lines of 
reasoning. Their worldviews guided their attitudes toward the policies, and also 
shaped the institutions and policies throughout the real political process. Those 
thoughts covered issues ranging far beyond economic plans, and it is impossible to 
label those thoughts as reflections of class.  
Moreover, based on their political theory of how to shape the bureaucrats¶ 
collective action and innovative capability, the formulators of the New Policies had 
built institutions to strengthen the state¶s capacity to deal with market changes so that 
they could guarantee the goal of increasing both social productivity and the state¶s 
revenue. They believed that such an institutional context would give local bureaucrats 
the autonomy to arouse their enthusiasm and capacity to resolve any problems related 
to the market. We can hardly interpret these institutions as representing the interests of 
particular classes.  
Scholars who analyze history from the perspective of social classes commonly 
attribute the failure of the New Policies to the dominant power of the scholar-officials 
or big landlords. They assumed that the drafters of the New Policies remained inactive 
in facing those challenges. Our study will show that the drafters of the New Policies 
had designed and implemented a complete scheme intended to guarantee that 
bureaucrats could overcome the influence of the powerful classes in their governing 
process. The question posed for us is why these measures failed to prevent the state 
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from being captured by the powerful classes.               
 
Another group of scholars attributes the failure of the New Policies to the 
³factional struggle 唘⡝´ that occurred throughout and after the New Policies period. 
Factional politics are an important phenomenon in Chinese political history. Scholars 
have long noted that both critics and supporters of the New Policies at the court used 
the term ³faction (唘)´ to label the other side. ³Faction´ is an important discourse that 
historical agents had employed to interpret the policy making process. The New 
Policies were rescinded by the opposing faction after Emperor Shenzong¶s death, so it 
is undeniable that the opposing faction struck the fatal blow to the New Policies and 
directly caused their failure at the court.  
Based on such a view, these scholars focus on ways to define the factions and 
portray their relationship. Scholars like Naito Konan and Deng Guangming emphasize 
that the factions are divided by their conflicting political assertions, such as different 
views on policy.23 Scholars such as Saeki Tomi hold that the factions formed based 
on regional ties.24 Scholars like Hirata Shigeki take the factions to have formed in the 
administrative system, with multiple factors collectively shaping members¶ identities 
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in their factions.25 Scholars like Kumamoto Takashi have taken the personal 
relationship between Wang Anshi and his subordinate officials as the key factor that 
motivated them to build a faction.26 Scholars like Luo Jiaxiang take ideological 
differences as the main standard for defining factions.27 Scholars like Daniel Levine 
stress that the factions in the New Policies period shared similar discourse in their 
attacks on others, but argue that they were in fact only loosely bound ministerial 
coalitions.28 
 
Despite their differences, all of these scholars take the faction as an independent 
variable for explaining changes in policy. The Song state is viewed as a place in 
which different factions competed to shape national policies. These studies overlook 
three important facts, however. First, the political elites¶ identity as members of the 
same faction and their perception of the factional alliance of their opponents during 
the New Policies period only emerged after Wang Anshi publicly refuted Han Qi¶s 
critique of the Green Sprouts Policy in the third month of 1070. Although different 
opinions existed during the initiative stage of the Green Sprouts Policy, the debaters 
still focused on how to resolve the policy problems, rather than addressing the alleged 
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factional alliances of their opponents. Second, the Emperor intended to incorporate 
and organize different opinions to respond to problems and revise his policies. He 
kept holding to such attitude until he eventually demoted Sima Guang in 1071. Third, 
although the political elites discussed factions before and during the initial stages of 
the New Policies period, ³faction´ played no role in the actual policy formation 
mechanism. Only after 1070 did factional reaction have real political consequence. 
The political elites then began to adopt collective action based on their identities as 
factional members. Their attitudes towards policy came to be determined by their 
judgment of the factional alliances of those holding various views. Those who gained 
policy-making power would expel those who they took as belonging to the opposing 
factions. The ³faction´ was therefore created as a device by political elites to show 
their different worldviews to the public in hopes of gaining large-scale support from 
the entire literati group.   
Previous research on this issue has failed to explain why such changes happened 
within the policy formation mechanism in the initial stage of the New Policies period 
(1069-1071). In particular, we should ask why the effort to organize different views 
based on their merit in resolving actual problems failed, and why factional lines came 
to play the decisive role in the policy formation process. These questions will lead us 
to take factional alliances as the outcome of the historical agents' interaction in the 
historical context. Under such a perspective, a state that only reflected the interests 
and ideas of factions was the consequence of the historical process rather than the 
preexisting condition of that process. The effort to build different policy formation 
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mechanisms had also been tried by various historical agents as a possible alternative. 
My dissertation will explain why historical agents made one choice rather than 
another.    
 
A third group of scholars takes Emperor Shenzong as the main reason for the 
deviation of the New Policies from their original goals, echoing the common 
statement that the Emperors of the Northern Song dynasty had the autocratic power to 
decide national policies and control bureaucracies.29 Based on such a view, these 
scholars argue that Shenzong¶s pursuit of his private economic interests led the 
implementation of the New Policies to deviate from the policy makers¶ original 
intention to protect the majority of market actors. Due to his shift of attention to 
revenue collection, the bureaucrats followed his lead to squeeze resources from 
society.30 These scholars also go beyond class to study the operation of the political 
system and discuss its relationship with the outcome of the New Policies.  
Such studies however cannot explain several problems. First, throughout the 
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New Policies period, Emperor Shenzong always maintained that the New Policies 
should protect the interests of small producers and merchants. He repeatedly 
emphasized that local bureaucrats should not exploit the small market actors. A close 
reading of the political thought of the drafters of the New Policies also illustrates their 
belief in the coherence between the goals of increasing revenue and strengthening 
social productivity. Surely it is important to address the role of the Emperor in the 
policy process, and we need to explain why the Emperor¶s intention to satisfy both 
goals eventually resulted in the achievement of one goal at the expense of the other 
after the policy was implemented by the bureaucratic system. Although we would not 
deny that the Emperor put priority to the revenue collection, we must explain how the 
Emperor and bureaucrat¶s belief in the coherence of different goals could give them 
the confidence to collect revenue while expecting that this would not damage their 
goal of increasing productivity.    
 Moreover, the drafters of the New Policies did not take the Emperor as the only 
determinative force in shaping policy. To the contrary, they attempted to build an 
institutional context that could discipline the mentality of bureaucrats so that their 
collective action and innovative capabilities could be maximized. It is therefore 
necessary to focus on the real effects of these measures, and explain how they could 
result in bureaucratic collaboration with big merchants. In particular, we should 
discuss why the Emperor¶s intention to collect the revenue caused his bureaucrats to 
sacrifice the interests of small market actors rather than increasing revenue through 
successful operation of the state¶s monopolies.  
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A fourth group of scholar focuses on how bureaucrats manipulated the New 
Policies to pursue their self-interest. This view takes the state as the reflection of the 
interests of bureaucrats. Policy was merely an instrument that the bureaucrats could 
freely interpret and carry out according to their own interests. These scholars argue 
that however good the intention of the drafters of the New Policies may have been, 
the policy was doomed to fail because it was impossible to control the implementer¶s 
self-interests. Such a perspective appeared even during the New Policies period, as 
can be seen in critical analyses by Sima Guang, Su Shi and Han Qi. Scholars such as 
Zhang Bangwei today explain the failure of the New Policies from a similar 
perspective.31 Liang Gengyao, in his study of the State Trade Bureau, further argues 
that both the drafters of the New Policies and the bureaucrats shared the goal of 
pursuing fiscal interests for the state. Such a rationale guided them to expand the 
state¶s economic interests and seriously damaged the small market actors.32  
In contrast to such arguments, scholars like Max Weber have pointed out that the 
EXUHDXFUDWV¶ inefficient professional knowledge of the market and its problems caused 
the failure of the New Policies. Weber¶s understanding of the Chinese bureaucracy 
was part of his theoretical framework on the pattern of the patrimonial state. In his 
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view, although the Chinese traditional bureaucracy had established a very advanced 
personnel system, such as the civil examination, the actions of bureaucrats still lacked 
a rational basis. Weber attributed the absence of rationality to the dominance of values 
such as filial piety. The lack of rationality also led the bureaucrats to ignore 
professional knowledge. Due to this problem, the New Policies failed.33 The Chinese 
scholar Wei Tianan had also discussed in detail how the lack of bureaucratic capacity 
to manage the financial markets led to their expansion into other industries to gain 
more resources. The exploitive tendency of the State Trade Bureau was not only 
caused by its pursuit of revenue, therefore, but also by its lack of professional 
knowledge in the economic field.34    
All of these discussions overlook an important aspect of the history of New 
Policies period. The bureaucratic problems that those scholars describe were also 
major concerns in the New Policy makers¶ vision of the political order, and they 
systematically designed measures for organizing bureaucratic collective action and 
strengthening their capacity to deal with market problems. In :DQJ$QVKL¶V argument 
against contemporary critics, whom he accused of contributing to the failure of the 
New Policies to control the self-interest of policy participants, he showed strong 
confidence that the drafters of the policies had established sufficient institutional 
context to guide people¶s self-interest onto the right track to guarantee success. The 
real consequences, however, illustrate the failure of those measures. The main goal of 
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this study is to explain that failure.       
The State-as-Actor Perspective and its Use in Studies of the New Policies  
The book Bringing the State Back in has been recognized widely as a 
breakthrough in the disciplines of political science and sociology because the authors 
and editors have convincingly reminded the academic community of the necessity of 
viewing the State as an autonomous research field. In this new conception the State is 
no longer viewed only as an arena within which social groups contend or ally with 
one another. Instead, the State is understood as an autonomous force and unitary actor 
that shapes the interests of other social groups through the process of governance.  
    This perspective can be traced back to the tradition originated by Thomas 
Hobbes. Scholars since the 16th century have portrayed the state as an entity ³having 
its own rights and properties,´ as the single and supreme sovereign authority whose 
power remains distinct from the people, as well as the great ³Leviathan´ that is 
independent from the influences of any single individual or group in wielding its 
power over society.35  
Scholars such as Max Weber and Otto Hintze continued this tradition in the late 
nineteenth century. These scholars focused on the functions of the State, rather than 
on social groups or government agencies. Weber, Charles Tilly and others defined the 
State as a ³compulsory association that controls territories and the social resources 
within them through coercive means´.36 Tilly termed the essential characteristics of 
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the State¶s operations as the notion of ³stateness:´ 
 
An organization which controls the population occupying a defined territory is a 
state in so far as 1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the 
same territory; 2) it is autonomous; 3) it is centralized; and 4) its divisions are 
formally coordinated with one another. 37 
Weber, Hintze and Tilly paid much attention to the functions of the state, which 
they thought could only be observed in the relations between state and society. This 
perspective is different from the ³traditional institutionalism´ perspective held by a 
group of scholars in the first half of the twentieth century whose works only focused 
on formal governmental institutions, legal codes and constitutions, although it should 
be noted that these two groups of scholars shared an emphasis on the State as an 
autonomous field of research.38 The scholars devoted to this discussion revived the 
tradition of Hobbes, Weber and Hintze in the 1980¶s and created such new fields and 
research topics as ³state capacity,´ ³state autonomy´ and ³state-building´ that have 
been engaging political scientists and sociologists since.  
 In her introduction to Bringing the State Back in, Theda Skocpol portrays the 
State as ³a set of organizations through which coherent collectivities of officials may 
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be able to formulate and implement distinctive strategies or policies.´39 Because the 
officials can achieve agreement on social problems and policy purposes insulated 
from contemporary dominant socioeconomic interests, the State as a whole can be 
taken as an actor independently exerting influence on society, thereby demonstrating 
its capacity of pursuing its policy purposes.  
   The state-as-actor perspective had also greatly influenced scholarship on the New 
Policies. The most important work that has adopted this perspective is Paul Smith¶s 
research on the State¶s economic activism in the tea industry of the Sichuan area. 
According to Smith, Chinese elites throughout the eleventh century focused their 
aspirations on serving in the government. As he notes,  
     
The ideological coherence and esprit de corps of the eleventh-century civil 
service insulated the Northern Song state to some extent from the importunate 
demands of specific social groups and classes, and contributed to a high level of 
what some sociologists term ³state autonomy´ Autonomy in turn promoted an 
expansive view of the appropriate spheres of state power, and an activist 
orientation to the burgeoning commercial economy. 40 
 
In Smith¶s argument the New Policies period witnessed the State¶s economic 
activism in the economic field. This activism mean ³)irst the propensity of the state to 
participate in the commercial economy both directly, through monopolies and 
government enterprises, and indirectly through commercial taxation; and second a 
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commitment to using state power both to promote economic activity and to increase 
the government¶s share of the economy¶s total resources.´41 State activism was 
promoted by the financial specialists whose wealth and power were directly linked to 
the expansive role of the State. By the mid-eleventh century this professional 
bureaucratic elite had ³created a dense network of state monopolies and commercial 
tax stations dedicated to economic regulation, a network that drew half the state¶s 
revenues from commerce and industry.´42  
Paul Smith goes on to note that Wang Anshi SURYLGHGDWKHRU\RI³ bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship´ which encouraged bureaucrats to innovate policies and expand of 
the scope of government activities in the market. Guided by such a theory, the drafters 
of the New Policies also designed and put into practice the personnel institutions that 
led the bureaucrats to accumulate profit and replace the powerful market actors.43  
He further argues that in practice, the State inevitably cooperated with powerful 
market actors despite its original intention to repress them. In Smith¶s view, the State 
could not monopolize the entire market but had to rely on merchants to retail its goods. 
In order to entice merchants into distributing tea on the market, the state chose to 
squeeze more tea out of the most vulnerable participants in the industry. As Smith 
concludes, ³7he degeneration of bureaucratic entrepreneurship into collaboration 
between state and merchant against the producer mirrored a more general failing of 
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the New Policies activist strategy.´44    
The State in Smith¶s study is an autonomous actor. In an approach similar to that 
of Theda Skocpol, Smith holds that the State¶s autonomy was forged by professional 
officials who had their autonomy to determine economic policies. They were 
insulated from social interests and set policy under the guidance of their professional 
knowledge of the market, finance and enterprises. Smith¶s depiction of the 
characteristics of the New Policy makers also shows the influence of scholars such as 
Robert Hartwell and Dennis Twitchett, who reject Weber¶s argument that the 
bureaucrats in pre-modern China lacked professional knowledge on managing 
economic affairs.45  
In Smith¶s explanation, the State failed to implement its goals in the New 
Policies period because it could not avoid the influence of powerful market actors. 
The nature of market structure determined that the State had to cooperate with other 
market forces, and ultimately had to give up its original plans and build coalitions 
with those actors. The State¶V autonomy was doomed, therefore, to be eclipsed by the 
market structure. That structure also determined the failure of the New Policies to 
promote the common good for all market actors.  
The state-as-actor perspective assumes the coherence of the State. Scholars 
working from this perspective take any bureaucrat or government agency as a 
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representative of the unitary State. For example, in Smith¶s work, the evidence 
illustrating the State¶s coalition with the powerful merchants is drawn from materials 
recording the activities of bureaucrats at the county level.46 This unified image of the 
State cannot explain the conflicting views between local bureaucrats and the officials 
at the court. Even Paul Smith accepts that the New Policy makers never abandoned 
their policy goals throughout the New Policies period. This illustrates their 
disconnection with the ³autonomous´ State. For example, historical evidence shows 
how the court tried to prevent local bureaucrats from building coalitions with 
powerful merchants. If we take such factors into consideration, our explanation of the 
failure of the New Policies must be nuanced. Such failure was not simply caused by 
the existing market structure, but by the incapacity of the drafters of the New Policies 
to shape the collectivity of the bureaucrats and make them follow the original policy 
goals. From this a perspective, the unitary State should not be the analytical unit from 
which scholars analyze history. To the contrary, scholars should analyze why the State 
cannot become a unitary actor.   
A Mechanism that Organizes Actors: 
A New Perspective on State-building and Its Use in the New Policies 
Both the passive-state perspective and the state-as-actor perspective make similar 
assumptions about the nature of the social and political world. Despite their 
differences, these two perspectives share premises about the deep causal structures of 
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the world from which their explanations of history begin.47 In both perspectives, the 
power process is monopolized by either the State or social elites in order to exercise 
domination. This kind of power can be exercised by a single group of people, whether 
it is a social class, interest group, or State, without having to cooperate with other 
groups, although different groups can simultaneously exercise their own despotic 
power in competition with another. This perspective assumes that the power holders 
naturally possess power without help from intermediary structures, thereby ignoring 
the institutions in which different actors participate, institutions that shape their 
capacity for resource mobilization. Historical sources are therefore interpreted as 
evidence of the despotic power of different actors and their conflicts with one another: 
social groups against the State, the small landlord class against the big landlord class, 
peasants against landlords, scholar-officials against the Emperor, the Emperor against 
other groups, or factions within the scholar official groups fighting one another. Both 
schools tend to interpret the nature of state power as domination, no matter who 
comes out on top. The actors therefore, are constantly engaged in a zero-sum game for 
dominance. The result of such a game is the exclusion of some actors from the power 
process. Such results can only be explained by the comparative advantage of each 
group in mobilizing resources and by their strategies in competition, as game theory 
strives to reveal.48 
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Moreover, because these scholars take the actors as their analytical unit, they 
assume the autonomy and cohesion of those actors. Any members of the State, class 
or group can represent the interests and ideas of the collectivity to which they belong. 
Guided by such an ontological view, scholars categorize historical figures into 
different groups. The same person might be labeled as representing different groups, 
however. For example, the political and economic thoughts of the New Policy 
formulators can be labeled as representing the demands of small landlord, the State, 
professional elites, scholar-officials, or a faction within the scholar-official group. 
Scholars may challenge each other easily because they can find evidence to buttress 
their own points or challenge those of others, but none of these interpretations are 
complete.  
Scholars normally trace the origin of the state-as-actor view to early modern 
European political theorists such as Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and the political 
philosophers who forged the theories on the ³reason of the state´49 Political 
philosophers since the 16th century have portrayed the state as an entity ³having its 
own rights and properties,´ as the single and supreme sovereign authority whose 
power remains distinct from the people, as well as the great ³Leviathan´ independent 
from the influences of any single individual or group in wielding its power over 
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society.50 The knowledge of the means of preserving and enlarging the state has also 
emerged as an independent field among political thinkers and statesmen after the 
sixteenth century.51 This early modern political theory simultaneously contained two 
different perspectives on the State, however. I take Hobbes as an example to illustrate 
this point.  
The Leviathan in Hobbes¶ view has an autonomous character that can be seen in 
its autonomous power to govern citizens. The citizens should abandon their belief, 
interest and passion to follow the rule of the State. As to this point, we may say that 
Hobbes viewed the state as the actor.52 
On the other hand, Hobbes has an entire scheme to incorporate people¶s concern 
for self-protection by offering them the inalienable right of electing the leader of their 
sovereignty. The citizens also should have unanimous commitment to be bound by the 
results of the electoral process, and maintain obedience to the law and the 
representative institution. In such a view, the sovereign power remains with people. 
That power can only be exercised by a ruler with a limited term, such as a monarch. 
In the real process of governing, the ruler should fulfill his duty to take seriously the 
task of ensuring for his citizen the necessities of life.53  
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Hobbes therefore focused on how to organize the citizenry by building 
mechanisms to guarantee their rights and concerns. This could refer to representative 
institutions, elections, and frequent communication between ruler and citizen in the 
routine governing process. In Hobbes¶ theory, the autonomy of the State was not an 
unconditional existence. Rather it was the outcome of mechanisms that organized 
people to form collective goals for the sovereignty. The emergence of the State as an 
autonomous actor therefore was preconditioned by the successful operation of the 
mechanisms that guaranteed the rights of policy participants and thus shaped their 
collective action in accordance with policy. In other words, Hobbes¶ focus was on 
how to organize people into the unified authoritative State¶s action, rather than 
assuming the preexistence of the unified State.   
 Theda Skocpol is commonly taken to be one of the modern founders of the 
state-as-actor approach. A close reading of her works shows that she held different 
ways of understanding the State. In some work, Skocpol equates the monarchy with 
the State.54 The great challenge confronted by this approach is that in reality, 
individuals are involved in multiple networks and organizations. Since the State is not 
the only organization in which people are involved, it cannot isolate its bureaucrats 
from the influences of other social networks. No action can be shown to serve only 
the interests of the State. At the same time, networks also endow their members with 
multiple social statuses. For example, the French seigneur and Chinese gentry held 
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both the statuses of officials and of social elites.55 Because in these cases the 
boundary between ³state´ and ³society´ was ambiguous, it is therefore difficult to 
find a permanent autonomous realm of the State that can be simplified as a 
personalized ³actor´ that dominated, competed and negotiated with other ³social´ 
forces.56 
In other works, Skocpol gives up the assumption that officials always act in 
such a collective manner. State autonomy can come and go; it is not a permanent 
phenomenon. She suggests that scholars further explore how the coherent 
collectivities of officials are constructed through multiple measures such as educating 
elites and building governmental institutions.57 Following this approach, scholars¶ 
attention should be shifted onto the mechanisms that organize officials into a 
collectivity. They should not simply take the State as a passive symbol and entity that 
only exists in the public imagination and discourse, and can be freely manipulated by 
different political and social forces. 58  
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     The most influential scholar who had developed this perspective is Michael 
Mann. Mann argues that all the previous theories on state-building can be understood 
as the products of the two approaches: the ³institutional statism´ approach and the 
³elitism´ approach.59 The later approach includes both the passive-state perspective 
and the state-as-actor perspective, because both take the power process to be the 
interaction between actors who compete for despotic power over others. According to 
Mann, the former approach can be distinguished from the later because of its 
fundamentally different explanation of the power process. As the name itself suggests, 
this approach takes institutions as the central analytical unit for explaining the power 
process. The functioning of the State cannot be exercised directly through political 
and social actors; neither can it simply be the exercise of those actors. Rather, the 
State¶s policies are made and implemented through mechanisms within which these 
actors are organized by either political or social leaders. In Mann¶s thought, the power 
of the State can be generated by those mechanisms because those mechanisms 
coordinate and structure social life in ways that can be admitted by all political and 
social actors. He therefore focuses on the mechanisms through which resources are 
mobilized in accordance with state policies, instead of assuming that any social group 
can monopolize the power of resource mobilization. No single group can control social 
resources; rather, it is these mechanisms²for example, the organizational structures 
that different social groups collectively construct and the process by which the different 
organizations collectively contribute to policy implementation²that can explain why 
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and how social resources are mobilized in accordance with policies and, consequently, 
how these mechanisms generate and maintain the infrastructural power of the State.  
This sort of power Mann FDOOV³LQIUDVWUXFWXUDO SRZHU´ as opposed to ³despotic 
power´ which is exercised directly by autonomous actors in the state (such as 
bureaucrats, state agencies and political leaders) without relying on any institutions 
that can organize the interests of state and social actors. As Mann states, ³Power of 
the modern state principally concerns not µstate elites¶ exercising power over society 
but a tightening state-society relation, caging social relations over national rather than 
the local-regional or transnational terrain, thus politicizing and geopoliticizing far 
more social life than had earlier states.´60 This approach therefore ³constructed 
important analytic bridge between state-centered and society centered analyses by 
looking at the institutional arrangement that the structure relations between the two.´61   
 
Both Mann and Skocpol focus on the mechanisms that organize actors into the 
actions of the authoritative State. These mechanisms however have two aspects, 
which these authors do not clarify. They may refer to the mechanisms proposed by the 
political authorities, but the policy makers¶ promotion of those organizing 
mechanisms does not mean that such mechanisms would successfully organize actors 
in the real policy process. The rules made by the policy makers can be broken by the 
actors, melting away the organizing power of those mechanisms and creating 
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conditions under which societal and political actors contend or collude with each 
other to ensure the success of their own demands and interests. The allocation of 
resources to those actors is simply determined by their comparative advantage in such 
a process. Under such conditions, the State only passively reflects the interests and 
ideas of political and social actors.62  
 The state-building process of the New Policies period witnessed this process. 
The Policy makers established mechanisms to channel and facilitate the collective 
action of political and market actors. The organizing mechanisms in the economic 
field included:  
 1) Rules that ordered government agencies to cooperate with each other to 
regulate prices by adjusting supply and demand based on changing market needs.  
2) Deliberative mechanisms that incorporated government and market actors to 
decide the price of goods. 
3) The institution of state monopolies that organized the interests of producers, 
the government, and powerful market actors to provide protection for the majority of 
market actors while increasing overall social productivity.  
4) A policy formation mechanism that incorporated and organized the political 
elites¶ opinions on economic policies based on their merits in addressing real policy 
problems. 
The goal of the policy makers was to forge a coalition between social actors, 
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political elites and bureaucrats, making it the solid foundation for operating the 
organizing mechanisms through which the State¶s autonomously exercised its power. 
These mechanisms either quickly broke down, however, or progressively withered 
over time as those actors pursued their own interests in addressing market problems. 
The bureaucratic agencies manipulated prices to pursue profits, refused to cooperate 
with one another, competed for economic interests, and greatly damaged the market 
order. The bureaucrats in the state monopolies built coalitions with powerful 
merchants, while the political elites could not find consensus and turned to political 
purges based on factional alliances as their major conflict-resolution mechanism. How 
to explain such failure?    
          
    Explaining the Failure of Organizing Mechanisms: the 'LVVHUWDWLRQ¶V
Approach, Sample Arguments and Contribution to the Existing Literature 
My inquiry into the interaction between ideas, institutions, the environment and 
the State¶s organizing power will explain what factors influenced the state¶s capacity 
to organize social and political actors. Our answer to this question lies in tracing the 
interactive dynamics between three key variables: 1) historical agents¶ beliefs (or 
political philosophy), 2) the gap between real policy problems and historical agents¶ 
perceptions of them, and 3) the institutions that their beliefs led them to create in 
response to these problems.  
Below is my major argument. The New Policies makers established 
mechanisms in the economic field to organize social and political actors to coordinate 
their interests and increase their social productivity. Due to their different views, 
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interests and practical difficulties, some of those actors opposed the New Policies and 
broke rules to pursue their own interests. The policy makers used their political 
philosophy to explain such deviations and build institutions to resolve those problems. 
However, their philosophical views could neither explain the rationale of those actors 
nor resolve the actual problems. The institutions therefore aggravated the policy 
deviations, resulting in the collapse of the organizing mechanisms. Such collapse 
illustrates the failure of the State to organize social and political actors, and the 
GHFOLQHRIWKH6WDWH¶s organizing power. The limits of the New Policy makers¶ political 
thought in explaining practical problems led to the failure of their institutions to 
resolve those problems. Below I explain those variables by using some sample 
arguments from my dissertation.  
 
³Belief´ refers to the logical framework that guided historical agents to explain 
the problems they encountered, to identify their goals, and to choose practical 
measures to resolve those problems. In my dissertation, it refers to the viewpoints 
held by historical agents that systematically explained the fundamental ways in which 
the subjective and objective world operated. Guided by such explanations, they also 
designed a coherent vision of how to build an ideal political order under which all 
policy participants could overcome the psychological confusion brought by the 
uncertainty of external change, forging collective action to pursue the optimum 
method of resolving actual problems.  
I take the ³line of reasoning´ as the unit for analyzing the beliefs of historical 
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agents. The line of reasoning is the logical framework that political philosophers 
employed to illustrate the validity of both their arguments and actions. In building the 
line of reasoning, these political philosophers addressed some theoretical puzzles. 
They integrated concepts such as human nature, moral principle, and self-interest into 
their lines of reasoning to articulate interrelations between those concepts, which 
determined how the world operated. Based on these lines of reasoning, they proposed 
schemes for resolving their puzzles. Any philosopher might have different 
interpretations of the same concept, and based on each interpretation they might build 
different lines of reasoning to illustrate different ways of building political order. They 
did not view those lines of reasoning as being in conflict; they might even merge them 
into the same utterance.  
 The drafters of the New Policies were deeply concerned with how to shape the 
collective action of the bureaucracy and improve its innovative capacity in dealing 
with changing market problems. The bureaucrats¶ collective action and innovation 
should be in accord with the intentions of the Emperor. As Chapter One will reveal, 
Wang Anshi had employed the concept of dao (³WKHWay´) to build his lines of 
reasoning. Dao is the only correct way to deal with external changes, but it is not 
equivalent to and specific concrete measures. Different measures can all be correct 
because they follow the same dao. Measures can change depending on changes in the 
external situation, but the dao that those measures follow is consistent. Wang Anshi 
took the dao as the thought of the Sages that as recorded in the Classics. The Emperor 
held the authority to judge the correctness of government policies. The intention of 
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the Emperor therefore should be followed by all members in the formal policy- 
making procedure, because his intention derived from the Sages¶ thought and 
represented the dao.  
Based on his interpretation of dao, Wang Anshi built two lines of reasoning to 
illustrate how to achieve his goals for shaping the collective action and innovative 
capacity of bureaucrats. On one hand, he argued that SHRSOH¶VLQQDWe nature contained 
the internal faculty to apprehend the dao. Policy makers should first follow the SageV¶ 
conceptions of governance in making their policies. They should then employ 
multiple measures to make them apprehend the intention of the policy makers. Such 
intentions were in accordance with the Sages¶ conception. The Emperor should 
appoint bureaucrats who had apprehended his intention to be the leaders in the 
political system, delegating them the autonomy to make decisions.  
On the other hand, Wang discussed situations in which bureaucrats could still be 
organized even if they had not apprehended the dao. According to him, if the ruler 
provided material incentives that were attractive enough for the bureaucrats, they 
would exhaust their talent to implement policy. Because those policies were crafted 
by people who apprehended the dao, the political system as a whole could follow the 
dao even if some of its members had not apprehended it. In this line of reasoning 
Wang Anshi assumed that it was within human nature to find the best measures to 
resolve problems if enough material incentives could be provided. The policy makers 
therefore needed only to consider how to build the material incentives to guide the 
EXUHDXFUDWV¶ self-interests.  
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As my close readings of Wang Anshi¶s texts will demonstrate, he interwove these 
lines of reasoning into his political writings, such as the Myriad Words Memorial 
which he submitted to the Emperor to present his overall views on the political order. 
These lines of reasoning were also employed by the drafters of the New Policies in 
dealing with problems of governance. Following the classical approach of intellectual 
history, I focus on the key texts of these political philosophers, revealing the 
arguments they posed in various texts. I then use their other writings to recover the 
lines of reasoning that led them to make such arguments. These lines of reasoning 
constructed the intellectual worlds of those policy makers, and guided them to 
conceptualize, explain and change the external world.  
Scholars in the field of intellectual history have continuously debated the proper 
method to interpret the meaning of utterances by historical agents. Scholars who 
adopt the ³speech-act´ theory take these utterances as performances of illocutionary 
action. The utterance is taken as the text through which those historians analyze the 
intention of the historical agents.63 Other scholars, however, take belief 
as the ³SV\FKRORJLFDO state in which one holds a proposition truH´ According to these 
scholars, historical agents expressed their beliefs in utterances; historians can 
³extrapolate from the relics available to them to the beliefs people expressed at some 
time in the past.´ The belief therefore is ³D psychological state that historians 
attribute to historical agents in an attempt to explain their behavior´64 
                                                        
63
 Skinner,Quentin. ³ Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas´ in History and 
Theory 8 no 1 (1969),3-53 
 
64
 Bevir Mark, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 43 
The divergence between these two approaches lies in their views of the 
relationship between texts and the mentality of their authors. The former approach 
denies the possibility to find out the author¶s intention from the discovery of the text¶s 
hermeneutic meaning. Instead, it uses other materials to construct the historical 
context in which the author lived, including the author¶s personal relationship with his 
contemporaries, the contemporary meaning of terms that the author uses, and the 
readers that the author targeted. It holds that the meaning and intention of the author 
can only be discovered in such a context.  
The latter approach however holds that it is possible to analyze the author¶s 
beliefs from close readings of the author¶s writings, given that the author expressed 
his viewpoint through the words that articulated what he thought to be true and argued 
why he believed so. Those utterances represented the true historical existence in the 
author¶s mentality and had real impact on the authors¶ social and political practices.65  
The above two situations both exist in history and it is difficult to take one as 
the absolutely correct approach to apply to the textual analysis of all situations. The 
work of the historian is therefore to compare the utterances with the historical figure¶s 
actual behavior. Based on that comparison, the researcher can evaluate the degree to 
which the viewpoint influenced his actual conduct. For example, in his discussion on 
Bolingbroke¶s opposition to Walpole¶s Ministry, Quentin Skinner notes that 
Bolingbroke enthusiastically endorsed Whig beliefs in his own political writing and 
used Whig political thought to justify his opposition to the Whigs¶ military and 
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economic policies. The professed belief of Bolingbroke and his party in Skinner¶s 
argument only served their coup to oppose their Whig enemies.66 In this case, the 
professed belief of Bolingbroke is apparently different from his actual behavior. 
Therefore Skinner¶s argument that the belief in this case cannot be taken as the 
guidance for the action of Bolingbroke is convincing because it can explain the 
phenomenon well.  
 
My dissertation however illustrates a historical process different from 
Bolingbroke¶s case. In this process the New Policy makers followed their belief to 
respond to actual policy problems. My argument can be proved by the coherence 
between their vision of political order and the institutions they built to deal with 
changes. The policy makers adopted the following tools to resolve problems: 
1) Educational and propaganda institutions that made policy implementers 
apprehend the principle of the New Policies and the intention of central leaders; 
 2) Power distribution mechanisms that both legitimized the Emperor¶s 
preference as the only goal for administration and admitted the EXUHDXFUDW¶V autonomy 
in dealing with actual problems,  
3) The continual demonstration of trust between the Emperor and his officials in 
the administrative process;  
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4) Revenue and profit quotas that the policy makers allocated to local 
bureaucrats, reward and punishment institutions that motivated bureaucrats to achieve 
those quotas, and enough free space to allow bureaucrats to adjust policies;  
5) A policy formation mechanism at the upper levels of government that was 
characterized by the construction of factional alliances, the clarification of 
irreconcilable attitudes between factions, and the purging of opposing factions from 
decision-making circles. 
The drafters of the New Policies built the above institutions to resolve 
deviations from the planned outcomes of policy, but they were inadequate. For 
example, the local bureaucrats built coalitions with market actors because of their 
own lack of capital, knowledge or capability to deal with market changes. Even the 
drafters of the New Policies had only rectified the revenue quotas because they 
believed that the material incentive was the fundamental tool to make people exhaust 
their talent. They had a whole line of reasoning to illustrate why the measures they 
chose were reasonable.  
As cases in this dissertation illustrate, the drafters of the New Policies insisted 
on using standardized measures to regulate economic problems regardless of the 
differences between situations, a fault of their rigid political beliefs. The case 
discussed in Chapter Four shows that they had no interest in finding new ways to 
organize bureaucrats after they had exhausted all the standard measures. Their 
ideology gave them great confidence that they could resolve any problems, but on the 
other hand, their firm belief also weakened their capacity to adjust their solutions to 
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handle real changes. They did not seek resolution by accumulating new knowledge on 
the economic system, but stuck to the same measures without considering how to 
make adjustments.  
Moreover, under the guidance of such reasoning, the New Policies makers' 
purpose to achieve one measure often motivated them to reinforce another measure 
that was at cross-purposes.67 For example, in order to gain the trust of the emperor, 
the managers of the state monopolies wanted to show him that they could achieve his 
stated goal of increase state revenue. At the same time, they convinced the emperor 
that their efforts to increase revenue would not damage small market actors, whose 
protection was another stated imperial concern. In practice, however, the monopoly 
managers kept on increasing their quotas for the purpose of increasing revenue, while 
giving local bureaucrats free reign to develop market strategies. They did this because 
their line of reasoning guided them to believe that the local bureaucrats had the innate 
faculty to find out the best way to achieve both goals if material incentives stimulated 
their enthusiasm . They used such a line of reasoning to convince the emperor because 
he shared this common belief with the monopoly managers.   
The measures listed above were openly proclaimed by the central leaders; these 
procedures were known to anyone in government and did not belong to any informal 
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or secret political system68. As Chapter Three illustrates, the drafters of the New 
Policies fully considered the possible reaction of the ³public´ to the way they dealt 
with critics at the court. They expelled critics from the policy-making circles because 
they believed that such a measure would show the leaders¶ determination to carry out 
the New Policies, leading others to then comply with the policies. Meanwhile, the 
critics also publicized their factional identity and adopted collective action, resigning 
from their official positions even in cases where they had good private relationships 
with the drafters of the New Policies and agreed with some parts of the new 
regulations. They did this because of their goal to gain support from the literati and 
officials. The Emperor and the drafters of the New Policies had the clear sense to 
make a distinction between informal deliberations and public procedure. Chapter 
Three shows that the Emperor allowed Sima Guang to criticize the New Policies in 
personal conversations, but once he realized that Sima Guang¶s critiques had been 
publicized, the Emperor changed his attitude and followed the formal procedure to 
purge Sima Guang from the court. After 1071, the exclusion of the opposing faction 
was utilized by both sides as a formal and public procedure for resolving conflict.       
The historical process therefore witnessed the reinforcement of the same 
procedures used in addressing economic problems. The policy makers 
institutionalized those measures and proclaimed them as formal procedure in front of 
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the entire bureaucracy69. I take institutions to be the outcome of the interactive 
dynamics between ideas and context. In responding to real deviations in the process of 
moving policy forward, the beliefs of these historical agents guided them to reproduce 
the same behaviors while excluding the possibility of choosing alterative measures. 
As %ROLQJEURNH¶s case indicates, this process of institutionalization would not occur if 
the policy makers had flexibly adjusted their response. The New Policies case 
illustrates another extreme, however, because the policy makers had a systematic and 
rigid political philosophy and refused to reconcile with real circumstances. This is 
different from cases in which policy makers gradually changed or radically replaced 
their philosophy after they found that a certain amount of policy feedback was hard to 
explain by their theory.70   
State intervention during the New Policies period shows the coexistence of two 
parallel processes. On the one hand, the policy makers repeatedly reinforced their 
institutions to maintain the mechanisms that they established for organizing market 
actors. On the other hand, the behaviors of local bureaucrats deviated from what the 
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policy makers had expected. The policy makers expected that the bureaucrats would 
find the best way to resolve market problems and adequately fulfill their roles in the 
state¶s monopolies if given free reign to make decisions. In practice, however, the 
bureaucrats lacked sufficient capital to operate the state monopolies. They had no way 
to expand the tea and salt markets. The quotas gave them great fiscal pressure. They 
lacked the capacity to simultaneously achieve their quotas and protect the interests of 
small producers. Moreover, the managers¶ apprehension of the Emperor¶V intention to 
increase revenue would lead them to overlook the goal of social protection. Although 
the drafters of the New Policies assumed that the two goals did not conflict, in 
practice the focus on one goal resulted in destroying the other. The overemphasis on 
revenue motivated managers to impose great pressure on the local bureaucrats. 
Because of their optimism about the omnipotence of people¶s innate faculties, they 
easily shirked the responsibility to their subordinate bureaucrats. The only choice 
those bureaucrats could make was to disregard the interests of small producers, 
turning to cooperate with the powerful merchants.        
 The gap between belief and practice can be discovered by comparing the real 
policy problems that the historical materials illustrate and the policy makers¶ 
perception of those problems as depicted in their political writings. The extant 
primary sources provide rich materials illustrating the communicative process 
between the local bureaucrats and the central leaders. The documents preserved in 
The Long Draft of a Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government 
(㒼䋷⋫䙊䪂䮧㐘) and the Draft Recovered Edition of the Essential Documents and 
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Regulations of the Song (ᆻᴳ㾱䕟は) include the memorials that the local officials 
and managers submitted to the central policy makers, and the edicts that the court 
issued in response. These documents show the bias of policy makers in picking up on 
problems reported from below. Meanwhile, they reflect the real difficulties that 
plagued local bureaucrats. These materials include later critiques of the New Policies 
issued after the death of Emperor Shenzong. Those critiques describe how local 
bureaucrats came to ignore the regulations due to their inability to resolve the relevant 
problems. Based on all these sources, this dissertation reveals how the gap between 
the policy makers¶ viewpoint and the actual problems of governance prevented the 
regulative institutions from arresting the decline of the state¶s organizing power.  
 
Organizing capacity refers to the State¶s capacity to incorporate and organize 
the interests and ideas of social and political actors into its authoritative action. Under 
a government with a high organizing capacity, social and political actors have a strong 
commitment to the authority of the organizing mechanisms, and allow policy makers 
to organize their interests and ideas through rules. A low organizing capacity means 
that the policy makers fail to organize those actors. In such a situation, those actors 
frequently pursue their own interests by breaking the rules set by those organizing 
mechanisms. Earlier I have listed the four ³organizing mechanisms´ that policy 
makers established in the economic field. In the case of state monopolies, the 
³organizing mechanisms´ refer to institutions that organized the interests of producers, 
the government and powerful market actors with the goal of protecting the majority of 
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market actors and increasing overall social productivity. When the bureaucrats broke 
away from these mechanisms and pursued their own interests by building alliances 
with the powerful market actors the organizing mechanisms stopped operating. This 
illustrates the state¶s weak organizing capacity.  
My explanation of this process will enrich the scholarship addressing a 
fundamental question that scholars in various disciplines have explored: How can we 
explain the relationship between state¶s organizing capacity and the particular 
institutions that emerged in the process of the policy makers¶ organization of social 
and political actors?      
 
My approach in answering this question differs from functionalist approach that 
³attempts to specify the functions a polity had to perform in order to be effective and 
the institutions that performed such functions.´71 Scholars following this approach 
first define the ideal features of the institution, holding that only when the institution 
possesses such ideal features can it strengthen the state¶s organizing capacity. They 
further compare the differences between the ideal institution and its characteristics as 
actually established by historical agents, with the degree of variance between them 
explaining the state¶s weak organizing capacity.   
 
     The most influential sociologist who applied this ontology to research on the 
relationship between institutions and the state¶s organizing capacity is Max Weber. 
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The central question that Weber asked in his discussion of domination is how the 
manifested will (command) of the ruler or rulers influences the conduct of one or 
more others (the ruled), and why that command can be obeyed by the ruled.72 In 
order to answer this question, he focused on the ³ultimate grounds of the validity of a 
domination´ that existed in the relations between the rulers, the ruling apparatus, and 
the ruled. In his mind, the validity of domination lies in the authority of the ruling 
body, such as the state, and that authority is determined by the institutions that 
structure the relationship between social and political actors.  
   Weber defined three ideal-types of domination that had different institutional 
features, which also determined the state¶s various organizing capacities. These types 
include ³rational authority´, ³WUDGLWLRQDO authority´ and ³charismatic authority´ I will 
use Weber¶s comparative study of rational authority and traditional authority as 
examples to show his ontology in H[SODLQLQJVWDWH¶s organizing capacities. 
According to Weber, the institutions that have rational authority possess the 
following features:  
The validity of a power of command may be expressed, first, in a system of 
consciously made rational rules (which may be either agreed upon or imposed 
from above), which meet with obedience as generally biding norms whenever 
such obedience is claimed by him whom the rule designates. In that case, every 
single bearer of power of command is legitimated by that system of rational 
norms, and his power is legitimate insofar as it corresponds with the norm. 
Obedience is thus given to the norm rather than to the person.73 
          
Institutions that have traditional authority show different features: 
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The validity of a power of command can also rest, however, upon personal 
authority. Such personal authority can, in turn, be founded upon the sacredness 
of tradition, i.e., of that which is customary and has always been so and 
prescribes obedience to some particular person.74 
 
In Weber¶s mind the state¶s capacity in organizing social and political actors 
will be strengthened by institutions that are built upon common rationality. The rulers 
and the ruled have commitment to the rational rule of such institutions and take that as 
the only standard for guiding their behavior. The ruled take the ruler¶s domination as 
legitimate, and follow the ruler¶s commands because they believe him to be following 
rational rules. Such institutions include the bureaucratic agency of the state, 
bureaucratic enterprise in private economy,75 the procedures of policy making,76 the 
administrative process of bureaucracy,77 the legal system,78 and party and democratic 
institutions.79      
In contrast to rational institutions, Weber thought that institutions that had 
traditional authority lacked stability in their organizing of social and political actors. 
These institutions were based upon the personal will of the ruler and traditional rules 
that had existed from past eras. The personal loyalty of the subordinates to the ruler 
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and to tradition guaranteed that the institution could organize members within the 
patrimonial unit. Those institutions could not, however, organize members of other 
patrimonial units because of their loyalty to different rulers and tradition.80 Weber 
WKXVLQWHUSUHWHGWKHSDWULPRQLDOSROLWLFDOSRZHUDV³DEXQGOHRISRZHUVVHSDUDWHO\
appropriated by various individuals by virtue of sSHFLDOSULYLOHJHV´,WLVWKHUHIRUH
difficult for the ruler of a patrimonial state to alter the traditional rules that each 
subordinate unit follows. Due to the lack of shared rationality, the power structure 
within the patrimonial order is fragmented, rigid, inadaptable to new circumstances 
and not amenable to abstract regulations.81 The ruler of the state could not organize 
other social units due to the limitations of such institutions. The policy process 
therefore only reflected the competition between various patrimonial actors.  
Weber took the true acceptance of rational rules by their members as the 
fundamental characteristic of the institutions that can shape the strong organizing 
capacity of the state. Based on this standard, he first categorized different countries 
into types. He then discussed how the institutions in those countries resembled or 
deviated from the ideal type institutions. He drew the conclusion that the state¶s 
organizing capacity was strong if the rulers ruled through rational institutions and 
weak if the rulers only had patrimonial institutions through which to rule. This 
approach had deep roots in Weber¶s interpretation of social action and his overall 
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methodological design of the ³explanatory sociology´.82  
Under such a view, the relationship between the feature of an institution and the 
state¶s organizing capacity is direct. Scholars who follow this approach first abstract 
the characteristics of the institution and then compare those characteristics with the 
ideal-type institutional features. They assume a causal relationship between the 
ideal-type and the state¶s organizing capacity. The only work they need to do, 
therefore, is to categorize institutions into different types and then draw conclusions 
about their effects on state capacities.  
Scholars like Samuel Huntington determined that institutions with high 
adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence would increase the state¶s capacity 
of organizing people to promote political stability.83 Fukuyama enlarged Huntington¶s 
standard and defined the following ideal-type institutional features: impersonal, with 
clear boundaries between private and public, strong consensus between state and 
social forces that were bound by the law, and the government¶s high responsiveness to 
social requests.84 Scholars such as Michael Mann have held that an institution that 
can coordinate social life would strengthen the state¶s organizing capacity, which in 
his terminology is called the state¶s ³LQIUDVWUXFWXUDO SRZHU´.85 Philip Gorski argued 
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that disciplinary institutions that have strong uniformity between their members 
would increase the state¶s infrastructural power.86 Scholars such as Desmond King 
and Robert Lieberman have further applied Mann¶s standard to their studies of 
American state-building, and argued that the American state has strong organizing 
power because of the widely existing institutions that coordinate the states with social 
forces.87 The New Tocqueville scholars such as Robert Putman, in his comparison 
between Northern and Southern Italian state¶s capacities, hold that the institutions 
organized based on the civic values are more effective in increasing the state¶s 
organizing capacity than those that are organized based on patron-client 
relationships.88 Other scholars such as Theda Skocpol argues that the state would 
have a strong organizing capacity not because of the civic features of the local civil 
organizations, but because of close coordination between government and those social 
organizations. 89     
 
Despite their divergent interpretations of the ideal-type features and their 
multiple research methods, these scholars do not go beyond the basic approach that 
Weber created. In this study, I reject the direct causality between the defined features 
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of an institution and its impact on WKHVWDWH¶VRUJDQL]LQJFDSDFLW\,DUJXHWKDWFXUUHQW
VFKRODUV¶HIIRUWVWRGHILQHWKHVWDWLFIHDWXUHVRIDQLQVWLWXWLRQIDFHWKHGDQJHURI
missing the multiple dimensions of that institution which do not match the defined 
features. They also ignore the protracted process in which the components of that 
institution emerge asynchronically due to the continual interaction between historical 
agents and their changing environment.90 Their approaches cannot explain why some 
choices in response to that environment become institutionalized while many other 
choices disappear. The institutions that have emerged in history have been far more 
complicated than these scholars have defined.  
Moreover, these scholars ignore the conflicts between the initiators of the 
institutions and the responses of other members. The ³parchment institution´ 
±codified rules of political contestation-- that emerged in the discourse of its creators 
cannot cover the various responses of other people.91 Scholars with a functionalist 
perspective tend to discover the institutional features from the discourse of the 
creators, overlooking the consequences that were brought about by the 
implementation of those rules.92 
For example, in his study of the disciplinary institutions created by the 
Calvinists, Gorski finds that those institutions had regulations for disciplining 
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people¶s minds. Based on that finding, he argues that those institutions possessed the 
feature of ³uniformity´ Because institutions with this feature are believed to naturally 
increase the state¶s power, Calvinist disciplinary institutions therefore increased the 
state¶s capacity to organize people.93 Gorski does not illustrate, however, why those 
disciplinary regulations represented the ³uniformity´ of that institution. The 
regulations could only represent the viewpoint of their designers. The different 
rationales of other people, however, would shape their various responses to the 
regulations, and could possibly damage the uniformity of the institution. As my 
dissertation illustrates, the drafters of the New Policies also designed institutions for 
disciplining the mentality of policy participants. Such regulations could not shape the 
collective action of the bureaucrats, however. It is therefore not reasonable to simply 
label any regulation as an illustration of organizational uniformity unless we have 
thoroughly examined its consequences.   
 Finally, despite their research employing great amounts of data and 
sophisticated quantitative and qualitative methods, scholars cannot avoid the 
preexisting assumption of the causality between the constructed feature of the 
institution and the state¶s organizing capacities. The results of such research repeat the 
classical political theories that explain the same questions, such as Weber¶s theory of 
rational authority, Tocqueville on civic culture, Hobbes on citizenship, John Mill on 
representation and responsiveness. This problem constrains their capacity to go 
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beyond the influence of those theorists to generate new theories.94   
 
If we redirect our focus toward the historical process in which institutions 
emerged, developed, were reinforced, and collapsed, our approach for explaining the 
relationship between institutions and the state¶s organizing capacity will also greatly 
change. We will extend the scope of our investigation into the formative mechanisms 
of institutions, and deeply inquire into the interactive dynamics between ideas, 
context, institutions and the state¶s organizing capacity. Based on such inquiries, I 
argue that the rise and decline of the state¶s organizing capacity can only be explained 
by the interaction between the policy makers¶ worldview and their environment. The 
scholarly constructed feature of the institution cannot be taken as the independent 
variable for explaining that capacity, because the institution itself is the outcome of a 
process in which the policy makers have used their fixed idea to explain and resolve 
policy deviations in a changing environment.   
Our interpretation of the relationship between institutions, ideas and the state¶s 
capacity differs from that of scholars who adopt the approach of functionalism. For 
example, in his tracing of the intellectual foundations of disciplinary institutions 
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Philip Gorski argues that Calvin¶s thought on ³justification´ led believers to establish 
institutions such as bible reading programs and community institutions.95 Gorski 
takes institutions to be the materialization of the philosopher¶s political thought. The 
institutional design in the WKLQNHU¶V philosophy and real institution contain coherent 
features which also resemble the Gorski¶s definition of the ideal-type institution.  
In my view however, the real interactive dynamics between ideas, institutions, 
and context will show that the IRUPXODWRU¶V philosophy can never fully explain the 
reality; the institution can never achieve its purpose; the real actions of the policy 
participants can never match the philosopher¶s prediction. I agree with Beland and 
Cox when they argue, ³:hat things change and how they change are all the result of 
what people choose to do in response to the world in which they find themselves.´ 
Our focus is on ³how people interact with the world and with one another.´96  
This dissertation focuses on how the policy makers interpreted reality by 
following their beliefs, and how their views concealed the actual problems. 
Institutions were created because policy makers predicted ways in which they would 
shape other SHRSOH¶s ways of thinking. The institution was exogenous to those 
receivers, however, and they responded to its imperatives by following their own 
rationale. As Thelen and Streek have stated, ³the enactment of a social rule is never 
perfect and that there always is a gap between the ideal pattern of a rule and the real 
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pattern of life under it.´ Therefore ³even the honest application in good will of a rule 
to empirical conditions may cause unanticipated results.´97 The reason for the decline 
of state capacity can only be discovered in the complicated mechanisms by which the 
unexpected responses of social and political actors varied beyond the predictions of 
the LQVWLWXWLRQ¶s creators. Scholars should explain these reasons by exploring the gaps 
between philosophy, institution and reality, rather than assuming coherent features and 
causal relationships betweeQWKRVHIHDWXUHVDQGWKHVWDWH¶VRUJDQL]LQJFDSDFLW\ 
 
My research illustrates that policy makers did positively engage in resolving 
policy deviations. The reason for failure was not inaction, but the unexpected 
responses of other policy participants. By illuminating the gap between expectations 
and unexpected consequences, I explain why these policy makers failed to maintain 
the mechanisms that organized people in the economic field. My research focuses on 
a time period that starts when the policy makers had just begun to receive feedback 
and complaints from policy participants, and ends with the time when policy makers 
had finished building the institutions to resolve these problems. The interactive 
dynamics between idea and environment in my research occur within this context.     
Scholars like James Scott have explored reasons for the failure of state efforts to 
organize people in economic affairs. Scott attributes such failure to the leader¶s 
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ignorance of the essential features of any real functioning social order. In his 
explanation, the schematic designs made by authoritarian leaders to shape modern 
society are isolated from real social needs, and therefore doomed to fail because they 
cannot penetrate into real social infrastructures.98 Such a view is echoed by scholars 
who explain the sustainability of the Chinese authoritarian regime. Such scholars 
believe that over the course of the Chinese Communist Party¶s history, the central 
leaders progressively adopted a passive role as compared to the ³guerrilla policy 
style´ of local bureaucrats who actively innovated their policies to deal with change.99 
However, these scholars do not explain the intellectual origins or the consequences of 
the efforts that the central leaders consistently took in responding to problems that 
were caused by the autonomous activities of social and political actors. As my 
dissertation will illustrate, the policy makers gave more autonomy to the local 
bureaucrats not because they had ignored the regulation. To the contrary, the 
decentralization of the decision-making power served the central leaders' purpose to 
shape the collective action of the bureaucratic system, while their political philosophy 
guided the choices they made. Under the New Policies, it was believed, bureaucrats 
would themselves find out the best ways to deal with market problems if provided 
with sufficient material incentives. Therefore policy makers only adjusted the material 
incentives while giving local bureaucrats more autonomy to deal with changes on the 
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ground.100 By exploring such instances, this study will enrich current scholarship on 
the patterns of authoritarian rule. 
    
    In explaining how the interaction between idea and context shapes the state¶s 
organizing capacity, I pay great attention to the beliefs not only of the drafters of the 
New Policies but also their critics. My thick description of their beliefs will reveal the 
complicated lines of reasoning that guided these historical agents¶ actions and their 
perception of practical problems. Scholars such as Dan Slater have focused on how 
the interaction between SHRSOH¶V psychological situation and their historical context 
determines the sustainability of the state¶s efforts to organize both elites and masses. 
Influenced by theories of Thomas Hobbes and the early modern European Skepticism, 
Slater argues that the elite¶s collective decisions to build and deconstruct the state¶s 
organizing power are determined by the motivation of self-protection. Their 
perception of danger will determine their attitudes toward the organizing power of the 
authoritarian leaders.101 Such an explanation assumes that historical agents will attain 
collective action if they share the same perception of problems. The reason for 
achieving such collective action lies in their shared rationality of self-protection. My 
study will show that the mentality of policy makers is actually far more complicated 
than this theory of self-protection depicts. Moreover, the historical agent¶s perception 
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of reality is the outcome of complicated lines of reasoning. It is therefore necessary to 
conduct a deep inquiry into their actual viewpoints rather than simply assuming a 
unified self-protection motivation.102  
     Other scholars have noted how policy paradigms guide the historical agent¶s 
perception of interests and the way policies are developed.103 The ideational approach 
prevails because current scholars have noticed the limits of the previous approach that 
explained human behavior only by looking at rational interests.104 These scholars 
mainly focus on how the economic ideas in modern society, such as Liberalism and 
Keynesianism, shape the ways in which policy makers resolve actual economic 
problems.105 Despite their different contents, these policy paradigms are the products 
of modern European and American economic thoughts. As I will discuss in the first 
chapter, the foundation of these ideas is different from the economic thought of the 
drafters of the New Policies. The former explained economic policy deviation by 
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analyzing the interaction between objective factors within the economic system, while 
the latter took policy deviations to be the outcome of the mental state of the policy 
participants. My study therefore would enable future comparative studies of how 
different philosophical foundations lead to different ways in which policy makers 
explain practical problems, and how those different explanations result in different 
organizing capacities for various states.  
   My approach focuses on how the views of policy makers held back policy 
revision in the face of actual problems. A similar issue has also been noted by Jacob 
Hacker in his explanation of the changes in American welfare policies. He illustrates 
how ideological views led conservatives in the national representative institutions to 
create a gap between existing welfare polices and the new social and economic 
transitions that took place after World War Two. According to Hacker, their measures 
privatized financial risks, making market actors serve as the main providers of social 
welfare and thus weakening the state's capacity to organize market actors and 
common citizens to renovate national welfare policies.106 This mechanism shows 
how the gap between policy revision and the reality was intentionally manipulated by 
policy makers in a modern democratic country. My study of the New Policies is 
comparable with Hacker's case in that it shows that how a similar gap emerged, 
weakening the state's organizing capacity in a different political system.    
 
                                                        
106 Hacker, Jacob The Divided Welfare State: The Battle over Public and Private Social 
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    James Madison posed a fundamental question of significance not only for the 
American founding fathers but for all state-builders: How to control both the ruled 
and the bureaucrats? Or, to put this question in another way: How to strengthen the 
state's capacity to organize these social and political actors? This question has puzzled 
scholars and state-builders for decades. The New Policies case in Chinese history has 
attracted the attention of modern state-builders precisely because they found that a 
similar puzzle had emerged in the historical process of eleventh century China. As this 
dissertation will show, the historical experience of state-building during the New 
Policies period demonstrates the deep roots of state power in the intellectual traditions 
that shaped how people thought and behaved. How to build comparative 
methodologies that incorporate those new factors, and how to generate theories based 
on these methodologies, are questions that will guide my future research.  
 
 
Outline of Chapters  
 
This dissertation is divided thematically and chronologically into three parts. Part 
One, comprising Chapter One, examines the political philosophy of Wang Anshi 
(1021-1086), the leading figure and chief architect of the New Policies. I focus on 
how he proved his scheme for shaping the collective action and adaptive governance 
of policy participants. These lines of reasoning guided him to explain deviations 
encountered in the implementation of economic policies as the results of the 
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bureaucrats¶ incorrect thinking. The drafters of the New Policies therefore built an 
institutional environment designed to discipline people¶s mentality. The institutions 
they designed included educational procedures that guided the bureaucrats to 
apprehend the dao, material incentives that stimulated the EXUHDXFUDWV¶ enthusiasm to 
exhaust their talent in pursuit of the ruler¶VJRDOV, and a power distribution system that 
gave policy-making power to those bureaucrats who apprehended the intention of the 
Emperor. By revealing Wang Anshi¶s various interpretations of human nature, I 
explain why the drafters of the New Policies believed that the bureaucrats could 
inherently find the best way to resolve any economic problem if the policy makers 
had educated them to apprehend the intention of the Emperor or had offered them 
attractive material incentives. Such a worldview failed to explain the economic 
problems, the real rationales and behavior of bureaucrats as encountered in practice.  
Part Two focuses on the intellectual origin, process, and consequences of the 
policy debate on the Rural Credit Policy (known as the ³Green Sprouts Policy´) 
among the political elites at the court in the first three years of the Reform era 
(1069-1071). In Chapter Two I focus on the critiques of this policy conducted by Sima 
Guang, Su Shi, Cheng Hao, Chen Xiang and Zhang Jian. These critics were among 
the most important political thinkers of the mid-eleventh century, and also had great 
influence over the Chinese traditions of political philosophy. I explain how their 
systematic visions of human nature and political order led them to irreconcilably 
oppose the VWDWH¶s intervention into the rural credit market. In Chapter Three I will 
show how the paradigms that both sides used to explain policies and justify their 
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positions eventually led them into a deadlock that excluded any possibility of 
coordinating their different views to revise the Rural Credit Policy. The result of these 
debates was the construction of factional alliances, the clarification of irreconcilable 
attitudes between factions, and the purging of critics from decision-making circles. 
The original conflict-solving mechanism, theoretically characterized by policy 
PDNHUV¶XQELDVHGLQFRUSRUDWLRQRIGLIIHUHQWRSLQLRQVIXOOUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWRSROLF\
feedback and strong capacity to shape collective choices, disappeared from the policy 
formation mechanism after 1071. By showing the interaction between the New Policy 
makers¶ worldview and the historical context, I will explain why the mechanism for 
organizing political elites collapsed.  
  
Part Three discusses the interactive mechanisms between central leaders, the 
bureaucracy and market actors in the course of state intervention in the financial 
market and the tea and salt industries from 1071 to 1085. I explain why the drafters of 
the New Policies failed to organize bureaucrats and government agencies to achieve 
their goals of regulating the price of salt vouchers and protecting small market actors.  
Chapter Four discusses how policy makers regulated the price of pond salt 
vouchers, which had been invented as a form of government bond to support the local 
JRYHUQPHQW¶s borrowing of resources from social forces. The over-issuance of these 
bonds and their depreciation on the financial market caused the court to face an 
increasing burden of repaying debt. In order to resolve this problem, the drafters of 
the New Policies drew up rules that ordered government agencies to collectively 
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follow the needs of the market, regulate the price of these vouchers by adjusting the 
demand and supply sides without competing with the interests of other bureaucracies. 
The central leaders also built a deliberative mechanism that incorporated government 
and market actors to decide the price of goods. However, the bureaucrats kept on 
using their administrative privilege to pursue economic interests, causing the 
continued depreciation of the pond salt vouchers. In contrast to the determination to 
expel and punish the critics in the court, policy makers in this case found no way to 
organize those government agencies, instead passively accepting their demands. I 
argue that the inaction of the central leaders in this situation was caused by the 
limitations of their views on resolving conflicts among government agencies. Because 
such conflicts occurred between bureaucrats who the drafters of the New Policies 
believed to have grasped their intention, the drafters had no proposal for dealing with 
their conflict. They rigidly followed their original plan to keep on delegating 
autonomy to these agencies, overlooking their serious damage to the order of the 
financial market. The original plan for organizing the bureaucrats to regulate prices 
therefore failed. 
 
 Chapter Five discusses the new policies makers¶ failure in building state 
monopolies designed to organize the interests of producers, the government and 
powerful market actors to provide protection for the majority of market actors while 
increasing overall social productivity. I argue that their worldview made the policy 
makers to ignore the real difficulties that local bureaucrats faced, such as ignorance of 
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the economy, capital shortfalls, and a weak capacity to handle market changes. 
Instead they simply delegated regulative power to the monopolies¶ managers, who 
they believed had grasped their intention. They also believed that they could lead 
bureaucrats to find the best way to resolve economic problems by building reward and 
punishment institutions and instituting revenue quotas. Such views originated from 
the New Policy makers¶ belief in the omnipotence of human nature. In the real 
process however, the managers increased the quotas to show their apprehension of the 
Emperor¶s intention, while ignoring the real problems of local bureaucrats. The 
increasing fiscal pressure motivated local bureaucrats to break away from the original 
rules and build coalitions with powerful market actors to damage the interests of small 
producers and merchants. The state¶s organizing capacity was seriously weakened.  
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PART ONE 
The Intellectual Origin of State-building during the New Policies Era 
(1068-1085) 
 
To direct all our activities according to a single plan presupposes that every one of our 
needs is given its rank in an order of values which must be complete enough to make 
it possible to decide among all the different courses which the planner has to choose. 
It presupposes in short, the existence of a complete ethnical code in which all the 
different human values are allotted their due place 
 
---F.A. Hayek107 
 
Using Wang Anshi (1021-1086) as a case study, this chapter explains how the 
drafters of the New Policies believed an active state should exercise its power in the 
market, including the economic policies they designed for structuring state activism in 
the market, their stated means of implementing policies to deal with external changes, 
and their lines of reasoning for explaining the correctness of these policies and means. 
The questions we ask include: 1) Why did Wang Anshi and other New Policy makers 
believe that their plans represented the only state-building option that could solve the 
social, political and military crises of the day; and 2) Why did they believe that their 
plans would work.  
My approach of posing questions to examine Wang Anshi¶s political thought 
resembles that of scholars such as Richard Tuck and James Tully. Both scholars have 
sought to develop an approach to political philosophy that sheds light on problems of 
the present age through contextual studies of the history of political thought.108 One 
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 James Tully, An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. (Cambridge: 
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purpose of such an approach is to study ³as far as possible the character of the actual 
life which the theorists were leading, and the specific political questions which 
engaged their attention.´ Furthermore, "a study of the reactions to those questions 
should not be purely a piece of historical writing. It should also be a contribution to 
our understanding of how people might cope with broadly similar issues in our own 
time.´109 
By following this approach, scholars have on the one hand sought questions that 
are universal to political thinkers across time and space. On the other hand, by 
situating those political thinkers within the historical context of their times, scholars 
have examined how such context shaped the answers that political thinkers provided. 
As I will show in chapters One and Two, a central question that had concerned Wang 
Anshi and other political thinkers was how the rulership should organize people into a 
political system. ³Governing´ in this sense was viewed as dynamic, for any policy 
inevitably had to adapt to changes in the external world. It is also possible that the 
implementation of policies could lead to consequences deviating from their original 
purposes. Wang Anshi¶VFHQWUDOFRQFHUQ therefore, was how to deal with such change 
and deviation. The line of reasoning he used to answer this question distinguishes him 
from political thinkers such as those in early modern Europe who took an 
epistemological approach to this question.110 The problem of explaining changes of 
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policy in relation to changes in the economic system had been a central concern for 
political thinkers in other historical contexts, such as early modern European 
Mercantilism. However, such concerns did not emerge in the political thought of 
Wang Anshi or his critics. In his reflections on economic policy, Wang Anshi tends to 
answer questions about how to install, manufacture, maintain and restore the 
economic order.111 However, he does not seek the answer within the economic field. 
In his view, changes in the economic order were not determined by factors in the 
objective world, but rather by the subjective mental states of policy makers and 
implementers. Also unlike political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, he did not 
claim that policy participants should renounce their own judgment and live in 
accordance with the law of the sovereign. Instead, his concern was how to lead people 
to make the correct judgments in their everyday economic activities.112  
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 Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-1651, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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political thinkers in the East and West. My study of how intellectuals in the New Policies 
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comparative studies to explain why the historical experience of state-building in the New 
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how political philosophy guided the state-builders to build institutions through which they 
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Scholars can also discuss why in some cases the plans that political thinkers proposed to build 
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so. These questions will be answered by the comparative studies on the differences in political 
thoughts, as well as they their capacities to both penetrate people¶s mind and explain actual 
social and economic changes.   
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In this chapter, I situate Wang Anshi¶s thought on state-market relationships 
within his broader intellectual framework on organizing people to deal with change. I 
argue that the New Policy makers¶ confidence in the correctness and feasibility of 
their economic plans was rooted in their view of how the human world should operate. 
As one of the most influential political theorists in eleventh century China, Wang 
Anshi never isolated his view of the state¶s economic role from his systematic vision 
of the ideal political order. He believed that his vision had overcome uncertainty in 
the policy process; his ideas could explain and resolve any possible problems that 
might occur after his economic plan was implemented.  
 Wang Anshi believed that establishing the order for governance meant first 
guiding how people should think, because the mental state of rulers and other policy 
makers were determinant factors that explained why the state operated in different 
ways. According to his theory, policy outcomes deviated from the intention of policy 
makers because those policy implementerV¶ minds had deviated from the correct way 
of thinking. Wang Anshi also believed that rulers could correct the implementers¶ 
minds through the construction of their institutional environment.  
The question that guided Wang Anshi¶s design of the political order was how to 
make participants in this order think and behave in a correct, consistent and 
innovative manner to overcome the confusion in their minds resulting from a sense of 
uncertainty in facing the changing objective world. Furthermore, in the process of 
governing, he sought a way to make this correct way of thinking accountable and 
acceptable to others, so that all people could behave in the same manner in 
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DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHUXOHU¶VZLOO  
In order to answer these questions, Wang Anshi had to confront an objective world 
of ceaseless change; such changes endangered any given solution due to uncertainty. 
He also had to face the ubiquitous conflicts of perspective that prevented people from 
agreeing on collective action in accordance with the ruler¶s will. Wang Anshi, 
however, firmly believed that people could eventually eliminate those conflicts and 
uncertainty, because they had the innate ability to apprehend the coherence of the 
world. Once people had grasped this coherence, they would not only behave in a 
correct, consistent and innovative way themselves, but also guide the entire political 
system to operate in conformity with this ideal.  
In Wang Anshi¶s political thought, the coherence of the world was the dao, 
generally translated as the Way. As Wang Anshi defined it, dao was the only path that 
³2IWKHP\ULDGWKLQJVWKHUHDUHQRQHWKat do not follow it 㩜⢙㧛н⭡ѻ.´ 
Consistent with this position, Wang Anshi believed in the existence of a single correct 
dao of thought and behavior that could be discovered, apprehended and implemented 
by human beings in their social and political practice. His systematic vision of 
political order and the line of reasoning he employed to prove the feasibility of this 
vision were based on his firm belief in the existence of the dao. Wang Anshi thus 
established the following line of reasoning: once rulers recognized the dao and 
applied it, they would guide the political system towards the only correct way of 
operation. The members of the political system would come to collective action in 
accordance with the rulers. The political system would then conduct consistently 
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correct innovation of policy in a way that was adaptive to change.   
 
The dao in Wang Anshi¶s thought had different meanings, and he also built 
different lines of reasoning to illustrate his interpretations of it. Based on those 
interpretations of the dao, Wang Anshi designed a political order that could achieve 
his two goals. My depiction of Wang Anshi¶s political thought focuses on his different 
understanding of dao, which is manifested in his interpretations of dao¶s relationship 
with human nature (ᙗ xing), mind (ᗳ xin), and cultural and political forms (᮷ wen, 
such as government policies, institutions and literary expressions in the Classics). I 
will reveal the logical connections between his political writings and clarify the 
different lines of reasoning that articulated the above interpretations. I will then focus 
a single piece of his political writing, the ³Myriad Word Memorial 㩜䀰ᴨ´ which he 
composed and submitted to the Emperor in 1058and which has taken by scholars as 
representative of Wang Anshi¶s entire plan for building a political order. Based on a 
close reading of this text, I will introduce Wang Anshi¶s schemes for building an 
institutional environment that could overcome policy deviations by shaping the 
collective action and adaptive governance of policy participants. I will further reveal 
how Wang Anshi interwove the above lines of reasoning to prove the validity of his 
political scheme in the Myriad Word Memorial.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Wang Anshi¶s Political Philosophy on State-building  
    Wang Anshi¶s political philosophy is centered on the concept of dao, a correct 
path that all should follow. Wang Anshi believed that people could follow this correct 
Way through self-cultivation as well as through guidance from external forces. By 
interpreting the dao as a personal moral principle, Wang Anshi explained how and 
why people could apprehend it in their mental world. By taking the dao as a principle 
for organizing people and materials, Wang Anshi further resolved the question of how 
and why people could follow the dao even if they had no recognition of it. By 
regarding the dao as the thought of the Sages, Wang Anshi resolved the question of 
how to find the dao, and who had the authority to judge the correctness of thought, 
behavior and policy.     
Dao as a personal moral principle 
Wang Anshi wrote that the dao of Heaven generated moral principles for people, 
which could guide their personal conduct. Common people could intuitively sense the 
dao as a guiding path and subconsciously adhere to it. Superior learned men could not 
only follow the dao, but through their education could learn to recognize naturally 
occurring principles as dao. Wang Anshi interchangeably named the dao DV³WKH
principle for human nature(xing ming zhi li ᙗભѻ⨶)´³WKHdao of the sages 㚆Ӫ
ѻ䚃´WKHvirtue (de ᗧ), and the ³spirit´(shen ⾎) ,Q:DQJ¶VPLQGWKHVHWHUPVwere 
one subliminal force referred to by many names. As he wrote,  
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We describe the sages as ³spirit´ because of their dao. We describe the 
sages as ³sages´ because of their virtue. We describe the sages as the ³Great 
Men´ because of their great achievement. The dao of the ancient sages always 
entered into their spirit (shen). We only call them sheng because their dao 
existed in the midst of empty silence and invisibility and when it was present in 
a man, it is called virtue (de). Therefore the dao of human being is spirit, but [in 
the case of personal virtue], they cannot be called shen. They were only named 
as de. ...Therefore we know that these three terms (sheng, shen and the Great 
Men) are all the names of the Sages. They have different names because these 
names refer to the different [dimensions] of the Sages.113   
 
According to such an understanding, people could become Sages either through 
fully achieving the dao or through fully achieving the de.114 7KH³shen´WKH³dao´
DQGWKH³de´LQGHSHQGHQWO\GHILQHGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWVRIWKHVDPH6DJH-like 
characteristics. As Wang Anshi defined it, the de is the dao as it is present in man. De 
in his discourse referred to the correct ways of behaving and thinking that people can 
actually learn and follow in their daily practice. Wang Anshi therefore implied that all 
people regardless of their talent, morality, social or political status, could truly 
apprehend the dao in their mind. But why did he believe this? 
:DQJ¶V conception originates from his interpretation of human nature (xing ᙗ) 
as the source for both good and bad behavior.115 Being neutral, it can be described as 
neither good nor evil; its moral features are only determined after its operation in 
SHRSOH¶VPLQGV At the same time, moral principle is DOZD\VSUHVHQWLQSHRSOH¶VPLQds. 
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The dao is thus not only the range of external societal and political norms that people 
PXVWIROORZEXWDOVRDQLQWHJUDWHGSDUWRISHRSOH¶VPLQGV:DQJFODLPHG  
7KHµdaode RIWKH)RUPHU.LQJV¶FDPHIURPWKHµSULQFLSOHVfor human 
nature (xingming zhi li¶DQGWKHVHSULQFLSOHVFDPHIURPSHRSOH¶VPLQGV7KH
Songs and Documents could accord with and reach the dao, and [the Qin rulers] 
FRXOGQRWWDNHDZD\ZKDWSHRSOH¶VPLQGVKDGRUJLYHWKHPZKDWWKH\GLGQRW
have. Although the Classics were lost, what caPHIURPPHQ¶VPLQGVZDVVWLOO
present.116 
 
Wang Anshi did not take the dao of the former Kings and the principles of the 
xing-ming to be principles imposed on people. He claimed, 
 
       If we speak of the whole of dao, then it is present everywhere and does 
everything. It is not something those who learn can rely on, nor should they keep 
their minds on it. The dao that is present in the self is de, de is something that can 
be relied on. Loving others because of de is humaneness (ren). « Rituals and rites 
are [the way through which] people feel the ren; intelligence (zhi) is [the situation 
in which] people know the ren; and trustworthiness (xin) [refers to the situation in 
which] people believe the ren.   
 
Wang Anshi emphasizes that de is something people can rely on; in other words, 
they may know, feel, believe in, and follow these correct manners in their daily 
practice. As Wang Anshi notes, people could feel this correct path through the rituals 
and rites they personally conducted. They could grasp correct manners through 
apprehension of knowledge using their intelligence. They could build trust in others 
because of their common belief and adherence to that correct way.  
How to apprehend the de is the next concern in Wang Anshi¶s line of reasoning. 
                                                        
116
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Wang Anshi did not believe in the capability of human nature to spontaneously 
provide moral guidance. Because human nature chooses both good and evil practices, 
Wang strongly rejected the idea that people need only follow their own minds to judge 
good and evil.117 Based on this position, scholars interpret Wang Anshi as believing 
WKDWH[WHUQDOSROLWLFDODXWKRULWLHVVHUYHDVWKHGHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRUVWKDWXQLI\SHRSOH¶V
values. This tendency is different from the Neo-Confucian rejection of political 
institutions as authorities for moral instruction, and their promotion of personal 
cultivation as the only correct way of leading people to a unified morality.118  
7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI:DQJ¶VSRVLWLRQLVWKDWLWFDQQRWH[SODLQ
why he designed and explicitly spelled out an entire process of self-cultivation which 
he thought could guide students to attain and maintain mental coherence with the dao. 
Although his design was relatively ambiguous and impractical compared with that of 
the Neo-Confucians, he promised that such internal coherence of the mind could 
enable students to respond spontaneously to situations in a manner true to the dao.119 
The self-cultivation Wang Anshi described can be understood as a process by which 
students reached the ultimate dao and applied it to their practice. I therefore argue that 
Wang took self-cultivation as the basis for achieving political order. Although he did 
not believe that the personal mind was a reliable source for the guidance of conduct, 
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KHVWLOOEHOLHYHGWKDWVWXGHQWV¶LQGependent learning through certain procedures was 
sufficient to reach the mental state of fully realizing the dao. 
 
Compared with his systematic explication of how to achieve the dao when 
RUJDQL]LQJWKHKXPDQDQGQDWXUDOZRUOG:DQJ$QVKL¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIKRw people 
could comprehend the de in their minds is not elaborate. His inadequate discussion of 
self-cultivation was also criticized by Neo-Confucians such as Cheng Hao, who was 
his contemporary.120 Those who came after Wang Anshi such as Zhu Xi took human 
nature as an innate essence and shifted their focus to the systematic development of a 
theory of learning, creating a new curriculum to guide literati self-cultivation.121 Even 
LIZHDFFHSW&KHQJ+DRDQG=KX;L¶VYLHZV:DQJ$QVKL¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHQRWLRQ
of attaining the de through self-cultivation cannot be completely dismissed.122 
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stages: one during his time as Grand Counselor, and one in his time as a local official. His 
writings about the Three Classics received much attention from scholars but his studies of the 
Book of Changes did not. (See Zhu Xi, Zhu Zi yulei 㛙⫸婆栆 (Changsha, Yuelu shushe, 
1997), P1784.) 7KH³1HZ/HDUQLQJ´KHSURSRVHGIRULQLWLDWLQJWKH1HZ3ROLFLHV was often 
taken as his only work on the Classics, but this is untrue and derserves future research. 
Following the content of the Book of Changes, Wang Anshi briefly discussed the issues of 
how to learn in order to attain the de as well as how to maintain this mental state to respond to 
the environment. He threaded his own commentaries into the selected entries from the 
Classics, cementing them as a coherent whole to reveal the implicit connections between 
these entries and the true meanings that the sages expressed in the Classics. For an excellent 
GLVFXVVLRQRI:DQJ$QVKL¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHVWXGLHVRIWKHBook of Changes, see Xu Gui 
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   Extant sources show some aspects of Wang Anshi¶s prescribed self-cultivation 
process. In general, KHEHOLHYHGLQSHRSOH¶VFDSDELOLW\WRUHVWRUHWKHLU³FRUUHFWQDWXUH
↓ᙗ´:DQJ$QVKLFDOOHGWKLVSURFHVV³H[KDXVWLQJQDWXUH ⴑᙗ´7KHSURFHVVRI
³H[KDXVWLQJQDWXUH´PHDQWFRPSOHWHDSSUHKHQVLRQRIWKH correct way of behaving and 
thinking (de), or full illumination of that way in the mind. Such a mental state in 
:DQJ$QVKL¶VGLVFRXUVHLQYROYHGHLWKHUWKH³FXUELQJRISDVVLRQDQGUHPRYLQJRI
desires to bring forth the shen (spirit) ৫ᛵফឮ㘼⾎᰾⭏⸓´DQGWKHVXEVHTXHQW
³FXOWLYDWLRQRIWKHspirit to achieve enlightenment ؞⾎㠣᰾´RUDPHQWDOVWDWHWKDW
³FRQWUROOHGWKHPLQGWRSXULI\DQGLOOXPLQDWHWKHde 啺᰾ަᗳ␵᰾ަᗧ´3eople 
could achieve the ideal mental state through controlling their desires, cultivating their 
spirit and purifying their mind.123  
    More practically, Wang Anshi designed a procedure for fully discovering internal 
                                                                                                                                                              
and Yang TiaobaR³=RXFKX-LQJ*RQJ[LQ[XH²dui Wang Anshi xueshu yanbian xingtai de 
zai gou le崘↢勲℔㕘⬠⮵䌳⬱䞛⬠埻㺼嬲⼊ン䘬ℵ⊦≺´=KHMLDQJGD[XH[XHEDR no 1 
(2005) ,31-35. Yang Tiaobao and Xu Gui argue that Wang Anshi in his early years put more 
emphasis on the learning of self-cuOWLYDWLRQ7KLVWHQGHQF\LVGLIIHUHQWIURPWKH³1HZ
/HDUQLQJ´ZKLFKHPSKDVL]HGWKHVWXG\RIWKHJRYHUQPHQW0\DUJXPHQWKRZHYHUholds that 
Wang Anshi did not show such clear periodization. The contradictions existing in Wang 
$QVKL¶VOHDUQLQJDUHQRWEHWZeen the learning of self-cultivation and government. The real 
contradiction is his different interpretation of the dao and the processes he designed for 
RUGHULQJWKHZRUOGEDVHGRQVXFKGLIIHUHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJV)RUVWXGLHVRI:DQJ$QVKL¶V
learning, also see Yang Tianbao㣲⣑ᾅ, Jinling Wangxue yanjiu²Wang Anshi zaoqi xueshu 
sixiang de lishi kaocha(1021-1067)慹昝䌳⬠䞼䨞-䌳⬱䞛㖑㛇⬠埻⿅゛䘬㬟⎚侫⮇
(1021-1067) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe 2008), 249-280. The Book of Changes 
had great influence on Northern Song politics. Studies of this issue, however, more or less 
LJQRUH:DQJ$QVKL¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGVWKHBook of Changes and how this book influenced his 
thoughts on learning. For studies on the Book of Changes and Northern Song politics, see 
Kidder Smith, Peter Bol, Joseph Adler and Don Wyatt ed., Sung Dynasty Uses of the I Ching, 
(Princeton: Princetion University Press,1990); and Tze ±Ki Hon, The Yijing and Chinese 
Politics: Classical Commentary and Literati Activism in the Northern Song Period, 
960-1127( Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004). )RUGLVFXVVLRQRQ:DQJ$QVKL¶V
understanding of the way of writing the Classics, see Peter Bol, This Culture of Ours, 
229-230. 
 
123:DQJ$QVKL³/L\XOXQ䥖㦪婾´Wang Jingong wenjiqianzhu zhong䌳勲℔㔯普䬳㲐
ᷕ,1032;1035 
 83 
coherence or de. This procedXUHVWDUWHGIURPWKH³QXUWXULQJRIWKHlife 伺⭏´$V
Wang Anshi claimed, 
 He who exhausts the possibilities of his nature is absolutely sincere; he 
who is absolutely sincere is of a fixed will; he who maintains fixed will 
preserves his physical form; and he who preserves his physical form nurtures 
his body.   
 
The reverse of this order can also be sustained. As Wang Anshi argued, 
 
The physical form is the foundation of all life. So the nurturing of life 
depends on the preservation of physical form; the fulfillment of the purpose of 
the physical form depends upon nurturing of the qi, the nurturing of the qi 
depends upon a fixed will, and a fixed will depends upon absolute sincerity. 
The attainment of sincerity depends upon exhausting nature.124  
 
The above quotations illustrate that Wang Anshi believed that good living 
conditions were related to the achievement of de. Wang Anshi also held that rigid 
manipulation of the mind was an important step for the enlightenment of the de; he 
HPSKDVL]HGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI³EHLng absolutely sincere 㠣䃐´DQG³KDYLQJDIL[HG
will ሗᗳ´ 
Indeed, Wang Anshi designed a mechanism in which the improvement of material 
conditions, the manipulation of the mind, and learning through daily practice 
overlapped with one another to collectively lead to comprehension of the de. The 
successful operation of this mechanism relied on interaction between external 
circumstances and internal motivation. Wang Anshi designed ways in which 
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JRYHUQPHQWDOIRUFHVFRXOGLPSURYHVXEMHFWV¶PDWHULDOFRQGLWLRQVDOORZLQJSHRSOHWR
follow their virtue without worrying about their means of livelihood.  
He also widely discussed the role that rites, policies, and laws should play in 
SURYLGLQJQRUPVIRUJXLGLQJSHRSOH¶VDFWLYLWLHV$OOWKHVHH[WHUQDOIRUFHVKDGWREH
activated by internal motivations to receive the dao, to cultivate the mind, and to 
apprehend the de. Rites and rituals in such a course appeared not as coercive rules 
made by external authorities, but rather as a cultural form that the Sages, as superior 
PHQFUHDWHGIRURWKHUV¶PHQWDOFXOWLYDWLRQ:DQJ$QVKLFULWLFL]HG;XQ]L¶V-238 
B.C) understanding of the rites, which argued that external authority could also force 
SHRSOHWRIDOVHO\IROORZSURSULHW\:DQJ$QVKLLQVLVWHGWKDWSHRSOHV¶FRPPLWPHQWWR
propriety came from nature, and any false obedience of the rites was impossible.125  
Wang Anshi argued that mental cultivation should be deeply involved in daily 
moral practices. Such practices emerged from a reliance on the norms that the Sages 
FUHDWHGWRJXLGHSHRSOHV¶DFWLYLWLHV%\internalizing these norms, participants could 
achieve a state that enabled spontaneous responses to external events in a manner true 
to the innate de:DQJ$QVKLKHOGWKDW³$VIRUWKHH[SUHVVLRQµORRNQRWDWZKDWLV
FRQWUDU\WRSURSULHW\¶WKLVGRHVQRWPHan that one should blindfold himself, and avoid 
the world of sight, for the things of the Heaven-and-earth as such are incapable of 
FRQIXVLQJP\ZLVGRP´%HFDXVHSHRSOHKDGUHFRJQL]HGWKHVHQRUPVWKHVHQRUPV
made people wise prior to experience. Therefore even though people possessed the 
physical organs for hearing and seeing, the key factor that enabled them to be wise 
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was their ability to recognize propriety, and only then, follow those norms to true 
wisdom.126 :DQJ$QVKLEHOLHYHGWKDWSHRSOH¶VFDSDELOLW\to gain such wisdom was 
inherent in their nature. 
   People could achieve such a stage by cultivating their de. Wang mentions no 
requirement for any special learning or specific knowledge of the world. He implied 
that once people had entered this stage of understanding, they could go beyond any 
concrete knowledge and discover the best way to adapt to changes. Surviving 
OLWHUDWXUHSURYLGHVOLWWOHHYLGHQFHRI:DQJ$QVKL¶VWKRXJKWRQWKHOLQNEHWZHHQWKH
learning of specific knowledge of the dao for organization of the external world and 
their apprehension of the de in their minds. Although he agreed that a wide range of 
knowledge on the human and natural world would be necessary to know the dao of 
the Sages, Wang Anshi did not clarify how such learning could be internalized as the 
de of the mind.127  
In his design, governing and learning unfold simultaneously. The process of 
governing is also the process by which the members of the political system learn from 
each other to apprehend the dao. This is a process of leaning by governing, as well as 
a process of governing by learning. In his commentary on the Book of Changes, Wang 
Anshi describes a dynamic in which a single participant can activate those around 
himself. If the activities of some participants clearly convey the de, others will 
perceive this enlightened state, and form collective action. In this dynamic, personal 
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EHOLHIOHDGVWRWKHFRQYHUVLRQRIRWKHUV7KLVFRQYHUVLRQLVD³WUDQVIRUPDWLRQ ॆ´WRD
moral position following the dao. Any participants in the process can influence others 
and be influenced by others. Both the ruler and the ruled could be mobilized by policy, 
if all were devoted to the dao and communicated openly with one another. The 
question emerges: how does a single participant align all of his actions to reach a 
VXVWDLQHGVWDWH":DQJ$QVKLQDPHVWKLVVWDWH³UHDFKLQJWKHFRPPDQGRI+HDYHQ 㠤
ᯬભ´ ,Q:DQJ¶VYLHZRQHPXVWDFFXPXODWHDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIde and consistently 
employ this de in every action. Participants continuously learn from one another to 
accumulate their de through observation, self-cultivation, moral practice, reception of 
external feedback, as well as reflection and rectification of the mind. This 
accumulation is a fully cyclical process, which begins anew each time it is completed. 
This self-perpetuating cycle will eventually lead to a mental state in which the de is 
fully apprehended.128  
 The government did not necessarily need to initiate this procedure, because the 
VXSHULRUPHQ¶VEHOLHILQWKHdao would be sufficient for them to spontaneously initiate 
pursuit of the dao and the process of learning. Political participation in the policy 
process was fully voluntary because all members were motivated by their political 
beliefs. ,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VGLVFRXUVHWKHUXOHUVVXFKDVWKH)RUPHU.LQJVDQGWKH6DJHV
were seen as superior men. No system of hierarchy existed outside of a moral 
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meritocracy.129 Their differences lay only in the advanced status they achieved in 
self-cultivation. As a result of such personal advances, their activities, as well as the 
SROLWLFDOODZVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVWKH\FUHDWHGFRXOGDOVRHQFRXUDJHRWKHUSHRSOH¶V
self-enlightenment. Enforcement of this dynamic was again completely unnecessary, 
because in pursuit of de, all participants would voluntarily follow policy. From this 
perspective, the policy process is viewed as an aggregation of individual activities.  
Self-cultivation is therefore seen as an independent process that can be 
accomplished independent of political forces, although Wang Anshi did not reject the 
positive role that such forces could play. The ideal political process had no 
autonomous rules independent of the moral norm for its members. There was no 
separate principle for organizing individuals, since people can be well-organized by 
assimilating to the moral conduct of one another. Thus, from this perspective, the 
governing process only comprises relations between individuals.  
The king himself is a member of the class of superior men, and the governance 
RIWKH)RUPHU.LQJVLVWKHEHVWPRGHOIRUWKHVXSHULRUPHQ¶VZD\RIUXOHUVKLS. In 
PDQ\RIKLVZULWLQJV:DQJ$QVKLWUHDWVWKH³VXSHULRUPHQ ੋᆀ´DQGWKH³)RUPHU
Kings ݸ⦻´DVV\QRQ\PRXVWHUPVregarding them as a category of rulers who 
followed the same procedures of governance.130 The entire governing process of 
superior men, however, was independent of governmental agencies. 
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Wang Anshi had another dimension in his understanding of the dao that is very 
different from the notion of dao as a self-organizing structure. In this second position, 
he viewed the dao as a principle for organizing people through an external power 
structure. People¶s apprehension of de was not taken as the necessary precondition for 
the achievement of the dao for organization, nor would the achievement of the dao 
bring transformation to the minds of the people in the political system. 
Dao as a Principle for Organizing People 
If the members of the political system do not apprehend the dao in their minds, 
how can order be attained? How does this political order deal with the various 
personalities and capabilities of its members? In the second dimension of his 
understanding of dao, Wang Anshi KHOGWKDWWKHIXOILOOPHQWRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶Vde is 
not a necessary prerequisite for achieving collective action that follows the dao. From 
this perspective, the dao is understood as a way of organizing many people and things, 
rather than a correct way for individuals to apprehend and follow in their personal 
actions. 
+XPDQ³QDWXUHxing)´LQthis line of reasoning was interpreted differently from 
the understanding discussed above. Human nature implies a common reaction that 
ordinary people have to a external stimulus. For example, Wang said that mediocre 
men lost their virtue when they were poor, and regained their morality when they 
were rich.131 +HDOVRZURWH³7KHQDWXUHRIPDQLVDVIROORZV7KH\HQMR\WKHLUOLYLQJ
when rich in spiritual life and comfortable in physical life. They consider death when 
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they feel depressed in mind and overwRUNHGLQERG\´132 In another situation, Wang 
KHOGWKDW³,QVSHDNLQJRIWKHxing of mediocre men, some people have good 
capabilities while others are incompetent. Some people are loyal while others are 
GLVOR\DO´133 In this interpretation, Wang posits that the varieties of the xing in 
GLIIHUHQWSHRSOHDUHLOOXVWUDWHGLQWKHVFRSHRISHRSOH¶VSUDFWLFDONQRZOHGJHWKHLU
various levels of morality, their diverse modes of behavior, and their complicated 
personalities. Although he believed that people could improve their capabilities and 
morality through education and political participation, Wang held that people could 
not remove their differences to the extent of equalizing their morality and capabilities. 
The making of policies and institutions, therefore, had to take this variety as its 
premise, rather than seeking a fundamental transformation of human nature. 
 Wang Anshi KHOGWKDWSHRSOH¶VDSSUHKHQVLRQRIYLUWXHFRXOGQRWJLYHWKHPIXOO
insight into the principles of all things. Nor would knowing the ethical norms 
automatically lead people to accept and follow moral principles. Virtue and 
knowledge of the external world were two separate fields. Based on his admission of 
variety in people¶s capabilities and virtues, Wang Anshi proposed the following goal 
for the operation of the political system: to ³make full use of people¶s capability 㗎ަ
ᶀ´ and ³make full use of people¶s ethical virtue 㗎ަᗧ´ The key to achieving these 
goals was to build the proper way of organizing them. As he stated, ³The monarch 
should appoint capable people to make full use of their capabilities. The monarch 
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should also appoint people who truly have [ethical] conduct and make them attain 
their virtue. Then the country will be prosperous. All monarchs want the talented to 
exhaust their talents and the moral people to attain their virtue.´134 
   
,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRUGHUSROLWLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQVVXFKDVULWXDOV
music, laws, and policy organizations were ties that bound individuals and material 
resources to the political order. Wang repeatedly pointed out that different ways of 
organizing people produced very different results. As I have mentioned, Wang also 
criticized how contemporary political institutions of his time deviated from the way of 
the Former Kings. These mistakes shaped the state¶s weak capacity in organizing 
people and materials.135 In this discourse, Wang took policies and institutions as 
independent resources for the attainment of the dao. Those institutions and policies 
were not created for helping people apprehend the dao, but to allocate people to their 
proper positions, organize them to achieve the goals of the entire political system, and 
to generate their collective wellbeing.  
Wang wrote at length on the ideal institutional framework that could organize 
people in the correct manner. In this system, the ruler should apprehend the dao in his 
mind and lead others who had no such apprehension. In ³Nine Transformations, Then 
Reward and Punishment Can Be Addressed ҍ䆺㘼䌎㖠ਟ䀰´ Wang Anshi 
elaborated on how the dao as a personal principle was coherent with the dao for 
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organizing people.  
 
That which myriad things rely upon to exist is heaven. The way that 
everything operates through is the dao. The dao that is present in the self is de. 
The love that is derived from de is benevolence. The proper manner of loving is 
righteousness. The actions that are benevolent should have sequence and the 
righteous way [of ruling] should have hierarchy. [The sequence and hierarchy] are 
called the order. [In that sequence] what should come last should not surpass what 
should come first. [In that hierarchy] the below should not surpass the above. 
These are their duties. Such sequence and hierarchy materialize into concrete 
forms. And they are also commanded by names. What are the forms that constitute 
such sequence and hierarchy? The decorations [for different people] were different 
according to their different statuses of noble and humble, as well as their near and 
distant relatives. What are the things that command sequence and hierarchy? The 
³noble and humble´ as well as ³the near and distant relatives´ are names to 
differentiate the commands. The way to construct the sequence and hierarchy is to 
give the noble and the humble respective forms. The way to command the 
sequence and hierarchy is to give different names to the near and distant relatives. 
Based on the [hierarchy between] noble and humble as well as [the sequence 
between] the near and distant relatives, individuals were appointed to their 
respective positions; this was called appointment according to reality. Even if we 
have appointe people to the proper positions, if we do not supervise them, they 
would be out of control. We should trace the origin of the situation and judge what 
they GR«. After we have clarified reality through tracing the origin and making 
judgment, we can tell right from wrong. After we have distinguished between 
right and wrong, we can put into effect reward and punishment.136 
    
Wang Anshi in the above quotation takes the de as the presence of dao LQSHRSOH¶s 
minds. Only after the ruler has apprehended the de can he conduct a series of 
activities under its direction, including the building of institutions that allocate people 
to different positions in the political system according to their respective statuses and 
supervise them in these roles. The main form of regulation was through reward and 
punishment. The political system followed the dao because its creator had 
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apprehended the de in his mind. As Wang Anshi further elaborated, if the ruler only 
trusted his own feelings without apprehending the correct way of thinking and 
behaving for himself, he would no longer possess any standard to rely upon. Without 
a correct standard, reward and punishment would cause great damage to society. As 
Wang Anshi stressed in this essay, the policy could not be based on the rulers¶ whim 
but must be grounded in the Way, which in turn required the rulers¶ self-cultivation. 
137
  
How was the government to guarantee that reward and punishment could 
achieve their purpose? Wang Anshi designed two mechanisms. The first mechanism 
focused on the emperor and his surrounding officials. Punishment and reward were 
assessed based on judgments about the personal character of the officials. Wang made 
this point in the commentary on the Great Plan in the Book of Documents: 
 
The monarch should appoint capable people to make full use of their 
capabilities. The monarch should also appoint people who truly have [ethical] 
conduct and make them attain their virtue. Then the country will be prosperous. 
All monarchs want the talented to exhaust their talents and the moral to realize 
their virtue. However, no one could achieve these purposes during these 
thousands of years [following the Sage Kings]. The monarchV¶LQWHOOLJHQFHZDV
not bright enough to illuminate the knowledge of the people of the world, nor 
was their sincerity complete enough to unify the virtue of the people of the 
world. Intelligent people, therefore, could not be known as they were pushed 
aside by the inept. Upright people received little support as they were trapped by 
the unworthy. Thus, it became impossible to accomplish their activities. The 
way to illuminate the knowledge of the world lies in investigating the principle 
of all things to the utmost; the way to unify the virtue lies in fully developing 
RQH¶VQDWXUH,IRQHKDVLQYHVWLJDWHGSULQFLSOHWRWKHXWPRVWKHZLOONQRZZKDW
the faults of wrong rules have been. He therefore will not give [false rules] to 
the people. He will also know what the ethical norms are. Therefore, he will 
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confer prosperity on people following such norms. If he has fully developed his 
nature, he will achieve his humanity without humiliating the rare and wise men. 
He can also achieve righteousness without fearing the powerful. If we follow 
these ways, then the inept will be induced to become the wise. Even if they can 
not become the wise, at least they will not be able to push aside the wise. In 
addition, the unworthy can become the upright. Even if they can not become 
upright, at least they will not trap the upright. Thereafter, the people possessing 
capabilities and good conduct can make good use of their activities, and the 
country will flourish.138   
 
Wang Anshi in the above essay proposed two goals for rulers. As he implied the 
ultimate goal was that ³ the unworthy can become upright´. On the other hand, he 
also realized that in many situations, that ultimate goal could not be achieved. He 
therefore also proposed the immediate goal. As he stated, ³even if they ( the unworthy) 
cannot become upright, at leas they will not trap the upright´. Wang Anshi in this 
statement did not take transformation of bureaucrats¶ mind as the single goal for 
building the ideal political order. He stressed that the rulers should allocate 
bureaucrats in the positions that made full use of their talent and virtue. For Wang 
Anshi, the reward and punishment are the major means through which the rulers could 
achieve that immediate goal.    
In the process of achieving that immediate goal, the basis for conducting correct 
reward and punishment was to put the officials into different categories. Wang Anshi 
thought that all officials had a main feature, such as being talented, worthy, inept, 
righteous, or unworthy. The ruler should first find out the true features of his officials, 
and then reward those who were talented and worthy while punishing the incapable 
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and unworthy ones. Only by doing that could the ruler exhaust his subordinateV¶ talent 
and virtue and motivate them to contribute to the political system as a whole. 
According to Wang Anshi, this process is would not be smooth because the unworthy 
and inept officials would prevent the ruler from selecting worthy and talented 
bureaucrats. The ruler therefore needed to cultivate himself so that he could correctly 
discriminate the true characteristics of his officials. In such a process, the emperor 
should survey the policy opinions of his officials as evidence of their personal 
features. The focus of the ruler would not be on the value of those opinions in 
resolving actual policy problems, but on what they reflected about the personal 
character of the holders.    
In another essay, Wang Anshi designed another institution for reward and 
punishment that would be based on material incentives, in keeping with his 
interpretation of human nature. As Wang Anshi stated, 
All people have the nature of being ashamed of and hating [something]. They 
manifest this nature by being ashamed of and hating one kind of thing. Here is a 
man who is ashamed of his failure to do good or to establish a good reputation. He 
is therefore devoted to do good in order to satisfy his nature of being ashamed of 
and hating something. What is there to prevent him from becoming worthy? This 
is an instance of fulfilling the ideal possibilities of his nature and is in accordance 
with what Mencius called ³the nature of man´  
 
Take another instance. Here is a man who is ashamed that he has not gained 
enough profit, or hates the insufficiency of his profit. If he devotes himself to gain 
more profit in order to satisfy his nature of being ashamed of and hating 
something, what is there to prevent him from becoming an evil man? This is an 
illustration of a man fulfilling the baser possibilities of his nature and is in 
accordance with Yang Zi¶s definition of the ³nature of man´139   
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Compared to his other definition, which emphasized people¶s innate ability to 
apprehend the dao in their mind, Wang Anshi reinterpreted human nature as a 
common tendency to be ashamed of, and to hate, the things they look down upon. 
However, although he believed people had the innate capability to know the common 
good, Wang Anshi denied the idea that there existed a common immorality that all 
people hated and felt ashamed of. People do bad things because those things are, in 
their views, not bad. 7KHEHQHILWVWKH\REWDLQIURPWKHVH³EDG´WKLQJVDUHPRUH
important than other considerations. Thus, the difference between bad people and 
good people lies in the different standards of what they hold to be hateful and 
shameful. 
External authority could motivate people¶s disposition and behavior by providing 
them with material incentives. Those incentives included good reputation, honorable 
political status or wealth. In his other writings, Wang Anshi expresses confidence that 
those three incentives covered all possible needs.140 He thought that people would 
exhaust their talent and virtue if such incentives had fully awakened their enthusiasm.  
The political system¶s adherence to the dao is determined by the mentality of the 
ruler. The ruler should apprehend the dao, then he should assess his officials to make 
full use of the worthy and talented. As we will discuss in Chapter Three, such ideas 
guided the way the drafters of the New Policies treated their critics. According to 
Wang Anshi, the ruler should also establish material incentives to motivate his 
subordinate bureaucrats to accomplish what he wanted them to do. Based upon his 
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goals, the ruler should set standards for deciding reward and punishment. As we will 
discuss in Chapter Five, the New Policies makers believed that they could control 
bureaucrats through fixing the reward and punishment measures to specific standards . 
They could also adjust those quotas to correct policy deviations.  
The assumption behind such an institutional design is that the people had the 
innate faculty to find out the best way to deal with change if the ruler built efficient 
reward and punishment institutions. The ruler therefore only needed to appoint 
officials who suited their positions, and provide an incentive system to stimulate those 
officials¶ enthusiasm. The ruler should leave policy implementers some space to let 
them make decisions, rather than intervening personally to address concrete 
difficulties they faced in the process of governance. Through those institutions, the 
intention of the ruler could be achieved even when other participants had not grasped 
his intention. The operation of the political system could therefore follow the dao.  
Dao as the SageV¶ Conception (᜿ yi)  
What are the intellectual and experiential requirements that one must fulfill to 
become qualified as an authority to make claims about the meaning of the dao? Wang 
Anshi answered this question by interpreting the dao as the thought of the Sages. 
In his famous essay entitled On Attaining Unity (Zhiyilun 㠤а䄆), Wang Anshi 
outlined an entire course for people to apprehend the dao. He further described the 
mental state of the Sages that had fully grasped the dao, explaining how they had 
attained this state. He claimed, 
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 All ten thousand things have an ultimate normative pattern ⨶ to them. If one 
can understand the essence of their pattern, he is a Sage. The dao of understanding 
this essence of pattern lies simply in attaining the unity of all things. If one attains 
unity, then all things under Heaven can be apSUHKHQGHGZLWKRXWFDOFXODWLRQ«,I
one is able to attain unity and grasp the essence of all patterns under Heaven, then 
he can enter shen. Once he has entered shen, then [he has reached] the ultimate 
dao. When thus, he is at a moment of shen WKDWLVµQRWKought, no action, tranquil 
DQGXQPRYLQJ¶+RZHYHUWKHUHDUHFHUWDLQO\DIIDLUVXQGHU+HDYHQWKDWFDQEH
WKRXJKWDERXWDQGDFWHGXSRQKHPXVWµFRPSUHKHQGWKHLUFDXVHV¶141   
 
  In this essay, Wang Anshi LPSOLFLWO\FKDQJHGWKHFRQQRWDWLRQRI³de,´ORZHULQJLW 
from a concept equal to dao to a series of simple virtues, which represented one 
DVSHFWRISHRSOH¶VFKDUDFWHUHe argued that people could ³fully realize their virtues ጷ
ᗧ (chong de)´ in their daily moral practice. However, Wang Anshi further argued 
that their realization of those virtues did not mean that they were fully aware of the 
SULQFLSOHRIDOOWKLQJVDEOHWR³DWWDLQWKHXQLW\ 㠤а´RIWKHZRUOG$WWDLQLQJWKHde in 
this philosophy was only the first step in a larger process of cultivating people¶s spirit 
(⾎ shen). Wang Anshi depicted the ³spirit´ as the ultimate mental state of ³no thought, 
no action, tranquil and unmoving´ Only when students had achieved this mental state 
could they attain unity in their social and political practice. Unity in this essay meant 
the coherence. Wang Anshi believed that if the students had attained the coherence, 
they would automatically respond to all things of the world in a consistently correct 
manner. In other words, they could find the correct way to overcome any uncertainties 
brought about by external changes.    
 In contrast to Wang¶s first position, he no longer took the apprehension of the 
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correct way of behaving and thinking in daily practice as enough for the student to 
enter the ultimate mental state. Realization of personal virtue only marked a 
beginning stage in the long self-cultivation process. According to Wang Anshi, after 
students had realized their personal virtue they should actively devote themselves to 
political practice. The student¶s pursuit of virtue referred to the perfection of their 
personal conduct in doing good and avoiding evil activities, but political practice 
required them to possess the principles that determined peace and turmoil in a 
political system. In addition, they had to grasp the best way of arranging people in 
different positions in the political system according to their virtue and intelligence.142 
Wang Anshi did not believe that common people could apprehend the spirit 
(shen) without the complete pursuit of virtuous conduct and bureaucratic service. This 
process can neither be achieved by only controlling their desires and emotions, nor by 
OHDUQLQJIURPRWKHUSHRSOH¶VHWKLFDOFRQGXFW8QOLNHWKHde, the shen was not inherent 
LQSHRSOH¶VPLQGVDQGWKHUHIRUHLQGLYLGXDOFDSDELOLW\WRUHcognize the shen could not 
be guaranteed by belief or devotion.   
Wang Anshi further argued that the Sages, who had entered a similar stage of fully 
apprehending the shen, FRXOGHDVLO\XQGHUVWDQGRQHDQRWKHU¶VDFWLYLWLHV7KH\ZRXOG
automatically react to the environment and follow the same dao. Although their 
activities were different, the dao that guided these activities was consistent.143 For 
common students, who had yet to experience the complete process of learning the 
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principle of all things in their moral cultivation and real political practice, this process 
was impossible. The impossibility of individual discovery of the dao was due to a 
shortage of experience that made students incapable of gaining a complete knowledge 
system of the world. Therefore those students could never fully develop the shen. 
Wang Anshi never designed or mentioned a practical procedure for guiding people to 
generate their shen. As his other writings illustrate, Wang Anshi considered the Sages 
to be the only people who had  attained complete shen. Shen was the ultimate goal of 
self-cultivation that individuals might aspire to, but could never attain. 
According to Wang Anshi, unity in thought and action meant that the Sages¶ 
every action was in accordance with the dao. This coherence in action distinguished 
the Sages from both the superior men and the common people. Wang Anshi defined 
the superior men (or the ³worthy´䌒Ӫ)as those who had apprehended the dao but 
could not attain unity. In his words, ³the worthy is not always in agreement with the 
Sage in the matter of conduct. It is simply that his knowledge is such that he can know 
the Sage´144 In this statement, Wang Anshi clarifies the difference between the 
mental states of the Sages who had known the complete dao and the worthies who 
had only apprehended the dao of the Sages. For Wang Anshi, the worthy¶s 
apprehension could not guarantee his unity in mind and behavior because his 
apprehension of the dao was based on, and constrained by, the Sages¶ words and 
writings. Moreover, Wang Anshi thought that this gap could not be filled because even 
the worthy could never attain the social and political experience that the Sages had 
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obtained.  
But does this mean that the dao is inaccessible to the learners? In Wang Anshi¶s 
political philosophy, the answer is no because he added the concept of ³wen ᮷´WRKLV
line of reasoning. ³Wen´ included the written texts of law, policies, and institutions 
that had been recorded in the Classics. As he stated, ³the teachings [that led to] order 
and the commands [that effected] policy were what the sages called wen.´145 Wang 
Anshi held that the Sages created those texts, which recorded how they responded to 
external changes. In their reaction to changes the Sages established laws, policies, and 
institutions to organize people. The Sages formed conceptions of how to deal with 
external changes, conceptions that were embodied by those institutions and the texts 
written by the Sages. Wang Anshi believed that the Sages had their pointes to make 
when writing those texts, which could be grasped by learners to guide people¶s social 
and political practice.146   
     
Who had the authority to explain the SageV¶ conception in the policy making 
process? This question is fundamental for building the order of governance, because 
only those who had such authority would have the legitimacy to lead the political 
system.  
 Wang Anshi attitude towards this issue in his various writings is ambiguous. In 
his preface to Explanations of the Characters (ᆇ䃚), Wang Anshi confidently 
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claimed, ³How could it not be that Heaven plans to restore This Culture of Ours and 
is using me to aid its beginning? Therefore teaching and learning must begin from this. 
Those able to understand this will already have nine-tenths of the meaning (yi) of 
daode.´147 Wang Anshi implied that he was the person who had been chosen by 
Heaven to begin the new literati culture, because he had discovered the conception of 
the Sages. This claim did not assert that he should have the dominant role in the 
formal policy making process, however.  
During the early years of the Xining reign, Wang Anshi re-edited his 
commentary on the Great Plan chapter in the Document and submitted his 
commentary with a memorial (㺘). The targeted reader of that memorial was the 
emperor. In the memorial, Wang Anshi asserted that the emperor had good personal 
virtue and intelligence. On the other hand, however, Wang Anshi did not suppose that 
the emperor had correctly follwoed the conceptions of the Sages in making policy. 
Good officials therefore would not be discovered by the emperor and thus the 
behavior of literati at court would not be transformed. Bureaucrats all over the country 
did not follow the correct policies. The court could not unify literati opinion, but 
instead allowed the existence of divergence and endless debate. According to Wang 
Anshi, he submitted this commentary because he wanted to make the emperor know 
how to use the conception of the Sages to deal with actual situations.148 Wang Anshi¶s 
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attitude in this memorial resembles his attitudes in his informal conversations with 
Emperor Shenzong and other high officials as they were recorded in his Diary ᰕ䤴). 
In those conversations, he repeatedly criticized the Emperor¶s hesitation on the New 
Policies as well as his tolerance of different opinions.149  
Nevertheless, in his other writings which the court publicly promulgated to the 
students at the government schools, Wang Anshi claimed that the emperor was the 
only authority who had not only discovered the dao but also personally decided the 
New Policies and made them fully reflect the conception of the sages. For example, in 
the prefaces he composed for the New Commentaries for the Three Classics, which 
was published as a textbook for government schools in 1075, Wang Anshi emphasized 
that he was merely the follower of Emperor Shenzong in the entire process of 
deciding the New Policies.150  
 Wang Anshi used a similar narrative to write his various prefaces to the New 
Commentaries for the Three Classics. He first stated that the Sages had apprehended 
the dao in their minds. The Classics that the Sages wrote therefore embodied their 
conception in ordering the world. He further argued that only Emperor Shenzong had 
discovered and apprehended that conception and followed that conception to make the 
New Policies. The emperor wanted students to learn the conception of the Sages, 
therefore he ordered Wang Anshi and his subordinates to write the commentaries. 
                                                        
149
 Wang Anshi¶s personal record is mainly preserved in Xu zhizhi tongjian changbian 㒼䋷⋫
䙊䪂䮧㐘.  
 
150
 Wang Anshi, ³zhouli yi xu ઘ⿞㗙ᒿ´ ³Shu yixu ᴨ㗙ᒿ´ ³Shi yisu 䂙㗙ᒿ´Wang 
Jingong wenji qianzhu xia 䌳勲℔㔯普䬳㲐, 1610-1617 ³Jin zishuo biao 䙢ᆇ䃚㺘´ Wang 
Jinggong wenji qianzhu zhong䌳勲℔㔯普䬳㲐ᷕ, 747; ³Jin zishuo zhazi䙢ᆇ䃚ࢴᆀ´ Wang 
Jingong wenji qianzhu shang䌳勲℔㔯普䬳㲐ᶲ,183 
 103 
Wang Anshi stressed that he had no authority to decide the meaning of the Classics. 
All his work was to record and deliver the Emperor¶s opinion on the dao. The way in 
which he delivered the emperor¶s opinion was to exhaust his knowledge of antiquity 
so that he could apprehend the emperor¶s conception by clarifying the interconnection 
between his policies and the Classics.151     
Wang Anshi even claimed that the emperor had the grasped the ³spirit ⾎´ which 
was the ultimate stage in Wang¶s design of self-cultivation.152 Wang Anshi therefore 
took the emperor to hold absolute authority in the formal policy process. The public, 
including bureaucrats and other policy implementers, should also recognize that 
authority and obey the emperor¶s edicts. The New Policies reflected the intention of 
the emperor, which was in accordance with the conception of the Sages.  
Wang Anshi did believe that the emperor could be corrected in the informal 
deliberation process, but he had the clear sense that the informal deliberative process 
should not be known to the public. The emperor could be wrong, but his mistake 
should only be discussed within a limited circle. The actions and ideas of the emperor 
as shown to the people outside that circle should be absolutely obeyed. Furthermore, 
the emperor should not show any hesitation about the New Policies before the public 
because those polices were his own. As we will see, Wang Anshi had designed a 
formal procedure to resolve policy deviations. He emphasized that the emperor¶s 
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intention should be honestly implemented by the bureaucrats.   
Moreover, the emperor was not autocratic in the formal policy making procedure 
because he could not arbitrarily interpret the conception of the Sages in the Classics. 
The New Policy makers, including the emperor, had achieved agreement on the basic 
understanding of the Sages¶ conception. They published standard commentaries on the 
Classics and unified the interpretation of that conception. I will discuss their 
interpretation in the next section.   
³Yi ᜿´ as the SageV¶ conception of priority and sequence in rulership 
Wang Anshi and other New Policy makers¶understanding of the Sage¶s 
conceptions/intentions (yi) was disseminated throught the composition of official 
commentaries on the Three Classics to make them the standard commentaries for the 
civil examination. This included the commentaries for the Documents, Songs, and the 
New Significances of the Institute of Zhou, the last of which Wang Anshi personally 
wrote. Extant materials demonstrate Wang Anshi¶s complex understanding of the 
Sages¶ thought (or yi) in his writings.  
In his correspondence to Zu Zezhi, Wang Anshi elaborated upon his 
understanding of the thought of the Former Kings in their political practice of making 
rules. He believed that their thought could be found in the wen written by the Sages. 
As he stated,      
The teachings [that led to] order and the commands [that affected] policy 
were what the Sages called wen. When written on slips of wood and applied to all 
the people they were one. As for the Sages in regard to Way, their minds must 
have apprehended it. When they acted and made teachings and commands, the 
Sages ordered root and branch, and what came first and last. They made principles 
[for people] on the proper way of action according to the situation and unified 
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them with the ultimate principle (℺ऒࡦ㗙㘼аѻҾᾥ). When they wrote them 
down on slips of wood they were simply recounting how it was. The ignorant 
people, however, did not do things as the Sages did. Sometimes they fit [the 
proper way of behaving], but sometimes not. They were either indulgent or overly 
constrained [in the process of resolving problems]. They either overdid things or 
did not reach [the standard for proper action]. In more serious situations, people 
gave up the things that should have been taken as the root, but only sought to do 
the things that are the branch; they put priority on the things that should be done 
later. All that they did deviated from the ultimate principle.153   
 
Wang Anshi demonstrated a mode of analysis that showed how to grasp the 
conception of the Sages with the concepts of ³root and branch ᵜᵛ´ and priorityݸᖼ. 
That conception was coherent because it fully captured the coherence of the external 
world. In his view, this mode of analysis could be applied to all times and situations, 
and was not limited to the Classics, which he did not think were complete in any case. 
Wang Anshi wanted to instruct learners on how they should think during the process 
of making policy. He believed that seeing the coherence of things at a higher order of 
abstraction/generalization was important in the development of policy.  
Priority or sequence referred to the Former Kings¶ conception of which 
problems should be resolved first and which problems would determine policy 
outcomes. In the Wanyan shu and other writings, Wang Anshi repeatedly describes 
such sequences as ³root and branch ᵜᵛ´ and ³what comes first and last ᖼݸ´154 
Wang Anshi believed that the sequence could be discovered in the Classics, which 
recorded the ways in which the Former Kings prioritized policies according to 
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changing circumstances. The ignorant had no knowledge of this, and therefore 
arranged the sequence incorrectly when facing multiple policy options.  
In his discussion of the sequence of rulership, Wang Anshi believed that there 
existed universal principles that could guide people to make choices about their 
actions in various situations. He also believed that the Sages had discovered those 
principles, and therefore the way they did things was correct. He further held that the 
Sages had recorded in the Classics how they made policies, but without explicitly 
articulating what the principles were. The principles had to be drawn from an analysis 
of the Sages¶ writings. The Sages¶ behavior as recorded in the Classics could not be 
seen because of the eclipse of time, but the Classics recorded the process of the the 
Sages thinking. Wang Anshi believed that he could also discover the principles by 
analyzing the Classics. These principles in his discourses are the conception or the 
dao of the Sages. Through his explanation of the Sages¶conception (yi), which guided 
them to act in particular ways, Wang Anshi believed that he had found principles that 
could also guide his contemporaries in their decision-making. 
Wang Anshi formulated the universality of the Sage¶s conception by 
reinterpreting knowledge distinctive to Zhou ritual in a more universal manner that 
could guide practices across time and space ibed using language that contemporary 
readers could understand, even when those readers had no concrete knowledge of 
policy or the jargon that was used in the age of the Former Kings. For example, in his 
discussion of the Nine Tributes(ҍ䋒) system of the Former Kings, Wang Anshi 
explained why the writer of the Rites of Zhou followed certain sequences in recording 
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the different categories of tribute. Wang Anshi argued that the Nine Tributes began 
with sacrifices imposed on the hou zone of service (100 li from the royal domain) 
because the Former Kings intended to extend the policies by following the sequence 
that put the upper before the lower. The Former Kings then imposed a tribute of 
women¶s textile production (silks and linen) on the dian zone of service (the next 100 
li) because the Former Kings followed the sequence RI³inner before outer.´ The inner 
(޵) in common people¶s knowledge referred to the women of the family. He further 
argued that the tribute of cloth (ᴽ䋒) came after the tribute of timber (ᶀ䋒) because 
the Former Kings thought that state supplies should be prioritized above personal 
supplies for the ruler.155 
Wang Anshi¶s argument is based on his knowledge of the distinctive terms 
employed in the Classics. In the above depiction, such terms included ³hou zone´ 
³dian zone´ ³tribute of cloth´DQG ³tribute of timber´ These terms would not appear 
in the SROLFLHVRI:DQJ$QVKL¶s time. The Song taxation and local administration 
system shared no similarities with the institutions that those terms described. Wang 
Anshi, however, did not think that the conception of the Former Kings can only be 
applied to those distant institutions and terms. Based on his analysis of the meaning of 
those terms, he used abstract but understandable expressions to describe the 
conception. For example, based on his analysis of the meaning of dian zone and hou 
zone, he concluded that the Former Kings did these concrete things because of their 
conception (yi) that ³the order of extending policies should put the upper before the 
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lower and the inner before the outer and should impose detailed [duties] on the near 
and modest [duties] on the far.´ To understand this expression required no knowledge 
of Zhou rituals. Words such as ³upper к´ and ³inner ޵´ can refer to anything related 
to emperor and family, including contemporary things. Their meanings thus subsumed 
the original meanings of those terms as used in the Zhou. Thus for Wang the 
conception of the Former Kings could be inferred from the fact that they arranged and 
the idea of a proper sequence could guide the way people in the present formulated 
their policies.  
Wang Anshi also believed that the Former Kings had a deeper meaning when 
arranging the sequence. Therefore, contemporary learners should not only know the 
principle for prioritization among different policies, but also apprehend the reasons 
why the Former Kings had formulated this principle. For example, in another section, 
Wang Anshi concludes that the Former Kings arranged the sequence of Eight Levers 
(ޛᷴ) by following a way that put reward before punishment, heavy reward before 
light reward, and light punishment before severe punishment. He pointed out that the 
Former Kings did this to imply that the ruler should show his priority of encouraging 
reward over punishment. Wang Anshi further noted that this arrangement of the 
sequence also implied the Former Kings¶ conception that the ruler should be flexible 
in carrying out reward and punishment, according to changing situations. In such a 
way, the Former Kings specified different priorities for punishment and reward.156 
The Former Kings¶ conception of the ruling sequence referred not only to the 
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question of ³what comes first and what second´ but also to which policies should be 
taken as the ³root ᵜ´ and which as the ³branch ᵛ´WKDWLVWKDWVRPHWKLQJVZHUH
fundamental to other things, and something were dependent on other things. From 
Wang Anshi¶s perspective, the achievement of the court¶s goal would depend upon 
several key factors. If the ruler wanted to achieve his goal, he should focus on the root 
factors, which would determine the result of governance, rather than superfluous 
factors. For example, Wang Anshi argued that the Former Kings had a ritual system 
built around showing true respect to the gods by rulers, officials and common people. 
The later dynasties, however, forgot this root. They lost true respect for the gods, only 
paying attention to the details of the rites. Thus they could not achieve the goal of 
attaining peace through concrete rituals. Wang Anshi concluded, ³7he process of 
governing has its root and branch. If you do not work on the root but only work on the 
branch, you will not achieve your purpose.´157  
In his commentary on the Great Plan chapter of the Documents, Wang Anshi 
discussed the conception of the Former Kings in regard to both the root of governing 
and its relationship to concrete policies. Wang Anshi believed that full achievement of 
the dao in the governance process would result in the improvement of common 
SHRSOH¶VOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQVLQFOXGLQJEHWWHUKHDOWKJUHDWHUZHDlth, increased virtue, 
and the promise of satisfaction at the end of life.158 He believed that the attainment of 
this purpose was determined by the fulfillment of the doctrine of WKH³August 
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Ultimate ⲷᾥ´ Wang Anshi interpreted this doctrine as the rulers¶ distribution of 
wealth to the majority people, even if they did not have the sincere mind to follow the 
ruler.159 Wang Anshi called this doctrine the ³root ᵜ´ for governing, because it 
determined the successful achievement of the fundamental goal.  
Wang Anshi believed that all the policies made in the governing process should 
reflect this root. The policies should also guarantee the achievement of this 
fundamental doctrine. In his commentary on the Great Plan, he showed that the 
Former Kings had this conception. Wang Anshi summarized the basic characteristic of 
the economic policies as ³taking resources from some parts of society to distribute 
them to other parts´ to strengthen agriculture as the basis of the livelihood of 
society.160   
In the Great Plan Wang Anshi argued that the Former Kings had the conception 
(yi) of designing various measures to guarantee the achievement of the fundamental 
doctrine. He point to such measures in the text as the monarch¶s self-cultivation of his 
nature through the five behaviors; the employment of the talented through the eight 
measures of governing; the use of the five records to follow the calendar; the use of 
the three virtues to deal with external changes; the reliance upon WKHPRQDUFK¶V own 
mind as well as external objectivities to resolve uncertain difficulties; and the 
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judgment of policies through natural omens.161  
 
Wang's interpretation of the Sages' conceptions extended to the relationship 
between the state and private interests in his own day, for example, in Wang Anshi¶s 
interpretation, the Sages¶ conception of ruling entailed a process. As he described it:    
 
The Zhou dynasty instituted the Market Treasurer, by which it suppressed 
land-engrossing, equalized [resources] to save the destitute and needy, and 
circulated the wealth of all-under-heaven. In later generations, only Sang 
Hongyang and Liu Yan were close to realizing the intention [of the Former 
Kings]. Scholars were unable to illuminate the conception of the Former King¶s 
policies; they simply thought that the sovereign should not compete with the 
people over profit. If we are to manage wealth today, we should establish the 
policy of Market Treasurer so as to control the power to profit.162  
 
 The above quotation depicted a process in which the government first took 
resources away from powerful market actors and then redistributed them to others 
who needed those resources. This ideal process had emerged in the Sages¶ governance. 
Wang Anshi believed that it could also reoccur in the contemporary age. The increase 
of state revenue, and its reinvestment in infrastructure and other efforts, would lead to 
the improvement of social welfare and strengthening of people¶s capacity to increase 
their products. y. The fundamental way to guarantee the achievement of this ideal 
process was to place the various government agencies under the leadership of 
bureaucrats who had apprehended the Sages¶ conception of the sequences and 
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priorities of rulership. Those bureaucrats should know that the root of the political 
system lies in the prosperity of the majority of people in society. They would then 
make policies and used material incentives to lead their subordinates who had no such 
apprehension to achieve that conception. They should also know the principle for 
arranging policy priorities depending on changing circumstances.  
The New Policy makers¶ interpretation of the SageV¶ conception in practice could 
not provide much guidance for resolving such practical problems. It became a theory 
that was used by policy makers to prove the legitimacy of their policies, which 
continually required more revenue. The New Policy drafters claimed that increasing 
revenue would not damage social productivity because the bureaucrats could find 
ideal ways to achieve their goals. The only work for the policy makers was to make 
the bureaucrats know the conception of the sages and the intention of policy makers, 
build the material incentives to stimulate their enthusiasm, and give them more 
autonomy to decide on market strategies.  
 
Building Motivation to Shape the Bureaucrats¶ Collective Action and Adaptive 
Governance : A Close Reading of Wang Anshi¶s Myriad Word Memorial 
Based on his understanding of the dao, Wang Anshi envisioned a whole scheme 
that in his mind would guarantee the successful implementation of the New Policies. 
Based on a close reading of his most famous essay, the Myriad Word Memorial 
(Wanyan shu 㩜䀰ᴨ), I will show how he interwove different lines of reasoning to 
design his ideal political order.  
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In 1060, Wang Anshi was appointed Administrative Assistant of the Tax Bureau 
of the State Finance Commission. At that time, he submitted to Emperor Renzong his 
most famous reform plan, known as the Myriad Word Memorial. Unlike his later 
plans on economic reform, Wang Anshi¶s focus in this memorial was on building an 
ideal system of governance to enable the Song state to successfully respond to 
changing conditions by flexibly adjusting its policies. The ideal way of ruling did not 
mean blind obedience to the letter of policy, but it not mean the unfettered autonomy 
of the bureaucrats either, who might choose to act so as to satisfy their private 
interests. For the New Policy makers like Wang Anshi, the ideal way of governing 
meant the simultaneous attainment of the policy implementer¶s creativity and 
conformity to the intentions of the policy.  
The strategy of rewarding conformity might appear to be at cross-purposes with 
developing creativity and innovation. To a certain degree, the system required policy 
participants to rigidly follow guidelines from the central authorities. At the same time, 
it also asked them to break through outdated constraints on governance, respond to 
external crises, and to be more adaptive to local developments unknown at the central 
level. This new political system required participants to innovate as long as they 
always followed the dao, and never prioritized their private interests. Unlike some 
early modern European political thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, or 
John Stuart Mill, Wang Anshi and other drafters of the New Policies did not try to 
resolve this theoretical difficulty by drawing a clear line between the power of policy 
making and the power of policy implementation. Not did they bestow categories of 
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power to their corresponding political units, such as a representative assembly as the 
unit for exercising policy making power or a bureaucracy for policy implementation. 
Instead, they believed that these two goals were not contradictory, because they 
integrated the concept of dao (or the yi of the Former Kings) into their logical 
framework. By using this term, they proved that these two goals could be satisfied in 
theory by the same governing body, which referred to both the emperor and the 
bureaucratic system as a whole. At the beginning of the Wanyan shu, Wang Anshi 
elaborates upon this view; he illustrates his lines of reasoning and demonstrates the 
coherence of his schematic vision for shaping the creativity and conformity of 
members of the political system. In short, his argument was that if policies for state 
intervention could follow the dao or the conception of the Former Kings, and if the 
rulers could build motivation to make policy participants follow the dao (rather than 
only the particulars of policies), the creativity and conformity of policy participants 
would be achieved.  
In the Wanyan shu, Wang Anshi enumerates the problems that existed in 
contemporary institutions. In his critique, the contemporary institutional context had 
failed to shape the collective action and creativity of the bureaucrats. According to 
him, any rules that relied solely on coercive power without following the dao would 
fail to inspire policy participants. This failure would interrupt the formation of 
bureaucratic conformity and creativity because it would promote the pursuit of their 
private interests. Wang Anshi believed the weakness of the government was caused, 
and amplified by, the innate defects of the political system. The bureaucrats, the 
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literati, and other members of society silently rejected the strict compulsory 
regulations imposed upon them. The rejection of the laws gave way to informal 
customs that gave actors complete freedom to pursue private interests. These informal 
customs subverted the rule of the state, and rendered it incapable of innovative 
governance.  
)URP:DQJ$QVKL¶VSHUVSHFWLYHFRHUFLYHJRYHUQDQFHZRXOGIDLOWRPDNHSROLF\
participants conform to the goals of the court because bureaucrats could twist the 
VWDWH¶VSROLFLHVDQGUHJXODWLRQVWRVDWLVI\WKeir own private interests. As a result even 
good policies would deviate from their original intention, thus disturbing the lives of 
the common people. Under such circumstances policy outcomes would be completely 
beyond the control of the court.163 Moreover, t officials who acted on the basis of 
self-interest would be expected to subvert the system to pursue their own goals, even 
when crises occurred.164 All these activities made the state more fragile and 
susceptible to crises. 
Moreover, iQ:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZWKH1RUWKHUQ6RQJVWDWH¶VSROLWLFDOV\VWHPKDG
failed to build innovative mechanisms for policy creation because bureaucrats faced 
rigid regulation, ineffective personnel selection, and unlimited opportunities for 
corruption. The current government, Wang asserted, depended on superficial 
regulations, and lacked a solid institutional context to control officials. These 
VXSHUILFLDOUHJXODWLRQVVHULRXVO\IHWWHUHGRIILFLDOV¶DGDSWDELOLW\2IILFLDOVWKHUHIRUHKDG
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to cautiously obey regulations in order to avoid punishment. The regulations did not 
encourage them to seek means in which their administration could continually 
innovate in implementing the ways of the Former Kings.165 Moreover, superior men 
who had pursued the way of the Former Kings would be punished according to 
regulations due to trivial mistakes.166 
The civil service examination system for selecting the literati only evaluated 
candidates based on their literary skills or, in less prestigious tracks, their 
memorizationof extensive portions of the Classics+RZHYHU³WKRVHZKRUHDOO\
understand the ideas of the Former Kings and are capable of applying them in a 
practical manner to the problems of government are not to be selected by this 
SURFHGXUH´167 Moreover, since these people lacked the practical knowledge 
necessary for good governance, they were not allowed to remain in one office for any 
length of time. Naturally, under such circumstances, the rulers faced significant 
difficulty in finding individuals to fulfill any given position.168 Incompetent officials 
also appointed similarly negligent men instead of choosing people devoted to the dao 
of the Former Kings.169 These self-serving and convention-mired men formed an 
interest group for protecting themselves and their vested interests. When this group of 
literDWLRFFXSLHGRIILFLDOSRVWVDWWKHFHQWUDODQGORFDOOHYHOVWKH\WHQGHGWR³VODYLVK
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conventionality ഐᗚ´,QRUGHUWRDFKLHYHWKHLUSULYDWHSXUSRVHVWKH\UHVRUWHGWR
³VHHNLQJWRPDNHUWKHLUVXSHULRUVKDSS\ ਆᇩ´DQG³HVWDEOLVKLQJSULYDWHQHWZRUNVWR
cultivate their personal advantage Ӕ⿱伺ᵋ´%XUHDXFUDWVDWGLIIHUHQWOHYHOV
neglected collective action in the development of administrative tasks, and only 
pursued their personal interests. In such a system, the right way of conduct according 
to the dao was directly at odds with the self-interest of thes group of officials 
ZKRP:DQJ$QVKLWKRXJKWOLYHGE\³FRQYHQWions⍱؇´6LQFHLQQRYDWLRQZRXOGZRUN
against vested interests and long-standing conventions, many bureaucrats rejected and 
prevented the promotion of superior men.170 Because the system allowed people to 
pursue their personal desires without restriction, people indulged their passions and 
spread rumors to attack anyone who could undermine their private interests.171 
Therefore, because these officials had no self-discipline and no practical knowledge 
RIJRYHUQDQFHWKH\IROORZHGWKHVDIHFKRLFHRI³FRQYHQWLRQ ᡀ؇´UHjected 
innovation when faced with external crises, and purged talented individuals who 
wished to restore the way of the Former Kings.172  
In the Wanyan shu Wang Anshi also expressed his vision of the ideal political 
order. The complete description of his view is as follows:  
 
Internally, we cannot stop our anxious thoughts about the security of the 
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country [in the sense of defense against rebellion]; externally, we cannot overcome 
our fears of the constant threat of barbarians on our borders. The resources of the 
country are rapidly approaching exhaustion, while the moral tone and habits of life 
among the people steadily deteriorate. On all sides, officials with the interests of the 
nation at heart fear that the peace of the empire may not last. What are the causes of 
those problems? My opinion is that this is the result of a prevailing ignorance of the 
proper way of governing. 
[We all know that] the current laws are strict and regulations are complete. 
They cover everything. But why do I still say that we do not understand the proper 
way [of governing]? [I say this] because our current institution does not agree with the 
policies of the Former Kings. As Mencius says, ³When a ruler is sincerely loving, and 
generally known to be so, but the effects of his benevolent disposition are not realized 
by the people in any adequate way, it must be because their way of governing has not 
imitated the dao of the Former KLQJV´ The saying has accurately pointed out our 
current fault. Our age is distant from the age of the Former Kings. The changes we 
encounter and the situations we face are different from those of the Former Kings. 
The most ignorant can see that the complete revival of the concrete policies of the 
Former Kings is practically impossible. When saying that our fault lies in not 
imitating the policies of the Former Kings, I mean that we should imitate the yi of the 
Former Kings. The Two Emperors [Yao and Shun] and the Three Kings [Yu, Tang, 
and Wen] were removed from each other by a thousand years. Order and chaos 
followed one after the other, and periods of splendor and decline were fully present. 
The changes they encountered, and situations they faced were different, thus the 
measures they adopted varied as well. But their conception (yi ᜿) in governing 
society and state were always the same in [what they treated as] root and branch and 
[in what they did] first and last. I therefore say: we simply ought to imitate their 
conceptions. If we imitate their conceptions, then whatever changes and reform we 
make will not shock people and cause complaint, yet they will surely be in agreement 
with the policies of the Former Kings.  
Though that is true, I am bound to admit that the present state of affairs is of 
such a character that even though your Majesty wishes to reform all affairs under 
heaven to fit the conception (yi) of the Former Kings, circumstances make this 
impossible «Why? Because human talent in society is inadequate. My observation 
leads me to suggest that there has never been such a scarcity of talented officials as 
exists today in the service of the state. It is possible that human talent is inadequate 
because they are hidden away in society and the contemporary rulers do not know this. 
I would say that although I have searched for the talented in urban corners and 
country yards, I have found very few indeed. Does this indicate that our methods for 
educating and perfecting the talented do not follow the correct way? 
 I would quote my own experience with local official life, for it adds weight to 
my argument that the talented people are inadequate. Within the circuits that extend 
several thousand li, I found very few officials who are able to carry out the court¶s 
policies. [Few officials] knew which policies should be implemented in piecemeal 
fashion and which should be carried out in a hasty way, [or how to] lead their 
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[subordinates] to fulfill their obligations to the state. On the contrary, those who are 
incapable, negligent, avaricious, and mean are innumerable. In some prefectures there 
is absolutely no one who is capable of clarifying the meaning (yi) of the Former 
Kings¶ policies and applying it to accommodate the current changes. Every time when 
the central court promulgates a policy, even if the intention (yi) of the policy is good, 
the officials still cannot realize [the intention] to benefit the common people. The 
clerks also take advantage of the policy to disturb the ordinary people.  
[Given the above facts,] I therefore say that talented officials in governmental 
service are inadequate and talented people in grass-roots society are also very few. If 
the talented are not adequate, even if your Majesty hopes to reform all the affairs 
under the heaven to fit the conception (yi) of the Former Kings and even if there are 
some ministers in court who could apprehend your Majesty¶s intention (yi) and take 
the responsibility of facilitating your reform, there are still few people in the country 
ZKRFRXOGDSSUHKHQG\RXU0DMHVW\¶s intention (zhi ᤷ) and realize it through concrete 
policies to benefit everyone in the country. I therefore argue that circumstances have 
made your plans impossible. As Mencius says, ³3olicy cannot operate automatically 
by itself [because the implementation of policy relies on the right people].´ Does not 
this statement talk about our current situation?  
To my mind the greatest need of the present time is the procurement of talented 
people. If the talented people in the country are numerous, then we can select those 
talented people for the right positions. When the officials in their positions have talent, 
then it was easy for the rulers to reform bad policies to follow the conception (yi) of 
the Former Kings depending on changing circumstances and based on the concerns of 
the people. Society nowadays is the same as that in the age of the Former Kings. The 
talented people in the age of the Former Kings were numerous, why are they 
inadequate today? I therefore say that the way in which we cast and complete human 
talent is not correct.173  
 
Wang Anshi separated the process of governance into two areas: policy-making, 
and the dynamics of policy implementation. This separation can be seen in his 
quotation of Mencius, ³policy cannot operate automatically by itself ᗂ⌅н㜭ԕ㠚
㹼´ In his other writings, he also emphasized that the content of correct policies 
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could convey the dao. Therefore even in the implementation process, the policy may 
produce bad results. Such results, however, were not caused by the policy content, but 
by the people who implemented the policy. From this perspective, Wang Anshi built 
coherence between the policy (⌅) and the dao. The belief in coherence between the 
New Policies and the dao made Wang Anshi confident that the policy was correct. 
Such coherence in his mind was the first prerequisite for shaping the political order. 
His next question focused on the issue of how to guarantee the successful 
implementation of policies in a changing social and political environment. For him, 
the key to answering this question was to build a policy-making and -implementing 
mechanism that could shape the conformity and creativity of policy participants. He 
repeatedly emphasized that good policy must be accomplished through its 
implementation process. On many occasions, even ³if the intention (yi) of the policy 
is good, the officials still cannot realize [the intention] to benefit the common people.´ 
A good policy could easily become a tool for evil bureaucrats to satisfy their private 
interests at the cost of the common people¶VLQWHUHVWV. 
Therefore, Wang Anshi¶VIRFXVZDVRQ shaping the ³circumstance ऒ´ or the 
context in which bureaucrats could both follow the rule of the central court and adjust 
the policies to deal with actual changes. The first step in Wang¶s line of reasoning was 
his redefinition of correct policy. Wang Anshi argued that ³dao´ or ³the conception of 
the Former Kings´ determined the correctness of specific policies. He clarified that 
due to differences in the historical contexts in which policy makers and bureaucrats 
are situated, there should not be any single policy to resolve all changes. The content 
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of the policies should shift according to changes in the external environment.  
Wang Anshi further argued that the dao or the conception of the Former Kings 
would not change. He explained, ³the conception (yi ᜿) of the Former Kings in 
governing society and state were always the same in [what they treated as] root and 
branch and [in what they did] first and last.´ How people think was thus crucial to 
their effective functioning and realizing their talent. Wang believed he knew how they 
should think, and that seeing the coherence in things at a higher order of abstraction 
was the way to make policy.  
As his depiction in Wanyan shu shows, the political system was comprised of 
three categories of people.  
 
Those who follow the dao and obey the command [of heaven] without 
recognizing [the dao and command] are called the ordinary people. Those who 
have recognized that they are following the dao and obeying the command [of 
heaven] are called superior men. Only the ultimate spirit can achieve [the third 
stage] in which it follows nothing but makes all things follow the dao, and it 
obeys nothing but commands all things.174  
 
Different levels of apprehension of the dao determined SHRSOH¶V different 
statuses in the political system. The difference between ordinary people and superior 
men lay in their awareness of the existence of dao in their mind. Although ordinary 
people could not realize the dao consciously, they could still follow the dao. The 
superior men realized the dao and aspired to learn it, but their apprehension of the dao 
was incomplete. Therefore the superior men should be organized by the emperor, who 
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had the ultimate spirit and fully grasped the dao. The ordinary people should then be 
organized by the superior men, who had recognized the dao of the ultimate spirit. 
Wang Anshi believed that conformity and creativity meant different things to these 
people. As a result, measures to shape conformity and creativity should also be 
different. 
Wang Anshi saw the emperor as the only authority who could grasp the 
complete dao. The conception of the Former Kings in the Wanyan shu¶s discourse was 
no different from that of the emperor in the real political process. For example, Wang 
Anshi says that ³If the talented are not adequate, even if your Majesty hopes to reform 
all the affairs under the heaven to fit the conception (yi) of the Former Kings and even 
if there are some ministers in court who could apprehend your Majesty¶s intention (yi) 
and take the responsibility of facilitating your reform, there are still few people in the 
coXQWU\ZKRFRXOGDSSUHKHQG\RXU0DMHVW\¶s intention (zhi ᤷ) and realize it through 
concrete policies to benefit everyone in the country.´ Here he depicts a reform process 
in which the emperor¶s intention was consistent with the conception of the Former 
Kings. The emperor in Wang Anshi¶s design had to obey the dao rather than deciding 
everything arbitrarily. On the other hand, Wang Anshi took the emperor as having the 
authority to judge which policies followed the dao in the formal governing procedure. 
As he was the only authority who had fully grasped the dao, the intention of the 
emperor should be followed by bureaucrats. But the emperor should guarantee that his 
conception in making those policies had followed the conception of the Sages.  
 By what means could the emperor prove that he was in accord with the Sages¶ 
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conception? The New Policy makers did not provide an answer to this question. As 
Chapter Five will show, in the real policy process, the emperor repeatedly emphasized 
that his policies would simultaneously increase social productivity and raise state 
revenue. Even if he was demanding that bureaucrats increase the revenues due to hi 
consideration for national security, he could still claim that such an action could not 
be called as deviating from the conception of the Sages because according to the 
conception of the Sages, revenue collection was not in conflict with social protection. 
The Sages had integrated both into a coherent policy process and achieved them 
simultaneously. The above quotation shows that by the New Policy makers¶ line of 
reasoning, the emperor was not at fault in making policy even if he could not achieve 
those two goals. In such a line of reasoning the only task for the emperor was to make 
the bureaucrats know his intention and build material incentives to stimulate their 
enthusiasm. The bureaucrats were then responsible for making the great effort to 
achieve those goals. Even if mistakes emerged in the policy implementation process, 
blame would not go to the emperor, because he had done all he needed to do. The 
New Policy makers¶ interpretation of dao therefore set limits on the emperor only in 
theory. In practice it provided the emperor with the theory to legitimate his pursuit of 
the goals different from the stated ³root ᵜ´ for ruling and shift responsibility to the 
local bureaucrats. The bureaucrats therefore gained more autonomy but also faced 
more pressure from the emperor because they were assigned with responsibility for 
policy failures.   
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The category of superior men, or the worthy, referred to those who had grasped 
the dao under the guidance of the emperor. Based on his first understanding of the dao, 
Wang Anshi pointed out that bureaucrats had the innate faculty to apprehend the dao, 
or the conception of the Sages and the emperor. His scheme therefore was to realize 
their potential through educating them. The main goal of the Wanyan shu was to ³FDVW 
and FRPSOHWH´ this category of bureaucrats by ³instructing´ them through state 
schools, ³nurturing them´ through rites and laws, ³selecting´ them through a 
complete evaluation system and ³HPSOR\LQJ´ them through long-term tenure. Wang 
Anshi called this a long-term and progressive program, which differed from the 
reward and punishment institutions that he suggested the emperor use temporarily. 
Wang Anshi also stressed that the emperor should appoint officials who had 
recognized the conception of the Sages to a stable tenure. The trust between emperor 
and officials was based on their common understanding of the Sages' conception, and 
such trust was fundamental for guaranteeing the officials' tenure in certain offices.   
According to Wang Anshi, the emperor should give the bureaucrats who had 
apprehended the conception of the Sages free space to make policy. The bureaucrats¶ 
innovation in the policy process should conform to the emperor's intention. Wang 
Anshi in the above quotation equaled the conception of the emperor with that of the 
Sages. In practice, however the emperor¶s intention could be in conflict with the 
doctrine of the Classics, even though the emperor claimed coherence between them. 
The bureaucrats therefore faced great difficulty in choosing between priorities. For 
example, the emperor informed the bureaucracy that he wanted to increase revenue, 
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but this goal would potentially damage the goal of increasing popular welfare because 
the bureaucrats would squeeze more resources from the common people to raise funds. 
Guided by the New Policy makers¶ worldview, the bureaucrats should not only prove 
that they had apprehended the emperor¶s goal of increasing revenue but should also 
prove that their achievement of this goal would not damage the social welfare.  
The New Policy makers provided a theory for the bureaucrats to prove the 
possibility of attaining both goals. The bureaucrats therefore keep on increasing 
revenue quotas to show that they had apprehended the emperor¶s intention, while on 
the other hand, the court also shifted the responsibility to lower-level bureaucrats. The 
policy makers only focused on building material incentives and delegating the power 
of deciding market strategies to their subordinates. They did this because their 
political philosophy had assumed that those measures would be sufficient for 
achieving the coherent conception of the Sages. Guided by such a belief, the 
bureaucrats did not feel pressed to accumulate knowledge to explain the actual 
changes in the economic system. Neither did they focus on the real difficulties that the 
lower level bureaucrats had constantly encountered in dealing with market changes. 
Their political belief gave them confidence but also blinded them from seeing and 
resolving the complicated market changes. Their only concern was to prove that they 
could simultaneously achieve both the emperor¶s goals and the conception of the 
Sages, because only by proving that were they able to gain the trust from the emperor 
and guarantee their continued employment in office. However they could only prove 
that in theory. In practice, they still failed to achieve those goals.  
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The third group of bureaucrats referred to those who had no recognition of the 
intention. Wang Anshi¶s second understanding of dao provided him with a line of 
reasoning for dealing with this group of bureaucrats. Wang Anshi identified 
self-interest as the enduring feature of people¶s habitual conduct. For him, the key was 
to establish an institutional environment that could guide such self-interest onto a 
track that could lead the political system to follow the dao. The ruler needed only to 
build incentives to stir the enthusiasm of the people, rather than providing them with 
professional knowledge on dealing with economic change.  
 In the passage from the Wanyan shu cited above, Wang Anshi distinguishes this 
group of peopleQRWLQJWKDW³Within the circuits that extend several thousand li, I 
found very few officials who are able to carry out the court¶s policies«On the 
contrary, those who are incapable, negligent, avaricious, and mean are innumerable. 
In some prefectures there is absolutely no one who is capable of clarifying the 
meaning (yi) of the Former Kings¶ policies and applying it to accommodate the 
current changes.´ The main goal for this bureaucratic group was to carry out concrete 
policies made by the rulers who grasped the conception of the Former Kings. In his 
Wanyan shu, Wang Anshi made a clear distinction between the long-term scheme for 
enlightening the literati¶s apprehension of the dao and the short-term plan by which 
the policy makers could guide people to their intention through material incentives.175 
He saw the latter as an immediate way to achieve the intention of the rulers. As he 
explained, all people wanted to gain good reputations, honorable official titles, and 
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great wealth. The ruler should use these as incentives to make people follow his 
intention. Wang Anshi was confident that the ruler would attain his goal if he could 
establish the proper material incentives. Moreover, the ruler should also severely 
punish those who dared to disobey the policies. People¶s fear of punishment would 
motivate them to follow the mind of the ruler.176 These measures are similar to Wang 
Anshi¶s discussion of the same issues in his other writings, such as his commentary on 
the Great Plan. The goal was not to make the bureaucrats apprehend the conception 
of the Sages or the emperor, but to make them do what the rulers wanted them to do.  
The New Policy makers¶ political philosophy did not, however, provide any 
useful knowledge to instruct those low level bureaucrats in how to overcome 
difficulties they would encounter in the course of market intervention. As Part Three 
will demonstrate, the real challenges faced by those bureaucrats included the shortage 
of capital, their absence of market knowledge, and their weak capacity in managing 
markets and operating businesses. These bureaucrats did not know how to overcome 
such difficulties. The only instrument they could employ was their political privilege. 
They therefore abused their power in ways that damaged the market order and 
betrayed the goals proposed by the New Policy makers. Those policy makers rigidly 
stuck to a laissez-faire attitude toward these bureaucrats and overlooked the 
unexpected consequences.    
    
      In short, the fundamental assumption behind Wang Anshi¶s design for a 
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political order was his understanding of people¶s innate faculty to find the best way to 
deal with external changes. Different from Neo-Confucianists such as the ³Left Wing´ 
of Wang Yangming¶V school in the Ming dynasty, Wang Anshi did not argue that 
people¶s minds were self-sufficient to lead them automatically to find the correct way 
of behaving177. Rather, he thought that the institutional environment was necessary for 
guiding people toward the right path. Such an environment included the Classics that 
contained the dao, education institutions, and reward and punishment measures that 
provided material incentives to policy implementers. On the other hand, Wang Anshi 
also believed that once such an environment had triggered a real impact on 
bureaucrats¶ minds, their human nature would automatically lead them to behave in a 
correct, collective and innovative way. Such a belief caused the drafters of the New 
Policies to continually reinforce the political education and material incentives in their 
regulation of policy deviations. They overlooked the issue of how to resolve concrete 
problems that emerged differently in each stage of the policy process. The following 
chapters will show how such a ³limited regulation´ resulted in the New Policy 
makers' failure to organize social and political actors.   
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PART TWO 
The Intellectual Origins and Political Consequences of Debates on the 
Rural Credit Policy (1069-1071) 
 
The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be 
reduced is that between friend and enemy 
                           ----Carl Schmitt178  
 
Introduction   
In Part Two we will discuss how state intervention in the rural credit market, 
known as the Green Sprouts Policy䶂㤇⌅, provoked great debate among the political 
elites at court in the first three years of the Reform Era (1069-1071). The result of 
these debates was the construction of factional alliances, the clarification of 
irreconcilable attitudes between factions, and the purge of critics from decision- 
PDNLQJFLUFOHV7KHVWDWH¶VVXEVHTXHQWSROLF\UHIOHFWHGWKHZRUOGYLHZRIRQO\RQH
faction, as policy makers failed to organize the perspectives of different groups into a 
state policy that transcended the interests and beliefs of the different factions, or to 
fully respond to problems that occurred in the policy implementation process. The 
VRUWRIVWDWHDXWRQRP\WKDWKDGEHHQLOOXVWUDWHGE\SROLF\PDNHUV¶XQELDVHG
incorporation of different opinions, full responsiveness to policy feedback and strong 
capacity to shape collective choices disappeared from the policy formation 
mechanism after 1071. 
In his statement quoted above, Carl Schmitt implies that the distinction between 
friend and enemy is the innate and permanent feature of any power process. My work 
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in this section will illuminate the intellectual origins of that distinction in the context 
of this period in the Northern Song, and the historical mechanisms through which 
political actors constructed that distinction. I will discuss why both sides of the debate 
adopted despotic methods of settling their debate rather than cooperative deliberation 
to resolve such policy problems, culminating in the expulsion of critics from the court. 
There are several puzzles that we must address. Why did this economic policy cause 
an unprecedented wave of political purges at the court, rather than agreement on a 
search for economic solutions? Why did the critique of real problems in the policy 
implementation process cause such irreconcilable differences of opinion? Why did 
both sides of the debate eventually choose exclusion, even though some historical 
agents in other situations had practiced tolerance? Why did debates on economic 
policy lead to the construction of factional lines as a way to resolve conflict?  
 
Promulgated in the ninth month of 1069, the Green Sprouts Policy created a 
nationwide state-run rural credit system. The bureaucrats at circuit, prefectural, and 
county levels made interest-EHDULQJORDQVFDOOHG³JUHHQVSURXW´cash, to farmers 
either in the summer and fall before harvest, or at other times in the year according to 
local circumstances. The central government delegated the power to decide the time 
of repayment to the Stabilization Fund Supervisorate ᨀ㠹ᑨᒣ at the circuit level. 
Borrowers were required to repay these loans after the summer or fall harvest, after 
paying their taxes. They could freely choose to repay in cash or in grain, as 
convenient. The government charged twenty to thirty percent interest, varying in 
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accordance with the exchange rates between money and grain. Moreover, the 
government organized guarantee groups of five families, in which a landowning 
household was made guarantor for its tenants, and their collateral was subject to 
confiscation in the event of inability to repay their loans. These loans were also made 
available to urban residents who held property or businesses, and to the wealthier 
rural households of grades one through three. However, critics argued that the court 
was loaning money to market actors whom the New Policy makers had originally 
labeled as ³HQJURVVHUV´  
  The deep influence of the Green Sprouts Policy over state structure is evinced by 
the way it reshaped the bureaucratic apparatus. At the central level, Wang Anshi 
created a new agency, the Finance Planning Commission ࡦ㖞йਨọֻਨ, which he 
directly controlled under the supervision of Emperor Shenzong. This agency not only 
set general policy rules, but also adjusted detailed regulations based on the feedback it 
received from local governments. The Stabilization Fund Supervisorate at the circuit 
level, together with the Fiscal Commission 䕹䙻ਨ and the bureaucrats selected by 
the controller-general 䙊ࡔ at the prefectural level of government, decided the 
amounts of the loans based on their calculation of the actual amount of reserves. They 
also took charge of the loan process at the local level. The magistrate and the leaders 
of the guarantee groups below the county level were responsible for guaranteeing that 
the quota set by the superior agencies could be met and the loans repaid.179  
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,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\ZDVQRWVLPSO\DQDPDOJDPDWLRQ
of concrete loan policies, but a coherent whole that followed the dao of the Former 
Kings. The concrete policies represented the principles that the Former Kings had 
adopted in their governance. Wang Anshi himself admitted that the concrete policies 
that the contemporary government implemented could not simply be copied from the 
policies of antiquity, because the situation had greatly changed. The key step in 
proving that the Green Sprouts Policy was of the same character was therefore to 
illustrate that the contemporary policy and the policies of Former Kings followed the 
same dao. The dao was not abstract, as it entailed specific policies of the Former 
Kings that could be found in the Classics. Wang Anshi made great effort to show that 
the policies preserved in the Rites of Zhou represented the same dao as the 
contemporary policies, despite some ambiguity in the literal meaning of some 
H[SUHVVLRQVLQWKH&ODVVLFVDGGUHVVLQJWKHVDJH¶VSROLFLHV:KHQ:DQJ$QVKL
elaborated upon the central intentions of the Former Kings in developing economic 
policy, he clarified the intention of the Green Sprouts Policy as follows:  
 
If the [Green Sprouts Policy] can be implemented, not only will our 
country sufficiently address the threat of famine, but also, because the people 
have received these loans, they will not fear shortage of food when doing 
agricultural work. Based on [these benefits], we can select officials to encourage 
them to build irrigation works. Agricultural affairs will be improved. The 
farmers have become poor and exhausted after their old grain has run out and 
before the new harvest is yet in. The engrossers have taken advantage of 
peoSOH¶VXUJHQWQHHG>IRUPRQH\DQGJUDLQ@DQGDVNHGIRUH[RUELWDQWLQWHUHVWRQ
loans. The borrowers have suffered because the only loans available had high 
interest. The holdings of the Ever Normal Granaries were distributed to the poor 
only in years when the harvest was insufficient and the food prices high, and the 
people who received such benefits were mostly the urban idle. The new policy 
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aims at adjusting the unequal distribution of goods within the circuit. The policy 
would grant low interest loans while also increasing the storage [of the Ever 
Normal Granaries]. The policy could also regulate prices. The achievement of 
these goals would enable farmers with financial resources to decide their 
agricultural affairs according to the season. The engrossers could no longer take 
DGYDQWDJHRIWKHIDUPHUV¶XUJHQWQHHGIRUPRQH\DQGJUDLQ$OOWKHVHPHDVXUHV
are made for the people. The government will not increase its income. The new 
SROLF\WKHUHIRUHIROORZVWKHSULQFLSOHRIWKH)RUPHU.LQJ¶VSROLFLHVDVWKH
government of the Former Kings distributed benefits to increase agricultural 
productivity, to subsidize agriculture through collecting loan interest, and to take 
resources from the rich to help the poor while repressing the unrestrained 
earnings of the engrossers.180  
 
:DQJ¶VRZQGLVFRXUVH in articulating the relationship between the contemporary 
*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\DQGWKH)RUPHU.LQJ¶VSROLFLHVLOOXVWUDWHVWKH way in which he 
understood and interpreted the Green Sprouts Policy. He never treated the policy 
simply as a collection of concrete articles. Instead he viewed the policy as a single 
whole, and in summarizing the essential components of the policy and revealing the 
concepts that these components conveyed, he demonstrated its unity with the Former 
.LQJV¶principles.  
,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZWKHHVVHQWLDOFRQWHQWVRIWKHSROLF\ZHUHWKHVWULSSLQJRI
power from the hands of engrossers, and the return to government control of the 
privileges of regulation over pricing and distribution. If the government held such 
power, it could better monitor and control the inequalities between different social and 
political groups. This redistribution of resources would inspire the originally 
disadvantaged social groups to increase their productivity. By providing farmers with 
the choice to repay their loans in either grain or money, the government and the 
farmers would be able to work together to determine grain prices on the basis of local 
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market demands and economic activities. This ability to negotiate would allow the 
government to strengthen its authority over the ratios of exchange. The goal of this 
policy was twofold: it allowed the government to increase its capacity for social relief, 
and it regulated wild market fluctuations.  
 :DQJ¶VSODQDOORZHGWKHJRYHUQPHQWDPRQRpoly over the power of resource 
redistribution within society. By taking resources from some parts of society and 
redistributing them, the government could increase the wealth of the entire society, in 
accordance with the principles of the Former Kings (as H[SODLQHGE\:DQJ$QVKL¶V
own interpretations of the Classics). The achievement of such a governmental 
function would have to be based on a definitive scope of governmental power in the 
HFRQRPLFVSKHUH:DQJ$QVKLWRRNVFRSHWREHWKHSRZHURI³DGMXVWLQJthe ratios of 
exchange as well as that of collecting and disbursing money and goods (䕅䟽᮲ᮓѻ
℺´:DQJ$QVKLLQKLVFRPPHQWDU\RQThe Rites of Zhou explained that the Treasury 
officers (⋹ᓌ) in the classical age had successfully monopolized this power without 
the fear of influence from other circles.181  
In :DQJ$QVKL¶VRZQGD\KRZHYHUWKLVSRlicy raised great opposition among 
those close to the court. Its opponents include Chen Shengzhi, Zhao Bian and Zeng 
Gongliang, the Grand Councilors and Vice-Grand Councilor, as well as other 
high-level policy makers. Su Shi and Sima Guang were Attendant Officials who had 
the responsibility to directly express their opinions on state policy to the monarch. 
Although Han Qi was appointed as a local official, his former rank as Grand 
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Councilor, his close personal relationship with Emperor Shenzong and his high titular 
status retained great influence over the monarch. Other critics belonged to the 
Censorate and Remonstrance Bureau, which had the special duty of criticizing 
policies, official appointments, and the personal conduct of the monarch and his 
officials. They were in the central circle of policy-making because their opinions on 
policy would be taken seriously by the monarch and other high officials. (see Table 1). 
   $OORIWKHVHSHRSOH¶VGLVWLQFWLYHSRVLWLRQVLQWKHEXUHDXFUDWLFV\VWHPRIIHUHGWKHP
the privilege to submit memorials directly to the monarch discussing major policies 
and governing principles. Emperor Shenzong personally read their memorials and 
occasionally consulted with them on these issues. In the Northern Song bureaucratic 
system these privileges distinguished them from ordinary bureaucrats who could only 
implement policies, rather than discuss them with the monarch.  
Table1 
Name Governmental Posts 
Sima Guang ਨ俜ݹ(1019-1086)  Administrator of Bureau of Personnel 
Administration and Hanlin Academician 
Reader-in-waiting 㘠ֽ᷇䆰ᆨ༛ǃ⸕ሙ
ᇈ䲒 
Su Shi 㰷䔮(1037-1101)  Auxiliary in the Historiography Institute 
and Administrative Assistant of the 
Kaifeng Superior Prefecture ⴤਢ佘ǃ䮻ሱ 
ᓌ᧘ᇈ 
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Cheng Hao 〻井(1032-1085)  Acting Investigating Censor ⴓሏᗑਢ㻿
㹼 
Chen Xiang 䲣㽴(1017-1080)  General Purpose Censor ֽᗑਢ⸕䴌һ 
Zhang Jian ᕥᡙ(1030-1076)  Acting Investigating Censor ⴓሏᗑਢ㻿
㹼 
Han Qi 七⩖(1008-1075)  Supervisor of Daming Superior Prefecture 
ࡔབྷ਽ᓌ 
Sun Jue ᆛ㿪(1028-1090)  Exhorter of the Remonstrance Bureau and 
Imperial Diarist ਣ↓䀰ǃ؞䎧ት⌘ 
Li Chang ᵾᑨ(1027-1090)  Exhorter of the Remonstrance Bureau ਣ
↓䀰 
Lu Gongzhu ੲޜ㪇(1018-1089)  Censor-in-Chief ᗑਢѝю 
Chen Shengzhi 䲣ॷѻ(1011-1079)   Grand Councilor ਼ѝᴨ䮰лᒣㄐһ 
Zeng Gongliang ᴮޜӞ(999-1078) Grand Councilor ਼ѝᴨ䮰лᒣㄐһ 
Zhao Bian 䏉ᢳ (1008-1084) Vice-Grand Councilor ৳⸕᭯һ 
  
7KHSROLF\¶VRSSRQHQWVLQFOXGHGVRPHRIWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWSROLWLFDOWKLQNHUV
of the mid-eleventh century, who also had great influence over the Chinese tradition 
of political philosophy. These figures include Sima Guang, Su Shi, Cheng Hao, Chen 
Xiang and Zhang Jian. These people had established a systematic vision of a political 
order in which policy participants undertook collective action to respond to external 
changes in ways that were consistently correct because they integrated concepts such 
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as dao, human nature, self-interest and wen into their lines of reasoning. These lines 
of reasoning illustrated the validity of their logics of state-building, all of which 
pointed to the same goal of shaping collective action and adaptive governance. Their 
debate with Wang Anshi was not over whether the government should involve itself in 
social affairs, but over how it should do so in a manner conductive to the good of 
society. An in-depth study of their intellectual frameworks will illustrate how 
mid-eleventh-century Chinese political philosophers presented different possible 
schemes for building the state. In Chapter two we will show how these figures tended 
to address similar questions as Wang Anshi regarding the way of ruling, but provided 
different answers to those questions. 
In this chapter, we will also focus on the debate over rural credit policy at the 
LQLWLDOSHULRGRIWKH1HZ3ROLFLHV¶IRUPDWLRQDQGLPSOHPHQWation, showing that the 
GHEDWHUV¶GLIIHUHQWRSLQLRQVDERXWWKLVSROLF\FDQEHH[SODLQHGE\WKHLUV\VWHPDWLF
visions of political order. This argument distinguishes our study from other 
approaches explaining the dynamics that gave rise to conflicting policy alternatives. 
In our view, the policy debate does not show the debaters deploying their illocutionary 
force to compete for material interest. Neither does it simply illustrate controversy in 
designing concrete plans about how to strengthen the societal intervention of an 
activist state. Instead, we illustrate how these eleventh-century Chinese intellectuals 
formulated their own lines of reasoning to connect concepts such as human nature, 
dao, moral principle, self-interest, wen, emotion, and social custom, all which have 
been interpreted variously in Chinese intellectual history. The logical framework of 
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WKH1HZ3ROLFLHV¶GHVLJQHUVJDYHWKHPFRQILGHQFHWKDWWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\
represented the only choice that could overcome all the crises the dynasty was facing. 
They believed it would eventually gain support and obedience and bring the people 
wealthy, harmonious and promising lives. Critics, however, posited that the New 
Policies were leading the state and society into the darkness of poverty and disorder.  
 :HZLOODUJXHKHUHWKDWWKH1HZ3ROLFLHV¶HFRQRPLFSODQRIVWDWHLQWHUYHQWLRQ
and its repercussions in the intellectual world are the products of the ontological 
diversity that had long existed in the tradition of Chinese political philosophy. Our 
study therefore goes beyond the specific policies to explore how different ways of 
WKLQNLQJGHWHUPLQHGKLVWRULFDODFWRUV¶SHUFHSWLRQRIWKHVLWXDWLRQWKHLUXVHRIIDFWVWR
buttress their lines of reasoning, and their adaptation of these lines of reasoning to 
design and judge policies. From this perspective, the state intervention process did not 
always adhere to the rationale of its designers, but rather became an intellectually 
interactive process in which the perceptions and responses of other participants had 
XQLQWHQGHGHIIHFWVRQWKHSROLF\PDNHUV¶SODQV   
 
 The lines of reasoning that policy makers navigated for judging the new 
policies were defined by the intellectual landscape in which they lived. Chapter three 
will show how the paradigms that both sides used to explain policies and justify their 
positions eventually led them into a deadlock that excluded any possibility of 
coordinating their different views to revise the Rural Credit Policy. In particular, I first 
discuss how their views on disciplining the self-interest of policy participants shaped 
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WKHLUIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQWSUHGLFWLRQVRIWKHSROLF\¶VRXWFRPHV,ZLOOIXUWKHU
discuss how the reaction of Wang Anshi to their critiques motivated his critics to use 
WKHLVVXHRI³SXEOLFRSLQLRQ´WRDUJue against him. I will then discuss how such a view 
directed the attention of each side to the factional alliances of the other. The policy 
RSSRQHQWV¶VHOI-conception of their factional identity led them to collectively resign 
from their positions. The policy-PDNHUV¶YLHZVRQEXLOGLQJDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WWR
GLVFLSOLQHSHRSOH¶VPLQGVDOVRPRWLYDWHGWKHPWRH[SHOWKHLUFULWLFVIURPSRVLWLRQVRI
power. Even Emperor Shenzong had to give up his original intention of 
accommodating different views. This historical mechanism led the agents to accept 
one alternative while abandoning the other. Policy debates led to the construction of 
factional lines by both sides of the debaters, and the collective purge of opponent 
factions from the court. The narrowness of the worldviews of both sides shaped the 
despotic tendency in conflict resolution among the political elites at the court.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Intellectual Origins of the Debates on the Rural Credit Policy 
(1069-1071) 
 
In this chapter I focus on the critiques of the Green Sprouts Policy that were 
articulated by Sima Guang, Su Shi, Cheng Hao, Chen Xiang and Zhang Jian. These 
figures not only had great influence over the Chinese tradition of political philosophy 
but also actively engaged in the debates on the Green Sprouts Policy during the initial 
stage of the New Policies period. In their critiques they challenged nearly every aspect 
of the Green Sprout Policy. They firmly believed that the innate policy defects were 
impossible to overcome and the failure of the Green Sprout Policy was predestined 
By situating the critiques within their systematic visions of political order, I argue that 
the critics¶ beliefs guided them to reject the whole policy, even though their critiques 
only focused on certain of its aspects.  
 
 
Shaping Mentality according to Political Hierachy6LPD*XDQJ¶V&ULWLTXH
of the Green Sprouts Policy 
 
In designing the ideal political order, Sima Guang focused on two categories of 
people. The first category referred to the superior men who made policy. Sima Guang 
required that such men cultivate their morality and achieve the achieve the state of 
LQQHUHTXLOLEULXPRUFHQWUDOLW\DQGKDUPRQ\FDOOHG³zhonghe ѝ઼´ The second 
category referred to the bureaucrats and common people whose behavior in the policy 
process was guided by their self-interest. Sima Guang had no ambition to transform 
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such people¶s minds as he did for the superior men. He thought that the policy makers 
should establish an institutional environment to shape their obedience to their roles in 
a political system that was hierarchical and functionally divided. His critique of Wang 
Anshi was guided by these two lines of reasoning. He believed that Wang Anshi had 
deviated from the ideal mental state in making his policies. The Green Sprouts policy 
and the means through which Wang Anshi implemented this policy would both cause 
the policy participants to stray from their previous submission to their roles in the 
political system. The policy therefore was wrong and its implementation would 
damage the economic order.     
 
The mental state of the drafters of the New Policies 
In Sima Guang¶s view, the policy makers¶ mental state determined the quality of 
the policies they made. He saw Wang Anshi as far from an ideal mental state, and he 
thouJKWWKDW:DQJ¶V self-indulgent claim to discovery of the dao made him deviate 
from the actual dao. This mental state meant that the Green Sprout Policy also 
betrayed the dao. In his famous correspondence to Wang Anshi in 1070, Sima Guang 
elaborated this argument. He wrote, 
    Taking power away from the current offices will disturb the government. 
However, you (Wang Anshi) regarded such a measure as the correct way of 
governing and gave priority to its implementation. The interest-bearing loan 
[in the Green Sprouts Policy] is a trivial affair. However, you took it as the 
policy of the Former Kings and devotedly pushed forward with it. Corvée 
labor had been the duty of the people since antiquity. However, you collected 
money from people to employ other services. Even the common people know 
that these three policies are not good; only you think they are good. It is not 
because your intelligence is inferior to that of common people. You simply 
want to pursue unusual achievements, and therefore have overlooked the 
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FRPPRQSHRSOH¶VNQRZOHGJH7KHdao of the August Ultimate is applied to the 
heaven and earth. People [exist within it] without even momentarily getting 
DZD\IURPLW«<RXULQWHOOLJHQFHDQGZRUWKLQHVVDUHEH\RQGWKDWRIWKH
common people. But your shortcomings are the same as those of men who do 
not reach the common level .This is why I say your have gone too far.182   
  
,Q6LPD*XDQJ¶VYLHZ:DQJ$QVKLWUHDWHGWKHdao as a mystery that common 
people could not understand and follow unless Wang enlightened them. Sima Guang 
totally rejected this proposition since he took the dao as an inescapable principle; 
SHRSOHH[LVW³ZLWKRXWHYHQPRPHQWDULO\JHWWLQJDZD\IURPLW´In other words the 
dao was present in FRPPRQSHRSOH¶VGDLO\DFWLYLWLHV and was not reserved for the 
autonomous political system. In many of his writings, Sima Guang repeatedly 
emphasized that the dao UHIHUUHGWRYLUWXHVWKDWJXLGHGFRPPRQSHRSOH¶VGDLO\
conduct. For example, in his correspondence with Han Wei (1017-1098), a Grand 
Councilor in SheQ]RQJ¶VUHLJQ6LPD*XDQJKHOGWKDWWKHdao was the path that people 
should follow in their everyday lives, signifying a moderate and balanced way of 
responding to daily affairs that all people have to face.183 People could learn and 
practice the dao anytime they wanted.184 Sima Guang did not think it was rare for 
people to know the dao.185 The difficulty, however, lay in the process of fully 
LPSOHPHQWLQJNQRZOHGJHDVFRQGXFW6LPD*XDQJWKHUHIRUHFULWLFL]HG:DQJ$QVKL¶V
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effort to construct a new discourse for interpreting the dao, which he saw as a 
deviation from the real dao. 
Unlike Wang Anshi, Sima Guang denied an omnipotent mental state that could 
enable bureaucrats to resolve all kinds of challenges. Such a utopian mental state in 
6LPD*XDQJ¶VYLHZZDVXQUHDOistic and meaningless. He believed that if superior men 
wanted to accomplish their self-cultivation, they should go beyond knowing the dao. 
+DYLQJUHDO³HWKLFDOFRQGXFW ᗧ㹼´VKRXOGEHWKHNH\VWDQGDUGIRUHYDOXDWLQJSHRSOH¶V
attainment of the dao. It would not be difficult to know what conduct is ethical since 
everyone is rational enough to judge other SHRSOH¶s actions; for example, Sima Guang 
suggested that the distinction between petty and superior men was easily recognized 
even by observing how they play games. Unlike the superior men, who are attentive, 
FRQVLVWHQWDQGFDOPWKHSHWW\PHQ³EHQGRYHUWKHLUERGLHVDQGVZLQJWKHLUDUPV7KH\
resort to cunning strategies. Even if they win just by luck WKH\GRQ¶WIHHODVKDPHG´186   
The difficulty of following the dao lies in OLYLQJXSWRRQH¶VNQRZOHGJH6LPD
Guang designed a procedure that the superior men could follow in their daily 
activities. He regarded cultivation of the mind as the key step for people to achieve 
the dao, the goal being to achieve the inner equilibrium (or centrality) and harmony 
FDOOHG³zhonghe ѝ઼´$V6LPD*XDQJH[SODLQHGzhong (centrality) exists in 
SHRSOH¶VPLQGVEHIRUHSOHDVXUHDQJHUVRUURZDQGMR\have been aroused. When these 
emotions are aroused, and all attain their due measure and degree, this is called he 
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(harmony).187 When people achieve this state, they do not indulge the emotions of 
pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy, or let these emotions disturb the innate equilibrium 
and harmony.188 Their mind is not controlled by the prejudice that selfish interests 
cause.189 As Sima Guang explained it, in facing changes in the material world 
VXSHULRUPHQZHUH³VWHDGIDVWDQGNHHSWKHLUPLQGVLQDVWDWHRIDEVROXWH quiet. They 
are respectful and keep their appearance unchanged. They are not cowards before 
victory. They are not arrogant after victory´190 This state does not mean that the 
superior men extinguish their feelings, but that they can maintain a state of unity 
while dealing with change.191 Sima Guang emphasized that the normal situation for 
people is that they can think clearly about right and wrong, but cannot necessarily 
respond in a harmonious and impartial manner because they cannot resist temptation 
from the external world.192  
Sima Guang believed that superior men could achieve a perfect mental state 
through self-training, such as focusing their attention on the work they wanted to do, 
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making their attitudes devoted and serious, and changing their intentions to be 
objective and correct.193 People should especially get rid of their desire to pursue 
material interests.194 He emphasized that people should not trust themselves too much 
RULQVLVWRQFOLQJLQJWRWKHLURZQLQWHQWLRQV$FFRUGLQJWR6LPD*XDQJSHRSOH¶V
mLQGVVKRXOGH[LVW³ZLWKRXWSUHWHQVHZLWKRXWFHUWDLQW\ZLWKRXWLQIOH[LELOLW\DQG
ZLWKRXWHJRWLVP´,ISHRSOHDUHQRWHJRWLVWLFDOWKHQWKH\ZLOOEHLPSDUWLDO6XFK
impartiality would lead them to follow zhonghe. In situations where people 
intentionally do good things, they may also indulge temptation and deviate from 
harmony and equilibrium. The Sages therefore only spontaneously followed the rites 
without purposely trying to be virtuous.195 
In order not to be partial, superior men should also learn from the creation of the 
human and natural worlds. According to Sima Guang, action guided by personal 
feelings but not thought will likely deviate from the dao.196 3HRSOHVKRXOG³JURXQG
the [dao] in heaven-and-earth, examining it among the Former Kings, taking evidence 
IURP&RQIXFLXVDQGYHULI\LQJLWLQWKHSUHVHQW´$QG³:KHQWKHVHIRXUDUHLQSHUIHFW
agreement and one tries to progress, then in anything that his knowledge reaches or 
his strength matches, no matter the distance or the size, he will not lose the 
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correctness of dao.197´:LWKLQWKLVSURFHVV³VLQFHUHO\cheng)´WKLQNLQJDERXWRWKHU
SHRSOH¶VFULWLTXHVDQGVXJJHVWLRQVKHOSVSHRSOHDWWDLQWKHdao. Even worthy people 
with superb intelligence avoid making mistakes through advice. Unlike Wang Anshi, 
Sima Guang did not take the mysterious process of cultivating the shen as the step to 
VDJHKRRG+HHPSKDVL]HGWKDWLWZDVZRUWK\SHRSOH¶VWKLQNLQJDQGFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI
RWKHU¶VVXJJHVWLRQVWKDWPDGHWKHPEHFRPHVDJHV198  
As his correspondence with Wang Anshi illustrates, Sima Guang believed that 
Wang Anshi¶s failures lay in his deviation from the perfect mental state. Sima Guang 
praised Wang Anshi as a great worthy man who was upright, with a strong will.199 He 
sincerely praised Wang even after breaking off their friendship due to their different 
opinions on the New Policies.200 6LPD*XDQJ¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRI:DQJ$QVKL¶VSHUVRQDO
merits did not, however, change his view that Wang was too stubborn. Wang Anshi 
easily became angry when people had opinions different from his own. He insisted on 
his own opinion, defending it and refusing any suggestions.201 According to Sima 
Guang, Wang only cared about finding new and esoteric things from the Classics. He 
had too much confidence that he had discovered the dao and therefore forced other 
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SHRSOHWRIROORZKLP+LVOHDUQLQJFRQWULEXWHGOLWWOHWRSHRSOH¶VHWKLFDOFRQGXFW
EHFDXVHLWLJQRUHGSHRSOH¶VDFWXDOIHHOLQJVDQGFRQFHUQVLQGDLO\OLIH202 Sima Guang 
implied that Wang deviated from internal harmony and equilibrium. His 
self-indulgence and stubbornness made him ignore the actual situation of right and 
wrong, the concerns of the common people, and the real crises that the country 
faced.203 6LPD*XDQJZURWHWKDW:DQJ$QVKL¶VZD\RIWKLQNLQJDQGSHUVRQDOLW\
caused policy to drift away from the dao.  
The mental state of the policy implementers 
Besides the moral standard for the policy makers, Sima Guang also described 
the ideal mental state of other policy participants. He fully accepted the variety of 
SHRSOH¶VFDSDELOLWLHVDQGPRUDOLWLHVDUJXing that it had no negative influence over the 
SROLWLFDOV\VWHP¶VFDSDFLW\WRPDNHDQGLPSOHPHQWSROLF\LISHRSOHFRXOGZLOOLQJO\
accept their roles as bestowed by the political hierarchy. Sima Guang took the 
³JXLGHOLQH 㓢㓚´DVWKHGHWHUPLQLQJIDFWRUIRUPDLntaining the stability of the political 
V\VWHP,Q6LPD*XDQJ¶VWKRXJKWWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIVXFKJXLGHOLQHVQRWRQO\
referred to the building of objective formal rules that gave people proper roles, but 
DOVRLPSOLHGSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKHLUSRVLWLRQin this hierarchy, recognition of their 
responsibility to protect this hierarchy, belief in the legitimacy of this hierarchy, and 
true obedience to the rules of this hierarchy.  
 ,Q6LPD*XDQJ¶VWKRXJKWWKHVXFFHVVIXORSHUDWLRQRIWKHKLHUDUFKLFDOV\VWHP
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FRXOGQRWVROHO\UHO\RQSROLWLFDOHQIRUFHPHQW+HWRRNWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶WUXH
submission to the hierarchy as the determining factor for maintaining its operation. 
Such obedience originated from the habits that people acquired through their activities 
and experiences in the daily life. As Sima Guang explained, if people could see the 
rules every day from morning to night, then their minds would become used to such 
rules. They would truly believe that the rules were most suitable to them. Then once 
some leaders tried to change the rules, people would not follow the changes.204 Sima 
Guang quoted a sentence from the Book of Changes WRGHVFULEHSHRSOH¶VVWDEOHPHQWDO
VWDWH³WKHVXSHULRUPHQHPSOR\HGUXOHVWRPDNHWKHGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVXSHULRU
and subordinaWHDQGWKHQSHRSOHEHFDPHDFFHSWLQJRIWKLVRUGHU´)RUKLPVXFK
mental stability ensured the submission of the subordinate political and social groups 
WRWKHVXSHULRUV¶UXOH2QFHSHRSOHKDGIRUPHGWKHLUREHGLHQFHWRWKHUXOHVWKHNLQJ
could establish guidelines for the whole country.205  
 Sima Guang also emphasized that ethical conduct had a decisive influence on 
people¶s commitment to a hierarchical system and adherence to its policies. Although 
SHRSOH¶Vtalents were important for implementing policies, virtues such as loyalty and 
trustworthiness were fundamental to the continuation of the political hierarchy. 
Without such virtues, talent alone would threaten the existing political order: talent 
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itself did not produce loyalty.206 Solely relying on talent could even cause the demise 
of the state and families.207  
 $OWKRXJKGLVDJUHHLQJZLWK:DQJ$QVKL¶VFODLPVWKDWWKHdao could be discovered 
and naturally apprehended by the people, Sima Guang implicitly agreed on the 
common rationale that all people had to recognize their positions and responsibilities 
in the political system. He accepted that such a mindset built the psychological basis 
IRUSHRSOH¶VREHGLHQFHWRWKHSROLWLFDOKLHUDUFK\6LPD*XDQJGLVWLQJXLVKHGWKLV
PLQGVHWIURPSHRSOH¶VSXUVXLWRIVHOI-interest. Chasing self-interest would provoke 
people¶s ambition to challenge the order.  
Sima Guang emphasized that the institutional environment had a decisive 
LQIOXHQFHRQWKHVXEMHFWV¶ identification with the political structure. However, the New 
Policy makers failed to build such an environment. As we have mentioned, Wang 
Anshi established new institutions such as the Finance Planning Commissions, which 
took away some power from the original Finance Commissions and circuit 
bureaucratic agencies. He also broke personnel management routines and promoted 
lower-ranked bureaucrats who could efficiently implement his policies. 
6LPD*XDQJWRWDOO\XSHQGHG:DQJ$QVKL¶Vclaims. He believed that Wang 
$QVKL¶s institutional design would seriously weaken the regime¶VSROLWLcal foundations 
because it greatly changed the power distribution among different governmental 
agencies. :DQJ$QVKL¶VFUHDWLRQRIQHZEXUHDXFUDWLFagencies ranging from the 
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Finance Planning Commission to the local Stabilization Fund Supervisorate mobilized 
local bureaucrats in the wrong way, so that they only cared about achieving loan 
quotas while ignoring the local economic reality.208 When this equilibrium was 
disturbed, bureaucratic obedience to the political hierarchy and loyalty to assigned 
roles collapsed.   
 As Sima Guang pointed out,  
[Wang Anshi] broke the routine to promote the officials who had supported 
him. [He] humiliated and troubled WKRVHZKRGLVDJUHHGZLWKKLVSROLFLHV«7KH
literati of the country who pursued wealth and rank happily attached themselves to 
him«,IWKH\GLGWKH\would immediately receive good posts. For years all the 
leading officials at both central and local levels were people like this. Those who 
were loyal and upright, and who still had a sense of shame, were all purged or 
punished. There was no place for them.209  
 
    For Sima Guang, Wang Anshi¶s changes in the personnel management 
institutions produced new temptations that led bureaucrats to pursue their private 
interests. He UHMHFWHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH6DJHV¶text (wen). It was not 
possible that adherence to the Green Sprouts Policy originated from the bureaucrats¶ 
recognition of the dao, instead it resulted from their self-interest. Once these 
bureaucrats were led by self-interest their policy innovations could not deal with 
external changes.  
As Sima Guang pointed out: 
       Your Majesty has only received reports [from local governmental officials 
who favored the New Policies]. [Based on such dishonest reports], you think that 
the law is good and has the support of all the people. But how could you know 
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what these bureaucrats have actually done in their localities? Some of them have 
added new articles to the law in order to produce deceptive [achievements]. They 
send different reports on the problems of the policy and change the policy by 
WKHPVHOYHV«.. The clerks and common people do not know what they should 
follow. The bureaucrats do all these things because if they produce new things, 
then they can be promoted. [Their creation of the new policies] stems from self 
interest and not from a true intention to benefit the country and make the 
common people more comfortable. 210    
 
Sima Guang criticized policy experiments based on self-interest. He felt that the 
pursuit of self- interest would make the bureaucrats lose their impartial evaluation of 
social problems. Wang Anshi thought he could ensure that innovation would not be 
guided by the private interest because his policies followed the dao, but for Sima 
Guang, because the policy deviated from the dao, it also made the bureaucrats deviate 
from ethical conduct and thus turned their potential innovations into chaos.  
 
Sima Guang¶s view of social context as determinative of the consequences of 
the Green Sprouts Policy 
Like Wang Anshi, Sima Guang was devoted to imSURYLQJWKHVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WR
mobilize resources to deal with crises. However, he thought the content of a policy 
could not predict its consequence. Instead, the temporal and spatial context in which 
the policy was made and implemented would determine whether a policy could 
achieve its purpose. The full evaluation of such a context required the policy makers 
WRNQRZKRZWRXQGHUVWDQGDQGDFFRPPRGDWHSROLF\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶YDULRXVEHKDYLRUDO
modes. Such modes were guided by their pursuit of self-interest. Sima Guang took the 
local bureaucrats, the clerks, the central government, the local rich people and poor 
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farmers as different actors who had varying responsibilities and autonomous interests. 
Any activity of one actor would influence that of the others, and thus influence the 
equilibrium of the entire system. The best mechanism for the state to mobilize 
resources was to maintain such an equilibrium and ensure the long-term sustainable 
development of the system. As Sima Guang held, the best way for the government to 
JDLQUHVRXUFHVZDV³WRVXUUHQGHUWKHVPDOO>PDWHULDO@LQWHUHVWEXWFROOHFWWKHODUJHU
benefits. Release the immediate payments but pursue long-term benefits.211´ 
     ,Q6LPD*XDQJ¶VYLHZWKHUHDOVRFLDOFRQWH[WZRXOGGHWHUPLQHSROLF\RXWFRPHV
Changes in policy also gave different actors opportunities to satisfy their own interests. 
7KHVHDFWRUV¶KDELWVDQGLQQDWHQDWXUHV could not be changed by policy. In his critique 
of the Green Sprouts Policy, Sima Guang predicted what would occur in the policy 
process. As he described it,   
        The reason why some people become poor while others become rich is 
because of their different talents, nature and intelligence. The rich people have 
good intelligence and long-term consideration. They would rather work hard and 
have bad living conditions than borrow money from others. This is why rich 
families always have a surplus and are not in debt. The poor people are lazy and 
only care about living. They have no long-term consideration. They spend all their 
money on drinking and have no moderation. They cannot pay off their debts. They 
HYHQVHOOWKHLUZLYHVDQGFKLOGUHQ«. Even when they become like this, they do 
not feel regret. Therefore the rich people often loan money to the poor to earn 
interest. The poor people borrow money from the rich to survive. Although their 
conditions are not the same, they still rely on each other. Now the magistrate uses 
government money to make loans in the spring and autumn. The rich people do 
not want to borrow this money. Only the poor people want it. The Stabilization 
Fund officials want to loan more money to make a better performance evaluation. 
Therefore they do not think about the real economic situation but only force 
people to borrow money. The rich people borrow more and the poor borrow 
OHVV«7KHEXUHDXFUDWVDQGFOHUNVDWWKHFRXQW\DQGSUHIHFWXUDOJRYHUQPHQWVGR
not want them to delay the repayment. These bureaucrats and clerks gather the 
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poor and rich together to become guarantee groups and appoint the rich people as 
the heads of the groups. When the poor people get the loan, they just waste all the 
money. In the future, if the harvest is insufficient, they cannot even pay their taxes 
not to mention the interest on their loans. The clerks have to urge them to repay 
their loans, and they run away to different places. The rich people cannot leave. 
They have to pay the money that other poor families in their guarantee group have 
borrowed. They cannot pay it all. The government has to allow them to delay the 
repayment. The debts of the loan in the spring have not been paid off the by 
autumn. These debts accumulate through the years and become even heavier for 
WKHULFK«7KHUHIRUHWKHFRPPRQSHRSOHKDYHWRSD\HQGOHVVGHEWVLQDQ\
situation. The poor people leave their hometowns and the rich people become poor. 
I am afraid that after ten years, few rich people we be able to exist in the country. 
If any crises occur in the border areas, the court will need money to mobilize the 
military forces. Who will pay for that?212 
 
Although Sima Guang did not reject the idea that people's values can change, 
such a change could only occur in his view by people's self-cultivation and their 
continuous moral practice in their daily life. The material incentives that Wang Anshi 
designed could not bring internal transformation to WKHV\VWHP¶V participants. To the 
contrary, the policy outcomes would be determined by the existing social and political 
circumstances, in which the policy participants followed their own interests and 
values to manipulate the policy to satisfy their own interests. Based on this logic, 
Sima Guang stressed the importance of social and political context.  
:LWKLQWKLVFRQWH[W³WKHSHRSOH´FDQQRWEHWDNHQDVSDUWRIRQHLQWHUHVWJURXS
They have multiple demands and conflicting interests. Each group of people has their 
own way of dealing with the policy. By understanding society and government as 
comprised of diverse actors, Sima Guang emphasized that the policy might change 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶OLYHVEXWQRWWKHLUnatural tendency to pursue self-interest. Policies can 
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only be taken as stimuli from the external environment, to which people would 
respond based on their own accustomed behavioral modes. Unlike Wang Anshi, Sima 
Guang took policy to be more than the one-sided demand of the central policy makers. 
The policy process is in his view was a mechanism by which different social and 
political actors interact with each other. In the above quotation, Sima Guang vividly 
describes how each social group could potentially use the Green Sprouts Policy to 
satisfy its own interests. He predicted the possible consequences that these group 
activities would result in, pointing to serious damage to the social and political order. 
He also thought that the policy makers at the court could not regulate such 
mechanisms. They had to be fully aware of those mechanisms, instead of simply 
believing that the New Policies would automatically achieve their ends. 
  
Comfortable Feelings, Trustworthiness and Social Custom as the 
Foundations for Political Order: Su Shi¶s Critiques of the Green Sprouts Policy 
Su Shi¶s critiques of the Green Sprouts Policy during the initial period of the 
New Policies (from 1069 to 1070) are preserved in his memorials to Emperor 
Shenzong during his appointments as the Auxiliary in the Historiography Institute and 
as Administrative Assistant of the Kaifeng Superior Prefecture.213 His position gave 
him the chance to submit memorials to the monarch offering his opinions about policy. 
Based on close reading of these four memorials, we shall see how Su Shi¶s different 
lines of reasoning on state-building ,which we find detailed in his other writings, 
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guided his arguments on the Green Sprouts Policy. These memorials present 
interwoven lines of reasoning that articulate the connections between key concepts 
such as human nature, the pattern of the world, dao, social customs, trustworthiness, 
and emotion.  
The sense of comfort 
   Su Shi argued that the Green Sprouts Policy made people feel ³uncomfortableн
ᆹ´ and lose their trust in the government. He wrote, 
 
    Before judging the right and wrong of actions, superior men will first 
observe the popular will. Although Xie An's employment of Zhuhuan was not 
absolutely correct, this employment was favored by the masses, and the country 
therefore was still stable. Yu Liang's employment of Su Jun was not absolutely 
wrong; the real situation, however, did not allow such employment and this 
action therefore made [Yu Liang] dangerous and shameful. From antiquity to the 
present, there is no case where people did not feel comfortable even when the 
rulers were tolerant and stood together with the masses. Neither is there a single 
case where an obstinate and opinionated ruler did not find himself in a 
dangerous situation.    
     Your Majesty also knows the unhappiness in other people's minds. ... Your     
establishment is great, but the people are really astonished and doubtful. Your 
new policies are untraditional; the clerks all feel perplexed and uneasy. The 
upright wanted their suggestions to be accepted but could not be satisfied, they 
could not avoid worries. The petty men intentionally flattered the court, and 
their actions were blameworthy. 214 
    Su Shi described policy participants' mental states as ³DVWRQLVKHGDQG
doubtful,´ ³perplexed and uneasy,´ unable to avoid worries, and intentionally 
flattering the court. All these activities illustrated his judgment that the New Policies 
had been causing the prevailing uncomfortable feelings of people at different levels of 
government and society. The common people thought they were deprived, and 
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therefore they felt uncomfortable with the policies. According to Su Shi, such an 
emotion had been spreading throughout the main social groups: the commoners, the 
soldiers, the clerks and the literati. For Su Shi this situation was very dangerous to the 
state because these categories of people constructed the basis for ruling. If the court 
loses their support, failure can be clearly predicted.215 Also, local officials feel 
themselves put in a difficult position because they face the dilemma of whether they 
should expand rural credit or control the scope of such loans to reduce financial 
risk.216 Among the political elites, the policy also raised great debates and caused 
cleavages. The monarch could not successfully pacify these debates to the satisfaction 
of all camps. The entire political elite was thrown into endless fights, debates and 
purges.217 
   Furthermore, such uncomfortable feelings not only existed among the upright 
and common people but also in the petty men and other officials who found that the 
New Policies gave them the opportunity to get unexpected (and generally undeserved) 
promotions. These people were therefore no longer satisfied with their current 
positions and sought every opportunity to be promoted. According to Su Shi, because 
of their desires, they would speculate on the intentions of the court and push the 
policies to extremes that would do great harm to the local people. They even would 
cheat the central policy makers and provide incorrect information. All these meant 
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that the emperor could not grasp the actual problems that occurred at the local 
level.218 These petty people's activities and their sudden success also intensified the 
dissatisfaction of the commoners and led them to disobey new rules.219 
 The uncomfortable feelings of the people can also be seen in the uncontrollable 
rumors that seriously affected economic and social stability. According to Su Shi, the 
establishment of the Finance Planning Commission caused rumors to the effect that 
the monarch was pursuing material interests and the Grand Counselor only cared 
about collecting money. The merchants worried that the state¶s policies would do 
harm to their trade, and withdrew from business with a consequent increase in market 
prices. The rumors spread to regions as far away as Sichuan and became difficult to 
control.220 For Su Shi, all these problems would eventually turn the policy off track 
from its original intention. Efficient control of the policy implementation was 
impossible if the mental state of the policymakers was not on the correct trajectory.221 
 
As his other political writings show, Su Shi¶s line of reasoning on political order 
directed his attention to the ³uncomfortable feeling´ of the policy participants. In Su 
6KL¶VRSLQLRQDOOSHRSOHLQHYHU\part of the world share some commonalities in their 
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spontaneous responses to external change. People act in a manner true to themselves, 
responding to the external world without calculation. In his work, Su Shi emphasizes 
that everyone in the world has the same response to certain environmental changes. 
Su Shi called this response ³renqing Ӫᛵ´DQGZUote that it originated from common 
human nature. As he explained,  
 
There is no person alive who does not feel uncomfortable when hungry or 
cold or who has never experienced sexual desire. Would it be acceptable today 
for someone to say that eating when hungry, drinking when thirsty, or having 
sexual desires is not part of human nature? Everyone knows this is 
unacceptable.222 
 
Human nature is something common to the best and worst of men, something 
LQHVFDSDEOH7KLVQDWXUHDOVRPHDQVWKDWSHRSOH¶VFRPPRQIHHOLQJVWRZDUGVWKLQJVDUH
spontaneous, inescapable and predictable. As Su Shi explained,  
 
The superior men cultivate their goodness every day to reduce their 
not-goodness. When the not-good dissipates day by day, something that cannot 
be gotten rid of is still there. The lesser men cultivate their not-goodness every 
day to reduce their goodness. When the good dissipates day by day, something 
that cannot be gotten rid of is still there. As for that which cannot be gotten rid 
of, [the sages] Yao and Shun could not add to it and [the evil men] Jie and Zhou 
could not subtract from it.223 
  
Unlike Wang Anshi and Neo-Confucian scholars, Su Shi did not believe in the 
possibility that people could achieve a transformative mental state and reach full 
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awareness of the correct way of behaving. ,Q6X6KL¶VWKRXJKWZKHQIROORZLQJWKHLU
natural inclinations and making choices, people would feel natural and comfortable 
without any complaints of being forced by external forces.224 Su Shi emphasized that 
PDLQWDLQLQJWKHVXEMHFWV¶QDWXUDOVWDWHZRXOGEHLGHDOIRUJRYHUQLQJEHFDXVHWKH
VXEMHFWVFRXOGIHHO³FRPIRUWDEOH ᆹ´LQVXFKDVWDWH 
    Su Shi¶s argument should be understood in his thought on the conflicts between 
the wills of the rulers and the ruled. In his line of reasoning he stressed that the ruler¶s 
will could be satisfied even it did not fully satisfy the needs of the ruled. The ruled 
could still feel comfortable if the ruler built a good institutional environment to 
resolve their concerns. Su Shi tended to contextualize the rules to answer the question 
RIKRZSROLFLHVSURYRNHGSHRSOH¶VSV\FKRORJLFDOUHDFWLRQs. What should a ruler do to 
make his subjects accept his policies?  
 
  6X6KLHPSKDVL]HGWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHVXSHULRUPHQ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
FRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH6DJHV¶UXOHVDQGSHRSOH¶VQDWXUH$V6X6KLSRLQWHGRXW  
 
If the superior men want to be sincere, they must be insightful. If we observe 
the origins of the dao RIWKHVDJHVZHILQGWKDWWKH\WKH\OLHLQWKHSHRSOH¶V
sentiments. If we do not follow such origins but only approach the matter from the 
end, we will think that that the Sages had some rules that were enforced but were 
not happily accepted by the commoners. If that were true, then we would have no 
way to be sincere [to those rules]. Therefore, the Doctrine of the Mean VD\V³:H
VKRXOGKDYHSHQHWUDWLQJH\HVLJKW´:HPXVWEHVXUHWhat our mind knows the rules 
and pursues happiness.  
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Su Shi continued to elaborate his point on what this penetrating view meant for 
superior men, and how superior men should use such insight to make people happy 
with the rules.  
 
 In all the daily rules, the rites are seemingly coercive to people. Why? People 
all like leisure and hate labor. Now we make it so people dare not sit with their 
legs extended but take standing all hunched over and kowtowing a hundred 
WLPHVDVULWHV««$OOWKHVHLPSUHVVLRQVWDNH the rites to be enforcement, and 
we make the mistake of seeing it this way because we approach the rites from 
the end. How about going back to the origins of the rites and thinking about 
them? Today I may say that standing all hunched over [a deferential posture, 
part of the rite] is not as comfortable as standing upright, but if comfort is all I 
want, no manner of standing can compare with sitting. Regular sitting, however, 
is not as comfortable as sitting with legs extended, while that manner of sitting 
is not as comfortable as lying down all day. And if I am unsatisfied even with 
lying down, then let me take my clothes off and show no shame. But if I were to 
lie around naked, I myself should feel uncomfortable with it. Nor would I be 
alone: every common man and woman in the entire world would disapprove. As 
soon as there is such disapproval, it leads eventually to standing all hunched 
over and kowtowing a hundred times. With this in mind, we may say that 
standing all hunched over and kowtowing a hundred times has its origins in not 
wanting to lie around naked. And it is not just standing hunched over or a 
hundred kowtows-- all the myriad kinds of conduct that the world considers 
coercive must have similar origins. We clarify their origins and use our 
reasoning to speculate about the end. This is what it means to have a penetrating 
view.  
          If we talk about the origins of the ways of superior men, then our words 
will be simple and clear. If we approach it from the end, then our words become 
difficult and secret. The superior men do not want their words to be secret; 
therefore they start from the easy parts [of the principles in heaven-and-earth], 
which the common man and woman can easily practice. Then they push their 
words to the extremes that the Sages cannot reach. They start their dao from the 
easiest part of heaven-and-earth and make its most difficult part familiar to the 
people. The people in the heaven-and-earth therefore can feel comfortable with 
the most difficult part and feel no difference from the easiest part.225 
 
The role of the superior men became important because they needed to explain 
                                                        
225
 6X6KL³=KRQJ\RQJ zhong ѝᓨѝ´Su Shi wenji di yice 㰷䔮᮷䳶ㅜа޺,61 
 161 
how the coercive features of the rules were not in conflict with a political order that 
ZDVGHVLJQHGLQSXUVXLWRIWKHIXOILOOPHQWRIWKHSHRSOH¶VFRPIRUW. Su Shi believed that 
although the rites could regulate people in many ways, ultimately they could not make 
people very uncomfortable.226 He stressed that superior men need to be penetrating to 
ILQGWKHGHHSFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQWKHVDJHV¶ULWHVDQGSHRSOH¶Vnature. In discussing 
such a connection, Su Shi did not take political enforcement as a good method. 
Instead, he emphasized that such enforcement should come from the goal of 
guaranteeing the long-term happiness of the people. As Su Shi revealed, the 
indulgence of natural inclinations will eventually pose the danger of leading people to 
the opposite feeling²GLVFRPIRUW³%XWLI,ZHUHWROLHDURXQGQDNHG,P\VHOIVKRXOG
GLVDSSURYHRILW´7Ke rules therefore are needed because they prevent in advance the 
uncomfortable feelings created by such extremes. 
Superior men therefore need to be penetrating because they must transcend a 
perspective that simply looks at the coercive feature of the rules, while also avoiding 
WKHLUUHVSRQVLEOHFRQQLYDQFHRISHRSOH¶VVKRUt-sighted choices based on temporarily 
comfort. They need to understand why such rules have developed, and explain to the 
common people how these rules play the long-WHUPUROHRIVHFXULQJSHRSOH¶VFRPIRUW
The key point, therefore, is to find measures that can convince people to follow such 
rules based on their common natural inclinations.  
Su Shi held that even the common people, without any special knowledge, could 
IROORZWKH6DJHV¶ LQVWLWXWLRQVLQWKHLUDFWLRQVEHFDXVHWKH\FRXOGIROORZWKH6DJHV¶
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guidance on such actions without any difficulties.227 When they followed the sages, 
they would feel comfortable. The Sages therefore should start from these easy rules 
which followed the dao and were not difficult for people to follow.  
On the other hand, Su Shi conceded that in the process he designed, people might 
not feel comfortable at any given moment with specific rules that the Sages had 
established. Sometimes the institutions were ambiguous and difficult to follow in the 
short run. Therefore, he argued that rulers needed to start by implementing the rules 
that followed the dao and also make people easily feel comfortable. Thereafter they 
VKRXOGSURJUHVVLYHO\³H[WHQG᧘´VXFKFRPIRUWDEOHIHHOLQJVWRWKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFK
people followed other institutions. This would be a progressive process in which the 
UXOHU¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶IHHOLQJVEHFDPHWKHPDLQJRDO  
 
7KLVSURFHVVGLIIHUVIURP:DQJ$QVKL¶VGHVign, largely because of their different 
views on how to explain dao and how to make authoritative explanations function in 
the governance process. Like Su Shi, Wang Anshi believed that people had different 
opinions and claims about what the dao meant. For Wang Anshi, this problem resulted 
in the low capacity of the government to innovate and implement policy, since the 
participants only followed their own self-interests without correctly recognizing the 
dao. The key steps in making participants take collective action, therefore, are the 
XQLILFDWLRQRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKH6DJHV¶WKRXJKWVDVUHSUHVHQWHGLQWKH&ODVVLFV
education to recognize the dao through such interpretations, and the process of 
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claiming coherence between the New Policies and the thoughts of the Sages. 
³&RPIRUW ᆹ´ZDVQRWSDUWRI:DQJ$QVKL¶VGLVFRXUVHRQWKHGHVLJQRIWKH
governance process. 
 By rejecting the possibility of defining the dao by any interpretation of the 
&ODVVLFV6X6KLFKDOOHQJHGWKHLQWHOOHFWXDOIRXQGDWLRQVRI:DQJ$QVKL¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQ
of ideal governance. Su Shi did not think it was possible to discover the whole of the 
dao by defining what the dao is. As he argued, complete realization of the dao was 
EH\RQGHYHQWKH6DJHV,WZRXOGWKHUHIRUHEHLPSRVVLEOHWR³HVWDEOLVKDFODLP ・䄆´
on what the dao is.228 Since no claim can interpret the daoSHRSOH¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRI
the dao through such intermediate interpretations is also impossible. Su Shi added 
³IHHOLQJFRPIRUWDEOH´DVDQHFHVVDU\VWHSIRUPDNLQJSHRSOHIROORZWKHUXOHVEHFDXVH
he did not believHLQ:DQJ¶VYLVLRQRIDPHQWDOVWDWHWKDWFRXOGHQDEOHSHRSOHWR
recognize the dao and automatically follow rules that conveyed the dao. 
 
At the practical level, Su Shi had no interest in discussing how to define the dao 
of policy. Neither did he believe in guiding people to the dao through governmental 
LQVWLWXWLRQV,Q6X6KL¶VRSLQLRQVLQFHWKHVWDWHFDQQRW successfully make people to 
follow the policy purposes, it has to make them comfortable with those policies and 
institutions. This is the area in which the state can be active.  
6X6KLWKRXJKWVXFKFRPIRUWFRXOGFRPHIURPSHRSOH¶VKRSHWKDWWKHSROLFLHVDQG
institutions could guarantee their personal benefits. Su Shi thought the government 
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VKRXOGHQFRXUDJHSHRSOH¶VSULYDWHLQWHUHVWV+HIXUWKHUFODULILed two categories of 
interest: the private motivation only for personal wealth and high office. The state 
should encourage the second by implementing policies that could give people hope 
that if they performed better, then their official careers would benefit. This would 
encourage them to happily, actively follow the commands of their rulers, so that 
policies would be implemented well.229 
 
6X6KLEHOLHYHGWKDWWKHUXOHU¶VPHQWDOVWDWHEHQHILWHGIURPKLVVHOI-cultivation 
and was fundamental for achieving a political order that made people comfortable 
with the rules. As he explained,  
[The process of self-cultivation] should start from sincerity. During the 
process of ruling, the ruler should not be hasty. The superior men should be 
rigorous from start to finish. The ruler should treat the common people as a part 
of his body. He should treat the extremely foolish in the same way as the 
extremely talented. [Such an attitude] can be called sincerity. If his sincere 
attitude cannot have a direct result, the essential thing is that he should trust 
himself without feeling puzzled. This is called doing things without being hasty. 
If he does things without being hasty, then his reign will last. If he can last [in 
power], then he can achieve [his goals]. The superior men use his respectful 
attitude to resolve the problems at hand. Therefore his attitude is rigorous.230 
 
    Su Shi did not believe in a mental enlightenment that enables the sovereign to 
know all the correct ways of rulershop. The rulers should focus on how to be sincere, 
self-trusting, cautious and rigorous. This stresses the rulers¶ mental state in the course 
of concrete policy-making. Self-cultivation in this discourse is intended to cultivate 
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the rulers¶ mind in order to make him achieve this mental state, instead of learning the 
interpretations of the Classics.  
 
Guided by the above line of reasoning, Su Shi criticized the Green Sprouts Policy 
and explained why Wang Anshi failed to put the policy participants at ease. Su Shi 
stressed that the VRYHUHLJQ¶V mental state and manner of rule determine the comfort of 
his subjects. He argued that if the ruler can be tolerant of the public opinion of the 
majority, then the people will feel comfortable. However, if the ruler is obstinate and 
opinionated, then the political order will be endangered because of people's 
uncomfortable feelings. 
In a memorial he sent to criticize the policy, Su Shi took Duke Xiang as an 
example. As he explained, "Although Duke Xiang of the Song state acted by 
following the moral principle of benevolence and righteous, he failed because he lost 
popular support."231 Su Shi¶VLQWHQWLRQ in this utterance and the hermeneutic meaning 
of his argument can be discovered by comparing this claim to his other writings.  
    In other writings both before and after this memorial, Su Shi did not depict Duke 
Xiang as a person who really followed moral standards. As one exposition he wrote 
for the Hanlin Academician examination in 1065 claimed, "Duke Xiang looked like a 
benevolent person... but in fact, he did not cultivate his morality. He only exhausted 
his people to satisfy his own desire for hegemony.´232 Su Shi further argued that 
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people like Duke Xiang only pretended to act in a moral way. Although they did some 
moral things, they also committed evil acts that exhausted their people. Their 
superficially moral conduct was for the ulterior motive of achieving their personal 
desires.233 In earlier writings, Su Shi had argued that such activities would lead rulers 
to lose the support and trust of the people.234 
  In Su Shi's view, it was impossible to define the rightness or wrongness of a 
policy-maker¶V decision simply by assessing the moral features of the policy's content; 
one had to take the public reception into consideration. Su Shi rejected any tie 
between policy content and moral principle. His argument about Duke Xiang implied 
that even if a leader like him could temporarily make policies that followed moral 
principles, his true mental state ensured that his policies could not be consistent. 
People therefore did not feel comfortable with him. Unfortunately, in Su Shi's view, 
the drafters of the New Policies were not tolerant, did not fully consider public 
opinions and did not show solidarity with the public. People did not feel comfortable, 
to the extent that these policymakers lost popular support and found themselves in 
precarious situations.  
Su Shi stressed the importance of governmental institutions in shaping people¶V 
comfort level. According to him, the Censorate and Remonstrance Bureau should play 
the key role in transmitting public opinions and feelings to the monarch to prevent 
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him from becoming isolated. Su Shi admitted that the opinions may not be right, but 
the value of these institutions was in making the government responsive to public 
opinion, finding ways to put the people at ease. In short, the public's feeling of 
comfort was more important than the correctness of their opinions.235 
6X6KL¶VFULWLTXHVKHOGWKDWGXULQJWKHSURFHVVRILPSOHPHQWLQJWKH*UHHQ
Sprouts Policy, Wang Anshi had seriously weakened the function of the Censorate and 
Remonstrance Bureau. Su Shi held that once this channel was broken, the monarch 
would be isolated from the reality of his subjects. People would also lose their faith in 
the policy because their dissatisfaction could not be expressed. These problems would 
destroy the foundation of the political order.236 
Trustworthiness  
Another focus of Su Shi's critique was his argument that the Green Sprouts Policy 
destroyed people's trust in the government. After examining his line of reasoning on 
trustworthiness, we shall see how his views led him to predict the failure of the Green 
Sprouts Policy.  
,QWKLVFDVH6X6KL¶VDUJXPHQWGRHVQRWDGGUHVVWKHLVVXHRIKRZWRVDWLVI\
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶IUHHFKRLFHVDQGQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQV,QWKe governance process, few 
SROLFLHVFDQVLPXOWDQHRXVO\VDWLVI\DOOSHRSOHV¶QDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQVJLYHQWKDWWKH\
must face divergent reactions from the various groups involved in the policy process. 
Su Shi not only admitted such discordant activities, but also discussed how to unify 
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SHRSOH¶VDFWLYLWLHVJLYHQVXFKGLVFRUGDQFHV+HWKHUHIRUHGHILQHGDGLVWLQFWPHQWDO
state that can be achieved by all policy participants, which is trust. Trust means that 
even if a policy cannot allow people to make free choices by following their natural 
inclinations, the participants in the policy can still accept it.  
,QPDQ\ZULWLQJV6X6KLGLVFXVVHVWKHLUUDWLRQDOIHDWXUHVRISHRSOH¶VHPRWLRQV+H
argued that once a ruler lost popular support, every policy he proclaimed would be 
VXEMHFWWRQHJDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVE\KLVVXEMHFWV(YHQLIWKHUXOHU¶VLQWHQWLRQLQ
making the policy was good, the ruled would still interpret such activities as deception. 
They would distrust all these policies and spread rumors to obstruct them.237 The 
Sages, however, were able to guide such emotions back to trust. As Su Shi discusses, 
the Sages never lost patience when repeatedly explaining their intentions to the 
commoners. Even when the commoners did not agree with policies, the Sages still 
explained the policies to them until all in heaven-and-HDUWKWUXVWHGWKDWWKH6DJHV¶
words were true.238 
 
     Su Shi designed concrete plans for making subjects trust the government. The 
first plan was to promote open and transparent communication between the monarch 
and his subjects. He compared the people in the country to instruments that were 
controlled in the hands of the monarch. The best way to make those instruments easily 
handled is to make the owners and the instruments familiar with each other, 
preventing the isolation of the monarch from his officials and subjects. As Su Shi 
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wrote,  
 If the instruments are not often used but stored locked away then the tools are 
not familiar to their users. The instruments become difficult to handle. Good 
workers will make their hands accustomed to the instruments as well as the 
instruments to their hands. The hands and instruments trust each other without any 
suspicion. After that people can do things successfully.239 
 
  Su Shi therefore argued that in the ideal politiFDOV\VWHPWKHPRQDUFK¶VWKRXJKWV
DQGHPRWLRQVQHHGHGWREHNQRZQE\KLVVXEMHFWVDQGWKHVXEMHFWV¶UHTXHVWVDQG
situations also needed to be fully expressed and smoothly delivered to the monarch. 
The ruled and the ruler should know each other well so that each can feel that the 
other is like a part of their body.240 In short, trust comes from better knowing each 
other.  
Such open communication would also require the smooth transference of true 
social information to the rulers. Su Shi suggested that rulers should fully respect 
SHRSOH¶VFXVWRPVDQGRSLQLRQV7KH\VKRXOGDOVRWKRURXJKO\LQYHVWLJDWHWKHUHDOVRFLDO
VLWXDWLRQVRWKDWWKH\FDQEHIDPLOLDUZLWKWKHLUVXEMHFWV¶DXWKHQWLFIHHOLQJVDQG
concerns.241 They should not forbid people from expressing their requests. In order to 
do that, they needed to prevent bureaucrats from repressing free speech. Su Shi 
therefore opposed showing any signs to bureaucrats that might lead them to speculate 
about future changes to policies; he suggested that the best way to reform is not to 
announce the reform but to make changes quietly, as Pan Geng the king of Shang did. 
Pan Geng did not create new laws, or correct the institutions, nor did he establish 
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H[SHGLHQWPHDVXUHV+HUHIUDLQHGEHFDXVHKHIHDUHGWKDW³WKDWWKHYDULRXVofficers and 
responsible officials would draw inferences contrary to his intent and forbid the 
SRSXODFHWRVSHDN´242 
7KHIRUPDWLRQRIWUXVWDOVRUHOLHVRQWKHUXOHU¶VFRQVLVWDQF\RILPDJH8QOLNHWKH
6DJHVZKRVHJRYHUQDQFHRQO\VHUYHGSHRSOH¶VQHHGVPRQDUchs in the comtemporary 
political situation had their own interests. Their ruling methods therefore were 
VRPHWLPHVWDLORUHGWRSHUVRQDOLQWHUHVWLQVWHDGRIIXOILOOLQJSHRSOH¶VQDWXUH243 Su Shi 
saw no difference between the moral principles that rulers claimed to follow and the 
political ruses they actually employed, because all were political strategies serving the 
private interests of the ruler. Such private interests distinguished them from the Sages, 
whose following of moral principles came from their true minds. Since these moral 
principles can be manipulated as political strategies, the rulers need to take the 
opportunity and choose the best strategies. The rulers in some situations could claim 
the moral principle and make people trust it, while in other situations, they should 
employ ruses without mercy.244 
Su Shi portrayed the public as a single entity that is insightful and can recognize 
GHFHSWLRQ+HDVNHG³'R\RXUHDOO\EHOLHYHWKDWWKHSHRSOHLQWKHFRXQWU\DUHOLNH
babies, animals or birds that can EHFKHDWHGZLWKPHUHEHDXWLIXOZRUGV"´245 The 
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SXEOLF¶VFDSDELOLW\WRUHFRJQL]HJRRGDQGEDGRULJLQDWHVIURPSHRSOH¶VFRPPRQ
QDWXUH$V6X6KLDUJXHG³,IDSHUVRQKDVRQFHHDWHQKLVEURWKHU¶VDUPEHFDXVHRI
hunger, even in other situations when he is hungry and does not steal, people in all of 
heaven-and-earth know that such good behavior does not come from his true 
PLQG´246 As we have discussed, Su Shi believed that people share certain common 
natural characteristics, such as loving their brothers and parents. Relying on these 
characteristics, people can use common standards to make judgments. The bad 
intentions of a person therefore can be easily recognized because their previous 
activities have deviated from such standards. Once people lose their trust in thHUXOHU¶V
ZRUGVWKHUXOHU¶VSROLFLHVFDQQRWEHZHOOUHFHLYHGE\WKHSXEOLF,QVXFKDGLVFRXUVH
WKH\VKDUHWKHVDPHUDWLRQDOLW\$Q\YDULDWLRQVRISHRSOH¶VPLQGVDUHEH\RQGWKHIRFXV
of this line of reasoning.  
 
   How does self-cultivation integrate into the trust-building process? Su Shi 
believed that the self-cultivation of the ruler is the foundation of the ideal political 
RUGHU+HIXUWKHUDUWLFXODWHGWKHORJLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHOHDGHU¶VFXOWLYDWLRQ
of mind and the achievement of the political order based on trustfulness. He integrated 
the terms dao, sincerity (cheng), centrality (zhong), oneness (yi), nature (xing) and 
trustfulness (xin) into a line of reasoning that illustrates his viewpoint on how to shape 
adaptive governance and collective action.  
$V6X6KLDUJXHG³+HZKRKDVQR-mind is one, and he who is one is trustworthy, 
                                                        
246
 6X6KL³6RQJ;LDQJJRQJOXQ ᆻ㽴ޜ䄆´Su Shi wenji di yice 㰷䔮᮷䳶ㅜа޺,78 
 172 
VRWKDWDOOWKLQJV>LQWKHLUFRQWDFWZLWKKLP@ZLOOIXOO\UHDOL]HWKHLULQQDWHSDWWHUQ´247 
³1R-PLQG´DVDPHQWDOVWDWHLQ6X6KL¶VWKRXJKWUHIHUVWRSHRSOH¶VUHVSRQVHto 
environmental changes without calculation.248 6XFKVSRQWDQHRXVUHVSRQVHLQ6X6KL¶V
GHVFULSWLRQDOVRHQWDLOVSHRSOH¶VIROORZLQJRIWKHLUQDWXUH(xing). As we have 
PHQWLRQHGSHRSOH¶VIROORZLQJRIWKHLURZQQDWXUHLVVSRQWDQHRXVZLWKRXWFDOFXODWLRQ
Su Shi argues that if people use their minds to define what the dao is, then different 
people will have different definitions. Once the mind has intentionally defined the dao, 
people cannot avoid misrecognition of it. Students should begin with studying dao, 
whLFKLQ6X6KL¶VGLVFRXUVHLVWKH³H[SODQDWLRQRIZK\WKLQJVDUHDVWKH\DUH ᡰԕ❦
ѻ䃚´249 After such learning, they need to enter the final stage of study, going 
beyond the concrete definition of dao WR³DFFRPSOLVK>WKHdao] by following their 
nature ᡀѻԕᙗ.250´6XFKDPHQWDOVWDWHDOVRPHDQVWKDWWKH\KDYHWRFRPELQHWKHLU
intellectual knRZOHGJHDQGKXPDQQDWXUHDVRQHZKLFKLQ6X6KL¶VWHUPLQRORJ\UHIHUV
to when people attain the decree (ming) of heaven. Ming refers to the spontaneous 
functioning of human nature (xing).251 $V6X6KLDUJXHV³:KHQWKHVXSHULRUPDQ
arrives at unity in relation to dao, it is like the way the hand functions by itself. It does 
                                                        
247
 6X6KL³'RQJ3R\L]KXDQ ᶡඑ᱃ۣ´YSu Shi Wenji biannian qianzhu, P254 
 
248
 For discussion of this issue, see Peter Bol, This Culture of Ours, 284 
 
249
 6X6KL³'RQJ3R\L]KXDQ ᶡඑ᱃ۣ´YSu Shi Wenjibiannianqianzhu, , 282 
 
2506X6KL³'RQJ3R\L]KXDQ ᶡඑ᱃ۣ´YSu Shi Wenjibiannianqianzhu, , 259 
 
251
 )RUGLVFXVVLRQRQWKLVLVVXH6HH3HWHU%RO³6X VKLDQG&XOWXUH´.LGGHU6PLWK3HWHU.
Bol, Joseph Adler and Don. Wyatt ed., Sung Dynasty Uses of I Ching (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1990), 87 
 173 
QRWNQRZZK\LWLVDVLWLV\HWLWLVVR´252 Moreover, Su Shi named such an ideal state 
as centrality (zhongLQZKLFKSHRSOHDSSUHKHQGWKHLU³RULJLQDOPLQG ᵜᗳ´ 
 
In his discourse, such a mental state makes the ruler feel happy, sincere and 
self-trusting. This mental state can be achieved without exhaustively knowing 
everything about social norms or the Classics. According to Su Shi, even the Sages 
could not comprehensively grasp these norms. Therefore it makes no sense to 
GLVFRYHUWKH6DJHV¶PHDQLQJLQWKH&ODVVLFV7KH6DJHVZHUHKRZHYHUGLIIHUHQWIURP
even those who had more knowledge because the Sages could achieve the mental 
state of being happy with the norms they already knew and therefore could 
spontaneously follow those norms. Their activities were guided by their true minds. 
Their choices were directed by their natural inclinations. When making choices, they 
had self-trust without calculation.253 For SX6KLOHDUQLQJWKH6DJHV¶PHQWDOVWDWH 
makes much more sense than learning their expressions or the meanings thereof.  
6XFKDPHQWDOVWDWHZDVQRWRQO\PHDQLQJIXOWRSHRSOH¶VVHOI-cultivation, but also 
fundamental for shaping adaptive governance and collective action. If the ruler can be 
sincere, he can earn trust from the people of the country. As Su Shi wrote in praise of 
Ouyang Xiu,  
      His following of benevolence, righteousness, rites, music, loyalty, 
trustworthiness and filial piety is the same as [his natural inclination] to eat and 
drink when feeling hungry and thirsty. He cannot even forget to do so for a second. 
Just as the fire is hot and the water is wet, his nature makes him spontaneously do 
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VXFKWKLQJV«7KHUHIRUHSHRSOHLQKHDYHQ-and-earth trust his sincerity and all want 
to learn from him.254 
 
  6XFKDVWDWHLVDOVRGHVFULEHGE\6X6KLDV³RQHQHVV´2QHQHVVLQ6X6KL¶V
GLVFRXUVHUHIHUVWRSHRSOH¶VFRQVLVWHQF\LQIROORZLQJWKHdao, as opposed to cases in 
which leaders only pretend to do good things. Such consistency could not be 
maintained if people had calculations about either their own private interests or how 
to follow the norms as defined by the dao.255 If leaders are consistent, other people 
will know them easily. The people can therefore trust the ruler and follow him. Su Shi 
also argued that people who cannot achieve such consistency are difficult to 
understand and therefore others do not trust or follow them.256 Compared with his 
argument that trust comes from frequent communication between the ruler and the 
ruled, Su Shi presented a fundamental resolution of this issue through personal 
cultivation. At the same time, Su Shi believed that if the ruler could achieve such a 
state, he would find the optimum choices when facing environmental changes, and 
adaptive governance would be achieved. 
 
In Su Shi¶s view, the situation that developed in the making and implementation of 
the New Policies had greatly deviated from the ideal political order. Su Shi's critique 
stressed that the ruler's lack of sincerity and self-confidence caused people's loss of 
trust in the government. In criticizing the Green Sprouts Policy, Su Shi's 
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understanding of common human nature guided his explanation of why the policy 
caused the ruler to lose trust. As he explained,  
  If your Majesty is really sincere to the people, then even if anyone slanders 
you, the public will not trust their claims. However if your Majesty is actually 
pursuing your own interests, then even if you defend yourself, others will not 
believe you. There are affairs about which we absolutely cannot deceive others. If 
the clerks receive bribes and pervert the law, others will definitely call out their 
corruption; if people take things that do not belong to them, others will definitely 
call them thieves. If they have truly [bad] actions, they will not dare to deny these 
accusations. If we use the Green Sprouts Policy to collect twenty percent interest 
how can we not admit that such a policy is lending money to get interest? If a 
person has done good things, others will praise him even if he has not praised 
himself. If a person has done evil things, others will blame him even he has not 
blamed himself. If all people who have done good things had to praise themselves 
to make others trust them, then the Sages like Yao, Shun, the Duke of Zhou and 
Confucius would have become exhausted [trying to get approval]. Now people in 
heaven-and-earth all regard [your policy] as pursuing material interests, but your 
Majesty thinks the policy is following the moral principle of righteousness; people 
in heaven-and-earth all regard [your policy] as evil, but your Majesty takes it as 
benevolence; people in heaven-and-earth take [the policy] as corrupt but your 
Majesty takes it as uncorrupt. Because you cannot stand the many critiques, you 
have asked some officials to use persuasive arguments to answer questions from 
thousands of mouths. They drew far-fetched analogies to the Classics, producing 
governmental documents to proclaim the value of the policy to the people of 
heaven-and-earth.257      
 
   Su Shi believed that the public could use its common rationality to distinguish 
rulers' intentions from their actual behavior. As he pointed out, if the ruler collected 
interest through the governmental lending policy, the public could conclude that his 
goal was to pursue material interests. As we have discussed, Su Shi's identification of 
the common people's capacity for judgment originated from his understanding of the 
people's common nature. Su Shi also insisted that such judgment, guided by nature, 
could not be changed even though officials like Wang Anshi tried to explain their 
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intentions by inventing an innate connection between their activities and the dao 
conveyed by the Classics. Once the subjects found that the ruler or officials were 
cheating, they would not trust their words. 
Moreover, Su Shi emphasized the importance of the policy makers' 
self-confidence in creating policies. In Su Shi's critique, the drafters of the New 
Policies were imprudent, haughty and opinionated. In order to satisfy their 
self-interest, they hastily created the Finance Planning Commission and proclaimed 
the Green Sprouts Policy and other policies. In Su Shi's view, due to the lack of 
serious planning, these policies would probably fail. Once they failed, the monarch 
would lose self-confidence. As a consequence, people in heaven-and-earth would also 
lose their trust in the capability of the government.258 The mental state of the drafters 
of the New Policies therefore determined their failures in policy innovation.  
Customs and morality  
Su Shi predicted that Wang Anshi¶VHIIRUWWRJXDUDQWHHWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKH
New Policies WKURXJKXQLI\LQJWKHOLWHUDWL¶VYDOXHVZRXOGKDYHDQHJDWLYHLQIOXHQFHRQ
social customs. He focused on social customs because he had a line of reasoning that 
articulated a relationship between policy, social customs, morality and human nature.  
Su Shi discussed the impact of institutional and policy changes on the stability of 
WKHSROLWLFDORUGHUWKURXJKWKHLULQIOXHQFHVRQSHRSOH¶VIHHOLngs and social customs (付
؇). He did not hold that comfort was the only goal of political and institutional 
FKDQJHVEXWDUJXHGWKDWSHRSOH¶VGLVFRPIRUWDQGGLVVDWLVIDFWLRQLQVRPHVLWXDWLRQV
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could negatively influence social customs and directly threaten the stability of the 
political order, especially during critical moments of political and institutional 
changes. How to find the proper balance? Su Shi provided several lines of reasoning 
to support his explanation.  
Su Shi discussed such an apparent conflict in his 1061 essay entitled On the 
Doctrine of the Mean ѝᓨ䄆 as well as in his essay On the First Emperor of Qin 〖
࿻ⲷ䄆. The implication of these discussions was very different, however. The first 
essay implies that the ruler should discover the origins of the laws, which demand 
conformity between the official rulHVDQGSHRSOH¶VFRPIRUWDEOHIHHOLQJV,WLVHYHQ
more fundamental that the ruler should find a way to progressively make his subjects 
comfortable with these rules. In the second essay, however, he presents a very 
different line of reasoning to resolve this apparent conflict. When given convenient 
PDWHULDOFRQGLWLRQVKHDUJXHVWKHFRPPRQSHRSOH¶VQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQWRPDLQWDLQ
the sense of comfort will lead them to have even greater desires. If such desires 
cannot be well controlled, the common people wouOGEHFRPH³GLVREHGLHQWFUDIW\
XQVWDEOHDQGGHFHLWIXODQGGLIILFXOWWRPDQDJH´259 Su Shi further argues that: 
 
 The Sages knew that sitting with legs extended and eating without bowing 
WRRQHRWKHUDUHIHOWFRQYHQLHQWE\SHRSOH¶VQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQDQGDre suitable 
IRUWKHERG\¶VFRPIRUWDEOHIHHOLQJ%XWHYHQWKRXJKWKH6DJHVNQHZWKLVWKH\
still made people follow the difficult regulations...because they wanted people to 
know how to respect the rules and not do crafty things. Therefore the rituals are 
cORVHWRSHRSOH¶VQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQVEXWGRQRWLQGXOJH>VXFKLQFOLQDWLRQV@260 
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7KLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQULWXDODQGSHRSOH¶VLQFOLQDWLRQVQR
longer emphasizes their long-term conformity but instead stresses the necessity of 
regulations to NHHSFRPPRQHUVPRUDO,Q6X6KL¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJUXOLQJLQVWLWXWLRQV
DQGSROLFLHVSOD\LPSRUWDQWUROHVLQVKDSLQJSHRSOH¶VPRUDOLW\EHFDXVHWKH\SURYLGH
LQFHQWLYHVWKDWZLOOFKDQJHSHRSOH¶VEHKDYLRU1RUXOHVFDQFKDQJHSHRSOH¶VQDWXUDO
inclinations. People will follow their nature to react to the rules instead of being 
changed by the rules. For example, as Su Shi notes, the first emperor of the Qin 
dynasty abandoned the rituals and only used utilitarian measures to rule people. 
People therefore used this opportunity to indulge their natural inclinations and do 
whatever satisfied their private interests without considering any moral standards.261 
Su Shi therefore suggested that policy changes should not provide incentives that 
make people betray morality with natural impulsive behavior. This suggestion differs 
from his second line of reasoning, which suggested that the rulers should 
progressively make people comfortable with the rules.  
Morality becomes a consideration in this line of reasoning, where the sound 
operation of a political system does not take as its sole goal the satisfaction of 
SHRSOH¶VFRPIRUWDEOHIHHOLQJV6X6KLEHOLHYHGWKDWSROLFLHVDQGLQVWLWXWLRQVDOVR
QHHGHGWRPDNHSHRSOHPRUDO3HRSOH¶VQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQVFDQQRWDOZD\VOHDGWKHP
to moral behavior given the short-sighted nature of these impulses and SHRSOH¶V
inability to resist temptation. Policies should therefore maintain the moral state of 
participants, and not provide them with incentives toward immorality.  
                                                        
261
 6X6KL³4LQVKLKXDQJ lun 〖࿻ⲷ䄆´Su Shi wenji di yice 㰷䔮᮷䳶ㅜа޺, 80 
 179 
Moreover, morality is also meaningful to the political order. The concept of 
³VRFLDOFXVWRP 付؇´ZDVXVHGE\6X6KLLQKLVUHDVRQLQJWRLOOXVWUDWHWKHFDXVDO
relationship between morality and political order. Although Su Shi did not clearly 
define the meaning of social custom in any of his writings, his discourse implies two 
connotations of this word. Social custom refers to the common behavioral patterns of 
the social members who possess moral features. For example, when social customs 
FKDQJH³WKHSHRSOHZKRDUHPHDQDQGYXOJDUFOHDQWKHLUPLQGVDQGEHFRPHPRUDO
They are then devoted to doing the loyal and honest thing. All people respect 
themselves and feel DVKDPHGRIVHFUHWO\WDONLQJDERXWHDFKRWKHU¶VIDXOWV´262 Society 
LQ6X6KL¶VYLHZKDVFRPPRQPRUDOIHDWXUHVZKLFKFDQEHIRXQGLQWKHFRPPRQ
behaviors that social members follow.  
Su Shi also believed that social customs directly determined the stability of the 
SROLWLFDORUGHU$VKHVWDWHG³,IWKHVRFLDOFXVWRPFKDQJHVLWFDQQRWEHFKDQJHGEDFN
[Under the new social customs] the moral people become weak, and the state will 
subsequently bHFRPHZHDN´263 Because social customs represent common 
behavioral patterns, people can easily predict the activities of others if they all follow 
the same moral behavioral pattern. The social ties of trust can therefore be easily 
established in a society that has good and stable customs.264 
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Unlike Wang Anshi, Su Shi did not believe that the state could take any measures 
that would completely unify social customs to create a higher moral order, because 
SHRSOH¶VQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQWRSXUVXHPDWHULDOLQWHUHVWVFould not be changed. On the 
RWKHUKDQG6X6KLGLGQRWJLYHXSRQWKHVWDWH¶VLQIOXHQFHRYHUVRFLDOFXVWRPV6LQFH
WKHUXOHU¶s governing cannot be abandoned, Su Shi considers how to make those 
policies and institutions play a positive role and improve social customs. As Su Shi 
DUJXHG³7KHZD\RIJRYHUQLQJVKRXOGUHO\RQVRFLDOFXVWRPV,IWKHVRFLDOFXVWRPLV
good, then [the rulers] should support it by using generous measures; if the custom is 
wicked, then the rulers should regulate it with strict measurHV´265 The role of the 
state therefore has to be based on the real situation of social customs. Policies and 
institutions should not give people incentives to deviate from moral standards. In such 
DGLVFRXUVHSHRSOH¶VQDWXUDOLQFOLQDWLRQLVQRWVRPHWKLQJWhat the rulers should 
absolutely follow but rather a reality that the rulers should fully understand and then 
regulate. Any innovation divorced from the social reality will result in turmoil and the 
GHJHQHUDWLRQRIVRFLDOFXVWRPVDJDSEHWZHHQDSROLF\¶Voriginal goals and its 
outcome, and this will result in the collapse of the political order.  
Su Shi admitted that even benign measures for improving social customs would 
cause uncomfortable feelings at the beginning stage of their proclamation because of 
their difference from long-held traditions. Su Shi held that such measures should 
eventually make people feel comfortable. The rulers therefore have to patiently 
                                                        
265
 6X6KL³'DR\RXVKHQJMLDQJ]KHQJ\Ru suge 䚃ᴹॷ䱽᭯⭡؇䶙´Su Shi wenji di yice 㰷
䔮᮷䳶ㅜа޺, 173 
 181 
convince people if they want to change social customs.266 Su Shi still held that 
making people comfortable was a goal that the political order should eventually 
achieve; on the other hand, he did not think that the government could make everyone 
feel comfortable at any given moment because in certain situations, correct policies 
ZRXOGFKDQJHSHRSOH¶V habits and temporarily cause them to feel uneasy. Those 
policies should not be abandoned even though they cause such uneasy feelings if they 
are good for the long-term development of society and the state. 
 
    In Su Shi¶s thought, the means through which Wang Anshi implemented the 
Green Sprouts Policy would greatly damage social customs. According to Su Shi, 
people who did not devote themselves to self-cultivation were led by their common 
nature, which made them take pursuit of their personal interests as their priority. Wang 
Anshi's unification of people's values through unifying the interpretation of the 
Classics and making it the standard by which officials are selected is therefore in vain. 
According to Su Shi, examinees could find multiple ways to cheat, and can also parrot 
whatever the state wanted them to say using words that have nothing to do with their 
actual morality. Moreover, because it is impossible to change people's nature, the new 
examination institutions provided incentives that guided people to cheat and become 
morally degenerate.267      
     Su Shi argued that the Green Sprouts Policy would cause similar problems. 
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:DQJ$QVKL¶VHQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHSROLF\DWWKHSULFHRIWKHSDUWLFLSDQWV¶PRUDO
FXOWLYDWLRQZRXOGLQ6X6KL¶VYLHZUHVXOWLQWKHFROODSVHRIVRFLHW\¶VPRUDOFXVWRPV
:DQJ$QVKL¶VSROLFLHVVHGXFHGSHRSOHWRFRPPLW evil in their quest for fast 
promotions, he argued. Officials would only learn to cater to the monarch, hiding true 
information about their localities and falsely reporting their achievements in loaning 
money to the farmers.268 The entire society would no longer follow moral principles, 
but would form what he termed "perfidious customs ▶付.´269 No good policy can 
be honestly implemented when officials and members of society are accustomed to 
cheating.  
 
³Public Opinion ޜ䆠´ in Critiques of the Green Sprouts Policy by Cheng Hao, 
Chen Xiang and Zhang Jian 
 
Cheng Hao 
In his critique of the Green Sprouts Policy, Cheng Hao emphasizes that the 
monarch should take care to accommodate public opinion which referred to superior 
men¶s rejection of the New Policies and the dissatisfactory feeling of bureaucrats and 
common people towards the policies.  In his line of reasoning, the public opinion is 
taken as the external opinion that the ruler should internalize as an integral part of his 
internal world in his mental self- cultivation.   
 In his memorial Cheng Hao argued,  
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 The principle of the world is simple and easy. If [Your Majesty] follows the 
principle in a smooth manner, then there is nothing that you cannot accomplish. 
:HWKHUHIRUHVD\WKDW³7KHZLVHSHRSOH¶V>GRLQJRIWKLQJV@LVOLNH6DJH<X¶V
FKDQQHOLQJRIIORRGVWKH\ERWKXVHVDIHPHDVXUHV´,I\RXJLYHXS>WKHVHHDV\DQG
safe measures] but use dangerous and difficult measures, you can hardly be taken 
as a wise person. Since antiquity, when the monarch wanted to create new 
measures for governing, although they could hold absolute power to decide, we 
however never heard of any monarch who could succeed if the important officials 
close to him held their own opinions and could not achieve agreement. [In this 
case where] the national policies are not unified, what the policy makers claimed 
GHYLDWHGIURPWKHDFWXDOLW\RILWVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQDQGSHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJVDQG
opinions inside and outside the court all opposed the policies.270   
 
The memorial shows that Cheng Hao¶s critique focused on two problems of the 
Green Sprouts Policy. First, the policy raised great opposition from officials at court. 
Second, the policy also caused ³great depression བྷ兡´ among subjects outside the 
court.271 He further argued that because ³SHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJVDQGRSLQLRQVLQVLGHDQG
RXWVLGHWKHFRXUWDOORSSRVHWKHSROLFLHV´ the emperor should follow those feelings 
and opinions to abolish the Green Sprouts Policy. Cheng Hao thought that the 
emperor¶s learning from the critiques held by the superior men and his full 
consideration of the feelings of common people would be integral parts of his 
self-cultivation. The correct way of the emperor¶s self-cultivation determined the 
successful establishment of the ideal political order. In his view, the current activities 
of the emperor and other drafters of New Policies had deviated from the correct way 
of self-cultivation. Those activities therefore should be criticized and corrected.  
 
                                                        
270
 &KHQJ+DR³=DLVKDQJVKX ޽к⮿´ Henan chengshi wenji juan diyi ⋣ই〻∿᮷䳶ধㅜ
а, Ercheng ji shang Ҽ〻䳶к,457  
 
271
 Cheng Hao, ³Jian Xinfa shu. 䄛ᯠ⌅⮿´Henan chengshi wenji juan diyi ⋣ই〻∿᮷䳶ধ
ㅜа, Ercheng ji shang Ҽ〻䳶к,457 
 184 
Cheng Hao rejected Wang Anshi¶s claim to having discovered the dao from the 
Classics. Instead, he held that the dao can be learned from daily life. As Cheng stated,  
  There is no need for the student to seek [the principle] far afield; the simplest 
course is merely to find it near at hand in himself, understanding the principle of 
benevolence and [maintaining] principle with integrity.272  
 
Cheng Hao rejected both Buddhism and Wang Anshi¶s external pursuit of dao. As 
his disciples later described,  
MLQJGDR&KHQJ+DRRQFHWDONHGWR:DQJ$QVKLDQGVDLG³<RXU
speaking about the dao is just like talking about the Dharmacakra atop the 
thirteen-storied tower. You stare at the tower and clearly talk about how it looks, 
but as an honest and straightforward person, I will not do what you did. I would 
rather immediately go into the tower to search for its top. I will work hard to 
climb up and slowly go up until reaching the thirteenth story. Although I cannot 
see and talk as you do, I will soon be actually in the tower. Since I will be closer 
and closer to the top, I will probably arrive there. When I have already sat in the 
Dharmacakra, I will find that you are still facing the tower and talking about 
KRZWKHWRSORRNV´  
Jiefu (Wang Anshi) only spoke of dao. +HVDLG³,NQRZdao is there and it is 
VRDQGVR´+RZHYHUZKHQKHVSHDNVRIWKHdao, he has already deviated from 
the dao. He does not know that when he speaks of the dao, that the dao he 
speaks of is not the dao. The sages who followed the dao also said things, but 
they only said common things. When Mencius said Yao and Shun follow their 
nature to do things, and said Shun did things by following benevolence and 
righteousness, his sayings were just common words. There is no need to talk 
DERXWWKHZRUGV³QDWXUH´DQG³IROORZLQJPRUDOSULQFLSOHV´EHFDXVHSHRSOHFDQ
clearly realize them by themselves.273     
Cheng Hao's critique of Wang Anshi stressed that Wang only had superficially 
described an abstract principle that was empty and difficult to recognize. Cheng 
believed that the dao could not exist on people's lips. The principles and norms that 
can only be spoken of are not dao. Dao has to be realized in the mind. In &KHQJ+DR¶V
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view, the dao was simple and people could recognize it in their mind without defining 
it. The real challenge for learners, therefore, was how to maintain their integrity and 
composure so as to preserve their knowledge of dao, rather than producing difficult 
words and expressions to speak of it.  
The self-FXOWLYDWLRQLQ&KHQJ+DR¶Vline of reasoning involves the process of 
KDQGOLQJWKHSURSHUUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHOHDUQHUV¶VXEMHFWLYHDQGH[WHUQDOZRUOGV 
rather than forcing students to learn the complicated interpretation of the SageV¶ minds. 
Unlike Su Shi, who integrated discourse abRXWVXEMHFWV¶FRPIRUWDEOHIHHOLQJVDQG
trustfulness into his logical framework on the political order, Cheng Hao mainly 
emphasized the mental state of the rulers. For Cheng Hao, the process of establishing 
WKHLGHDOUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHUXOHU¶VVXEMHFWive world and external things is 
self-cultivation, the realization of principle in his subjective world. The UXOHU¶VPHQWDO
world is the basis for the political order. In Cheng's description, the mental state of the 
subject in responding to the ruler's self-cultivation does not appear as a necessary 
standard for defining the ideal political order.   
   Cheng Hao described the moral principle of benevolence (ren) as follows:  
    
0HGLFDOERRNVXVHGWKHWHUP³XQIHHOLQJ´QRWren) for numbness in the hands 
and feet; this is an extremely good way to describe it. By benevolence, heaven and 
earth and the innumerable things are regarded as one substance, so that nothing is 
not oneself; and when this is recognized there is nothing one will not do for them. 
If they are not possessed in the self, naturally they are of no concern to it; just as 
ZKHQKDQGVDQGIHHWDUH³XQIHHOLQJ´WKHKXPRXUTLGRHVQRWFLUFXODWHWKURXJK
WKHPDQGWKH\QRORQJHUEHORQJWRRQHVHOI+HQFH&RQIXFLXVVDLGWKDWE\³JLYLQJ
widely and assistiQJDOO´WKHTXDOLWLHVRIWKH6DJHDUHUHDOL]HGLQSUDFWLFHEXWVLQFH
EHQHYROHQFHLVH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWWRGHVFULEHDOOKHVDLGRILWZDV³ZLVKLQJWR
stand oneself, help others to stand; wishing to arrive oneself, help others to arrive. 
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An ability to judJHWKHQHHGVRIRWKHUVE\RQH¶VRZQPD\EHGHVFULEHGDVWKH
PHDQVWRDSSO\EHQHYROHQFH´%\PDNLQJXVORRNDWEHQHYROHQFHIURPWKLVSRLQW
of view, he wished to help us grasp what it is.274 
 
   Self-cultivation refers to ³NQRZLQJEHQHYROHQFH´According to Cheng Hao, the 
fRXURWKHUPRUDOSULQFLSOHVRI³GXW\SURSULHW\ZLVGRPDQGJRRGIDLWK´DUH³DOO
EHQHYROHQFH´275 Learning to be benevolent is the process of erasing the boundary 
EHWZHHQWKHOHDUQHUV¶LQWHUQDODQGH[WHUQDOZRUOGV6XFKDSURFHVVLVGHVFULEHGE\
Cheng Hao as regarding the external things as one undivided substance with the self. 
$V&KHQJ+DRGHVFULEHG³%\EHQHYROHQFHKHDYHQDQGHDUWKDQGWKHLQQXPHUDEOH
WKLQJVDUHUHJDUGHGDVRQHVXEVWDQFHVRWKDWQRWKLQJLVQRWRQHVHOI´7KHLPSOLFDWLRQ
of this statement is that the learner should fully feel the feelings, emotions, ideas and 
LQWHUHVWVRIRWKHUSHRSOHMXVWOLNHWKH\IHHOWKHLURZQKDQGVDQGIHHW,Q&KHQJ+DR¶V
thought, the external world does not exist far afield. It is reflected LQSHRSOH¶V
subjective world because the feelings of the people in the external world can be felt 
E\DOHDUQHUMXVWDVWKHOHDUQHU¶VRZQLQQDWHIHHOLQJV  
   In his critique of the New Policies he stressed that their drafters ignored the 
opinions and feelings of the public and only followed their own intentions. The gap 
between subject and ruler in feeling the effects of the policies therefore becomes 
serious. This problem had already made the monarch deviate from the correct way of 
self-cultivation and betray the dao. 
Chen Xiang 
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In his critique of the New Policies Chen Xiang also held that the monarch should 
follow public opinion and annul the Green Sprouts Policy, but the logic of his 
argument is different from that of the intellectuals we have discussed so far. Chen 
XiDQJ¶VORJLFRULJLQDWHVIURPKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDFRPPRQKXPDQQDWXUHHQGRZHG
by heaven and therefore good. As Chen Xiang held,  
     Human nature is good. This nature is most central and most unbiased and is 
regarded as the standard for people. The bad thing that is not part of human nature 
is human desire.276 
 
According to Chen Xiang, human nature contains five principles: benevolence, 
righteousness, propriety, wisdom and faithfulness, all of which are possessed by all 
people equally. Chen Xiang further clarified the manifestation of these principles. 
As he held,  
When people are born, [their mind] is quiet. Before emotions and desires are 
aroused, it is transparent. The mind of commiseration exists [from the 
beginning]. This mind is that of benevolence. The mind of shame and dislike is 
righteousness. The mind of respect and deference is propriety. The mind of 
knowing right and wrong is wisdom. The mind of honesty is faithfulness. 
People already have these five minds before learning. This is why we say they 
are endowed by heaven. Human nature and heaven-and-earth both originate 
from the dao.277 
 
Chen Xiang further clarified two kinds of emotions(ᛵ) that people will have 
when stimulated by external things. Good emotions were guided by human nature, 
while bad emotions were caused by human desire. If people¶s desires do not disturb 
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their mind, their responses to external things will automatically be good because 
their human nature guides such responses. As Chen Xiang argued,  
 
 Seeing an innocent person killed, all people have the emotion of 
commiseration. This is what we mean by saying that people¶s minds are all 
benevolent. People have such a mind, but still do evil things because desire 
disturbs the mind. When doing things that are not righteous, all people have the 
emotion of shame. This is what we mean by saying that people¶s minds are 
righteous. People have such minds, but still do unrighteous things because 
desire steals [the good] mind. «278 
 
In Chen Xiang¶s discourse, he repeatedly emphasized that the emotions caused by 
human nature are common(ޡ) to all people, regardless of their level of knowledge. 
These reactions, in the context of the process of implementing policy, constitute 
public opinion. Because public opinion is not disturbed by a desire to pursue private 
interest, it represents the dao and therefore should be taken as the standard for judging 
policies. As Chen Xiang elaborates, 
  
      The dao of heaven-and-earth is conveyed by public opinion. If public opinion 
is ignored, the dao in policy will disappear. All people have the mind that makes 
correct judgment. This mind comes from human nature, which represents 
principle. The sages and the common people have no difference on this point. 
When making judgments, if people¶s minds have no bias, their words will be fair. 
If they can be thus, even the judgments made by illiterate men and women have 
utility that can be accepted, not to mention [the judgments] made by the literati 
and superior men. When making a policy, those who rule the common people 
always say ³:e have carefully thought about the policy and deeply discussed it´ 
therefore they do not seriously consider public opinion. They even regard such 
opinion as conventional and refuse to consider it. Public opinion is created before 
emotional bias appears, but it disappears when people compete to best others. The 
monarch has to be clear about this problem. If only you yourself think the policy 
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is right but all others regard it as wrong, or if only you yourself think the policy is 
wrong but people in heaven-and-earth all take it as right, your majesty should not 
do this. «Therefore when the monarch wants to get suggestions from people, he 
should ignore whether these people are rich or poor, distant or close, wise or 
foolish. He should only worry about whether the people who help him make plans 
are insufficient in number, and whether the number of people who discuss the 
policy are not broad enough [in scope].279 
 
  According to Chen Xiang, in contrast to the common people's unbiased 
attitudes, the drafters of the New Policies had involved themselves in pursuing their 
own private interests. No matter how much more knowledge they had relevant to the 
policies, their opinions were wrong because their desires and private interests had led 
them astray. Their bias prevented them from seeing that people commonly opposed 
the Green Sprouts Policy and other New Policies. In Chen Xiang's mind, the 
policymakers should definitely accept these critiques because the critiques had no bias 
since they did not reflect private interest.  
Zhang Jian 
Zhu Xi considered Zhang Jian to be intellectually similar to his brother Zhang 
Zai ᕥ䔹 (1020-1077).280 As the Acting Investigating Censor, Zhang Jian was very 
active in criticizing the New Policies, which led to his withdrawal from the court. 
Among his relevant memorials, only one is preserved, but it illustrates Zhang Jian¶s 
reasoning that led to his advice for policy makers to follow public opinion. Zhang Jian 
argued, 
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I truly believe that people all think Your Majesty is sagely and illuminating and 
perfectly impartial, because when you act, you definitely follow principle. You are not 
for anything or against anything; you follow the principle of rightenousness as the 
standard. Because previous suggestions said the policy is convenient, you temporarily 
put it into practice. If you can change and abolish it now after knowing of its harm, 
you can be said to be following the mind of people and accomplishing the affairs of 
the country «Therefore [the Book of Changes says], ³ [People] should not have 
intentions, certainty, inflexibility or egotism´ It also says, ³ [People] should act when 
the situation requires them to act; [people] should stop when the situation requires 
them to stop. The principle of righteousness that the Book of Changes conveys 
requires that [people behave] in accordance with the situation. Does your Majesty 
have any materials interests to pursue? You only should pursue the principle of 
righteousness. Nowadays public opinion hates the policy and people in 
heaven-and-earth are greatly disturbed, but Wang Anshi still wants to conceal his 
mistakes. The arguments he holds are very narrow. He cheats and intimidates people. 
He has been devoted to expunging correct opinions. These are the reasons why I 
should criticize him, even if I die for that. The principle of righteousness requires that 
I not follow him. I am irreconcilable with him.281  
 
Zhang Jian stated that people held a unified attitude against the New Policies, 
and that the public mind should determine the ruler¶V actions. Those in government 
should not stick to their own private interests and indulge their own intentions, but 
instead should follow(丶) the public mind so that they can be said to be following the 
principle of yi, and abolish the Green Sprouts Policy. %HFDXVHRI:DQJ$QVKL¶V
rejection of correct judgment, Zhang Jian declares himself irreconcilably opposed to 
him in order to protect the principle of righteousness.   
    His view of public opinion as an actual situation existing in the external world 
differentiated Zhang Jian from Cheng Hao, Su Shi or Chen Xiang. Public opinion in 
Zhang Jian¶s viewpoint is not an external thing that the ruler should ³feel´ but rather 
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represents a changing situation that the ruler should absolutely follow. The ruler¶s 
following of public opinion is taken as following the principle of yi, which is the 
essential principle held by Zhang Jian as guidance for people¶s activities.  
Su Shi also emphasized that rulers should not indulge their own intentions and 
private interests. However, he did not take the unified public view as a real situation. 
Su Shi describes the real situation that rulers should consider their response to as the 
existence of multiple choices that people might make in following their human nature. 
Zhang Jian, however, did not focus on this diversity.  
Chen Xiang believed that public opinion represented moral principle and 
therefore should be considered by the ruler. By this logic, public opinion is the form 
that conveys principle. Following public opinion therefore constitutes following 
principle. Zhang Jian, however, regarded the public mind as the same as the actual 
situation, rather than the same as the principle of yi&KHQ;LDQJ¶VGLVFRXUVHKRZHYHU
took public opinion as the representation of moral principles. He therefore goes no 
IXUWKHULQKLVDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHPRUDOIHDWXUHVRIWKHUXOHU¶VDFWLRQV  
 
In this chapter I have discussed how various lines of reasoning guided critics to 
formulate their critiques of the Green Sprouts Policy. In Chapter Three I will discuss 
how the worldview of the critics caused real political consequences at court. I will 
explain why purges based on factional lines became the measure for dealing with 
different opinions in the policy making process.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
From Toleration to Exclusion: Policy Formation Mechanisms among Political 
Elites during the Rural Credit Policy Making Process (1069-1071) 
 
Chapter two has discussed the thought on state building of major political 
thinkers other than Wang Anshi during the New Policies period. The participants in 
the debate over the Green Sprouts Policy ( or Rural Credit Policy) represent some of 
the most influential intellectuals of the period, who not only shaped the landscape of 
intellectual history in the mid-eleventh century but also had a great impact on the 
subsequent years of the Song dynasty and even the broader canvas of Chinese 
intellectual history. We have seen some of the richness of the intellectual resources on 
the issues of governance that Chinese political thinkers in eleventh century developed 
out of their common concern with shaping collective action and adaptive governance. 
The history of political thought not only presented different possibilities for change, 
but also great tension between these possibilities. Taking the Green Sprouts Policy as 
DFDVH,KDYHGLVFXVVHGKRZWKHVHWKLQNHUVYLHZHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VSROLWLFDOWKRXJKW
and economic policies within their own logical frameworks, which them different 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHFRQFHSWVVXFKDV³wen,´³dao,´DQGKXPDQQDWXUHxing), and the 
relations between those concepts. Chapter two has explored why those thinkers 
UHMHFWHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VHQWLUHHFRQRmic plan, rather than focusing on revising specific 
policies.  
As leading figures with influence on the political elites at the court, these 
intellectuals organized widespread opposition to the Green Sprouts Policy in the 
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initial years of the New Policies. Critics included not only intellectuals with an 
integrated worldview of the political order, but also officials who had different views 
from Wang Anshi on the meaning of the Classics, the consequences of the policies 
and the features of the existing political mechanism. The question of how to overcome 
such oppositions to implement the policy was therefore a major challenge for the 
makers of the New Policies. For the critics, meanwhile, their challenge was to address 
WKH1HZ3ROLFLHVPDNHUV¶V\VWHPDWLFZRUOdview and the policies and actions that were 
guided by such views.  
 
In this chapter, I will focus on the conflict-solving mechanisms between the 
Emperor and political elites at the court during the process of developing the Rural 
Credit Policy (1069-1070). I will demonstrate that during this critical juncture, two 
alternatives emerged for treating dissenting opinions on policy. The first alternative 
was to admit that all debaters shared the common goal of promoting public 
governance even if they held very different opinions of policy. Conflicts over beliefs 
and practices would be allowed to persist in the policy making process, and even if 
the policy makers did not adopt the opinions of the critics, there would be no 
retaliation against them. The debate would be limited to the policy field, without 
attacking the personalities or factional alliances of the critics 
 The second alternative was to deny the common ground between debaters and 
WRWUHDWGLVVHQWLQJRSLQLRQVDVWKHSURGXFWRIRSSRQHQWV¶SHUVRQDOLWLHV moral features 
and factional affiliations. The focus shifted from resolution of policy problems to the 
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character and factional alliances of the other side. Once a person was judged as 
belonging to an evil faction, every action he took would be opposed. Each side 
adopted an irreconcilable attitude, fully ignoring the possible merit of the opinions of 
opponents. Opponents would also be purged from policy-making circles because the 
policy makers thought this would be a way to discipline the mental state of other 
policy participants, to make them apprehend and follow the intentions of the emperor. 
In this chapter, I address the following question: Why was the first alternative 
replaced by the second at this critical juncture? Why did the debaters fail to maintain 
their common commitment to the goal of improving the public good, or establishing a 
deliberative mechanism that could lead them to collectively figure out an preference 
for the state?    
In this chapter, I will trace the mechanisms of conflict resolution among political 
elites at the court during 1069-1071. My discussion starts from 1069 because the 
Green Sprouts Policy was promulgated in the ninth month of that year, provoking 
great opposition soon thereafter. Those who actively criticized the Green Sprouts 
Policy included acting and former Grand Councilors, Assistant Civil Councilors, 
leaders of the Bureau of Military Affairs, leaders and officials in the Censorate and 
Remonstrance Bureau, Hanlin academicians, Attendant Officials who had the 
privilege oIGUDIWLQJWKH(PSHURU¶VHGLFWVDQGGLUHFWO\GLVFXVVLQJDIIDLUVZLWKKLPDQG
important provincial level leaders. My study ends in 1071 because by that time the 
critics of the Green Sprouts Policy at the court had been purged from decision-making 
circles by the advocates of the Policy.  
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I argue that the worldviews of both sides shaped the way they perceived and 
interpreted feedback and problems in the process of policy implementation. 
Fundamentally different philosophical interpretations of human nature, self-interest, 
and the dao caused them to form very divergent interpretations of those problems. 
When Han Qi harshly criticized the Green Sprouts Policy, both Wang Anshi and his 
FULWLFVLQWHUSUHWHGVKLHYHQIURPWKHLURZQSHUVSHFWLYHV6KHQ]RQJ¶VVXSSRUWIRU Wang 
$QVKL¶VYLHZVWLPXODWHGFULWLFVWRXVH³SXEOLFRSLQLRQ´WRFULWLFL]H:DQJ$QVKL¶V
response to Han Qi. The drafters of the New Policies also changed their focus from 
WKHFULWLFV¶SHUVRQDOLWLHVWRWKHLUIDFWLRQDODOOLDQFHV)DFWLRQIRUPDWLRQOHGWR
irrHFRQFLODEOHDWWLWXGHV7KHSROLF\PDNHUV¶JRDORIGLVFLSOLQLQJSHRSOH¶VPLQGVIRUWKH
SXUSRVHRIPDNLQJWKHPIROORZWKHHPSHURU¶VLQWHQWLRQOHGWKHPWRSXUJHFULWLFVIURP
policy making circles. This historical mechanism caused great change in the modes of 
conflict resolution. 
 
Competing Rationales for Resolving Dissenting Opinions before and during the 
³+DQ4L(YHQW´-1070.2) 
  Two competing rationales for resolving dissenting opinions coexisted in the views 
of policy makers during the policy implementation process. The first rationale gave 
priority to the utility of opinions to resolve actual problems, independent of any 
personal characteristics of the individuals who expressed those opinions. The political 
deliberation process focused on crafting the best solution, incorporating dissenting 
opinions on their merits. The second rationale, however, took the political and moral 
characteristics of the presenters as the determinative factors for judging their opinions, 
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perceiving those characteristics as fundamental to the political order. The major 
concern of the policy makers was not the value of opinions, but characteristics such as 
SUHVHQWHU¶VPRUDOLW\SROLWLFDOLGHRORJ\SHUVRQDOH[SHULHQFHDQGQHWZRUNDQGSROLWLFDO
and social influence. Policy makers would attack and purge opponents on this basis, 
even when their opinions addressed significant problems in the policy implementation 
process. 
  Wang Anshi clarified these two rationales in his first conversation with Emperor 
Shenzong in the fourth month oI,QDPHPRULDOHQWLWOHG³>:K\@7KLV'\QDVW\
has Enjoyed a Hundred Years Without Disaster 䄆ᵜᵍⲮᒤ❑һࢴᆀ´VXEPLWWHG
ULJKWDIWHUWKHPHHWLQJ:DQJ$QVKLEHJLQVE\FHOHEUDWLQJ(PSHURU5HQ]RQJ¶V
open-mindedness toward differing opinions. Wang thought this had advantages 
because it would help the Emperor avoid being misled by bad advice. Because the 
VWDWH¶VEURDGFKDQQHOVIRUH[SUHVVLQJRSLQLRQVJDYHWKH(PSHURUDFFHVVWRDOONLQGVRI
information, evil people would be discovered even if they were temporarily appointed 
to positions of power, and talented literati would also be discovered by the system 
even if they might occasionally be blocked282  
+RZHYHULQ:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZWKLVDSSURDFKSULQFLSOHZRXOGQRWSHUPLWWKH
Song state to achieve true greatness. He arJXHGWKDW(PSHURU5HQ]RQJ¶VWROHUDWLRQ
had in fact allowed the court to become filled with mediocrities and outright villains 
who were treated by Renzong on equal terms with the talented and worthy. Bad 
policies were repeatedly adopted, even if correct views were not excluded from the 
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debate. The Emperor passively allowed all of this to happen without making an effort 
to correct problems by following his own correct view.  
,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VPLQGWKH(PSHURUVKRXOGKDYHWKHLQVLJKWWRGLVFHUQWKHWUXH
mental VWDWHRIKLVVXERUGLQDWHV:DQJXVHGWKHFRQFHSWVRI³ming ਽´DQG³shi ሖ´WR
LQHYDOXDWLQJVXJJHVWLRQVRQSROLFLHV:RUGVDQGDFWLRQVDVZHUH³DSSHDUDQFHVming 
਽´WKDWQHHGHGWREHLQWHUSUHWHG7KH(PSHURUVKRXOGSHQHWUDWHPHQ¶VVXSHUILFLDO
words and actions to see what they in fact meant. Distinguishing appearances from the 
true meaning by the emperor could determine who should be categorized as petty 
men.283 In this view, the value of policy suggestions could not be determined until the 
motives of critics were distinguished. Wang Anshi questioned the unconditional 
accommodation of different views, arguing that policy makers should first figure out 
which critiques were made with evil intentions. For example, the economic policy that 
he proposed was going to harm the economic interests of the engrossing families, so 
those families could be expected to make every effort to express their opposition 
through sympathetic officials. In truth those critics only served the economic interests 
of the engrossing families, rather than representing the common people.284 
The Emperor therefore should not direct his attention to whether those opinions 
could efficiently resolve concrete problems faced by the government. Rather, he 
should focus on discovering the real intention or PRWLYHVRIWKHFULWLFV3HRSOH¶VZRUGV
and actions were important not because of their contribution to the revision of policies, 
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but because those words and behavior revealed their true intention, the Emperor could 
then respond to them based on his judgment of their intention.    
,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZPHPEHUVRIWKHJRYHUQPHQWFRXOGEHFDWHJRUL]HGLQWR
three essential types: 1) the superior men who followed the dao with clear thinking 
and were effective; 2) the petty men who were flawed due to their wrong learning, 
bad personal characteristics and affiliation with other petty men; and 3) the mediocre 
majority who did not stick firmly to any category, possibly becoming either superior 
men or petty men depending on who influenced them. He thought that superior men 
should be rewarded by the Emperor and petty men eliminated. Only when the 
Emperor had undertaken these measures could the mediocre be corrected and the civic 
mores guided onto the right trajectory.285  
:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZRIKLVFULWLFVZDVQRWIXOO\DFFHpted by Emperor Shenzong 
XQWLOWKHVHFRQGPRQWKRI7KH(PSHURU¶VPDMRUFRQVLGHUDWLRQEHIRUHWKDWZDVWR
resolve the real problems that had emerged after the initiation of the Green Sprouts 
Policy. To this end, he needed to gather advice broadly and select the best measures 
RIIHUHG7KHFRXUWDOVRVRXJKWWRSDFLI\FULWLFV¶GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQZLWKWKHSROLFLHVE\
allowing them to express their opinions.  
6KHQ]RQJ¶VRSHQ-mindedness towards dissenting opinions can be seen in his 
UHVSRQVHWR6X6KL¶VFULWLTXH RI:DQJ$QVKL¶VVXJJHVWLRQVIRUUHIRUPLQJWKH
examination system. In the fifth month of 1069, Emperor Shenzong called upon his 
court to discuss the possible reform of the civil examination and school system. As we 
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KDYHVHHQLQWKHVHFRQGFKDSWHU6X6KL¶V vision of an ideal political order led him to 
RSSRVH:DQJ$QVKL¶VHIIRUWWRVXEVWLWXWHWKHSRHWU\VHFWLRQZLWKWKH&ODVVLFVLQWKH
FLYLOH[DPLQDWLRQ(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJVKRZHGJUHDWLQWHUHVWLQ6X6KL¶VPHPRULDODQG
called for a meeting with Su Shi. Even though Wang Anshi had clearly told Shenzong 
WKDW6X6KL¶VHQWLUHLQWHOOHFWXDOIUDPHZRUNZDVIXQGDPHQWDOO\GLIIHUHQWIURPKLVRZQ
Shenzong still suggested inviting Su Shi join the agency that draw up the New 
Policies.286    
  In the ninth month of 1069, the court required that the Green Sprouts Policy be 
implemented in the circuits of Jingdong, Hebei and Huainan. The court did not 
require other circuits to carry out this policy unless they thought that local situation 
was suitable.287 However, only two months afterward, the court extended the Green 
Sprouts Policy to the rest of the country.288 The extension of the policy to the national 
level, however, caused a multitude of problems due to differences in local conditions. 
In the first month of 1070, the Remonstrance Bureau officials Li Chang and Sun Jue 
submitted a memorial criticizing the policy implementation process in Hebei circuit. 
According to this report, Wang Guanglian, the Fiscal Intendant in Hebei, imposed 
quotas for making loans according to household grade.289 Sima Guang had also 
discerned that local bureaucrats in his native Shanxi were forcing farmers to borrow 
from the government. He reported this problem in person to the Emperor as evidence 
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of the failure of the policy.290 Moreover, the Finance Planning Commission at the 
court also received complaints from local officials that the newly appointed officials 
in the Stabilization Fund Supervisorate who were in charge of the Rural Credit Policy 
had began to interfere with local administrative affairs that should be managed by 
other local agencies.291  
  In responding to these problems, the court issued an edict in the first month of 1070. 
According to the edict, the central policy makers emphasized that the intention (yi ᜿) 
of the Green Sprouts Policy was to protect the poor. Local bureaucrats had not 
grasped this intention, instead forcing rural households to take their loans even hen 
thy did not need them. The court therefore ordered the circuit Judicial Commissioners 
to investigate. The rationale that guided such a response to these problems was to 
resolve concrete difficulties based on the investigation of actual local conditions. This 
way of dealing with problems was supported not only by the Emperor but also by the 
Grand Councilors Chen Shengzhi and Zeng Gongliang, who had previously given 
Wang Anshi strong support.  
  Wang Anshi, however, thought that it was too simple to conclude that local 
bureaucrats had been forcing the farmers to take out loans - there must be also 
situations in which the farmers needed those loans. Therefore the edict also directed 
ORFDOEXUHDXFUDWVQRWWRUHSUHVVWKHSHDVDQW¶VLQWHUHVWLQERUURZLQJPRQH\292 
  %\WKHILUVWPRQWKRISROLF\PDNHUV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIZKDWKDGDFWXDOO\
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happened at the local level had greatly diverged. The focus of both sides was on 
whether local bureaucrats forced the farmers to accept the loan against their will, or 
REVWUXFWHGWKHSHDVDQW¶VERUURZLQJRIPRQH\GXHWRWKHLULQHUWLD1HLWKHUVLGHFRXOG
find enough evidence to win the other over, because local variations provided them 
with enough ammunition to support either argument.  
 Wang Anshi could never have expected that only one month later he would 
have to face a much more serious crisis, one that almost caused the abolition of the 
Green Sprouts Policy. In the second month of 1071, Han Qi submitted a memorial 
harshly criticizing the Green Sprouts Policy. This initiated a new process of debate 
and deliberation at the court that reshaped the rationales and practices of both 
supporters and opponents in treatLQJHDFKRWKHU¶VRSLQLRQV  
Han Qi had been the Grand Councilor during the reigns of both Renzong and 
Yingzong. His reputation and status gave him great influence over the Emperor and 
other officials even after he resigned as Grand Councilor in 1067 and was appointed 
as the Manager of the Affairs of the Daming Superior Prefecture in the Hebei, one of 
the four capitals of the Northern Song dynasty.  
 +DQ4L¶VPHPRULDOLQFOXGHGDQHFGRWHVDERXWORFDOEXUHDXFUDWV¶HUURQHRXVO\
implementing policies, his charges that some policies had deviated from their stated 
LQWHQWLRQVDQGKLVSUHGLFWLRQWKDWZDVEDVHGRQKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISHRSOH¶V
behavior and self-interest would cause financial risk.  
Han Qi mainly identified three problems that thwarted the goal of increasing 
productivity by suppressing engrossers and protecting small farmers. In his view all 
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those problems were caused by the self-interest of the policy makers and local 
bureaucrats. The first problem was with the recipients of the loans. As he pointed out,  
 It is the rural households of grade three and above and the propertied urban 
DQGVXEXUEDQKRXVHKROGVWKDWKDYHKHUHWRIRUHEHHQWKH³HQJURVVLQJIDPLOLHV´
Now they are all given loans and charged 1,300 cash for every 1,000. The 
government is simply chasing after interest payments. This measure absolutely 
contradicts the stated intent of the policy to suppress engrossers and aid those in 
need.293 
 
,QKLVODWHUUHSO\WR:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHIXWDWLRQ+DQ4LIXUWKHUFODULILHGKLVSRLQWE\
stating that this problem ZDVFDXVHGE\RIILFLDOV¶SXUVXLWRIPRUHSURILWE\IRUFLQJ
loans upon the engrossing families.294    
Second, Han Qi predicted that the self-interest of both bureaucrats and poor 
people would result in unintended financial risk to the government. Local bureaucrats 
would seek to loan more money to avoid the punishment, but because wealthy 
families had no great interest in borrowing, the bureaucrats would allow poor families 
to borrow despite their lack of solvency. Han Qi warned that in the future, to recoup 
those loans the local bureaucrats would have to force the leaders of the guarantee 
groups to repay the loans of the poor, or to use coercive measures to force the poor to 
repay their loans. Either of these measures would cause great instability to the social 
order. Han Qi buttressed his argument by pointing out the diversity of environmental 
conditions in different localities. As he pointed out, during the local experimental 
stage of the Green Sprouts Policy, Shanxi showed good results. The small farmers 
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could get loans and repay them in the next year. This result could only be achieved, 
however, in good weather without any natural disasters. He argued that such good 
conditions would not always prevail in other localities. If natural disasters occurred in 
other localities, the farmers would have no money to repay the loans. Thus, spreading 
the policy into other regions would be rash.295 
 +DQ4L¶VWKLUGSRLQWZDVWKDWEXUHDXFUDWVLQ+HEHLKDGJLYHQSULRULW\WRWKHORDQ
policy while overlooking their original task of strengthening capacity in the policy 
field of social relief. He notes that in 1069, the Hebei circuit had a big harvest and the 
market price of rice fell dramatically. This should have been an opportunity for local 
officials to purchase the rice in bulk to prepare for future shortages. The circuit 
officials concentrated, however, on charging the thirty per cent interest from the loans, 
directing their subordinates to focus on loan collection. The government thereby lost a 
valuable opportunity because of the self-interest of the local officials.296  
+DQ4L¶VSURSRVLWLRQZDVWKDWWKHVHOI-interest of policy makers, bureaucrats and 
other social groups could never be eliminated, and their pursuit of self-interest would 
lead them to destroy the original intentions of the drafters of the New Policies. Based 
on such a belief, Han Qi suggested that the Emperor abolish the entire Green Sprouts 
Policy rather than revising it.  
2WKHUFULWLFVVXSSRUWHG+DQ4L¶VRSLQLRQDIWHUKHVXEPLWWHGWKLVPHPRULDO7KH
Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Chen Shengzhi, and Grand Councilor 
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Zeng Gongliang clearly showed their agreement in conversations with Emperor 
Shenzong and Wang Anshi. Lü Gongzhu, the Vice Censor-in-Chief who headed the 
Censorate, as well as other officials in the Censorate and Remonstrance Bureau such 
as Li Chang, Cheng Hao and Zhang Jian, all supported Han Qi in their memorials to 
WKH(PSHURU6LPD*XDQJDQG6X6KLGLGQRWFRQQHFWWKHLUFULWLTXHVZLWK+DQ4L¶VEXW
they submitted new critiques soon aftHU+DQ4L¶VPHPRULDOZDVVHQW  
$OOWKHVHFULWLTXHVVKDUHG+DQ4L¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKHVHOI-interest of those 
WDVNHGZLWKLPSOHPHQWDWLRQKDGFDXVHGWKHSROLF\¶VGHYLDWLRQIURPLWVRULJLQDO
intention. Critics such as Lü Gongzhu and Su Shi held that the local bureaucrats 
would inevitably force farmers and wealthy people to borrow money, provoking fear 
and turmoil among the local people and threatening the social stability.297 Sima 
*XDQJ¶VPHPRULDOIURPWKHVDPHPRQWKSUHVHQWVQHZDUJXPHQWVUHVHPEOLQJWKRVHRI
Han Qi beyond his previous critiques of the Green Sprouts Policy that had 
emphasized the extortion of farmers by bureaucrats. As we have discussed in chapter 
two, Sima Guang stated in this new memorial that the poor farmers had their own 
interests, and due to their pursuit of self-interest they would borrow money even if 
they had no capacity to repay the loan. The wealthy people in their guarantee group 
WKHUHIRUHZRXOGKDYHWRPDNHXSIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VORVVE\XVLQJWKHLURZQPRQH\
Bureaucrats eager to show their succeed in putting the policy into effect, making loans 
and earning interest, would take a laissez-faire approach to regulations. This would 
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QRWRQO\LQFUHDVHILQDQFLDOULVNZKLOHH[KDXVWLQJWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VUHVHUYHVRI
material for social relief, EXWZRXOGDOVRKXUWWKHZHDOWK\7KHVWDWH¶VFDSDFLW\WRGHDO
with natural disasters, national defense and social rebellion would be seriously 
damaged by this policy, Sima Guang argued, so he absolutely opposed it.298 
Su Shi also argued that it was inevitable that bureaucrats would pressure people 
to borrow money, and furthermore that they would have target the wealthy with loans 
because otherwise it would be difficult for them to obtain repayment and escape 
official sanction from superiors.299 Su Shi in fact implied that the institutional context 
and incentives that the New Policies established would guide the self-interest of the 
policy implementers unwilling to destroying the social order.  
$QDO\VLVRIWKHFULWLFV¶RSLQLRQVVKRZVWKDWWKHLULUUHFRQFLODEOHDWtitudes towards 
the Green Sprouts Policy originated from their understanding of the self-interests of 
the policy participants, and their belief that the contemporary institutional context 
would not prevent the policy from being captured by those interests. Because their 
propositions were so similar, the evidence they used and the arguments they presented 
were much alike. They denied any possibility of revising the policy or building a new 
institutional context that could regulate these self-interests onto the right track. In sum, 
they provided no alternative to the abolishment of the Green Sprouts Policy. The 
Emperor thus had to face two choices: either stick to the policy or abolish it, without 
any middle ground.   
                                                        
298
 6LPD*XDQJ³6KDQJKHQ]RQJTLEDWLDROLVLMLFKDQJSLQJVKizhe к⾎ᇇҎ㖧ọֻਨ৺ᑨᒣ
֯㘵´Songchao zhuchen zouyi ᆻᵍ䄨㠓ཿ䆠,1211-1213 
 
299
 6X6KL³6KDQJVKHQ]RQJKXDQJGLOXQ[LQID к⾎ᇇⲷᑍ䄆ᯠ⌅´Songchao zhuchen 
zouyi ᆻᵍ䄨㠓ཿ䆠,1217-18 
 206 
:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHVHFULWLFVKDG two steps. First, he sought to prove 
that the policy itself had followed the conceptions of the Sages in the Classics. The 
problems were therefore not caused by the policy itself, but by the wrong mental 
states of those who implemented it. Secondly, Wang stated that all of the problems 
WKDWWKHFULWLFVSUHGLFWHGFRXOGEHSUHYHQWHGLIWKHVWDWHFRXOGJXLGHSHRSOH¶V
self-interests onto the right track by building the right institutional context to 
GLVFLSOLQHWKHPHQWDOVWDWHRIWKHSROLF\¶VSDUWLFLSDQWV2QFe the correct interactive 
G\QDPLVPKDGXQIROGHGEHWZHHQSHRSOH¶VPLQGVDQGWKLVFRQWH[WWKHLUVHOI-interest 
would guide the policy to its original goals. He therefore suggested that the attention 
of policy makers should be shifted to the issue of how such an institutional context 
could be built.  
The deliberation process between Emperor Shenzong, Wang Anshi and other 
KLJKOHYHORIILFLDOVVKRZVKRZLQIDFLQJOLPLWHGFKRLFHV:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHDVRQLQJ
ended up convincing the Emperor to accept his scheme. When the Emperor received 
+DQ4L¶VPHPRULDOKLVILUVWUHVSRQVHZDVWRDVVXUHWKDW+DQ4L¶VWUXHLQWHQWLRQZDVWR
LPSURYHWKH(PSHURU¶VJRYHUQDQFH6KHQ]RQJH[SUHVVHGKLVVXUSULVHWKDWWKH*UHHQ
Sprouts Policy had damaged the common people in his conversations with Wang 
Anshi and Chen Shengzhi. His attention focused on two of the points that Han Qi had 
revealed in the memorial, namely that engrossing families had received the loans and 
that local bureaucrats forced people to borrow the money.  
In answering ShenzoQJ¶VFRQFHUQV:DQJ$QVKLILUVWVRXJKWWRSURYHWKDWWKH
policy makers were not guided by self-interest. As he argued,  
 207 
 You Majesty made the Green Sprouts Policy as a way to make life easier for 
the common people. The collection of interest is a policy that the Duke of 
Zhou adopted. A man like Sang Hongyang in the Han dynasty monopolized 
the money and goods of the whole country to serve the private interests of his 
master. He guided the Emperor on a tour of prefectures. The Emperor wasted 
several million strings of cash in rewarding others. All these costs were 
provided by the revenues gained by their economic polices. Sang Hongyang 
can be called an official pursuing material profits. You majesty has [in contrast] 
greatly enlarged the reserves for social relief. You repress the engrossing 
families and cause the weak and poor to prosper. You have established offices 
to manage the wealth of the nation. You do this not to satisfy your own private 
interests. How can it be said that you employ officials who only pursue 
material interests?300 
As we have discussed in the first chapter, Wang Anshi believed that the 
Emperor had truly discovered the conception of the Sages. He therefore had the 
exclusive authority to implement such conception in the policies he made. This was 
the precondition for unfolding his scheme of building a mechanism to guide other 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶VHOI-interest. Only if the new policies had followed the dao, could their 
drafters lead others to apprehend this dao. By proving that the policy followed the 
conception of the Sages rather than the private interests of the Emperor, Wang Anshi 
emphasized that the policy was correct. His implication was that the problems that 
Han Qi revealed could not be used as reasons for overthrow the policy. After making 
clear this precondition, Wang Anshi went on to illustrate that all the problems that had 
DSSHDUHGGXULQJWKHSROLF\LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVVFRXOGEHRYHUFRPHLISHRSOH¶V
self-interest could be correctly guided.   
$IWHUKHDULQJ:DQJ$QVKL¶VFODULILFDWLRQDERXWWKH(PSHURU¶VLQFRUSRUDWLRQRI
WKH6DJHV¶FRQFHSWLRQLQWRWKHSROLF\(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJVKRZHGKLVDJUHHPHQW+H
then asked Wang Anshi how to explain why the policy loaned money to wealthy 
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urban families. Wang Anshi replied,  
The reason we allow wealthy urban families to borrow money is because we 
have abundant capital for the loans. After guaranteeing the satisfaction of the 
UXUDOSHDVDQW¶VQHHGVZHVWLOOKDYHFDSLWDOOHIW:HXVHWKLVFDSLWDOWRPDNHXS
for the insufficient funds of the urban merchants. By loaning money to them we 
can also enlarge our stores in the local Ever-Normal Granaries. After we enlarge 
the stores, we will have more money to aid the common people in the event of 
natural disasters. I really do not know how can we say that this policy breaks the 
principle of righteousness.301   
 
By arguing that loans to urban wealthy people served the goal of protecting small 
farmers, Wang predicted a very different consequence of this policy from Han Qi.  In 
+DQ4L¶VUHDVRQLQJWKHEXUHDXFUDWVORDQHGmoney to urban families because they 
wanted to collect more interest to satisfy their superiors and gain more funds for their 
RZQSXUSRVHV,Q+DQ4L¶VPLQGWKHEXUHDXFUDWVZRXOGLQHYLWDEO\DOO\ZLWKWKH
engrossing families and protect their interests because they overlapped with their own. 
Guided by such a rationale, bureaucrats would not consider the interests of small 
IDUPHUVEHFDXVHWKH\RIIHUHGQREHQHILWIRUWKHEXUHDXFUDW¶VRZQLQWHUHVWV   
Wang Anshi depicted a very different mechanism, however. The bureaucrats, in 
his view, knew that the goal of the policy was to help the rural peasantry. They would 
first satisfy this goal. However, they also had a long-term strategy to increase state 
capital by enlarging the scope of financial services to other social groups that had a 
need for capital. The bureaucrats made all the resultant earnings serve the public good, 
such as social relief. Wang Anshi therefore argued that this mechanism followed the 
moral principle of righteousness.  
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In this view, the bureaucrats had fully grasped the intention of the policy makers 
DQGWKHLUZLOOWRSXUVXHSULYDWHLQWHUHVWKDGEHHQIXOO\FKDQQHOHGLQWRWKHSROLF\¶V
purpose of serving the public good. Wang Anshi therefore argued that the policy had a 
high chance of success. The key to attaining success was to help the bureaucrats reach 
a mental state that overcame their self-interest. The focus of the policy makers 
therefore should not be on whether or not the policy should be abolished, but on how 
to create a means through which the bureaucrats would be educated to achieve this 
ideal mental state.  
In the same debate, Zeng Gongliang restated the concerns of Han Qi and Sima 
Guang about the financial risks of the Green Sprouts Policy that would result from 
poor people defaulting and forcing the rich people in the same guarantee group to 
compensate for their loss. Wang Anshi replied that the institutional context that the 
government had established would eliminate this risk by correctly guiding people to 
protect their self-interest. He stated that the guarantee group would make all of its 
members share the financial risk. Wang Anshi suggested that the Emperor and critics 
should fully trust the rationale of the people, who would make every effort to protect 
their interests. Within the guarantee group, the pursuit of self-interest would make 
members very cautious about any loans that could lead to such a loss, and other group 
members would supervise the financial activities of the poorer members. From this 
perspective, Wang Anshi did noWZDQWWRHOLPLQDWHSHRSOH¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRI
self-interest, but rather sought to guide this interest to facilitate the healthy 
accomplishment of the policy.  
 210 
+HQFH:DQJGLIIHUHGIURPKLVFULWLFVLQWKDWKHGLGQRWDVVXPHWKDWSHRSOH¶VZLOO
to protect their self-interest would inevitably cause the failure of policy. Given that 
self-interest is understandable and manageable, it could be directed to a positive 
outcome. The government need not closely supervise financial transactions in the 
market. The only thing it needed was to build the policy environment and shape its 
LPSDFWRQSHRSOH¶VPLQGV:DQJ$QVKLZDVFRQILGHQWWKDWWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\
would succeed, without forced participation, because the right institutional context 
had been established.  
Both Emperor Shenzong and Chen Shengzhi further addressed the concern that 
bureaucrats forced local people, especially the upper strata, to borrow money rather 
than letting the common people take loans according to their own needs. Wang Anshi 
agreed that this phenomenon must have occurred in some localities, but he did not 
take such a problem to be insoluble. In his view, the key to resolving this problem was 
to make the bureaucrats understand the goal of the government and severely punish 
those who broke the rules. 302 
$QRWKHUFRQFHUQWKDWERWKHUHG(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJZDV+DQ4L¶VFODLPWKDW
common people had widely resisted the policy, leading the bureaucrats to force people 
to take loans. Han implied that compulsion in the implementation of the policy could 
never EHFRQWUROOHGE\WKHFRXUWEHFDXVHSHRSOH¶VZLOOWRSURWHFWWKHLUSULYDWHLQWHUHVWV
would lead them to resist the rural credit policy. Shenzong worried some might use 
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this discontent to foment rebellion.303 Wang Anshi put great effort into refuting this 
claim, because it was key to convincing Shenzong of the feasibility of the policy.  
Wang Anshi realized that it was difficult to find direct objective evidence of 
SHRSOH¶VIHHOLQJVDERXWERUURZLQJPRQH\IURPWKHJRYHUQPHQWEXWKHXVHGLQGLUHFW
evidence to argue that common people had great interest in borrowing money. 
According to Wang Anshi, Han Qi had directed his subordinate prefectural and county 
officials to submit reports suggesting that the common people in their areas did not 
want to receive governmentloans. His subordinate officials did not comply, however, 
because they thought that the common people did indeed want to borrow money from 
the government. They dared not to force people to borrow any money because that 
DFWLRQZRXOGEHWUD\+DQ4L¶VLQWHQWLon, but despite their fear of Han Qi, they refused 
to falsely report the situation. Han Qi therefore could not report to the court that he 
had received any reports from prefectural or county officials renouncing their duties 
administering loans. Wang Anshi argued that even as Han Qi took great effort to find 
evidence, he still could not report any such facts in his memorial. All of this 
demonstrated that the common people needed loans, and were not forced by local 
officials to get them.304 
Based on this judgment, Wang Anshi further questioned the reliability of 
critiques that claimed that people were forced to take loans. He stated,  
The new Green Sprouts Policy helps the poor, constrains the engrossers, and 
enlarges preparation for disaster-relief for ordinary people. I do not know how 
this policy could make people suffer. Individual people may be silly, but when 
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collectively they are sages. As a collective, they are not easily instigated. People 
have full awareness of their own suffering. Taken collectively, the people are not 
emotional, so their feedback must reflect the real situation. The scholar-officials 
do have emotions, so what they say must be a deviation from the true situation. 
305
  
 
Because the Green Sprouts Policy would greatly benefit the interests of the 
common people, Wang Anshi believed, they would welcome it. He further reminded 
Shenzong to examine whether the critiques he received truly reflected the situation or 
if they only represented the bias of critics speaking for their social group. Wang Anshi 
WRRN+DQ4L¶VFULWLTXHDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIVXFKELDVHGRSLQLRQV  
 ,QVKRUW:DQJ$QVKL¶VORJLFZDVWKDWWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\KDGIROORZHG
the intention of the sages and would gain support from the common people. He 
clearly distinguished the policy itself from the problems of implementation that were 
caused by the unguided self-interest of bureaucrats. Because the policy was correct, 
there was no need to abolish the policy; rather, the fundamental work of reformers 
was to build an institutional context that would either make them recognize the 
intention of the policy makers, or provide material incentives to guide their 
self-LQWHUHVWRQWRWKHULJKWWUDFNWRIXOILOOWKHSROLF\¶VJRDOV  
 The debates that occurred during the initial stages of the Green Sprouts Policy 
showed the limited choices available to policy makers in dealing with these problems. 
The critique was that the policy was created to satisfy the private interest of the policy 
makers. All the problems that occurred in the implementation process were caused by 
the self-interest of the policy participants. Because such interest could not be 
                                                        
305
 Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian shibu 㒼䋷⋫䙊䪂䮧㐘᤮㼌 v5,305 
 213 
overcome, the policy was doomed to fail. The supporters, however, believed that the 
policy could still achieve its original purpose because the policy makers could 
discipline the policy participants. Neither of them presented concrete adjustments to 
the policies to respond to their shortcomings.  
Historical developments between the second and the third month of 1070 
opened up another possibility for resoOYLQJWKHFRQIOLFWVLQLWLDWHGE\+DQ4L¶V
PHPRULDO(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJ¶VLQLWLDOUHVSRQVHWRWKHFULWLFVZDVDVIROORZVWKH
policy makers should allow people to criticize and make correction on the problems 
that the policy had faced during its implementation process, because the critics shared 
a common goal of improving the quality of governance. The leaders should try their 
best to cooperate with those critics so that people with different opinions on policy 
could fully express their views and feel satisfied. The leaders could also enlarge their 
solicitation of information and improve their governance by incorporating different 
opinions. Moreover, debates on policy issues should be kept independent of the 
GHEDWHUV¶SHUVRQDOIDWHV- such as their careers in government - because these opinions 
were the products of their common intention to improve governance rather than the 
pursuit of private interests.    
Looking back on his meetings with Emperor Shenzong, Cheng Hao recalled the 
choice that Emperor Shenzong wanted to make in the midst of deadlock between the 
two sides. According to his later description, Emperor Shenzong had been convinced 
E\+DQ4L¶VFULWLTXHDQGKDGFRQVLGHUHGWHPSRUDULO\VXVSHQGLQJWKHH[WHQVLRQRIWKH
Green Sprouts Policy throughout the country. As his dialogue with Wang Anshi 
 214 
illustrates, Emperor Shenzong had not been fully persuaded that this scheme for 
shaping the institutional context would have good results. Moreover, he had realized 
that the heads of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Wen Yanbo and Lü Gongbi, were also 
on the side of Han Qi, even though they did not state their position explicitly. He 
suggested that Wang Anshi should allow people who had different opinions to 
³H[KDXVWWKHLUFRPSODLQWV ⴑӪ䀰´306 The policy makers should seriously consider 
these suggestions and make changes.  
Meanwhile, Shenzong did not want to give up the entire policy even though he 
had faced so much questioning and criticism during the initial stage. He therefore 
wanted to keep Wang Anshi in the Vice Grand CouQFLORU¶VSRVLWLRQWRPDQDJHWKH
reform process. Emperor Shenzong had personally told Cheng Hao and Sun Jue that 
he wanted to keep Wang Anshi in this position even though he would temporarily 
suspend the Green Sprouts Policy.307 The Emperor wanted to separate the Green 
Sprouts Policy from other new policies that the court would implement under the 
leadership of Wang Anshi, so that opposition to this policy would not influence the 
progress of the entire reform course. He also wanted to show his openness to 
suggestions on concrete policy. Keeping Wang Anshi in his position would show both 
sides of the debate that the acceptance or rejection of particular suggestions on policy 
would not influence the official position of the opinion holders. This illustrates 
ShenzRQJ¶VHIIRUWWRPDLQWDLQWKHPHFKDQLVPLQZKLFKSROLWLFDOGHOLEHUDWLRQRQ
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policies would be conducted based on resolving the real policy issues instead of 
personally targeting the participants in the deliberation.  
 
However, political circumstances made thH(PSHURU¶VHIIRUWLQYDLQ,QWKH
second month of 1070, after realizing his difficulty in convincing Shenzong of the 
feasibility of his plan, Wang Anshi shelved his duties as Vice Grand Councilor and 
indicated his intention to resign from the position if the Green Sprouts Policy could 
not be continued.308 :DQJ$QVKL¶VUHDFWLRQLQGLFDWHGWKDWLI(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJ
would not keep the Green Sprouts Policy, the cost would be the failure of the entire 
UHIRUPSODQ,WDOVRFORVHGWKHGRRUWR6KHQ]RQJ¶VRULJLQDOLQWHntion of focusing on the 
Green Sprouts Policy by itself rather than allowing other factors to influence its 
revision. Any decision on economic policy had to consider the potential cost that it 
would bring to the entire reform plan and the arrangement of personnel. 
:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHDFWLRQDFKLHYHGKLVSXUSRVH6RPHFULWLFVVXFKDV:DQJ=LVKDR
&KHQJ+DRDQG/L&KDQJZKRKDGJUDVSHG6KHQ]RQJ¶VLQWHQWLRQWHPSRUDULO\KHOG
back their criticism and now turned to support Wang Anshi.309 By the end of the 
second month of 1070, Emperor Shenzong was on the same page as Wang Anshi. 
According to his conversation with Wang, the Emperor had calculated the potential 
FRVWRIWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\DQGGHWHUPLQHGWKDWHYHQLIWKHFULWLFV¶SUHGLFWLRQV
came true, the gains would be much greater than any possible loss. After hearing 
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6KHQ]RQJ¶VFRPPHQWV:DQJ$QVKLSURYLGHG6KHQ]RQJZLWKDQRWKHUOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJ
on how to interpret and resolve the problems that Han Qi had revealed. This line of 
reasoning was fully accepted by Shenzong and became the rationale that guided 
6KHQ]RQJ¶VODWHUUHVSRQVHWRFULWLFV$V:DQJ$QVKLVWDWHG 
 
 If we try our best to implement the policy and do not allow the petty men to 
intentionally destroy it, we definitely will not lose any money or goods. We 
previously practiced a policy of loaning money to merchants and requiring them 
to repay the loans with silk. We practiced this policy for a long time and we have 
never lost any money or goods. If you Majesty cannot get rid of your mental 
hesitation, telling the officials that you only want to experiment with the policy, 
those officials will never cease their criticisms and suggestions. They will order 
their subordinates to intentionally delay the policy and illegally cause trouble for 
the common households. Then they will [use this as evidence to] show to court 
that the policy itself has caused those problems. Therefore You Majesty should 
clearly show members of the government that the policy will never change. If 
anyone does not implement it well, we will punish him according to the law. Then 
no one will dare to destroy the policy, and it will be implemented.310 
 
  When Wang Anshi suggested that problems might intentionally be caused by 
the critics themselves to subvert the policy, he rejected the assumption that all 
critiques were based on a common desire to improve the policy and social welfare. He 
argued that the policy implementers and critics colluded with each other to 
intentionally cause problems because they had found that the Emperor was hesitant 
about the policy. The fundamental reasons for those problems could therefore be 
overcome if the Emperor could clearly show his determination and seriously punish 
those who intentionally caused trouble. By adding political intentions into his line of 
reasoning, Wang Anshi suggested a fundamentally different role for the Emperor: His 
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IRFXVVKRXOGQRWEHRQUHVROYLQJDFWXDOSROLF\LVVXHVEXWRQFRUUHFWLQJSHRSOH¶V
intentions. The best way to eliminate the critiques that were made by petty men eager 
to cater to the Emperor was not to show his open-mindedness to criticism, but on the 
contrary, to show his rejection of those critiques. By this line of reasoning, policy 
makers should not be responsive to policy issues but to the mental state of the policy 
implementers and their critics. Building an institutional context to discipline the 
PHQWDOVWDWHRIRIILFLDOVUHOLHGRQWKH(PSHURU¶VUHMHFWLRQRIIDOVHUHSRUWVDERXWIODZV
LQWKHSROLF\WKHSXEOLFFODULILFDWLRQRIWKH(PSHURU¶VLQWHQWLRQWRWKHHQWLUH
bureaucratic group, and the severe punishment of local bureaucrats who betrayed the 
SROLF\¶VLQWHQWLRQ   
 
A New Rationale for Interpreting Criticism Guides the Responses of 
Wang Anshi and the Emperor to Policy Feedback  
 
After the twenty-third day of the second month of 1070, Emperor Shenzong had 
IXOO\DFFHSWHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VOLQHRIUHDVRQLQJDQGXVHGLWDVKLVJXLGHIRUUHVROYLQJ
problems in the implementation process. He assumed that critiques were the products 
RIWKHFULWLFV¶VHOI-interest, and accepted that the EmpHURU¶VUHVSRQVHVKRXOGEHWR
focus on building the institutional context to guide the critics and other policy 
implementers to overcome these self-interest. As Wang Anshi had suggested, the 
Emperor decided to clearly show the bureaucrats and broader public his true intention 
in setting forth the Green Sprouts Policy, lest the proliferation of critiques increase the 
confusion of local bureaucrats and weaken their enthusiasm for carrying out the policy. 
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Guided by such a rationale, Emperor Shenzong ordered the Finance Planning 
&RPPLVVLRQWRRIILFLDOO\DQGSXEOLFO\UHVSRQGWR+DQ4L¶VPHPRULDO  
A series of actions that Emperor Shenzong adopted between the 23rd and 29th days 
RIWKLVPRQWKLOOXVWUDWHKRZKHWRRN:DQJ$QVKL¶VUDWLRQDOHDVKLVJXLGHLQGHDOLQJ
with critics - actions that only intensified the opposition from the Grand Councilors 
and Vice Grand Councilors. On the 23rd, the Remonstrance Official Li Chang 
submitted a memorial criticizing local bureaucrats for forcing people to take loans at 
twenty perceQWLQWHUHVW/L&KDQJ¶VFULWLTXHUHVHPEOHVWKRVHRI+DQ4LDQG6LPD
*XDQJZLWKRXWDQ\VXEVWDQWLDODGGLWLRQV7KH(PSHURU¶VDQVZHUKRZHYHUGLIIHUHG
JUHDWO\IURPKLVSUHYLRXVUHVSRQVHV$IWHUUHDGLQJ/L&KDQJ¶VPHPRULDOWKHILUVW
response of the Emperor was not to address the problems that the critique revealed. 
Instead, he criticized the Grand Councilors Zeng Gongliang and Chen Shengzhi 
because he believed their divergence with Wang Anshi caused these endless critiques 
from Li Chang and other officials.311 ,QUHSO\LQJWRWKH(PSHURU¶VEODPH=HQJ
Gongliang and Chen Shengzhi suggested that he should abolish the policy.  
Shenzong further questioned the authenticity of the problems that Li Chang 
pointed to. He required Li to provide further details about which counties had 
experienced these errors. This order marked a change in the imperial convention for 
treating critiques from the Remonstrance Officials, a convention that had persisted 
since the early Northern Song that the Emperor should not require officials to provide 
any further investigative results in support of their critiques. It was thought that such 
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DQDFWLRQZRXOGKDYHDQHJDWLYHLQIOXHQFHRQWKRVHRIILFLDOV¶IUHHFULWLTXHVRIWKH
(PSHURU¶VSROLF\6XFKDQLUUHJXODUFRPPDQGLOOXVWUDWHVWKH(PSHURU¶Vanxiety to 
know the true situation. Zeng Gongliang and Chen Shengzhi opposed this command 
because they thought that the convention should not be broken, but Emperor 
Shenzong did not follow their suggestion.  
 
Four days after this event, the court received a memorial from Liu Yang, the 
Fiscal Commissioner of Hebei circuit, reporting that the urban poor who had no 
property had continued to borrow money with resultant loss of the loans. The 
Commissioner suggested stopping the loans to the urban poor, instead directing all 
funds to satisfaction of the needs of the rural farmers. Urban residents should not get 
loans unless a surplus remained after loans were made to the rural farmers. According 
to the report, the officials in the Fiscal Commission who made this suggestion had 
VHULRXVO\VWXGLHGWKH³LQWHQW(yi)´RIWKHSROLF\DQGWKHLUVXJJHVWLRQVKDGDOVR
followed this intent 
With the exception of Wang Anshi, all the other Grand Councilors and Vice 
Grand Councilors agreed with this suggestion by the Fiscal Commissioner in Hebei. 
Wang Anshi, however, interpreted this memorial in a very different way. He noted that 
the Fiscal Commissioner had made the decision to stop granting urban loans before 
the court had officially agreed. He did this with the permission of Han Qi, without 
showing proper respect to the central authority. Moreover, the court had previously 
punished another local official, Wang Guangyuan, for having decided to promote the 
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Green Sprouts Policy without the permission of the court. According to Wang Anshi, 
Wang Guangyuan and Liu Yang had made similar mistakes. Wang Guangyuan was 
anxious to promote the new policies, but he was still punished. If the court tolerated 
/LX<DQJ¶VPLVWDNHORFDORIILFLDOVZRXOGFRPSDUHKLVFDVHZLWKWKDWRI:DQJ
Guangyuan, sSHFXODWLQJWKDWWKHFRXUWKDGEHHQLQIOXHQFHGE\+DQ4L¶VPHPRULDODQG
lost its confidence in promoting the Green Sprouts Policy. More critiques would thus 
emerge as those officials sought to cater to the Emperor by discovering numerous 
problems with the policy. Because the most important work for the Emperor was to 
XQLI\ORFDORIILFLDOV¶DWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVWKHSROLF\:DQJ$QVKLVXJJHVWHGWKDWWKH
Emperor should first proclaim that Liu Yang had made a mistake, and then pardon his 
fault.312  
Grand Councilor Chen Shengzhi and Vice- Grand Councilor Zhao Bian 
RSSRVHGWKLVVXJJHVWLRQ%RWKRIWKHPGLVDJUHHGZLWK:DQJ$QVKL¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI
this event and argued that it was very normal for local officials to adjust policy when 
dealing with local situations. However, Emperor Shenzong supported Wang Anshi and 
accepted his suggestions.313 
Two days later, Sima Guang submitted a memorial rejecting his appointment as 
the Vice Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Emperor Shenzong had 
intended to promote Sima Guang to the position before the second month of 1070, 
GHVSLWH6LPD*XDQJ¶VKDUVKRSSRVLWLRQWRDOOWKHQHZSROLFLHV,Q6KHQ]RQJ¶VPLQG
6LPD*XDQJ¶VYLHZVRQWKHSROLF\VKRXOGQRWLQIOXHQFHKLVFDUHHUDVKHZDVDQ
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upright person.314 Sima Guang took the abolishment of all the new policies as the 
precondition of his acceptance of the appointment, however. Shenzong insisted on 
NHHSLQJWKHRIIHURSHQGHVSLWHUHSHDWHGO\UHFHLYLQJ6LPD*XDQJ¶VPHPRULDOVVHHNLQJ
to resign. On the 29th of the second month, however, Shenzong changed his attitude 
DQGDGRSWHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI6LPD*XDQJ¶VPHPRULDO$FFRUGLQJWR
Wang Anshi, the appointment of Sima Guang would have a great impact on other 
EXUHDXFUDWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKH(PSHURU¶VYLHZRIWKHQHZSROLFLHVIf the Emperor 
insisted on promoting Sima Guang to such a high official position, officials would be 
more active in criticizing the policies because they thought the Emperor was incline to 
accept their suggestions. Emperor Shenzong fully accepted Wang AnshL¶V
interpretation and withdrew the appointment, even though Zeng Gongliang argued 
that the Emperor should not.315  
$OORIWKHVHHYHQWVLOOXVWUDWHWKH(PSHURU¶VFKDQJLQJUDWLRQDOHLQKLV
interpretation of criticism after he had made up his mind to stand with Wang Anshi. 
His response to critiques of the Green Sprouts Policy was not determined by his 
judgment of the policy itself, but by his evaluation of the influence of the critiques 
over the entire bureaucratic system. The Emperor paid attention to the seriousness of 
those critiques and the mental state of the critics. The debate on policy had also come 
WRSOD\DUROHLQWKHFULWLFV¶RIILFLDOFDUHHUV6XFKFKDQJHVUDLVHGVHULRXVGLVDJUHHPHQW
from other key officials such as Chen Shengzhi, Zhao Bian and Zeng Gongliang. By 
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the end of 1070, all of them had been demoted.  
As Wang Anshi had emphasized to Shenzong, the key to building an institutional 
FRQWH[WIRUGLVFLSOLQLQJWKHEXUHDXFUDWV¶PLQGVZDVWRFODULI\WKH(PSHURU¶VLQWHQWLRQ
in framing his policies, to show his determination to stick with these policies, and to 
punish bureaucrats who did not follow this intention. In order to do this, Wang Anshi 
personally wrote a document that was promulgated to all levels of government under 
the auspices of the Finance Planning Commission.  
In this document, Wang Anshi begins by explaining that his purpose is to make 
WKHRIILFLDOVDWWKHFLUFXLWOHYHOVJUDVSWKH³yi ᜿´RIWKHFRXUWLQFUHDWLQJWKH*UHHQ
6SURXWV3ROLF\6XFK³yi´UHIHUUHGQRWRQO\WRWKHSROLF\PDNHUV¶LQWentions but also 
the key issues that the implementers should strictly follow in order to achieve these 
LQWHQWLRQV,QWKLVGRFXPHQW:DQJ$QVKLGLUHFWO\TXRWHVH[SUHVVLRQVIURP+DQ4L¶V
critiques, pointing out that his critique had misunderstood the intention of the policy. 
He also further articulates what bureaucrats should do to guarantee the achievement of 
these intentions.  
 Han Qi had criticized the thirty percent interest collected by circuit officials in 
the process of loaning money to farmers, arguing that this betrayed the stated goal of 
only serving the interests of the common people. In refuting this charge, Wang Anshi 
first noted that the Former Kings had collected twenty five percent interest in their 
loans to the common people. Although the court allowed officials in Hebei to collect 
thirty percent interest, such a quota only represented the ceiling for interest rates. 
When loaning money to farmers, the government had to calculate how much grain 
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and other goods were equivalent to the same amount of money. The borrowers could 
choose to repay their debt either in money or in other forms of goods, depending on 
their consideration of market prices. Local bureaucrats should closely observe 
changes in the price of the grain and other goods and adjust the interest rate 
accordingly. They would allow the farmers to pay in grain when the price of grain was 
cheaper than it had been at the time when the farmers originally borrowed the money. 
The amount of the grain to be repaid was calculated by using the higher price at the 
time when the loan was borrowed, rather than the lower price when the loan was 
repaid. The government did not earn any interest, even if the farmers repaid more 
grain, due to its use of that higher price. Meanwhile, if the grain and other goods had 
become more expensive than they were at the time when the farmers borrowed money, 
the government could instead allow the farmers to sell their goods and repay the debt 
in money. According to the policy, the court would not strictly order precise amounts 
of money and grain for the farmers to repay, leaving this to the local bureaucrats to 
adjust depending on their investigation of market prices. No matter how much they 
collected, however, the amount would not go beyond the twenty-five percent interest 
rate that the Sages had practiced. Moreover, Wang Anshi also argued that the interest 
gained from the loans would not be used for any purposes other than social relief.  
,QUHIXWLQJ+DQ4L¶VFULWLTXHRIWKHSROLF\DVFDXVLQJORFDOEXUHDXFUDWVWRIRUFH
upper-grade households to borrow money, Wang Anshi pointed out a way to avoid this 
problem. He emphasized that the government should follow the interest of the upper 
grade households and allow them to freely decide whether or not to join a guarantee 
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group. The upper grade households would make their own calculations on whom they 
could guarantee and when they should borrow money from the government. They 
would be happy to borrow money if they thought that such a loan would be of benefit, 
depending on their actual economic situation. Even if some local bureaucrats seeking 
promotions tried to force people to borrow money, the existing supervisory structure 
would prevent such illegal activities. The Fiscal Commissioners and Judicial 
Commissioners at the circuit level would not have the same interests as these officials; 
therefore they would strictly supervise them and report their mistakes.316   
 In this document Wang Anshi intended not only to clarify the intention of the 
Green Sprouts Policy for the bureaucrats, but also to remind them of their own duty in 
the policy implementation process. At the end of the document, Wang Anshi requires 
the strengthening of supervision over the local bureaucrats in order to avoid the 
problems that Han Qi had predicted. All officials at the circuit level should conduct 
strict supervision and punishment of illegal activities by county and prefectural 
officials317.  
:DQJ$QVKL¶VGRFXPHQWLOOXVWUDWHVWKDWKHWRRNKLVFULWLFVDVSHRSOHKHFRXOG
deliberate with. He had seriously considered the problems that they revealed, and tried 
to figure out the way to resolve those problems. Even though he did not agree with 
their opinions, he still accepted that they held those critiques because they shared his 
goal of improving the quality of governance. The intention of Wang Anshi in writing 
                                                        
316
 Songchao zhuchen zouyi ᆻᵍ䄨㠓ཿ䆠, 1219 
 
317
 The document is preserved in Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian shibu 㒼䋷⋫䙊䪂䮧㐘᤮㼌
v7 ,327-334 
 225 
this document was not been fully understood by his critics, however, due to the 
persistence of their own worldviews. In the next stage, both sides of the debate began 
to challenge the previous consensus that they shared the same commitment to public 
good    
The Emergence of Factionalism in the Policy Debate 
7KHSURPXOJDWLRQRIWKH:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHIXWDWLRQRI+DQ4L¶VFULWLTXHGLGQRW
end the debate on the Green Sprouts Policy. On the contrary it not only intensified the 
tension, but also shaped a different reasoning by both sides in dealing with each 
RWKHU¶VYLHZV7KHGHEDWHVEHWZHHQ:DQJ$QVKLDQG+DQ4LVWLPXODWHGZLGH-ranging 
critiques of the New Policies in the third and fourth months of 1070. Critics argued 
that public opinion should determine the right and wrong of the policy, and they 
believed that they represented public opinion. Guided by this rationale, the critics 
began to pay attention to those who shared their opposition to the policy, and 
intentionally unified themselves by claiming that this group represented the public 
opinion and thus was correct. They opposed the appointments that Wang Anshi made 
because they thought anyone affiliated with Wang should be opposed, his faction 
having been formed based only on private interests. Moreover, Wang Anshi also 
viewed his critics as members of an enemy faction and tended to purge them based on 
their affiliation.  
The focus of the debate therefore shifted from policy issues to factional 
alliances. Factional affiliation became the main concern of both the opponents and 
VXSSRUWHUVRIWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\%RWKVLGHV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHLUIDFWLRQDO
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affiliations shaped the way in which they responded to opposing views on policy. The 
result of such a change was a wholesale purge of critics that was motivated not only 
by the drafters of the New Policies, but also the critics themselves. People like Sima 
Guang, Su Shi, and Cheng Hao, who had held onto their offices despite their critiques, 
were eventually expelled from decision-making circles due to their influence on 
factional formation. As for the critics, their identity as the member of the same group - 
rather than views on policy - became the key reason for their requests to resign from 
office.   
As we have arguHGWKHWDUJHWDXGLHQFHRI:DQJ$QVKL¶VGRFXPHQWZDVWKHORFDO
bureaucracy. Wang Anshi wanted to clarify how to carry out the Green Sprouts Policy 
correctly. The readers of this document in elite political circles did not perceive Wang 
$QVKL¶VLQWHQWLRQLQ this way, however, interpreting it as an attack on Han Qi who in 
WKHLUH\HVZDVUHVSHFWIXODQGLQIOXHQWLDO)RUWKHP:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHVSRQVHWR+DQ4L
was inappropriate. 
After reading this document, Han Qi immediately submitted a memorial to 
respond to Wang Anshi. In the same third month of 1070, almost all Remonstrance 
and Censorate officials including Li Chang, Sun Jue, Cheng Hao, Zhang Jian, Chen 
Xiang and Lü Gongzhu submitted memorials supporting Han Qi and criticizing Wang 
$QVKL¶VDUJXPHQWVDJDLQVWKLP. Vice Grand Councilor Zhao Bian not only criticized 
Wang Anshi but also asked to resign. Fan Zhen, who had the power to reject the edict 
and petition the Emperor to reconsider the edict he originally issued, refused to allow 
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the Finance Planning CommissioQWRDUJXHDJDLQVW+DQ4L¶VPHPRULDO318. Su Shi, who 
was in charge of the Jinshi examination in the same month, sent a memorial 
criticizing the treatise question that Shenzong had asked in the palace examination319. 
The Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Wen Yanbo, sent a memorial 
supporting Han Qi. Sima Guang insisted on declining his appointment by the Emperor 
as Vice Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs. He also wrote three personal 
letters to Wang Anshi debating his policy. These letters were intentionally spread by 
Sima Guang and other opponents, having great public influence.320   
This new wave of criticism emphasized two issues. The first, emphasized by 
SHRSOHOLNH/L&KDQJDQG6XQ-XHIROORZHG+DQ4L¶VVHFRQGPHPRULDOLQFKDOOHQJLQJ 
:DQJ$QVKL¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH&ODVVLFVRQZKHWKHUWKHVWDWHFRXOGFROOHFWLQWHUHVW
through credit institutions. Although they provided very detailed evidence and 
sophisticated arguments on this issue, Wang Anshi and Emperor Shenzong did not 
take the matter seriously. As Wang Anshi told Shenzong, such debates over the 
meaning of expressions in the Classics made no sense and were not worth of 
debate.321 
The second issue, the one that drew great attention from all debaters and had a real 
impact on them, was WKHFULWLFV¶GLVFXVVLRQRI³SXEOLFRSLQLRQ ޜ䆠´$FORVHDQDO\VLV
RIDOOWKRVHFULWLTXHVLOOXVWUDWHVJUHDWVLPLODULW\LQWKHDXWKRUV¶OLQHVRIUHDVRQLQJLQD
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manner different from the previous debates. We have discussed in chapter two, the 
different political perspectives that guided Cheng Hao, Chen Xiang, Zhang Jian and 
Su Shi to take public opinion as the standard for evaluating the Green Sprouts Policy. 
Despite their different worldviews, however, these figures all emphasized that the 
ruler should follow public opinion. Not only they, but other critics such as Li Chang, 
Sun Jue, Lü Gongzhu, Sima Guang, and Zhao Bian also emphasized in their critiques 
that they and Han Qi represented the true opinion of the public. In order to illustrate 
that the public had opposed Wang Anshi, the critics noted the collective action of 
other critics in showing their dissatisfaction. They took as their companions others 
who had shown the same attitude toward Wang Anshi. Such a view guided them to 
shift their attention from the content of the policy itself, to other people who had the 
same attitude toward the policy. They therefore developed a group identity, as 
LOOXVWUDWHGLQ6XQ-XH¶VFULWLTXHLQWKHWKLUGPRQWKRI  
,QKLVPHPRULDO6XQ-XHILUVWDGPLWWHGWKDW:DQJ$QVKL¶VJRDOLQSURSRVLQJWKH
Green Sprouts Policy was correct: the government should repress the engrossing 
families and support the poor. However, to achieve such a goal the government should 
follow the correct steps, with each step supported by the public. He further argued that 
even though he agreed with the goal of the Green Sprouts Policy, he would still 
oppose its implementation because he had observed that public opinion strongly 
opposed this policy.  
 In order to illustrate his estimation of the public opinion, Sun Jue listed several 
people who had shown their opposition to the policy, including Han Qi. Sun Jue also 
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OLVWHGHYHQWVVXFKDV)DQ=KHQ¶VUHMHFWLRQRIWKHGRFXPHQWFULWLFL]LQJ+DQ4LWKH
FULWLTXHVPDGHE\&HQVRUDWHDQG5HPRQVWUDQFHRIILFLDOVDQG6LPD*XDQJ¶VUHIXVDOWR
accept promotion as examples of how the policy had stimulated resistance in public 
opinion. Sun Jue further suggested that no matter whether the goal of the policy was 
correct, the Emperor should still seriously consider the public opposition and follow 
WKHSHRSOH¶VFRPmon judgment to cease the policy.  
,Q6XQ-XH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQPRUHRYHU:DQJ$QVKL¶VDFWLRQVLQDUJXLQJDJDLQVW
Han Qi served an evil purpose of summoning faction members who had the same 
RSLQLRQVDVKLP,Q6XQ-XH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ:DQJ$QVKL¶VFODULILFDWLRQRIWKHSROLF\¶V
intention represented his organization of a faction to contradict the public opinion that 
a group of critics had been upholding.322  
Similar views can also be found in memorials sent by Li Chang, Cheng Hao, 
Zhang Jian, Lü Gongzhu, Zhao Bian and Su Shi.323 All these critics listed several 
cases to show public opposition to Wang Anshi, highlighting similar events and 
individuals. Moreover, not only did these people identify themselves as members of a 
group, others also identified them as companions. They shared the same interpretation 
RI:DQJ$QVKL¶VDWWDFNRQ+DQ4LDVEHLQJGLVUHVSHFWIXOWRDQLQIOXHQWLDORIILFLDODQG
RQWKHSXEOLFRSLQLRQWKDW+DQ4LUHSUHVHQWHG+RZHYHUWKH\KHOGWKDW:DQJ¶V
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skillful rhetoric could not change public opinion. As Su Shi had stated, pubic opinion 
made the correct judgment on whether or not the policy followed the dao. Wang 
$QVKL¶VUHIXWDWLRQRI+DQ4LWKHUHIRUHRQO\H[SRVHGKLVIODZHGPHQWDOVWDWHDQGKLV
deviation from moral principle.324  
These critics commonly took some behaviors as signifying membership in their 
JURXS6XFKEHKDYLRUVLQFOXGHGDQLUUHFRQFLODEOHDWWLWXGHWRZDUG:DQJ$QVKL¶VSROLF\
and the determination to resign from their official positions. They not only praised 
other people for taking such actions, but also performed them personally. For example, 
Zhao Bian praised Lü Gongzhu, Fan Zhen, Sun Jue, Zhang Jian, Cheng Hao, and 
Sima Guang in a memorial because he thought that their petition to resign from their 
offices illustrated a stand on the same line with public opinion. At the end of the 
memorial, Zhao Bian also requested that the Emperor demote him from the position 
of Vice Grand Councilor.325  
$QDO\VLVRIWKHFULWLFV¶FRPPRQUDWLRQDOHVKRZVWKDWWKH\VWDUWHGIURPWKH
premise that public opinion was the only standard for judging the correctness of the 
policy. Their next step was not to resolve the question of how to build institutions to 
form public opinion, such as a deliberative mechanism for forging agreement on how 
to revise the policy, or a voting system to legitimate the opinion of the majority. 
Instead, they assumed that public opinion would naturally emerge in response to 
flawed policies, because they believed that people had the innate capability to form 
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such a common opinion. Therefore the next step in their logic was to show that their 
own ideas about the policy represented this correct public opinion. In order to 
illustrate this point, they presented lists of names to show that they were members of a 
group that had found common ground in its response to the Green Sprouts Policy. 
Such common ground did not mean to them that they had found agreement on how to 
synthesize different opinions to agree on revisions to the policy; it meant that they all 
shared an absolute rejection of the Green Sprouts Policy. The formation of these 
SHRSOH¶VLGHQWLW\DVDQRSLQLRQJURXSZDVWKHUHIRUHGULYHQE\WKHLUFRPPRQ
worldview. They sought other companions and adopted collective actions to show the 
correctness of their opinion. Their sense of belonging to the same faction had been 
VWLPXODWHGE\:DQJ$QVKL¶VSXEOLFDWWDFNRQ+DQ4LHYHQWKRXJK:DQJ$QVKL¶VPDLQ
purpose had not really been to attack them.    
 
Both Emperor Shenzong and Wang Anshi had noticed the collective action of the 
critics, but they had different understandings of these actions. In a conversation with 
Wang Anshi in the third month of 1070, Emperor Shenzong expressed his worries 
about the surprisingly large scale of opposition among the Censorate and 
Remonstrance officials. He thought that such opposition should be seriously 
FRQVLGHUHGEHFDXVHWRVRPHGHJUHHLWUHSUHVHQWHGSHRSOH¶VFRPPRQYLHZVRQWKH
policy.  
 Wang Anshi, however, rejected on its face any notion that the widespread, 
opposition to his policy represented a correct choice. As an example, he cited a 
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SROLWLFDOGHEDWHWKDWKDGRFFXUUHGLQWKHWLPHRI6KHQ]RQJ¶VIDWKHU<LQJ]RQJ
Emperor Yingzong was the stepchild of Emperor Renzong. After his accession to 
5HQ]RQJ¶VWKURQH<LQJ]RQJKDGZDQWHGWRRIILFLDOO\UHIHUWRKLVELRORJLcal father, 
.LQJ3XDV³IDWKHU´7KLVGHPDQGUDLVHGDJUHDWGHEDWHDPRQJWKHSROLWLFDOHOLWH7KH
&HQVRUDWHDQG5HPRQVWUDQFHRIILFLDOVFROOHFWLYHO\RSSRVHGWKH(PSHURU¶VLQWHQWLRQ
because they thought that Yingzong should only call Renzong father. Eventually 
Yingzong ignored the suggestion of these officials. Emperor Shenzong personally 
DJUHHGZLWK<LQJ]RQJ¶VFKRLFHDVGLG:DQJ$QVKL,QKLVFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWK
Shenzong, Wang Anshi used this event as an example to show that even as the 
Censorate and Remonstrance officials claimed that they represented public opinion, 
their arguments demonstrated a lack of basic respect for human nature and moral 
principle.326 
 :DQJ$QVKL¶VZRUGVJDLQHG6KHQ]RQJ¶VDJUHHPHQW+RZHYHU6KHQ]RQJVWLOO
expressed puzzlement as to why the only the Green Sprouts Policy received such 
strong opposition, implying that perhaps the policy itself had some problems. Wang 
Anshi however emphasized that the Censorate opposed all of the New Policies and 
had tried every effort to damage the reforms, reflecting their bias and self-interest. 
They had not openly done so before because the Emperor had show his determination 
to push ahead with the reforms, but this time they found that the Emperor had some 
hesitation, so they colluded with local officials such as Han Qi to produce fake 
                                                        
326
 Xu Zizhi tongjian changbian shibu 㒼䋷⋫䙊䪂䮧㐘᤮㼌 v5,337-38 
 
 233 
evidence and blame it on the Green Sprouts Policy327. The collective action of the 
FULWLFVLQ:DQJ$QVKL¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQUHYHDOHGQRWWKHLUFRPPRQFRPPLWPHQWWR
recognize problems, but only their collusion and conspiracy. 
 Wang Anshi also clarified his public refutation of Han Qi. He told Shenzong that 
he had debated with Cheng Hao in person about whether he should embarrass a great 
official like Han Qi or accommodate his critique. Wang Anshi explained that he made 
his criticism public because he did not want Han Qi to mislead the local bureaucrats 
or the common people. In facing the various critiques of the policy, the most 
important way to eliminate flawed arguments was to clearly tell people what the 
SROLF\¶VWUXHLQWHQWion was. He had no personal intention of offending Han Qi, only to 
lead the people to the correct way of thinking. 328 
 6KHQ]RQJZHQWRQWRVXJJHVWWKDWOHDGHUVVKRXOGQRWEHWUD\³SHRSOH¶VPLQG Ӫ
ᗳ´:DQJ$QVKLUHSOLHGWKDWWKHSXEOLFZLOOZDVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKSULQFLSOHDQGWKH
people would be happy with actions that followed principle. Wang Anshi implied the 
FKDOOHQJHRIGHFLGLQJZKHWKHUVRPHSHRSOH¶VRSLQLRQVUHSUHVHQWHG³SXEOLF´RSLQLRQ
given that it was impossible to gather all of the opinions in the world. He took the 
Duke of Zhou and Wang Mang as examples. All the surrounding lords opposed 
=KRX¶VSROLF\EXWWKRVHORUGVVWLOOFRXOGQRWUHSUHVHQWWKH³SXEOLF´DQGKLVSROLF\ZDV
still taken to have been welcomed by the public because his policy represented 
principle. In contrast, Wang Mang usurped the throne although he had great popular 
support. According to Wang Anshi, one could not say that Wang Mang had gained the 
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support of public opinion, because his actions marked a serious betrayal of moral 
principle.329  
,QWKLVFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWKWKH(PSHURU:DQJ$QVKLQRWRQO\GHQLHGWKHFULWLFV¶
entire line of reasoning, he also represented their collective action as the result of 
intentional collusion. Compared with his previous refutation of his critics, which 
PDLQO\IRFXVHGRQKRZWREXLOGDQLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WWRGLVFLSOLQHSHRSOH¶VPLQGV
and resolve the policy problems created by local bureaucrats, Wang Anshi had begun 
to take the collusion of these critics as the major challenge to be faced. For Wang 
Anshi, the collusion of the critics turned them into factions, and every member of 
these factions should be purged because they were petty men. The exclusion of these 
groups would make other local bureaucrats adhere to the will of the New Policies.  
Wang Anshi and his critics were in agreement that the critics had formed factions, 
EXW:DQJ$QVKL¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIZKREHORQJHGWRZKLFKIDFWLRQZDVQRWDOZD\VLQ
accordance with the perspective of his FULWLFV,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VPLQGWKHUHH[LVWHG
several factions led by key figures. Although he knew that all these groups were 
united in their opposition to the Green Sprouts Policy, he did not take them to be one 
organized group. Moreover, Wang Anshi even believed that some individuals were 
members of more than one factional group. For example, he took Su Shi as having 
factional alliances with both Ouyang Xiu and Sima Guang.  
:HZLOOIRFXVRQWKUHHFDVHVWRH[DPLQH:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZVRQIDFWLRQVDQGWKH
disFUHSDQF\EHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWSHRSOH¶VSHUFHSWLRQVRIWKHP,QRQHFDVH:DQJ$QVKL
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identified Lü Gongzhu and his subordinate officials in the Censorate and 
Remonstrance offices as a faction. This faction he believed to have a close alliance 
with Han Qi. The members of this faction such as Cheng Hao, Chen Xiang and Zhang 
Jian all took Lü Gongzhu as their patron because of their private interests. In this case, 
:DQJ¶VSHUFHSWLRQZDVLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHVHPHQ¶VRZQIDFWLRQDOLGHQWLW\  
On the other hand, Wang Anshi viewed Su Shi and Ouyang Xiu as belonging to one 
faction not only because of their good personal relationship, but also because of their 
VLPLODUDFDGHPLFEDFNJURXQG,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZWKHLUOHDUQLQJKDGVKDSHGWKHLU
personalities in ways that were wrong in similar ways. Su Shi did not identify himself 
as a member of this faction, however, although he believed that he was a member of 
the group that represented public opinion.  
In the case of Sima Guang, Wang Anshi took him to be the leader of a group of 
people who opposed the New Policies, but he had no clear sense of who belonged to 
this faction. He assumed that there existed a large group of people who opposed the 
policy, and even though no one formally organized this group, Sima Guang was still 
espoused by its members as their leader because all of his activities opposing the New 
Policies were known to the public. Sima Guang did not, however, take himself to be 
the leader of this large group. Rather, he saw himself as a member of a group of 
people who had collectively opposed the Green Sprouts Policy.   
  
%DVHGRQVXFKDQHYDOXDWLRQ:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHDFWLRQWRKLVFULWLFVDIWHUWKHIRXUWK
month of 1070 appears to have served the purpose of removing these factions by 
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expelling those he saw as their heads and their subordinates. The first instance was his 
reaction to Lü Gongzhu, with whom he had previously, had a good personal 
relationship. Because of their amity, Wang Anshi had recommended that Lü Gongzhu 
replace Lü Hui as the head of the Censorate in 1069. Before 1070, Lü Gongzhu had 
also supported Wang Anshi and appointed former bureaucrats from the Finance 
Planning Commission as Censorate officials, such as Cheng Hao. Although Lü 
Gongzhu showed his disagreement with the Green Sprouts Policy, displeasing Wang 
Anshi, Wang had no intention to expel him from the Censorate until Lü claimed 
allegiance with Han Qi.330  
In the fourth month of 1070, Lü Gongzhu told Shenzong in person that Wang 
$QVKL¶VSXEOLFDWWDFNRQ+DQ4LFRXOGFDXVH+DQ4LWRUHEHOVLQFHKe controlled a 
great military force in Hebei. Shenzong felt very uncomfortable with this opinion 
because such a perception would inflame the tensions between Han Qi and the court. 
He therefore decided to demote Lü Gongzhu. After reading the notes of that 
conversation, Wang Anshi decided to seize this chance to publicly fight back against 
Lü Gongzhu and Han Qi. He drafted an edict claiming that the court was demoting Lü 
*RQJ]KXIRUVSUHDGLQJWKHUXPRUWKDW+DQ4LZRXOGUHEHOGXHWRWKHFRXUW¶VDWWDFNRQ
him.331 
The Grand Councilor Zeng Gongliang and other high officials did not agree with 
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WKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI/*RQJ]KX¶VHUURUEHFDXVHVXFKDQDFWLRQZRXOGXSVHW+DQ4L332 
The official charged with drafting the edict, Song Minqiu, also strongly opposed 
:DQJ$QVKL¶s idea.333 Wang Anshi insisted, however, because this activity would 
clearly demonstrate to the public the attitude of the court toward any alliance between 
Han Qi and other officials. Emperor Shenzong supported Wang Anshi. Song Minqiu 
was removed from his position and the Emperor chastised Zeng Gongliang. The court 
then promulgated an edict publicly connecting the faults of Lü Gongzhu with Han Qi. 
Lü Gongzhu, for his part, refused to admit any alliance between Han Qi and himself.  
:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHDFWLRQWR/ Gongzhu was guided by his belief that the exposure 
of factional alliances before the public would be an effective way to mobilize the 
participants in his policy. The audience of the edict included literati with official posts 
in the government. The discussion of factional alliances was no longer secret political 
discourse within small circles of the political elite; it became a tool that the court 
HPSOR\HGWREODPHRIILFLDOVEHIRUHWKHSXEOLF:DQJ$QVKL¶VLQWHQWLRQZDVWRVKRZ
the public the unified and determined attitude of the Emperor and the court toward 
critics of the Green Sprouts Policy. This was part of his scheme to shape an 
LQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWH[WIRUGLVFLSOLQLQJSHRSOH¶VPLQGV*XLGHGE\VXFKDUDWLRQDOHWKH
SXEOLFSXQLVKPHQWIRU/*RQJ]KX¶VDOliance with Han Qi served the purpose of 
mobilizing bureaucrats. As we will discuss later, both the New Policy makers and 
their critics were deeply concerned with the potential influence of their actions on the 
public. Even though they did not have a concrete design for incorporating this 
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DXGLHQFHLQWRWKHSROLF\PDNLQJSURFHVVWKH\VWLOOSDLGJUHDWDWWHQWLRQWRWKHSXEOLF¶V
psychological reaction to their actions and considered such reactions as factors in 
shaping their policies.    
In the month after demoting Lü Gongzhu, Wang Anshi appointed officials to fill 
the vacant positions created by the personnel change. He appointed Feng Jing as the 
head of Censorate and Li Ding and Xie Jingwen as General Purpose Censors. He also 
appointed Han Jiang as the Vice-Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs. 
These personnel appointments stimulated a new wave of opposition by his critics, 
motivating them to draw a strict factional boundary and to show their irreconcilable 
attitude toward any decision made by the opSRVLQJIDFWLRQ7KHFULWLFV¶FULWHULDIRU
defining their faction included not agreement about the Green Sprouts Policy, but also 
personal integrity as manifested by their activities in chastening Wang Anshi. These 
critics labeled the officials that Wang AnVKLSURPRWHGDVVKDULQJ:DQJ¶VSHUVRQDOLW\
and belonging to his faction, even if their opinions might not be completely in accord 
with those of Wang Anshi.  
 In the same month, the main Censorate officials, Chen Xiang, Cheng Hao, Zhang 
Jian and Chen Xiang, DWWDFNHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VSHUVRQQHODSSRLQWPHQWVDQGUHTXHVWHG
their own demotion. These people expressed the differences between themselves and 
the people that Wang Anshi had appointed in some similar ways.  
 ,Q&KHQ;LDQJ¶VPHPRULDOKHTXHVWLRQHGWKHFRXUW¶VDSSRLQWPHQWRI+DQ-LDQJ
as the Vice Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs. While Chen agreed that 
+DQ-LDQJ¶VWDOHQWDQGUHSXWDWLRQZHUHIRUPLGDEOHKHWKRXJKWWKDW+DQ-LDQJKDGEHHQ
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in charge of the Finance Planning Commission with Wang Anshi and supported Wang 
$QVKL¶V*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\&KHQ;LDQJWKHUHIRUHODEHOHGKLPDVDEXUHDXFUDW
devoted to the pursuit of his material interests. Chen Xiang further contrasted him 
with another worthy who had been devoted to moral cultivation and learning of the 
Classics; he was referring to Sima Guang, who had originally been appointed as Vice- 
Commissioner but declined this appointment.334 ,Q&KHQ;LDQJ¶VYLHZWKRVHZKR
had criticized the Green Sprouts Policy and had been demoted by the drafters of the 
New Policies, such as Sima Guang, Lü Gongzhu, Li Chang, Sun Jue, Cheng Hao and 
Zhang Jian, belonged to the same category. He did not deny blame for belonging to 
the same faction. Instead, he stated that as member of this faction, he should resign, 
because only by doing so could he show the same morality and policy demands as 
other members of that group.335 A similar discourse also appeared in the memorials 
of Cheng Hao, Zhang Jian and Wang Zishao. Zhang Jian showed the most radical 
attitude towards Wang Anshi. In his memorial, he claimed that Han Jiang and Li Ding 
ZHUHERWKPHPEHUVRI:DQJ$QVKL¶V³GLHKDUGIDFWLRQ↫唘´=KDQJ-LDQH[SUHVVHGKLV
GHHSZRUU\WKDW:DQJ$QVKL¶VDSSRLQWPHQWVZRXOGSODFHKLVIDFWLRQLQFRQWURORIDOO
the important positions in the courW=KDQJ-LDQHYHQZHQWLQSHUVRQWR:DQJ$QVKL¶V
office to quarrel with him and show his determination to leave office.336  
All these cases showed that these people were not passive in the face of possible 
demotion; indeed, , they sought demotion as a way to show their identity as members 
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of a group that they labeled as upright, representing correct public opinion. Only those 
ZKRKDGWKHPRVWLUUHFRQFLODEOHDWWLWXGHVWRZDUG:DQJ$QVKL¶VIDFWLRQZRXOGUHFHLYH
such an honorable punishment.  
 
This reaction by his critics further motivated Wang Anshi to view them as being 
in collusion. His shifted his attention to destroying opposing factions and purging 
them from the court. Factional alliances became the main standard for judging critics. 
People who had been judged as belonging to the faction would be demoted regardless 
RIWKHYDOXHRIWKHLUDGYLFHRUSHUVRQDOLWLHV&KHQJ+DR¶VFDVHLOOXVWUDWHVKRZ
IDFWLRQDODOOLDQFHVEHFDPH:DQJ$QVKL¶VPDLQVWDQGDUGIRUMXGJPHQW  
$FFRUGLQJWR&KHQJ+DR¶VODWHUUHFRUGVKHKDG had good relations with Wang 
Anshi before the Han Qi incident. Cheng Hao once criticized the Green Sprouts 
Policy in a personal conversation with Wang Anshi, urging him to follow public 
opinion. Wang Anshi thanked Cheng Hao and praised his critique as coming from his 
³VLQFHUHLQWHQWLRQ 䃐᜿´337 Wang Anshi still thought that Cheng Hao shared a 
FRPPRQJRDORILPSURYLQJWKHVWDWH¶VJRYHUQDQFH  
Wang Anshi changed his judgment after the Han Qi incident, during which 
Cheng Hao showed his alliance with Lü Gongzhu. As with Lü Gongzhu, he had 
vieweG:DQJ$QVKL¶VUHIXWDWLRQRI+DQ4LDVDQLQDSSURSULDWHLQVXOW+HYLVLWHG:DQJ
$QVKL¶VRIILFHWRH[SUHVVKLVFULWLFLVP&KHQJ+DR¶VDFWLRQSURYRNHG:DQJ$QVKL¶V
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dissatisfaction, which he expressed to Emperor Shenzong.338 Cheng Hao further 
showed his support IRU/*RQJ]KXDQGFULWLFL]HG:DQJ$QVKL¶VSHUVRQQHO
DSSRLQWPHQWVLQWKHIRXUWKPRQWKRIVWUHQJWKHQLQJ:DQJ¶VMXGJPHQWWKDW&KHQJ
Hao belonged to the same faction as Lü Gongzhu. After making this judgment, Wang 
$QVKL¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUG&KHQJ+DRFKDQged greatly.  
In a conversation with Shenzong in the fourth month of 1070, Wang Anshi 
harshly criticized Lü Gongzhu as a person with bad intentions. He further judged that 
Cheng Hao, Chen Xiang, and Zhang Jian all belonged to the same faction as Lü 
Gongzhu and facilitated his negative influence over policy. In this conversation Wang 
Anshi suggested that the Emperor seriously punish this faction so that others would 
GDUHQRWWRFKHDWWKH(PSHURUDQGZRXOGIROORZWKHFRXUW¶VSROLFLHV339 Wang 
represented Cheng +DR¶VIDFWLRQDODOOLDQFHDVWKHPRVWLPSRUWDQWUHDVRQIRUSXQLVKLQJ
him. The punishment should be meted out to the entire faction. Factional alliances had 
replaced the personalities of individual critics as the main factor in deciding 
punishment. Wang Anshi believed that the factional alliance among the Censorate 
officials had caused great confusion to the bureaucrats, because their collective 
opposition to the refutation of Han Qi would make the bureaucrats hesitant about the 
true intentions of the court. Therefore, even though Cheng Hao had good morality, he 
should still be demoted along with his factional members. Only by doing this could 
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the court clarify its intentions for the entire bureaucratic group.340 Guided by such a 
rationale, Wang Anshi and Emperor Shenzong expelled all of these critics from the 
decision making circle.  
 
Another case shows how Wang Anshi and Emperor Shenzong identified the 
faction of Su Shi and Ouyang Xiu based on academic background, and how such 
perception motivated them to change the educational and examination systems to 
eliminate the ideological base of their faction. As we have discussed in the second 
FKDSWHU6X6KL¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOIUDPHZRUNZDVYHU\GLIIHUHQWIURP:DQJ$QVKL¶VZKLFK
OHGWRKLVGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWK:DQJ$QVKL¶V Green Sprouts Policy.  
In the fifth month of 1069, Emperor Shenzong had shown great interest in Su 
6KL¶VOHDUQLQJDIWHUDFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWK6X6KL6X6KLVXEPLWWHGDPHPRULDO
discussing his thoughts on the civil examination system. As we have discussed, in this 
memorial he did not suggest that the Emperor initiate reforms, because the goal of 
ruling was to make all policies comfort the people. The best way to achieve this goal 
was to find what people needed and use policies to satisfy their needs. Su Shi did not 
EHOLHYHWKDWSHRSOH¶VVHOI-interests could be rectified by imposing moral standards 
XSRQWKHLUOLYHV7KHXQLILFDWLRQRIWKH&ODVVLFVZRXOGQRWHOLPLQDWHSHRSOH¶V
self-interest, but only would seduce them to cheat. Shenzong liked this argument and 
introduced it to Wang Anshi. 
,Q:DQJ¶VYLHZKRZHYHU6X6KL¶VWKRXJKWRQWKHUROHRIWKH(PSHURUZDV
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fundamentally wrong. Wang replied that the Emperor should not just depend on the 
need of his subjects to decide the policies. The ruler could indeed disciSOLQHSHRSOH¶V
self-interests.341 The ruler needed to follow the dao WRUHJXODWHSHRSOH¶VVHOI-interests 
LQVWHDGRIFKDVLQJDIWHUWKHP:DQJ$QVKLWRRN6X6KLDVDUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRI³HYLO
learning 䛚䃚´,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZ6X6KL¶VWKHRU\RIOHDUQLQJRQO\WDXJKWSHRSOH
how to develop superficial rhetorical and writing skills, while ignoring how to guide 
people to follow the dao3HRSOHZKRIROORZHG6X6KL¶VOHDUQLQJGLGQRWKDYHD
consistent standpoint on right and wrong because they paid attention to superficial but 
beautiful writing and rhetoric. Wang Anshi told Shenzong that Su Shi used his 
writings to cater to those in power. He did stick to any consistent view but only 
followed others in deciding the main idea of his articles. He gave the impression that 
he was a clean person even while secretly accepting bribes, his learning having 
shaped his personal values.342 Wang Anshi therefore hated Su Shi and rejected the 
(PSHURU¶VLGHDRIDSSRLQWLQJKLP  
,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZ6X6KLDQG2X\DQJ;LXKDGVLPLODULGHDV%HFDXVHRI
their mutual admiration for the same learning, the two had good personal relations. In 
the fifth month of 1070, Emperor Shenzong considered appointing Ouyang Xiu as 
Grand Councilor. Wang Anshi was opposed because he thought Ouyang Xiu had been 
influenced greatly by people like Su Shi and he feared that if he were appointed, 
SHRSOHRIVLPLODU³VXSHUILFLDO´OHDUQLQJZRXOGJDWKHUDURXQGKLPWRIRUPDODUJHU
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faction. Literati still lacking a clear sense of the right way to learn would be misled 
into thinking that Ouyang Xiu represented the correct direction.   
(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJDJUHHGZLWK:DQJ$QVKL¶VFRPPHQWVDFFHSWLQJWKDW6X
6KL¶VOHDUQLQJZDVHYLOEHFDXVHRIWKHIODZVLQKLVSHUVRQDOity. As revealed in the 
(PSHURU¶VFRQYHUVDWLRQZLWK6LPD*XDQJWKHIRUPHUKDGQRWLFHGWKDW6X6KL¶V
private life did indeed show him to be the kind of person that Wang Anshi had 
described, using his writing to harm others while pretending to be an upright 
person.343 Emperor Shenzong was deeply concerned with eliminating such influences 
on the minds of the literati. He thought that the influence of Su Shi and Ouyang Xiu 
led contemporary literati to focus on their writing skills to the detriment of grasping 
the meaning of the Classics. He was worried that such a faction would enlarge under 
the increasing influence of Su Shi.344  
,QRUGHUWRHOLPLQDWHWKHLQIOXHQFHRI6X6KL¶VIDFWLRQ(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJ
DFFHSWHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VVXJJHVWLRQWRSXEOLFL]H6X6KL¶VXQILOLDl conduct throughout 
the six circuits. Su Shi resigned from his official position in shame. He was demoted 
to a low-ranking local office.345 In the tenth month of 1070, Ouyang Xiu was publicly 
criticized by the court for submitting a memorial suggesting revisions to the Green 
Sprouts Policy. In his memorial he had suggested that the court change the frequency 
of the loans from twice a year to once a year, so that local governments could have 
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more flexibility in adjusting the loans depending on the local situation.346 Emperor 
Shenzong decided to publicly chastise him in order to repress the influence of his 
faction over the literati.347 6KHQ]RQJ¶VUHVSRQVHVKRZVWKDWKHWRRNIDFWLRQDODOOLDQFHV
as determinative factors for deciding the reward and punishment of the critics. The 
PHULWRIWKHDGYLFHJLYHQE\WKRVHFULWLFVGLGQRWDPHOLRUDWHWKH(PSHURU¶VDWWLWXGH
toward them.  
Emperor Shenzong and Wang Anshi had thought of reforming the civil 
examination system in 1069. Their perception of the great influence of Su Shi and 
2X\DQJ;LX¶VIDFWLRQKRZHYHUPDGHWKHPWRWKLQNLWZDVXUJHQWDQGQHFHVVDU\WR
reform the examination system in the second month of 1071. The new examination 
IRFXVHGRQWHVWLQJWKHFDQGLGDWH¶VOHDUQLQJRIWKHPHDQLQJRIWKH&ODVVLFVUDWKHUWKDQ
their ZULWLQJVNLOOV,Q6KHQ]RQJ¶VPLQGWKHOLWHUDWLRSSRVHG*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\
because they did not understand the entire worldview that guided the making of this 
policy - they did not know the dao of the Former Kings, therefore they criticized the 
policy. (PSHURU6KHQ]RQJIXUWKHUOHJLWLPL]HG:DQJ$QVKL¶VFRPPHQWDU\RQWKH
Classics as the only correct textbook for the civil examinations. Wang Anshi and 
(PSHURU6KHQ]RQJFDOOHGWKLV³XQLI\LQJdao and de DQGPDNLQJFXVWRPVWKHVDPH´
In their mind, this was an important way to build acceptance of the New Policies.348   
Unlike the first case we cited in which people like Cheng Hao, Zhang Jian and 
Lü Gongzhu identified themselves as members of the same group, Su Shi did not see 
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himself as being in an alliance with Ouyang Xiu, even though he repeatedly praised 
KLPLQHVVD\V,Q6X6KL¶VPLQG:DQJ$QVKLKDGDWWDFNHGKLPEHFDXVHRIKLVFULWLTXH
of Wang, and Su Shi believed Emperor Shenzong still liked him.349 Su Shi had no 
intention to resign from his position in solidarity with a faction; he did so only to 
VHFXUHKLPVHOIIURP:DQJ$QVKL¶VDWWDFN+LV³IDFWLRQ´ZDVFRQVWUXFWHGEDVHGRQ
RWKHUSHRSOH¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIKLVYLHZVDQGEHKDYLRU6XFKDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQZDV
shaped by the paradigm with which they viewed the world. The ways in which others 
dealt with the faction was also guided by their worldview on how to shape the ideal 
political order.  
 
 The attitudes of Emperor Shenzong and Wang Anshi towards Sima Guang 
remained divergent until the second month of 1071. Sima Guang had repeatedly 
criticized the Green Sprouts Policy since its initiation, but his critiques did not 
LQIOXHQFHWKH(PSHURU¶VWUXVWLQKLP,QWKHVHFRQGPRQWKRI6KHQ]RQJ
appointed Sima Guang as the Vice-Commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs. 
Although this appointment was suspended due to the restoration of Wang Anshi, 
Shenzong still trusted Sima Guang and considered appointing him to the same 
position in the seventh month of 1070.350 In one conversation during that month 
Shenzong said that although Sima Guang opposed the Green Sprouts Policy, he would 
not make such a political attitude influence his sincere devotion to his career and he 
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could be trusted to resolve the great difficulties facing the court.351 Emperor 
Shenzong hoped that Sima GuDQJ¶VGLVDJUHHPHQWVRQWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\ZRXOG
not influence his contribution to other affairs of the court, as he still hoped to make 
IXOOXVHRI6LPD¶VWDOHQWVDQGWRVROLFLWKLVDGYLFHRQJRYHUQPHQWDIIDLUV%\WKHHLJKWK
month of 1070, however, the Emperor had changed his mind. He did not insist on 
keeping Sima Guang at court, accepting his petition to step down to service in local 
JRYHUQPHQW6LPD*XDQJ¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUGWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\KDGEHFRPHWKH
determinative factor in the Emperor¶VFRQVLGHUDWLRQRIKLVFDUHHU  
:DQJ$QVKL¶VDWWLWXGHWRZDUG6LPD*XDQJZDVPRUHFRPSOLFDWHGWKDQWKDWRI
Shenzong. Wang had never questioned the probity of his personality.352 His main 
concerns about Sima Guang were his fundamentally different understanding of the 
dao RISROLWLFDORUGHUDQG6LPD¶VEURDGDQGFORVHWLHVZLWKSROLWLFDOHOLWHVDWWKHFRXUW
and his great influence over them.353 ,Q:DQJ$QVKL¶VFRQYHUVDWLRQVZLWK6KHQ]RQJ
in the second, third, fifth and ninth months of 1070 he repeatedly expressed his 
ZRUULHVDERXW6LPD*XDQJ¶VOHDGHUVKLSLQWKHRSSRVLQJIDFWLRQ354 He feared that 
6LPD*XDQJ¶VLUUHFRQFLODEOHRSSRVLWLRQWRWKH1HZ3ROLFLHVDQGKLVJUHDWLQIOXHQFH
would make the court lose the authority to justify its policies, and would cause it to 
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lose the support of the literati.355 Wang Anshi therefore disagreed with any 
appointment of Sima Guang suggested by the Emperor.  
6LPD*XDQJ¶VDWWLWXGHVWRZDUGVDSSRLQWPHQWE\6KHQ]RQJDOVRHYROYHG%HIRUH
the eighth month of 1070, Sima Guang did not resign from his current positions as 
Hanlin Academy Reader-in-waiting, Grand Master of Remonstrance, and Drafter of 
Proclamations, although he claimed that he would decline any promotion if the court 
did not abolish the Green Sprouts Policy. He continued communicating with the 
Emperor in person, trying to convince him to change his policies. After that, however, 
Sima Guang gave up his position at the court, removing himself to local government. 
He did not make any new policy suggestions until 1074. His attitude toward Wang 
Anshi also experienced a great change when he decided to resign from his position at 
court. Previously he had taken Wang Anshi to be an upright person, though he did 
criticize him for indulging in his own ideas without maintaining openness to 
critiques.356 In the second month of 1071, however, he sent the Emperor a memorial 
LQZKLFKKHUHYHDOHGDPDUNHGFKDQJHRIDWWLWXGHVWDWLQJWKDW:DQJ$QVKL¶VLQWHQWLRQ
to forge policy and build a faction was evil because it derived from his private 
interests and lust for power.357  
How to explain all these changes? Why did Emperor Shenzong eventually accept 
:DQJ$QVKL¶VVXJJHVWLRQWRGHPRWH6LPD*XDQJ":K\GLG6LPD*XDQJFKDQJHKLV
mind and leave the court? Why did he change his judgment of Wang Anshi? It appears 
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that the change came as a result of Sima Guang and Emperor Shenzong shifting their 
attention from policies to factional alliances.  
Before the fourth month of 1070, Wang Anshi had repeatedly emphasized that 
Sima Guang should be demoted because of his leadership among the literati who 
opposed the Green Sprouts Policy. Emperor Shenzong however did not take that issue 
VHULRXVO\LQFRPSDULVRQWRWKHPHULWRI6LPD*XDQJ¶VFULWLTXHV+HKDGDVLPLODU
attitude towards other critics such as Han Qi, Su Shi and Cheng Hao.   
6KHQ]RQJ¶VDWWLWXGHFKDQJHGDIWHU+DQ4LLQFLGHQWDVZHKDYHGLVFXVVHG$IWHU
Wang Anshi officially refuted Han Qi, the critics of the New Policies began to form a 
group identity and they chose collective action to show their irreconcilable attitudes 
WRZDUGVWKHSROLF\6LPD*XDQJ¶VUHIXVDORIKLVDSSRLQWPHQWDV9LFH-Commissioner of 
the Bureau of Military Affairs was taken by other critics as a model.. Sima Guang 
therefore became a representative of public opinion. His political influence was not 
constrained within policy-making circles, but began to extend to the entire literati 
FODVV)RUH[DPSOH6LPD*XDQJ¶VSULYDWHOHWWHUVWR:DQJ$QVKLDQGKLVRWKHU
memorials were circulated among the literati.358 People with axes to grind even 
produced fake writings under the name of Sima Guang to spread political rumors.  
 This circulation of documents had deeply worried Wang Anshi and Emperor 
Shenzong. Wang discussed his great anger in a conversation with Shenzong about 
6LPD*XDQJ¶VFLUFXODWLRQRIFRUUHVSRQGHQFe he had written to Wang. He held that this 
DFWLRQIXUWKHULQWHQVLILHGSHRSOH¶VFRQIXVLRQDERXWWKH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\OHDGLQJ
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them to oppose it.359 Emperor Shenzong also began to pay attention to this problem. 
In a conversation with Sima Guang in the fourth month of 1070, Shenzong asked 
Sima Guang if he had authored some writings that criticized the Emperor, a rumor 
that Sima Guang denied.360 All these problems made the Emperor accept Wang 
$QVKL¶VYLHZWKDW6LPD*XDQJZDVWKHULQJOHDGHURIWKHVHGLVVLGHQWV His learning and 
his critiques of the New Policies were influencing others.  
,QWKHVHYHQWKPRQWKRIKHDFFHSWHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VYLHZWKDWWKH
fundamental way to discipline the mental state of local bureaucrats and other policy 
participants, inducing them to follow the intentions of the emperor, was to eliminate 
dissent, abandoning the practice of previous Song Emperors who allowed different 
opinions to coexist and compete. Although Wang Anshi had repeatedly outlined his 
scheme to unify morality, Shenzong did not show very clear interest until that time. In 
this month, however, Shenzong came to stand with Wang Anshi and officially gave up 
his original view on accommodating different opinions.361 He therefore no longer 
insisted on keeping Sima Guang in the court, because he realized that such 
accommodation to Sima Guang would not only cause greater confusion among the 
literati, bureaucrats and political elites, but also strengthen the solidarity of the faction 
that took Sima Guang as its leader. For all these reasons, Emperor Shenzong decided 
to demote Sima Guang.  
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In the second month of 1071, Sima Guang submitted his last memorial criticizing 
Wang Anshi, refusing thereafter to make any comments on the new policies. In this 
memorial he not only showed his determination to leave policy-making circles, but 
also explain why he was giving up any chance to express his opinion on the 
policies.362  
At the beginning of the memorial, Sima Guang listed Lü Hui, Fan Chunren, 
Cheng Hao, Su Shi, Kong Wenzhong and Fan Zhen as his models. He stated that he 
had lacked the foresight of Lü Hui because before Wang Anshi began the reforms, Lü 
had already predicted that they would greatly damage society and government. Sima 
Guang realized that he did not have the upright and unbiased mind of Fan Chunren or 
Cheng Hao, who despite having been promoted by Wang Anshi still criticized his 
policy. Sima Guang further admitted that he did not have the bravery to express his 
critique as had Su Shi and Kong Wenzhong, who wrote articles to criticize the new 
policies. He realized that he did not have the same determination to break with Wang 
Anshi as did Fan Zhen, who had written a very harsh critique of Wang Anshi and had 
been seriously punished.  
By listing all these representative figures from the opposition to the Green 
Sprouts Policy, Sima Guang placed them into a group as representatives of correct 
RSLQLRQ6LPD*XDQJIXUWKHUGHVFULEHG:DQJ$QVKL¶VDFWLRQVLQFRQVSLUDWRULDOWHUPV
portraying him as establishing a faction and occupying the most important 
government positions. He expelled those who had different opinions and made every 
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effort to cater to the Emperor. He used the name of the Emperor to satisfy his own 
interests.  
In this memorial, Sima Guang did not make any reference to matters of policy 
per se, viewing the policy-making process entirely as a competition between two 
factions. The group he belonged was comprised of people with good virtue, and 
because of their virtue they made a special contribution to the enterprise of opposing 
thH*UHHQ6SURXWV3ROLF\:DQJ$QVKL¶VIDFWLRQLQFRQWUDVWZDVGHVFULEHGDV
comprised of men with evil intentions and bad morality. At the end of the memorial 
Sima Guang claimed that he would learn from his colleagues, and requested that the 
Emperor punish him and allow him to resign from all his posts.  
   6LPD*XDQJ¶VPHPRULDOLOOXVWUDWHVWKDWKLVGHFLVLRQWRUHVLJQUHIOHFWHGKLV
commitment to the same path of action as the other members of his group. This view 
was different from the line of reasoning that had appeared in his previous memorials, 
in which he explained that his reason for refusing promotion was his difference of 
viewpoint on the Green Sprouts Policy.363 6LPD*XDQJ¶VFDVHWKHUHIRUHKLJKOLJKWVWKH
end of deliberation on policy and the turn to factional politics that caused the purge of 
critics from the court by the second month of 1071.  
In this chapter I have shown how the desire to regulate policy deviation led to a 
despotic manner of conflict resolution at the court. However, this despotism only 
represents one of the mechanisms that emerged during the New Policies period for 
GHDOLQJZLWKIHHGEDFNGXULQJWKHSROLF\LPSOHPHQWDWLRQSURFHVV7KHFRXUW¶VSROLF\
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makers had to directly face significant problems that were reported by local 
bureaucrats. Even though the court would not question the morality and factional 
alliances behind those reports, it still had to figure out ways to resolve those problems.  
The leaders in policy formation had realized that they could not fully grasp the 
diverse situations to be found in different localities during the process of 
implementing the Green Sprouts Policy. Their response to many problems was 
therefore was to bestow autonomy to the local circuit bureaucrats, allowing them to 
adjust the policy depending on the situations they encountered.  
For example, on the 25th day of the fourth month of 1070, the Finance Planning 
Commission allowed circuit bureaucrats to freely decide their own schedules for 
making loans and the amounts of each loan. The court only gave a yearly quota of 
loans to each locality.364 This was around the time that both the drafters of the New 
Policies and their critics at court had already shifted their focus of debate from actual 
policy to factional alliances. This trend did not prevent the court from adopting 
flexible approaches to resolving the problems reported by the local bureaucrats, 
however, because these reports were not taken as representing the views of critics 
with factional entanglements and bad intentions.  
The court on the one hand sRXJKWWRXQLI\WKHEXUHDXFUDWV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH
intention of the policy; on the other hand, when they had made sure that this intention 
had been clarified for the bureaucrats, they delegated power to the local level. The 
drafters of the New Policies lacked the capacity or intention to regulate the local 
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problems caused by the changes in the market system.  
 
In following chapters, we will continue to investigate how the drafters of the 
New Policies resolved the real problems that emerged during the statH¶VLQWHUYHQWLRQ
LQWKHPDUNHWSDUWLFXODUO\SUREOHPVFDXVHGE\EXUHDXFUDWV¶LQDSSURSULDWHDFWLYLWLHV
that led the policy to deviate from its original intentions. We will show how the 
LQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQWKH1HZ3ROLFLHV¶UDWLRQDOHIRUUHJXODWLQJEXUHDXFUDts and the 
practical process of state intervention shaped the way in which the state deployed its 
power in the market.  
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PART THREE 
State Intervention in the Salt and Tea Markets during the New Policies Period 
(1071-1085): Perspectives and Practice     
 
One of the big problems with the principal-agent framework is that it takes for 
granted the existence of state capacity. That is, it formulates the problems of 
managing an organization primarily as one of incentives and will: the principal 
commands that the agents do certain things, and the agents fail to do so because they 
are opportunistic or self-interested. But agents can be completely loyal and motivated 
to do the right thing and yet fail because they simply do not have the knowledge, 
competence or technical ability to carry out the principal¶s wishes.  
                                   -----Francis Fukuyama365 
 
In Part three, we shift our focus from the conflict resolution mechanisms among 
the political elites at the central court to interactive mechanisms between the central 
government, different levels of bureaucracy, and broader social forces in the process 
of state intervention during the New Policies period. We will discuss how the 
worldviews of the New Policy makers interacted with their historical context to shape 
the ways in which the state exercised its power in the salt and tea markets. 
In preparing for its wars with the Tangut Xi Xia and the Khitan Liao, the 
drafters of the New Policies strengthened state intervention into the financial market 
for salt vouchers, as well as the tea and salt industries, from 1071 to 1085. Through 
such intervention, they hoped to coordinate market actors, perfect the market order, 
LQFUHDVHWKHVWDWH¶VUHYHQXHDQGLPSURYHVRFLDOSURGXFWLYLW\,QRUGHUWRachieve these 
goals, they established mechanisms for organizing bureaucrats and market actors. 
Those mechanisms included rules ordering the government agencies to collectively 
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regulate prices by adjusting the supply and demand based on market changes; a 
deliberative mechanism that incorporated government and market actors to decide the 
price of goods; and the institution of state monopolies that organized the interests of 
producers, the government and other powerful market actors to provide protection for 
the majority of market actors in an effort to increase overall social productivity. 
    However, the ultimate result of state intervention was the collapse of those 
mechanisms. The bureaucracies manipulated prices to pursue profit; they competed 
for economic interests and greatly damaged the market order. The bureaucrats in state 
monopolies build coalitions with powerful merchants to manipulate prices and 
damage the interests of small producers. Part Three explains the causes of such 
failures. I argue that tKHOLPLWVRIWKH1HZ3ROLFLHVPDNHUV¶ZRUOGYLHZLQH[SODLQLQJ
policy deviations caused their failure in organizing political and market actors to 
achieve their policy purposes.  
     The quote by Fukuyama depicts a regulatory mechanism that resembles some 
features of the cases that I will discuss. As I will show, the political beliefs of the 
drafters of the New Policies guided them to continually reinforce the same procedures 
in regulating policy deviations, regardless of the variety of actual problems 
encountered. ,KDYHGHILQHGVXFKVWUDWHJLHVDV³OLPLWHGUHJXODWLRQ´E\ZKLFKWKH
UHJXODWRUVIRFXVHGRQGLVFLSOLQLQJSHRSOH¶VPHQWDOLW\UDWKHUWKDQUHVSRQGLQJWRDFWXDO
SROLF\GHYLDWLRQV6XFKDZD\RIUHJXODWLRQRULJLQDWHGIURPWKH1HZ3ROLF\PDNHUV¶
systematic vision of how the world operated and the correct way of building an ideal 
political order. They believed that they could overcome any policy deviations by 
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directing the policy participants toward the correct way of thinking. In facing practical 
difficulties, they adhered to certain measures without considering the changes in the 
real situation. The actual behavior of market actors and bureaucrats contradicted their 
H[SHFWDWLRQVKRZHYHUDQGWKHLUULJLGUHVSRQVHVVHULRXVO\ZHDNHQHGWKHVWDWH¶V
organizing capacities in the economic field.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Changing Policy Paradigms in the Control of Pond Salt Voucher Prices during 
the New Policies Period (1072-1080) 
 
In this chapter, I discuss the consequences of the policy process in which New 
Policies makers practiced different measures to stop the market depreciation of the 
Pond Salt Vouchers during the Xining and Yuanfeng periods (1068-1089). I first 
analyze the factors that influenced the market for these vouchers, arguing that the 
limits RI1HZ3ROLF\PDNHUV¶ZRUOGYLHZSUHYHQWHGWKHPIURPH[SODLQLQJWKHPDUNHW
changes, in part because they took the government as the only reliable actor to resolve 
depreciation. They established new government agencies in the hope that these 
agencies would find the proper way to regulate prices and increase revenue through 
adjusting the demand and supply of salt vouchers. They also designed the roles of 
other bureaucracies in the price-regulation process. Ultimately, however, these 
bureaucrats abandoned the goal of price regulation to pursue their economic interests 
at the expense of other market actors. Existing bureaucracies refused to cooperate 
with these new agencies, with all parties focused more on their own economic and 
bureaucratic interests than on cooperation. 7KHFHQWUDOSROLF\PDNHUV¶SROLWLFDO
philosophy provided no guidance for how to coordinate these agencies. The leaders 
were therefore slow to face this disorderly competition. State intervention in the 
financial market caused increasing cleavage among governmental agencies, 
intentional inaction by regulative bureaus and the central court, and collusion between 
circuit bureaucrats and big merchants.  For all these reasons, state regulation of the 
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price of Pond Salt Vouchers failed.   
Factors Influencing the Price of Pond Salt Vouchers (1058-1074) 
Scholars on political economy have found that the market operates independently 
of people¶s conception of how it operates, and why changes in price occur in the 
course of its operation. 366 A brief introduction to the market in which the salt 
voucher played a role reveals a number of complicated mechanisms that affected the 
price of these vouchers. As this chapter will demonstrate, the gap between the policy 
makers¶ understanding of such mechanisms and their real operation led to repeated 
changes in policy to control the vouchers¶ depreciation.   
The function of the pond salt voucher 
The pond salt voucher (jieyan chao) was but one category of salt voucher, others 
RIZKLFKLQFOXGHGWKH³YRXFKHUIRUSRZGHUHGVDOt in Hebei and Jingdong circuits 
(hebei jingdong yanchao´³WKHYRXFKHUIRUWKHSRZGHUHGVDOWLQ+XDLQDQDQG
Liangzhe circuits (huaizhe yanchao´DQG³WKHYRXFKHUIRUZHOOVDOWLQ6LFKXDQ
(Sichuan jingyan yin´7KHSRQGVDOWYRXFKHUZDVPDLQO\XVHGE\PHrchants trading 
salt from the huge state-operated saltworks centered around two ponds located in Xie 
and Anyi counties in Xie prefecture, Yongxingjun circuit, Shanxi. This region was 
part of the Northwestern border area of the Song, where the local government faced 
great financial burdens in provisioning the local garrisons that safeguarded the 
frontier against the Tangut state.   
The military conflicts between the Song and the Tangut state caused the Fiscal 
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Commission of Shanxi to face shortages of grain, fodder, and both iron and copper 
cash. In 1058, under the suggestion of the Xie Salt Commissioner Fan Xiang, the 
government allowed merchants in Shanxi and other regions to use their hard cash to 
buy pond salt vouchers. They could then hold these vouchers or use them to exchange 
for salt in the state managed enterprise. The merchants could sell the salt in 
designated regions with the permission of the government. The denomination of the 
SRQGVDOWYRXFKHUVZDVPDUNHGLQXQLWVRIVDOWRU³PDWV´DVZHOODVLn copper or iron 
cash.    
Merchants trusted the salt vouchers because the central government not only 
issued them but also guaranteed the holder¶s legal right to exchange them for salt or 
cash according to the denomination of the voucher. In order to attract merchants, the 
central government also promised to pay a bonus depending on the distance that the 
merchant traveled in transporting the cash or other trade goods to Shanxi. The 
merchants could also earn great profits by selling the salt in designated areas such as 
Jingxi, Shanxong and Hebei circuits.367 Because only those who had government 
permission could sell salt, the participating merchants could easily cover the cost of 
their long-distance transportation. In order to stabilize the price of the salt vouchers, 
the central government established an agency in capital Kaifeng to repay holders with 
a standard price, 6000 copper cash for one voucher. Even if the merchants had bought 
their vouchers at a lower price, the government still guaranteed their right to sell the 
vouchers to the government at that standard price. Although this policy could make 
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the central government lose money, its real goal was to prevent the voucher from 
serious devaluation.368 Compared to other kinds of salt vouchers, the local 
bureaucracy in Shanxi had more autonomy to decide the amount of vouchers it would 
issue. The pond salt voucher was mainly issued by a circuit-level governmental 
agency, the Salt Intendancy (xieyan si) in the Shanxi region.  
The salt vouchers therefore can be understood as bonds that the local government 
issued to support their expenses on behalf of the central government. The local 
government borrowed money from sectors of society and was repaid by the central 
government in either cash or salt resources. The salt resources are controlled by the 
central government. The central leaders regarded the salt voucher as ³flying money´ 
because by repaying local debt, the central government transferred money to the local 
government.369 The successful operation of such a mechanism however required 
close cooperation between Shanxi¶s local government and the central government. If 
the local government issued too many vouchers for the central government to pay off, 
then the salt vouchers would face the danger of depreciation. In fact, this had been a 
major problem faced by the central government during the Xining and Yuanfeng 
periods.  
The over-issuance of salt vouchers in Shanxi 
As discussed above, tKH1RUWKHUQ6RQJ¶Vlong-term preparations for war with the 
Tanguts and its military conflicts with the Tanguts in 1072-1073 and 1081-1082 put 
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great fiscal pressure on both the central and local governments.370 As the bureaucratic 
agency responsible for military provisions, the Fiscal Commission 䕹䙻ਨ in Shanxi 
stockpiled grain and fodder, the amount of which became the main standard for 
official evaluation of its personnel.  
As the head of Fiscal Commission, the Fiscal Commissioner 䕹䙻֯ was 
normally appointed as Fiscal Commissioner and Concurrent High Commissioner of 
Xie Salt ࡦ㖞䀓咭֯.371 Such concurrent posts bestowed the Fiscal Commissioner 
with the power to manage salt. They could therefore decide on the number of 
vouchers to be issued depending on the quantity of war material they needed to 
prepare. Moreover, the central government also established an incentive system to 
motivate the Fiscal Commission to buy grain and fodder, rewarding the Fiscal 
Commissioner and his subordinates if they purchased more than their quota and 
punishing them for buying less. This policy was meant to prevent the Fiscal 
Commission from focusing on profiting from the salt trade while ignoring its main 
duty of preparing war materiel for the central court.372 
Such a standard encouraged the bureaucrats in the Fiscal Commission to finance 
their expenditures through expanding local debt. The local government therefore 
manipulated the pond salt vouchers to pursue the goal of buying more materiel. They 
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actively devalued the price of the vouchers to induce merchants to sell them more 
grain. The original policy imposed strict restrictions on the use of salt vouchers. In 
WKHFHQWUDOJRYHUQPHQWDGRSWHG)DQ;LDQJ¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKDWWKH)LVFDO
Commission in Shanxi only sell the vouchers to merchants who had the equivalent 
hard cash. After receiving the cash, the Fiscal Commission would use it to buy fodder 
and grain and transport it to the border areas. The central court at first forbad the local 
government to directly use salt vouchers to buy grain and fodder because it worried 
that the local government would freely devalue the vouchers.373 This policy however 
was changed progressively by local bureaucrats.  
The Fiscal Commission broke this restriction and directly used vouchers to buy 
grain and fodder. As noted in the History of the Song, ³After some time, [the Shanxi 
Fiscal Commission] allowed merchants to provide fodder and grain in place of cash 
payment for salt vouchers. But the problem of overvaluation of goods grew and with 
LWWKHVDOWYRXFKHUV¶YDOXHIHOO´ As the price of each salt voucher fell, the local 
bureaucrats needed to spend more salt vouchers to get the same amount of goods. 
This strategy induced merchants to contribute more materials so that the local 
government could achieve the quotas imposed by the central court. This activity 
greatly increased the number of the vouchers in circulation, however.  
In 1060, Xue Xiang succeeded Fan Xiang as Fiscal Commissioner and High 
Commissioner of Xie Salt. During his tenure, Xue Xiang greatly expanded the usage 
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of salt vouchers.374 For example, in 1060 the central court required Xue to increase 
the purchase of horses from Tibetan merchants. Xue Xiang thought the profits that the 
Tibetan merchants earned were not attractive enough. He therefore crafted a policy 
that allowed the Tibetan merchants to exchange their horses for tea, popular in Tibet, 
with merchants from Sichuan. Sichuan merchants wanted silver, which they could 
exchange profitably back in Sichuan. Xue Xiang used the pond salt vouchers as 
instruments to satisfy the interests of all of these parties; the Fiscal Commission used 
vouchers to buy horses from the Tibetan merchants. After obtaining these pond salt 
vouchers, the Tibetan merchants could bring them to designated prefectures to 
exchange them for Sichuan goods. Thereafter, the salt vouchers went into the hands of 
Sichuan merchants, who could exchange the vouchers for silver.375 This silver 
belonged to a separate fiscal channel controlled by central government. By using this 
policy, Xue Xiang could successfully attract merchants from both Sichuan and Tibet 
by facilitating their trade with salt vouchers. In so doing, Xue Xiang could issue more 
vouchers, because the demand for them by the Sichuan and Tibetan merchants 
increased. The silver for repaying the salt vouchers had to be provided by the central 
government, however, so the salt vouchers still played the role of local bonds.  
     Moreover, in order to accumulate more cash for preventing debt, the 
bureaucrats in the Fiscal Commission tended to expand its reserves by issuing more 
salt vouchers to exchange for copper and iron cash. In 1073 the State Finance 
Commission йਨ reported that the Fiscal Commissioner of Qinfeng circuit was 
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reducing the price of the salt vouchers to sell them. According to the report, the 
original sales quota that the Finance Commission set for the Fiscal Commission was 
1,710,000 strings per year. The actual amount of cash that the Fiscal Commission had 
earned from selling the salt vouchers was already 4,600,000 strings.376 
As the vouchers had no maturity date or limit of issuance, the local government¶V 
arbitrary manipulation shifted their financial burden to the central government. The 
resources and cash that the central government controlled were insufficient to support 
such a great deal of local debt.  According to the data collected by the 
Secretariat-Chancellery ѝᴨ䮰л, the highest policy making agency led by the Grand 
Councilors, the local bureaucrats in Shanxi spent 90,2716 vouchers in the sixth year 
of Xining (1073). This number was already more than double the actual amount of 
salt available to be sold to earn the cash. In other words, the local debt had surpassed 
the total value of the salt that the central government could use to repay these debts. 
The Secretariat-Chancellery believed that such overspending was caused by the local 
officials¶ uncontrolled use of salt vouchers to buy grain and fodder.377 Moreover, the 
original agency that Fan Xiang established in the capital to pay the face value for salt 
vouchers had ceased its work by 1074 due to a lack of hard cash. The central 
government gave up its function in the stabilization of voucher prices and allowed the 
market and local government to determine their value.  
Until 1074 the government did not put an expiration date on salt vouchers. The 
government protected the commercial right to buy pond salt by using salt vouchers, 
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thereby earning great social trust for vouchers. After paying the stated price, the 
merchant could own the voucher and use it to get one mat of salt, equal to two 
hundred jin or around eighty kilograms. A legal voucher could only be used in tandem 
with a sales permission document, called yin ᕅ. After obtaining salt from the Salt 
Agency at Xie pond, the voucher was taken away but the sales permission was still 
held by the merchants. They took the salt and the document of permission to those 
regions where the government allowed them to sell the salt. There the local 
government claimed the permission document once the merchant arrived at the 
designated region and began his sales. In order to prevent the counterfeiting of 
vouchers, the State Finance Commission issued another document that was sent 
separately to the branch of the Salt Agency at Xie pond. This document listed the 
information that also appeared on the salt vouchers and sales permissions. Once the 
merchant submitted the vouchers, the officials who received them would check the 
information on the voucher with that listed in the documents.378  
    Even though we find central policy makers complaining continuously that the 
number of salt vouchers had surpassed the actual output of salt, no materials 
discovered so far show that the government faced any sort of difficulty in satisfying 
the merchants¶ demand for salt. This reveals that great number of the vouchers were 
traded in the financial market rather than used directly for buying salt. Moreover, the 
low price of salt vouchers compared to the market price of salt also guaranteed that 
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sellers could earn good profits.379 The market¶V trust in salt vouchers was therefore 
more solid than it was for other instruments, such as exchange notes. 
The financial market for pond salt vouchers and the factors influencing price 
The formation of the financial market for pond salt vouchers benefited greatly 
from the government¶s policy of allowing the free trade of the vouchers on the private 
market, a policy quite different from the other categories of salt voucher. In the case 
RIWKHSRZGHUHGVDOWYRXFKHUWKHKROGHU¶VQDPHDQGWKHVHTXHQFHQXPEHURQWKH
voucher were recorded for reference.380 The powdered salt voucher therefore had 
parallels to negotiable monetary instruments, since each voucher could only be held 
by a particular payee and could not be transferred. As the payer, the government paid 
powdered salt to the holder. The transaction was limited between the merchant and 
government, without any private market role. The government in the early Northern 
6RQJKDGVWULFWSHQDOWLHVRQWKHLOOHJDOWUDQVIHURIDYRXFKHU¶VRZQHUVKLS)RUH[DPSOH
in 1047 the prefect of Xuanzhou of Jiangnandong circuit was demoted because he 
changed the name on his powdered salt voucKHUWRDQRWKHUPHUFKDQW¶VQDPH381 
7KHSRQGVDOWYRXFKHUVLQFRQWUDVWGLGQRWOLVWWKHKROGHU¶VQDPH382 The Salt 
Agency at the salt pond needed only to verify the proof of payment stamped on the 
voucher.383 To do this they checked their records of the lot number (liaoci) and 
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sequence number (chaohao) to see if their records match the numbers appearing on 
the voucher.384 This anonymity allowed the pond salt vouchers to be traded freely 
between holders.    
A market for the vouchers emerged for several reasons. The lack of expiration 
dates allowed enough vouchers to remain in circulation to conduct transactions in the 
private market. Furthermore, the central government could not afford to buy up all the 
vouchers in circulation, so it allowed them to float on the private market lest the 
central government face the danger of default. Third, the central government protected 
the legal right of merchants to buy and sell salt using the vouchers, making them 
trustworthy on the market. Lastly, transactions using pond salt vouchers left relatively 
broad margins for earning profits. This attracted more people to hold the salt vouchers. 
All these factors promoted the development of a secondary market in which both 
governmental agencies and social forces actively engaged. However, the various 
actors in this market also caused uncertainty and price fluctuation.    
The Song bureaucracy began to actively engage in the market during the Xining 
and Yuanfeng periods. In 1069, the central government established an agency in 
Shanxi to buy back the pond salt vouchers. The operation of the agency differed, 
however, from the institution that Fan Xiang had created to repay the local debt; most 
importantly, the government no longer promised to repay the local debt according to 
the face value of the salt vouchers. Instead, the new institution bought the salt 
vouchers according their market price. After accumulating the vouchers, the Salt 
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Commission used them to exchange for salt and monopolized sales in the Yongxingjin 
circuit of Shanxi.385 As I will discuss, Wang Anshi expanded this model in an effort 
to adjust market price and increase revenues. These governmental agencies had a 
great influence on the vouchers¶ price in the secondary market.  
Furthermore, the active engagement of commercial forces in this market 
complicated price formation. The widespread usage of pond salt vouchers by both 
central and local governments strengthened the capacity of social forces to influence 
the price of the vouchers. Various government agencies not only used the salt 
vouchers to buy goods from merchants, but also advanced the vouchers to merchants 
on credit, encouraging them to sell the vouchers and repay the government with 
cash.386 As vouchers flowed into the hands of merchants, those merchants preferred 
not to directly exchange all their vouchers for salt. They held vouchers for many 
reasons. First, the paper vouchers were much more convenient to carry and store than 
coins. Great numbers of vouchers were therefore hoarded by the rich. Shen Kuo 
estimated the number at ten million strings.387 Second, the iron cash used in Shanxi 
were forbidden to circulate outside the region, so salt vouchers were welcomed 
because they could be spent elsewhere.388 Third, merchants could hold vouchers in 
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anticipation of their appreciating value on the market.389 Due to the lack of financial 
institutions capable of taking deposits, the government could hardly control money 
flow by the direct regulation of interest rates. The power of collecting and distributing 
pond salt voucher was therefore shared between government and other social forces.  
Within the multi-currency system that complicated transactions between Shanxi 
and the capital, the changing supply and demand of copper and iron cash would 
influence the price of salt vouchers. The Northern Song government allowed multiple 
categories of currency to be used in market. Within the Shanxi region, large iron cash 
(datieqian or tieqian), large copper cash (da tongqian) and standard copper cash 
(tongqian or xiaotongqian) were simultaneously used, with exchange rates between 
these currencies were decided by the government. The government forbad the outflow 
of iron cash from Shanxi. The basic unit for copper and iron cash was the wen. The 
large iron and copper cash were treated as equivalent by the government in Shanxi, 
valued at two wen, while the standard copper cash was one wen. One pond salt 
voucher had a face value of six min or guan, equal to six thousand wen of either iron 
or copper. 
 In real market operations, however, iron and copper cash had different values. 
In some periods of the Northern Song dynasty, when the government produced more 
iron cash, the exchange rate of iron against copper decreased, so that in localities such 
as Shanxi where the price was mainly measured in iron cash, the price of salt 
vouchers became higher than other localities where its price was measured in copper.
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390
 The variation in the voucher¶s price was therefore caused in part by the exchange 
rate between copper and iron cash, fluctuating with the supply and demand for those 
currencies. 
   Another factor affecting the price of vouchers was the demand for salt on the 
market. In case where the profits for the merchants were impinged upon by the 
government¶s competition for market share or insufficient local demand, the demand 
for salt vouchers would also decrease. This would result in the depreciation of salt 
vouchers on the secondary market. 391 
     
 Central policy makers had confronted the depreciation of salt vouchers 
throughout the reigns of Renzong and Shenzong. Under those rulers, the pond salt 
vouchers would eventually be repaid by the state with either cash or salt, in 
accordance with their face value, which was measured both in mats of salt and in 
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strings of cash. The depreciation of these vouchers meant that the government had to 
pay higher prices for buying goods.392 It also meant that the government had to 
devalue its salt to repay the merchants.393 Either way, this meant the loss of state 
revenue. Therefore, policy makers repeatedly discussed the depreciation of salt 
vouchers.   
As we will see below, policy makers explained price formation from different 
perspectives in their analysis of the reasons for depreciation. These various 
perspectives lead them to suggest different policies to resolve the problem. People 
like Lü Huiqing and Shen Kuo tended to favor restraining the secondary market, 
while others like Wang Anshi and Xue Xiang showed more interest and confidence in 
promoting the JRYHUQPHQW¶s engagement in the secondary market.394   
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394 The Northern Song government had used other ways to manage the salt trade before the 
New Policies period. These past experiences provided a range of choices for the New Policy 
makers, especially after they found that the measures they were using were not sufficient to 
resolve this problem. For example, in some areas the government had monopolized the 
purchase of salt from producers and sold it to consumers and merchants. Although during 
some periods before the New Policies era, particularly in Hebei, Jingdong and Sichuan, the 
government had allowed some producers to sell their salt directly to merchants, the state held 
a predominant advantage in the salt market. Besides direct revenue from government sales, 
the local government also obtained funds by forcing the local residents and merchants to pay 
taxes.The revenues gained in such a manner mainly belonged to the bureaucracies in charge 
of selling the salt. These bureaucracies therefore became independent actors on the salt 
market. Although they claimed to represent the interests of the unified state, their motive was 
to pursue the interests of their own agencies. The bureaucracies most deeply involved in the 
salt market included the Fiscal Commission at the circuit level and the branch agencies 
established by the Finance Commission in the central government. After collecting salt from 
producers, the fiscal commissioners at the circuit level had the prerogative to directly sell it to 
increase their revenues. As the independent accounting unit, the fiscal commission at the 
circuit level took the salt revenue as one part of the local fiscal revenue. Some of the local 
revenues were turned over to the central court. Others were spent for operating local 
government, covering the cost of su,orting local garrisons, and dealing with emergencies. The 
central government also built bureaucracies in production areas such as Shanxi to sell the salt. 
The income from these agencies was directly controlled by the central government.   
The government monopoly did not necessarily mean the exclusion of other social forces from 
the salt market. Two modes of cooperation existed between the government and merchants. In 
the first mode, the government sold merchants franchise rights to sell salt, with any profit 
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Issuing Exchange Notes ( ) to Resolve Salt Voucher Depreciation 
(1073-1075) 
Although the exchange notes had been widely used in Sichuan before the New 
Policies, this period still witnessed an unprecedented experiment that employed the 
exchange notes as policy instruments for regulating the market price of pond salt 
vouchers.   
In the sixth month of the seventh year of Xining (1074) the 
Secretariat-Chancellery reported,  
The border areas of Shanxi have received 5,230,000 strings of cash in the 
sixth year of the Xining period and they gave out 902,716 mats of salt vouchers. 
The consumers however could only use 428,601 mats. The remainder is void 
vouchers. [The central government had made the] rule that the local government 
should not give salt vouchers to the merchants unless they have paid hard cash, 
and the local government should only use this cash to buy grain and fodder. In 
reality, however, due to the lack of hard cash and the need for local officials to 
achieve the yearly quota of grain and fodder purchases, the local officials had to 
discount the vouchers and use them to buy grain and fodder directly. Some 
officials suggested that we restore the exchange notes [as a measure to resolve this 
problem]. Many of them said that by issuing the exchange notes, we could create 
one million strings of paper money. These people however have not learned the 
principle of issuing exchange notes. If we use the exchange notes in Shanxi, the 
number of the exchange notes should be the same as the actual amount of hard 
cash that the government holds. For example, someone using 10,000 strings of 
hard cash to get the exchange notes in the border area might want to get back that 
cash in other prefectures. Such a demand would require some prefectures to 
prepare 10,000 strings of hard cash so that they it could satisfy the repayment in 
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reign by local governments in regions such as Liangzhe, Fujian and Sichuan. In the second 
mode, the government would simply wholesale the salt to retailers so that the government 
could save costs. This practice existed all over the country. The government could also 
directly sell salt to consumers, though this mode always faced the danger of being rejected 
because of the unsatisfactory quality of the salt. In order to guarantee profit, the local 
JRYHUQPHQWLQDUHDVVXFKDV)XMLDQ³FDOFXODWHGWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶VSURSHUW\YDOXHVWRGHWHUPLQH
the amount of salt WKH\KDGWRSXUFKDVH´394 The market was greatly damaged by the 
employment of coercive measures by local government. Without relying on the salt vouchers 
as the way of mobilizing social forces, the government directly gained copper and iron cash 
by selling salt and collecting taxes.  
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time. If we can satisfy this requirement, then the exchange notes could be the 
same as hard cash. Then we could use the exchange notes to resolve urgent 
financial problems and avoid the over-issuance of salt vouchers, which has 
increased the price of purchases in the border areas. 395 
 
The central concern of the central policy makers was to guarantee that the central 
government could repay its debt; otherwise it would be impossible to stop the 
depreciation of salt vouchers. One measure for resolving this problem was to reduce 
the amount of salt vouchers until the government could use either salt or cash to repay 
them. The exchange notes therefore became instruments for achieving such a goal. 
This scheme aimed at regulating the primary market of the salt vouchers by inventing 
the exchange notes as replacements.  
The policy makers in the above discussion viewed the salt vouchers and exchange 
notes as financial instruments that the local government used to borrow hard cash and 
other resources from society. The central government therefore had to take the 
responsibility of guaranteeing that such debts could be repaid. According to them, 
because the actual amount of the salt that could be converted into cash could not 
cover the local debt, the salt vouchers therefore depreciated. The central policy 
makers had clearly realized that this problem was caused by the local government¶s 
overuse of salt vouchers due to their lack of cash. However, they had no intention to 
cut off the local debt because otherwise the local government had no way to prepare 
resources for the central court. On the other hand, they had to resolve the problem 
because they also knew that the depreciation of the salt vouchers would increase of 
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the central JRYHUQPHQW¶s burden of repayment, leading to a great loss of government 
resources.  
For these policy makers, unless the government could guarantee the free 
conversion of exchange notes into iron cash by any prefectural government, the 
exchange notes would not be accepted by the market. In their view, the only measure 
was to produce enough iron cash to back the exchange notes. Otherwise the market 
would lose confidence in the government¶s solvency and would not continue its 
purchase of exchange notes. The main goal was to build social trust in the exchange 
notes.   
As we will discuss later, such a policy was supported by Lü Huiqing ੅ᜐয, 
who was appointed Vice-Grand Councilor after Wang Anshi was relieved of his post 
as Grand Councilor in the fourth month of 1074. However, in the second month of 
1075, Wang Anshi resumed his post as Grand Councilor and as his later debate with 
Lu Huiqing showed, Wang Anshi preferred to continue the loose salt voucher policy 
while adjusting the price of vouchers through government engagement in the 
secondary market. He therefore opposed Lu Huiqing¶s policy of promoting the 
issuance of exchange notes.  
In the sixth month of 1074, however, the central policy makers agreed to promote 
the exchange notes to complement the salt vouchers. This policy gained support from 
the Fiscal Commissioners of the Yongxingjun and Fengxiang circuits because it 
opened the door to increasing the local debt and the minting of iron cash. With the 
help of such a policy, the Yongxingjun circuit begun to radically expand the mintage 
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of iron cash in the ninth month of 1074, in preparation for issuing exchange notes.  
The local leaders of the Yongxingjun circuit, Military Commissioner Wu 
Zhongfu and Fiscal Commissioner Pi Gongbi, promoted a plan to recover counterfeit 
iron cash. According to this plan, the government should use copper cash to buy the 
counterfeit iron cash that was privately produced and circulated on the market. After 
taking in these iron cash, the local government should build nine mints to melt the 
iron and use it to cast new cash. At the same time, the government would also strictly 
prohibit the circulation of all the old iron cash.396This policy would greatly increase 
local government capacity to control the monetary resources.   
When Pi Gongbi and Wu Zhongfu first proposed their plan in the ninth month of 
1074, Xiong Ben, the Fiscal Commissioner in the Fengxiang circuit, opposed the plan 
because he doubted that the government could call back all the counterfeit money or 
could have enough copper cash to conduct such an ambitious plan. He also worried 
about the potential damage that the prohibition of currently circulated iron cash would 
bring to the common people. Because the counterfeit iron cash was very common in 
society, such a movement would cause great loss to the poor who commonly held 
their meager wealth in counterfeit iron cash.397  
   The central authorities did not show a clear attitude towards these opinions. 
This ambiguous attitude encouraged Pi Gongbi and Xiong Ben to conduct local policy 
experiments even without the formal permission of the central government. From the 
ninth to the twelfth months of 1074, the Yongxingjun circuit carried out a recall of 
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counterfeit iron cash. Their policy gained support from Wang Guangyuan, the 
Military Commissioner in the Jingyuanlu circuit, another military circuit of Shanxi. 
The Finance Commissioner at the central court, Zhang Dun, also advocated that the 
government should prohibit and recall counterfeit iron cash, and establish more mints 
to produce new iron cash as preparation for the exchange notes. Although Xiong Ben 
was still hesitant about this policy, he agreed that the government should mint more 
iron cash.398   
  In the first month of 1075, Emperor Shenzong agreed to Pi Gongbi¶s plan to 
establish nine mints and produce one million strings of iron cash in preparation for 
issuing exchange notes.399 According to the record of a later discussion between 
Emperor Shenzong, Lu Huiqing and Wang Anshi in the ninth month of 1075, Lu 
Huiqing believed that the recall of counterfeit iron cash would build a strong base for 
guaranteeing the success of exchange notes. As he stated, ³ Since we would have 
already gotten rid of the counterfeit iron cash, our exchange notes would not be issued 
without enough preparation of [genuine] iron cash. We will hold those iron cash [as 
backing] for issuing the exchange notes.´ 400 
 
Although the circuit bureaucrats in Shanxi had agreed to expand the mintage of 
iron cash in preparation for issuing exchange notes, conflicts between the circuit 
government and the functional bureaucracy that managed exchange notes became 
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more serious around the first month of 1075. Such a divergence resulted in conflicting 
implementation of the exchange notes policy and caused the failure of the policy by 
the end of 1075.   
 As the main official in charge of the exchange note policy, the Exchange Notes 
Planning Commissioner Zhao Zhan insisted that the face value of the exchange notes 
that the government issued should be backed by the actual amount of iron cash that 
the government held, lest it become hard to guarantee the value of the notes.401 As the 
Fiscal Commissioner of Yongxingjun, Pi Gongbi agreed that the issuance of exchange 
notes should be supported by a certain amount of iron cash. However, he felt that 
solvency should not be a major obstacle to the issuance of exchange notes. Pi sided 
with local officials, who viewed the program as a way to use debt to purchase war 
materiel. He proposed issuing far more exchange notes than the actual amount of iron 
cash on hand.402 Zhao Zhan and Pi Gongbi had a great debate on this issue.403  
  Their conflict greatly influenced the implementation of the exchange policy. 
Zhao Zhan required that Pi Gongbi transfer enough money to his agency so that he 
could start the business of money exchange in the Yongxingjun circuit. Pi Gongbi 
however was not very responsive to this request because he did not think it is 
necessary to prepare the full face value of iron cash for the exchange notes. More 
seriously, their conflict was known to the public, including the merchants who wanted 
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to conduct money exchange with the government. A rumor spread that the 
government in fact had no cash backing for the exchange notes. Zhao Zhan even 
connived in the spreading of this rumor and refused to issue an order to imprison 
those who spread it. The inaction of the bureaucracy exacerbated the market¶s distrust 
of the exchange notes.404  
The central authorities chose to support Pi Gongbi because of their heavy reliance 
on the circuit bureaucracy to accomplish war preparations. Zhao Zhan was 
immediately moved to another position and Pi Gongbi gained power to make policy 
related to the exchange notes.  
This policy opened the door for circuit leaders to repeat the same strategies they 
had been employed with the salt vouchers. They issued large numbers of exchange 
notes without considering the number of iron cash that the government should reserve 
for maintaining solvency and protecting the market¶V trust. This eventually caused 
serous inflation in Shanxi after Shenzong¶s reign.  
 The government¶s formal abolishment of the exchange notes did not wait until 
that time. By the eleventh month of 1075, Emperor Shenzong had noticed that the 
depreciation of exchange notes was already serious, due to overspending at the local 
government level. In that month, the Fiscal Commission in Shanxi submitted a request 
to borrow 300,000 strings of cash from the central government to buy grain and 
fodder. The central government had to appropriate 100,000 strings of iron cash that 
was originally taken as reserves for supporting the exchange notes. Moreover, 
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Emperor Shenzong required that the local Fiscal Commissions not issue more 
exchange notes than the actual amount of iron cash they held for exchange. 405   
  Emperor Shenzong¶s attitude illustrates the dilemma of the central policy 
makers in regulating the market activities of the circuit bureaucrats. On the one hand, 
they showed strong determination to maintain a stable value for the exchange notes 
because otherwise the government would lose hard cash in repaying local debt. On the 
other hand, the central authorities could not reject the local governments¶ requests for 
funding because it relied on the local bureaucrats to buy materiel. In cases where the 
central government could not find other resources for funding those bureaucracies, it 
had to compromise with local governments and allow them to issue surplus exchange 
notes regardless of the actual reserves of iron cash. 
From the eighth month to the ninth month of 1075, the question of how to build 
social trust in the exchange notes had puzzled Emperor Shenzong and Lu Huiqing. 
Emperor Shenzong adopted tactics such as paying an extra bonus to encourage 
merchants to use exchange notes. Lu Huiqing suggested that the central court show 
determination that it would continue to use the exchange notes.406 All these measures 
could not stop the depreciation of exchange notes, however, nor the resulting 
depreciation of the pond salt vouchers.     
The depreciation of exchange notes triggered a sharper decrease in the value of 
pond salt vouchers. Benefiting from the different local exchange rates between 
exchange notes and iron cash, the merchants bought exchange notes at a low price 
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from the government in the Yongxingjun circuit and sold them to the prefectural 
government of Qinzhou where the price of exchange notes was higher. The 
government lost a great number of iron cash in this transaction. Moreover, because the 
merchants could earn much more profits than in their previous trading of salt 
vouchers, they lost interest in salt vouchers. According to the data collected by the 
central government, the government lost twenty percent of its iron cash in the 
currency exchange market, while the price of salt vouchers fell to 1000 strings of cash 
per voucher.407  
In the first month of 1076, Sun Jiong, the Finance Management Commissioner in 
Xihe Circuit, submitted a memorial persuading the central policy makers to give up 
the current exchange note policies. In the first part of the memorial, Sun Jiong 
described how merchants could earn money through trading the exchange notes from 
one local government to another, leading the government to lose hard cash. He further 
stated,  
   The court issued the exchange notes for the purpose of reducing the expense 
of transportating hard cash, and because the pond salt vouchers depreciated, the 
government used the exchange notes to support its salt voucher policy. Nowadays, 
[due to the market operations described above], the transportation fees are wasted 
and the price of salt vouchers is deeply harmed. This has greatly benefited the 
engrossing families who have won over the government in commercial 
competition. The government needs to purchase war materiel for the future; hard 
cash should be valued.408    
 
Sun¶s narrative illustrates how clearly officials observed how social forces earned 
profit through manipulating the market. Such observations did not, however, lead 
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them to explore measures to intervene, regulate or manipulate this market. What the 
state should do given such a market mechanism is to protect its hard cash resources so 
that it can guarantee the purchase of materiel. The only possible measure therefore 
was to cease the use of exchange notes.   
In the case studied above, state intervention into the financial market was limited 
because the central government only sought to control the amount of salt vouchers 
through issuing alternative currencies. The rationale behind such a policy was that the 
depreciation of salt vouchers was mainly caused by circulation of surplus vouchers 
that could not be repaid by the government with either salt or hard cash. The goal was 
to strengthen the repayment capacity of government by replacing some of the salt 
vouchers with exchange notes and improving the government¶s reserves of iron cash 
as backing. The government therefore issued the exchange notes and new iron cash as 
alternative currencies so that the number of salt vouchers could fall to an amount at 
which all vouchers could be efficiently converted into salt. Although such a policy 
matched the interests of both central and local governments in expanding their control 
of money resources, the actual implementation of the policy did not achieve this goal 
due to the local government¶s disinterest in guaranteeing repayment. Local 
implementation of the policy therefore focused on the constant increase of exchange 
notes and iron cash as the measures for conducting purchase. Due to the lack of 
regulation of market activities by both local government and merchants, the exchange 
notes failed to earn trust in the market and therefore greatly depreciated. The 
depreciation also resulted in the depreciation of salt vouchers. In facing such a 
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problem, both central policy makers and local bureaucrats found no solution but to 
protect their revenues. They abandoned the exchange notes in the first month of 1076. 
Under Wang Anshi¶s influence the state adopted an alternative policy that represented 
different ways to perceive and resolve the depreciation of pond salt vouchers.  
 
Wang Anshi¶ Policy Paradigm and Its Practice in Regulating the price of Salt 
Vouchers 
The New Policy makers¶ plans for price regulation 
Rather than simply reducing the amount of salt vouchers in circulation, Wang 
Anshi¶s scheme tended to add a coordinative role to the state. For him, without 
external force, resources would be centralized in the hands of the few big merchants 
who had great resources to manipulate the market price. The majority of market 
participants--small merchants and common people--would emerge as losers. In Wang 
Anshi's policy paradigm, the state was the only political unit that could go beyond any 
private interest, and coordinate the interests of the major participants. Being confident 
in their plans of education and building material incentives, the New Policy makers 
such as Wang Anshi believed that the bureaucrats who acted on behalf of the state 
would be faithful, wise and capable agents of the central leaders. Through 
investigation, the state would know what those participants could supply and the 
materials they sought. The state could therefore adjust the distribution of resources 
depending on its knowledge of demand. This coordinative role, Wang thought, could 
also increase the state's revenues. The majority of market participants and state could 
all benefit from such policies.  
From the eighth year to the ninth year of Xining¶s reign (1075-1076), Wang 
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Anshi¶s policy paradigm was adopted together with the exchange note policy in 
regulating the price of salt vouchers. After the abolition of the exchange notes in the 
first month of 1076, Wang Anshi's policy played the leading role until the second 
month of 1077. Compared with other measures, Wang Anshi¶s scheme offered more 
varied and flexible modes of state intervention into the pond salt voucher market. The 
essential idea that guided his policy was the belief that the state could adjust the ³ratio 
of exchange 䕅䟽´ between different categories of currencies and between currencies 
and goods through its flexible ³collection and distribution ᮲ᮓ´of those currencies 
and goods.      
In Wang Anshi¶s understanding, price is determined by both supply and demand. 
The goveUQPHQW¶s activities in the market as either demander or supplier would 
greatly influence price fluctuations. The government bought commodities or forced 
taxpayers to convert their own products into other materials or currencies according to 
the requirements of the state. This process in his discourse refers to "collection ᮲". 
The government also sold goods to earn money, hence "distribution ᮓ." In his 
discussion of price, Wang Anshi assumed a normal range of price fluctuation, but held 
that the government¶V excessive demand for certain materials would cause the price to 
spike beyond such a range. For example, in explaining why silver and gold became 
expensive, Wang Anshi stated that because tax collectors did not know the proper way 
of collecting tax, they asked taxpayers to offer payment only in silver and gold. The 
social demand for silver and gold greatly increased and they became very expansive. 
Wang Anshi further suggested that the government choose other goods as tax based on 
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their current price.409 In another situation, the government urgently sold three million 
shi of rice. Wang Anshi strongly opposed this plan because he predicted that such a 
large sale would cause a decrease of the price of rice.410  
   The state's intervention into the market should center on collection and 
distribution so that the price can be maintained within the proper scope. This process 
in his view also meant competition between government and the big merchants whom 
Wang Anshi also labeled ³engrossing families ެ֥ѻᇦ.´ In Wang Anshi's view, the 
market price was manipulated by those big merchants because of their advantage in 
controlling resources. For example, in some situations the central government forced 
local bureaucrats to offer as tribute certain goods that were difficult to collect in that 
locality or that season. In order to fulfill this quota, the local government had to rely 
on big merchants. Those merchants collected goods from localities where the price 
was low and sold them to the government at a high price.411 In Wang Anshi's scheme, 
the fundamental way to overcome this problem was to make the state replace the 
function that had been played by the big merchants. 
   Wang Anshi developed a complicated mechanism by which the state decided its 
actions in the market depending on changing commodity prices. The state should not 
be passively led by price changes as were the common merchants; rather, he 
advocated, it should use its policies to influence prices. The fundamental difference 
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between the state and engrossing families was that the state would not only pursue its 
economic interests through control of resources. Although it could handle great 
resources, it would not randomly use its advantage to increase the price. In demanding 
materials, the state could buy them at a higher price so that small sellers can benefit. 
In supplying materials, the state could consider the economic interests of small 
merchants and commoners, choosing a lower price.  
  The role of state in this paradigm should be achieved by a deep inquiry into the 
market conditions in different localities. Based on this information, the state could 
collect and distribute goods in a timely manner. After that, the state could find a 
proper price to sell those goods or credit them to the small retailers.   
     I define Wang Anshi's design as the ³market-coordinating state.´ The state¶V
main tool in coordinating the various interests of the major market participants 
through price regulation was its control of resources in response to the changing 
market situation. Three main qualities can be seen in Wang's policy paradigm: First, in 
contrast to the Neo-liberal and Keynesian principles that prevail among modern states, 
his idea did not take the promotion of free market competition as its goal. He did not 
believe that competition could ever attain the ideal distribution of resources according 
to the interests of the majority because the big merchants would reinforce their 
advantage through manipulating the prices of the resources they controlled. The state's 
intervention was therefore needed to protect the common people and small merchants. 
Hence, the market was not an economic space for unregulated competition, but rather 
a place under protection by the power of the state.  
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   Second, although he did not believe in the self-adjustment of the market, Wang 
Anshi still took supply and demand as necessary means by which the state could 
protect the market order and increase its revenue. The market in his paradigm was 
understood as the place where price was determined by the changing supply and 
demand conducted by state and social forces. Price changes also influenced the state's 
revenue. The state could not simply rely on its coercive power; it had to rely on the 
mechanism of price-adjustment to gain revenue. "Price" therefore became the central 
concern in the discourse of the crafters of the New Policies. This paradigm differed 
substantially from the mandates that ignored factors of price but tended to distribute 
resources through administrative command. Wang Anshi treated the merchant's sales 
and government monopoly of sales in a practical manner. As the salt voucher case will 
show, although Wang Anshi promoted the state monopoly of salt sales in some areas, 
his intention was to strengthen the state's capacity to coordinate social interests and 
regulate prices because he thought that the monopoly could gave the state more space 
to manipulate the supply and demand of salt vouchers. For him, such a capacity was 
necessary for increasing the state's revenue and for the state to finance its security 
needs. 
      The third dimension of Wang Anshi's thought on the subject derives from his 
assumption that the state is a coherent unit despite the existence of different 
bureaucratic units. Wang Anshi repeatedly described such a state as "the single source
аᆄ" from which all benefits flowed. The possible existence of divergent 
bureaucratic interests did not appear in his discourse. Instead, he proposed that the 
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various government agencies would cooperate with each other, fulfilling their 
respective roles and collectively contributing to the goals set by the central court.  
This perspective resembles a common belief held by supporters of state intervention 
in other eras and countries. As Vito Tanzi has argued, ³under such a perspective, both 
policy makers and bureaucrats had no personal or group interests to promote, and they 
pursue only the general public interest,« and such an interest can be defined.´ The 
state therefore ³can be given monopoly powers over the needed policies.´412 Any 
single bureaucratic unit had the faithfulness, wisdom and capability to represent the 
public interests of both society and state. The New Policies makers had realized that 
bureaucrats might cause some problems destructive to the original goal of state 
intervention, but they were confident that they had efficient regulative measures to 
correct those mistakes, as they knew how to form correct thinking through education 
and material incentives. The role of the market-coordinating state in Wang Anshi's 
thought was manifested by the bureaucracies that closely and efficiently cooperated 
with each other, actively participating in the market to regulate prices and increase 
revenues.  
    In practice, however, Wang Anshi did not put great focus on how to shape the 
unified action of all bureaucracies. He avoided regulating the existing Fiscal 
Commission in Shanxi, but created new agencies to fulfill the JRYHUQPHQW¶VUROHLQ
coordinating the interests of various social forces. The major institutions he created 
include the State Trade Bureau and the Xie Salt Sale Agency. He believed that these 
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agencies would achieve his goal of regulating prices if they were endowed with more 
resources. Such a policy however raised great resistance from the existing 
bureaucracies such as the Fiscal Commission in Shanxi.  
     
The fulfillment of the market-coordinating mode of the state in Wang Anshi's 
design relied on a number of conditions, the first of which was timely and accurate 
collection of trans-regional market information by the government. Based on this 
information, the government could decide to sell or purchase goods at the right 
moment. The government agencies capable of fulfilling such a role should extend 
their intervention into different regional markets so that they could handle as much as 
possible the information collection, purchase, transfer and selling of materials across 
various regions. Second, the successful achievement of the state's function also relied 
on a professional bureaucratic group that could flexibly deal with market changes and 
deploy the resources they controlled to satisfy the interests of both state and society. 
In practice, they should have insight into both the short-term operation and long-term 
trends of the market, not only to maintain good market order but also to guarantee the 
state's economic interests. Thirdly, the state's strong capacity to adjust prices was also 
determined by its advantage in controlling resources. If resources were controlled by 
the engrossing families rather than the state, those engrossers would satisfy their 
interests by manipulating the shortage of resources. The price would be determined by 
them and would be harmful to both the state and small merchants. Finally, the New 
Policies plan relied on close cooperation between different agencies. In particular, it 
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needed the State Finance Commission and the Fiscal Commission in Shanxi to fulfill 
their respective roles and closely cooperate with the new agencies created by the New 
Policies makers, such the State Trade Bureau and the Xie Salt Sales Bureau. They 
would need to give up their own institutional and economic interests and serve the 
collective interests of the state as a whole.   
   As we will discuss, the agencies created under the auspices of the New Policies 
could not satisfy all the above requirements.  
  Wang Anshi¶s measures to regulate the price of pond salt voucher.  
State intervention in the pond salt voucher market was embodied in the activities 
of concrete bureaucratic agencies, including the State Trade Agency, Salt Voucher 
Purchase Agency and Xie Salt Sale Agency. Wang's YLHZRIWKHVWDWH¶VUROH differed 
from that of supporters of exchange notes, such as Lu Huiqing. In the eighth month of 
1075, Wang Anshi debated this issue before Emperor Shenzong. As Lu Huiqing 
himself recorded,  
 [Wang An]shi said, "The issuing of exchange notes has hampered [the 
successful operation]of salt vouchers. " 
    The Emperor said, "The exchange notes are converted into hard cash. The 
salt vouchers are converted into salt. They will not hamper each other." .... 
 
[Wang An]shi said, " Eventually it hampers the salt voucher. The output of salt 
is not stable, and the government's supervision and prosecution of the illegal 
salt trade is not thorough. We also lack a fixed figure for how much salt 
society actually consumes. If we issue many salt vouchers, we will gain the 
salt. If we issue too few, then we will lose the profit from selling the salt. It 
is a pity! We therefore need to issue more salt vouchers and we can build an 
agency to sell them at a reasonable price.´ 
 
I said, ³I cannot agree with you. Although the yearly output of salt is not stable, 
the salt consumption cannot be too much more than average. This is 
different from the consumption of wine. We decide the tally of salt vouchers 
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according to the average quantity of consumed salt, but the consumption of 
salt will not increase greatly in the years with high production. It is not 
difficult to immediately issue the salt vouchers when people need salt and 
the vouchers have proven insufficient. Then the salt vouchers will always be 
valuable. If the vouchers are valuable, then the price of grain will not 
increase. Therefore it is better that we issue fewer salt vouchers and use the 
exchange notes.413 
   
    Wang Anshi had confidence that the JRYHUQPHQW¶s intervention into the salt 
voucher market would resolve the depreciation problem even should the number of 
salt vouchers exceed the actual consumption of salt. He rejected the explanation that 
the depreciation of salt vouchers was caused by surplus issuance, as he believed that 
the market mechanisms that decided the voucherV¶ price was much more complicated, 
with the bureaucracy constituting an important participant in the market. Because of 
his belief that the bureaucracy had a strong capacity to influence prices, and because 
the process of shaping the price could also make a profit for the state, Wang Anshi 
tended to favor an relaxed salt voucher policy. 
     Wang Anshi¶s view was conveyed by the eight points of a new policy that the 
Finance Section of the Secretariat-Chancellery formally promulgated in the fifth 
month of 1075.414 The policy was based on two fundamental explanations for salt 
voucher depreciation. It stated,  
[We have] limited capital for the purchase of vouchers but [we have] 
issued too many vouchers. When the vouchers could not all be bought up, their 
value fell. [The merchants] increases the price for grain and [the government] 
has had to spend more salt on it. This is what happened to Shanxi¶s pond salt 
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[market]. Therefore, salt vouchers should not be issued without limit. This is the 
first point.  
Moreover, even if we set a limit for the issuance of salt vouchers, when 
merchants have wanted to exchange them for cash and the government would 
not purchase them, they have fallen into the hands of engrossing families. The 
voucher price then dips even further. When the border is in dire need, we still 
have to overissue salt vouchers. So it is fitting that an agency be established to 
stabilize the market price by purchasing these vouchers. This is the second 
point.415 
     
The above scheme came from the understanding that the salt YRXFKHUV¶ 
depreciation was partly caused by uncontrolled local debts growing beyond the 
government¶s capacity of repayment. The central policy makers therefore aimed to 
regulate the local government¶s activities that led to this indebtedness. First, the 
central court set a limit on the total number of salt vouchers that the local government 
in Shanxi could issue, thus requiring that local debt be restrained. Second, the central 
government shifted the burden of repayment to the Fiscal Commission of Shanxi. As 
the third point of the plan stated, the Procurement-sales Salterns bought the 
depreciated salt vouchers at face value. After buying them, the central government 
sold these vouchers. If the vouchers could not be sold, the loss would be deducted 
from the financial allocation that the central court provided for the circuit government. 
The central government also required the Fiscal Commission to pay 10,0000 strings 
of copper cash as the fund for repaying the salt vouchers. Third, the central court 
required that the number of salt vouchers in circulation should not exceed the actual 
amount of salt that the market could consume.     
The SROLF\¶VGUDIWHUV took the big merchants as another main cause of 
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depreciation, in keeping with the policy paradigm of Wang Anshi. Based on such an 
observation, the new policies redefined the function of government in the salt voucher 
market. As the second point of the policy stated, the government should compete with 
the engrossing families in buying and selling the salt vouchers. In contrast to their 
previous single function of repaying debt, under the new policy government agencies 
could use the vouchers as capital for supporting their engagement in the market. 
These agencies included the State Trade Bureau and the Procurement-sales Salterns 䋧
䌓䡄๤.  
Two purposes determined the new modes of using salt vouchers: regulating the 
salt voucher¶s price and increasing state revenues. In the view of the drafters of the 
New Policies, these two goals could simultaneously be achieved by treating the salt 
vouchers as good capital. The operation of this capital by the governmental agencies 
could make up for the financial losses caused by the depreciation of salt vouchers. 
Because increasing revenue using the salt vouchers was a common goal of local and 
central government, the central court tended to give the bureaucracy great autonomy 
in handling the large numbers of salt vouchers in the market.  
 
The new policy thus established two measures for buying salt vouchers from 
the secondary market. The vouchers that were issued before the fifth day of the fifth 
month of 1075 would be bought by the State Trade Bureau depending on the market 
price. The salt vouchers issued after that date would be bought by the 
Procurement-sale Salterns according to the denomination of the vouchers. After 
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buying the vouchers, the agencies could sell them, use the vouchers to buy and sell 
salt, or credit the vouchers to merchants for earning interest. As the New Policies 
stated,  
The old vouchers depreciated due to the failure of the government to 
purchase them. The merchants had gained these vouchers through selling grain 
to the local government. Since the government already lost the benefits, we 
should just allow the State Trade Bureau to buy them at the depreciated price.«.. 
If we only make the State Trade Bureau buy the vouchers at the depreciated 
price and not at their face value, the price of salt is harmed. .... If we can buy up 
all the vouchers at their depreciated price, our interests would not be damaged. 
[But we have to consider that in the real situation], if we buy the vouchers at the 
low price, the merchants could compete with us by increasing the purchase price. 
It is therefore difficult for us to buy up all the salt vouchers. The government 
may buy ten percent of the vouchers, but the merchants can buy ninety percent. 
Ninety percent of the benefits caused by the depreciation of the price of salt 
would go to merchants while the government would only get ten percent. We 
therefore cannot merely rely on buying the vouchers at a low price while 
abolishing the purchase of vouchers at their face value.416 
 
The regulation that governed these commercial activities was the Regulation for 
the State Trade Bureau ᐲ᱃⌅, which was promulgated by the New Policy makers in 
the second month of the fifth year of the Xining period (1072).The essential point of 
the regulation was to enlarge the government¶s control over commodities so that the 
government could set proper prices for the respective materials, benefit the small 
merchants while gain reasonable interest for the state. According to the regulation, the 
State Trade Bureau could negotiate with affiliated small merchants to decide upon the 
prices for these materials. After deciding the prices, the State Trade Bureau would 
offer these materials to the small merchants on credit. The small merchants would pay 
ten to twenty percent of the price as interest to the Bureau, repaying the principal of 
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the loan before a set deadline. Deliberation between the government and the 
borrowers would guarantee the protection of the small merchants and exclude the 
negative influence of the engrossing families. In case the State Trade Bureau could 
not find borrowers, it could instead sell the commodities. They should not force others 
to buy their goods, nor should they excessively pursue profit by setting high prices.417 
In the view of the New Policies makers, the purposes of seeking state revenue and 
maintaining good market order were not in conflict and could be achieved 
simultaneously.418   
    In the eight-point plan, the New Policy drafters designed a mechanism tfor 
organizing the cooperation of various government agencies, which was a precondition 
for the State Trade Bureau and Xie Salt Sale Bureau to fulfill their price-regulation 
function in the market. Within this mechanism, the Fiscal Commission in Shanxi 
needed to give up some salt tax resources. Before the implementation of the New 
Policies, the fiscal commission had collected tax from merchants who sold salt in 
some regions. The New Policies however restricted merchant trade of pond salt in 
those regions, only allowing the State Trade Bureau and the Xie Salt Sales Bureau to 
sell there. The Fiscal Commission therefore lost revenue. Moreover, the Central 
Finance Commission played a decisive role in guaranteeing social trust in the salt 
vouchers. The Finance Commission continued purchasing the vouchers according to 
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their denomination. Otherwise the State Trade Bureau and Xie Salt Sales Bureau 
could not gain the trust of merchants and would fail to regulate the price of vouchers 
by adjusting the demand and supply sides.  
Because of their confidence in the mechanisms for organizing various 
bureaucracies and market actors, the New Policy makers strengthened the new 
agencies' control of salt vouchers. In the tenth month of 1074, Finance Commissioner 
Zhang Dun prompted the central court to borrow 5,000,000 strings of cash to the State 
Trade Bureau, allowing the Bureau to deliver this cash to the border area to buy salt 
vouchers from the circuit government. Zhang Dun convinced Emperor Shenzong by 
promising that the State Trade Bureau could earn three to four million strings of hard 
cash per year through capital operations using the salt vouchers. This income would 
offset the eight million strings of cash that the central government had lost during the 
past four years due to the depreciation of salt vouchers.419  
 
Multiple modes of capital operation were practiced by these governmental 
agencies. The outcome of those modes benefited the common purpose of both the 
central court and the bureaucracy to prepare war materiel. The State Trade Bureau 
extended the pond salt vouchers to merchants on credit. The hard cash gained from 
the loan interest would be delivered to the border areas to support local expenditures. 
For example, in the eighth year of Xining, a merchant named Guo Huaixin did not 
repay his loan to the State Trade Bureau; he asked to help the Bureau directly 
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transport hard cash to the border prefectures in order to avoid fines.420 In another case, 
the policy makers gave peasants salt vouchers to buy the grain and fodder that they 
would harvest in fall. This policy adjusted the price of grain, preventing the price 
from rising too high in case of a poor harvest or too low in case of a bumper crop. The 
government could also strengthen its stockpile of grain and fodder so that it would not 
rely on the engrossing families in case of a poor harvest. The State Trade Agencies 
also earned 1,000,000 strings of profit by buying and selling different categories of 
grain which had different market prices.421 A third case shows that the State Trade 
Bureau used cash to help the prefectural governments buy silk from producers. The 
salt vouchers that were originally used by the prefectural government were transferred 
to the Bureau. The Bureau then sold the vouchers to earn profit.422  
     Moreover, the New Policy makers encouraged the bureaucratic agencies such as 
the Xie Salt Sales Bureau and State Trade Bureau to use large amounts of the salt 
vouchers to buy salt. The Xie Salt Sales Bureau was established in the fourth month 
of the eighth year of Xining period, gaining direct support from Wang Anshi. Both 
these agencies received funds from the central court and controlled great amounts of 
salt vouchers. With the permission of the central court, they bought depreciated salt 
vouchers from local governments or on the market and converted those vouchers into 
salt from the Xie ponds. Thereafter they sold this salt in designated areas. The low 
cost and the high price guaranteed their profits. These agencies expelled other social 
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forces from the salt market. From the eighth year to the tenth year of the Xining 
period, the central court continuously enlarged the region in which these agencies 
monopolized the privilege of selling the Xie salt, eventually covering prefectures in 
Shanxi, Jingdong, Hebei, Lizhou and Yizhou circuits. Many of these regions had 
previously allowed merchants to sell salt. The earnings from the monopoly of sales 
did not belong to the circuit governments, as the central government directly 
controlled this part of the revenue.423 
Prompted by this policy, more bureaucratic agencies gained the privilege to use 
the salt vouchers on the market. The new policies integrated the central court and 
those agencies into the same chain of interests. The central leaders paved the way for 
those agencies¶ pursuit of profits, which also served the central court¶s fiscal demands. 
For example, the profits that the State Trade Bureau earned by using the salt vouchers 
often had to support the temporary needs of the central court.424 This new fiscal 
structure changed the original arrangement, in which the central court had heavily 
relied on the Fiscal Commission in Shanxi to gain resources. Through promoting the 
development of these new agencies, the new policy makers believed that they could 
adjust the salt voucher¶s price while also earning benefits by using the vouchers as 
capital. The real economic situation, however, did not harmonize with such a scheme.  
The consequences  
The New Policies makers' wisdom however could not deal with the real situation 
in the financial market. First of all, the New Policies makers could not ever regulate 
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the activities of the circuit government in Shanxi. The over-issuance of salt vouchers 
was still serious. Although the New Policy makers had fixed the quotas for the local 
government issuance of salt vouchers, local governments tried many ways to break 
the restriction and expand their issuance. In facing this problem, the New Policies 
makers faced a dilemma. The Fiscal Commissions in Shanxi were the main agencies 
in charge of the purchase of war materials, so it was impossible for the central 
government to stop their spending of salt vouchers. The dilemma reappeared in the 
case of exchange notes. Although the eight-point policy tended to constrain the Fiscal 
Commission¶s overspending of the salt vouchers, it still left spacious leeway for the 
indebtedness of the circuit government. 
The Xie Salt Bureau maintained the power to issue salt vouchers. The head of 
the Bureau, Pi Gongbi, also served as the Fiscal Commissioner of Yongxingjun. The 
issuance of salt vouchers served local interests. As Shen Kuo, the Finance 
Commissioner, complained LQWKHWHQWK\HDURI;LQLQJSHULRG³7he local bureaucracy 
holds the power of increasing and decreasing the quantity of salt vouchers. [Its 
officials] do not care whether the Finance Commission has enough resources [to repay 
their debt].´425 Although in the eight-point policy the central government had set 
220,0000 strings per year as the ceiling for local debt, only one year after the policy 
was implemented the Shanxi local government had already broken the restriction to 
issue 109,8000 extra strings.426 After this activity was stopped by the Finance 
Commission, the Fiscal Commission continued asking for more salt vouchers to buy 
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grain. The central government had to agree and allowed them to use the quota for the 
following year.427 The key factor that caused the depreciation of salt vouchers could 
not be fundamentally resolved. 
     Moreover, the unlimited issuance of salt vouchers had lasted for more than 
thirty years since Fan Xiang first created the salt voucher policy in 1043. The 
accumulated salt vouchers remained in circulation, especially at the hands of 
merchants. The central policy makers however had no grasp of the actual number of 
those vouchers because previously the power of issuance was held by local 
government. After the recall policy was put into practice, the central leaders were 
surprised to find that the number of salt vouchers far exceeded the JRYHUQPHQW¶s 
capacity of repayment. For example, by the tenth year of Xining period, the State 
Trade Bureau had borrowed 59,3000 strings of cash from the Finance Commission to 
buy the Xie salt vouchers. Even it only bought those vouchers at the depreciated price, 
the central government still found it impossible to buy back all the vouchers in 
circulation.428  
All these factors make the government incapable of controlling the salt voucher 
market. The salt vouchers were still used at the local government level and most of 
them had flowed into the hands of big merchants, who controlled salt vouchers which 
had been issued over the past thirty years. 7KHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSULFH-adjustment plans 
faced insurmountable competition from other social forces.      
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      Second, the bureaucratic agencies with which the New Policy makers planned 
to regulate the price could not fulfill their function due to their weak capacity to deal 
with market changes. In facing jagged shifts in price, their strategies were far from 
efficient. As Shen Kuo noted in the tenth year of the Xining period, the market 
activities of the bureaucratic agencies that controlled a large quantity of salt vouchers 
were not following the original intention of price regulation. Rather than acting as one 
unit, the commercial interests of various bureaucracies became fragmented. In 
competing with each other, the only strategy that these bureaucracies could use was to 
keep on lowering the price of salt vouchers in order to find more buyers.429 Otherwise, 
they had to rely on political power to sell their vouchers. For example, the Xie Salt 
Sales Bureau forced commoners to buy salt, which caused widespread rejection of salt 
vouchers as the market for salt shrank due to government intervention.430 The 
original intention to adjust the price of salt vouchers through increasing government 
demand caused unexpected consequences.   
 
     Third, the successful implementation of the New Policies required the Fiscal 
Commission and the Central Finance Commission to cooperate with the State Trade 
Bureau and State Salt Sales Bureau. In practice however, the new agencies¶ 
intervention into the markets of salt vouchers and salt provoked great opposition from 
other agencies. The Fiscal Commission and Central Finance Commission tried to 
refuse to cooperate with the new agencies. As the Fiscal Commissioner of 
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Yongxingjun and the Xie Salt Commissioner, Pi Gongbi strongly opposed the 
monopoly of salt sales conducted by the Xie Salt Sales Bureau. According to Sima 
Guang¶s description, Pi Gongbi attributed the crash in voucher prices to the monopoly 
of sales by the Xie Salt Sales Bureau, pointing to the fact that the Xie Salt Sales 
Bureau had been forcing common people to buy their salt based on their level of 
personal wealth. Pi Gongbi further implied that failure of the policy was caused by the 
bureaucrats¶ self-interest, because the bureaucrats in the Xie Salt Sales Bureau and 
State Trade Agencies profited by abusing their power, leading to great social 
opposition. The merchants who used salt vouchers found that the salt market was 
dominated by the Salt Sales Bureau. The salt vouchers were therefore shunned by 
commercial forces and their value plummeted.431 Pi Gongbi suggested that 
abolishment of the Xie Salt Sales Bureau was the only way to address this problem.  
    Pi Gongbi¶s critique resembled a line of reasoning commonly held by the critics 
of the New Policies. As we have discussed in Chapter Two and Three, critics believed 
that it was impossible to make bureaucrats overcome their self-interest during the 
policy implementation process. The only way to resolve this problem would be to 
completely abolish the policies. In the case of salt vouchers, such a line of reasoning 
led Pi Gongbi to suggest that the central court take the power to use salt vouchers 
away from the agencies created by the drafters of the New Policies.   
Moreover, Pi Gongbi¶s attitude towards salt vouchers was also shaped by the 
conflicting economic interests of the circuit Fiscal Commission and the Xie Salt Sale 
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Bureau. In prefectures such as Tongzhou, Huazhou, and Shanzhou in the Yongxingjun 
circuit where merchant sale of salt was allowed, the Fiscal Commission collected 
commercial taxes from the salt trade. When Xie Salt Bureau monopolized the sales of 
salt in these areas, the Fiscal Commission lost that revenue.432 Different modes of salt 
trade were therefore closely related to the underlying economic interests of various 
bureaucracies. The opposition to the salt policies by the local Fiscal Commissioner 
not only represented the personal view but also the interests of the local bureaucracy 
he represented.  
The Finance Commission at the central court was also dissatisfied with the new 
agencies. The Finance Commission was responsible for buying up all the vouchers to 
stop depreciation, but these new agencies controlled great amounts of vouchers and 
caused further depreciation. The Commission sought to take over these new agencies¶ 
privilege in trading salt vouchers and to adopt more radical and coercive measures to 
control the circulation of the vouchers.  
As the Finance Commissioner in the central government, Shen Kuo¶s perspective 
represented the interests of his agency. Although Shen Kuo agreed with Wang Anshi¶s 
goal of strengthening governmental control of salt vouchers, he did not trust that the 
bureaucracies promoted by Wang Anshi could achieve such a goal. At the same time, 
he was cautious when handling requests from local government. . In a memorial he 
sent to Emperor Shenzong, Shen Kuo reminded the monarch that the Xie Salt Sale 
Bureau could earn more than 200,000 strings of cash for the central court through its 
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salt sales. The government therefore needed to carefully calculate the costs and 
benefits to be caused by changing from a monopoly to permitting merchant sales of 
salt.433  
     In contrast to Pi Gongbi, Shen Kuo did not attribute the salt voucherV¶ 
depreciation to the Xie Salt Sales Bureau alone. Instead he insisted that the 
over-issuance of salt vouchers by local government and the competition between 
bureaucratic agencies for material interests were the main causes. Shen Kuo¶s 
suggestion to resolve this problem differed from both Wang Anshi and Pi Gongbi. He 
did not believe that enlarging the regional scope for merchant sales of salt could 
resolve the problem, neither did he support delegating autonomous power to 
bureaucratic agencies and follow the market to adjust prices. He believed that the 
private interests of both merchants and bureaucrats were impossible to regulate. The 
central government could only rely upon itself.  
 He therefore proposed strengthening the power of the Finance Commission and 
adopting more radical measures to control the number of salt vouches. Shen Kuo gave 
four suggestions to the monarch. These suggestions included 1) strictly controlling the 
number of vouchers for each year; 2) equalizing the price of salt between the western 
and eastern parts of Shanxi; 3) taking back the power of issuing salt vouchers from 
local government to the Finance Commission; 4) strictly forbidding bureaucratic 
agencies from devaluing salt vouchers, using mandatory measures to call back all 
surplus vouchers by requiring additional payment from the voucher holders to 
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increase their price.434 
Shen Kuo proposed the same goal as Wang Anshi: use governmental force to 
reclaim all the vouchers and increase their price. However he distrusted Wang¶s 
reliance on the market to adjust their price. Relying on bureaucratic agencies to 
collect and distribute resources was not sufficiently efficient to achieve this goal. For 
Shen Kuo, more radical measures were needed, using government power to promote 
the value of the vouchers. The burden of repaying the local debt should be shifted 
from the central government to the holders of the vouchers.  
Shen Kuo¶s scheme on salt vouchers was related to the broader monetary policies 
implemented by the Central Finance Commission. As Finance Commissioner, Shen 
Kuo was concerned with the problem of monetary shortage. He opposed the local 
minting of more iron cash to resolve this problem because he thought that it would be 
impossible to avoid the problem of counterfeiting, and iron cash would not be trusted 
by the market. He held that the government should promote copper cash and salt 
vouchers as the main forms of currency. The main cause of the shortage of copper 
cash, he believed, was people¶s hoarding of copper. The government needed to guide 
society to change this habit and store salt vouchers instead, so that more copper cash 
could return to circulation. It was first necessary to stabilize the salt vouchers and stop 
their depreciation.435 As to this point, Shen Kuo differs from Wang Anshi in that he 
viewed the salt vouchers more as money for general circulation than as capital 
operated by government to win profit.  
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While Wang Anshi assumed that the new agencies he created had the capacity to 
adjust demand and supply based on market changes, Pi Gongbi and Shen Kuo 
believed that the bureaucrats could not overcome their self-interest in pursuing 
economic benefits. None of them, however, had proposed any practical plan to guide 
the bureaucrats to deal with actual market challenges and make their policies adaptive 
to those changes. The only measures these people could propose therefore were to 
keep relying on the new bureaucracies or on other forces, such as merchants and the 
central court.    
The depreciation of salt vouchers was still serious after the new policies were 
implemented. The market value kept on decreasing from six strings to about two 
strings per voucher.436 This continuous depreciation gave opponents enough evidence 
to declare :DQJ$QVKL¶VSROLF\ as a failure and promote other measures. After Wang 
Anshi resigned from the position of Grand Councilor in the tenth month of 1076, the 
central court called for reform of the pond salt voucher policies. The policies 
promulgated in the second month of 1077 reflected the different positions of the New 
Policy drafters, Shanxi¶s Fiscal Commissions and the Finance Commission of the 
central government.  
Rebalancing Opinions and Interests: the Salt Voucher Policy of 1077437 
In addressing the competition between these bureaucracies, the central leaders 
could not harmonize them to achieve their respective responsibilities. Instead, the 
leaders had to allow them to independently pursue their own interests. In the second 
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month of 1077, the Fiscal Commissioner of Yongxingjun, Pi Gongbi, and the Finance 
Commission collectively promulgated a new salt voucher policy. This policy 
synthesized the ideas and goals of the previous policies while reflecting the interests 
of the bureaucratic agencies that had been engaged in the salt voucher market. The 
results included loosening control of salt sales by merchants, and forced voucher 
holders to pay an extra fee.  
     The policy adopted a new explanation for the cause of depreciation. It claimed,  
        Abuses of the salt policy were due to Xihe Circuit over-issuing vouchers, 
making their price fall and the fodder and grain prices rise. Furthermore, in what 
are supposed to be merchant sales districts to the east, west, and south of the three 
circuits, the government also sells salt, disrupting merchant participation. The salt 
policy should be changed now and government sales abolished.438    
 
This explanation gave up :DQJ$QVKL¶V claim that the engrossing families were 
to blame for the vouchers¶ depreciation. It was therefore not necessary to build new 
bureaucracies to replace them as the main guarantors of steady prices, protectors of 
market order, and operators of capital. Instead, the power of merchants and the 
coercive force of the central government rose to the same level of importance as those 
new bureaucracies.   
  The policy of 1077 was intended to satisfy the economic interests of both the 
Fiscal Commission in Shanxi and the Finance Commission at the central government. 
The agencies that Wang Anshi created had taken away the substantial profits that the 
circuit Fiscal Commission had originally earned from taxation and governmental sale 
of salt. Although in 1075, the court ordered those new agencies to share part of the 
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profits they would earn in 1076 with the local government, the circuit officials had no 
power to decide how much profit could be shared, nor could they receive the money 
until the end of 1077.439 This would cause a great drop in local revenue.  
Pi Gongbi, who represented the interests of Shanxi¶V local government, sought to 
invite big merchants back into the salt market. The prefectures that Pi suggested 
reverting to merchant sales included Tong, Hua, Jie, Hezhong, and Shanfu, all of 
which belonged to the Yongxingjun circuit. The abolishment of the Xie Salt Sales 
Bureau¶s monopoly would increase the tax that the Fiscal Commissions in Shanxi 
collected from merchant sales. Only two months after the policy was implemented, 
the central authorities ordered that in these prefectures, the Xie Salt Sales Bureau 
return its salt to the circuit government. The Fiscal Commission and Xie Salt 
Commission would keep on selling the remaining salt until it sold out.440 The local 
interests of Shanxi were therefore partly satisfied by this policy.  
Although allowing merchant sales was one measure to resolve voucher 
depreciation, the Finance Commission could not completely accept Pi¶s scheme to 
restore the role of merchants. In Pi¶s original proposal, the districts allowing merchant 
sales would include all the prefectures in which the Salt Sales Bureau and State Trade 
Bureau had been monopolizing government sales. After reviewing this plan, the 
Finance Commission only allowed merchant sales in several prefectures.  
The Finance Commission argued that Pi¶s plan would cause disorder in the salt 
market. According to its report, if the government retreated from the prefectures of 
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Chan, Pu, Ji, and Dan Cao, there would be no governmental force to regulate the 
illegal transportation and sale of powdered salt from other places. Moreover, although 
the central government admitted merchant sales in some prefectures, it also 
emphasized that this policy was temporary; the central government would compare 
the profits earned from selling salt vouchers with those from the government 
monopoly, and decide on a future policy.441 Moreover, just two months after the 
policy was promulgated, the central court ordered the State Trade Bureau to 
monopolize the sale of salt in the capital.442 The policy not only allowed the Salt 
Sales Agency to keep its monopoly of sales in the prefectures such as Chan, Pu, Ji, 
Shan, and Cao. it also allow the State Trade Bureau and the Xie Salt Sales Bureau to 
use salt vouchers although it reduced the space for them to earn profits. 
The central leaders also adopted a radical view from the Finance Commission, 
that it should give up its original plan of coordinating market actors and stimulating 
demand and supply based on the real needs of those actors. As the Finance 
Commission suggested, 
³Old vouchers, collected and stamped, as well as old salt that has already been 
distributed among merchants must follow the rule of additional payment: the 
government should buy up all old vouchers and merchants must report their sales 
of already distributed salt by a deadline. [At that point], a new price [for salt 
vouchers] should be reckoned, the number of salt mats stamped and a counterfoil 
given. Under the old policy, a voucher for one mat of eastern or southern salt cost 
3500 cash; a voucher for one mat of western salt ran 1,000 less than that. The 
government should buy up these vouchers completely. But first they must be 
checked and recorded by proper officials at Xie prefecture¶s saltern, and then the 
merchants can proceed to sell. For salt that has already been requested, a deadline 
will be set according to the merchants¶ desired destination. For eastern and 
                                                        
441
 SHY shihuo24/15 
 
442
 SHY shihuo24/15 
 310 
southern salt, add 2500 cash per mat [worth of vouchers], while for western salt, 
add 3,000 cash per mat [worth of vouchers, for changing old licenses to new]. The 
license must be exchanged by the deadline. Government sales in the two regions 
[of Qinfeng and Yongxingjun circuits] must be abolished. The Xie Salt Sales 
Bureau should also pay the additional payment as the merchants would do]. These 
additional payments will be used to purchase old vouchers. « The merchants and 
the Xie Salt Sales Bureau should report their mats of salt within ten days. After 
reporting their mats, they shall pay those additional payments in cash. They will 
get one new license for each voucher with the new stamps on it«.´ 443 
 
As the above material illustrates, in order to satisfy the concern of the Finance 
Commission, the 1077 policy allowed the Finance Commission to turn to coercion to 
call back all the salt vouchers. As Shen Kuo suggested, the state should close the salt 
ponds, forbidding merchants from using any vouchers to get salt. This policy 
motivated the merchants to rush to the State Trade Bureau to convert their salt 
vouchers into cash, even the government only promised to buy them at the 
depreciated market price. Such market activities further motivated the Finance 
Commission to adopt more radical measure to call back the remaining salt vouchers.   
In the fourth month of 1077, only two months after the new policy was 
promulgated, the central government already found it impossible to buy up all the 
vouchers even at the depreciated price. The deficiency of cash became serious. The 
central government therefore had to give up using cash to repay local debts. Instead, it 
only employed cash to pay thirty percent of the value for each old voucher. The 
central state used new salt vouchers to pay the remaining value, based on the face 
value of these new vouchers. The price of the old vouchers therefore increased and the 
number of the salt vouchers held by merchants decreased because of the state's 
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command.444 
Moreover, the policy also manipulated the existing institutions to force merchants 
to compensate the central state for its loss in selling the depreciated vouchers. The 
Northern Song regulations on salt sales required that each salt voucher be connected 
with one license, without which it could not be sold. After the merchant obtained salt 
with a voucher, he would take the salt and the license to an area where merchant sales 
were permitted.445 After arrival, merchants would show the license to the local 
government and get a sales permit issued by the prefecture government. Then they 
submitted their license to the prefectural government and finished the registration 
process. Therefore, even if the merchant had obtained salt by using a voucher, he still 
could not sell that salt without a license. As the quoted document illustrates, the 1077 
policy required merchants who had already purchased salt to pay an extra fee for 
changing to a new license, lest they lose the privilege of selling their salt.  
Increasing local debts forced the Finance Commission and central policy makers 
to rely on such mandatory measures to reduce the central government¶s repayment 
burden. Through forcing merchants to pay an extra fee for salt and salt vouchers, the 
central government gained the hard cash needed for obtaining war materiel and 
repaying local debt. Although it claimed the same goal as had the New Policy leaders, 
the 1077 policy abandoned the effort to adjust prices through state manipulation of 
supply and demand. In contrast, the central authorities relied on mandates to obtain 
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cash directly.  
  The central policy makers in 1077 also took power away from the State Trade 
Bureau and Xie Salt Sales Bureau, both of which were now treated by the central 
government on the same level as common merchants, required to pay an extra fee for 
new permits. The policy makers no longer followed the Regulation for the State Trade 
Bureau in delegating to these agencies the power to set prices. Instead, the Finance 
Commission centralized the power to set the price of salt vouchers. According to Shen 
Kuo, after paying extra fees and getting new licenses, the profit that either 
governmental agencies or merchants could expect was constrained to 500 wen, and 
the price for each mat of salt was fixed at 6000 wen.446  
    
On the other hand, the 1076 policy did not prohibit the market activities of the 
State Trade Bureau or the Xie Salt Sales Bureau, although the cost of such activities 
greatly increased due to the Finance Commission's collection of extra fees. In the 
third month of 1077, the policy makers declared that the State Trade Bureau should 
continue selling salt after paying the extra fee, although it could not get the privilege 
of a monopoly.447 The State Trade Bureau's participation in the salt market continued 
throughout the entire Yuanfeng period.448 However, by 1082 the Emperor had 
publicly renounced the New Policy makers¶ promise to regulate market prices via the 
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State Trade Bureau.449 The State Trade Bureau¶s intervention into the salt voucher 
market only served the purpose of earning profit.  
The Xie Salt Sales Bureau still monopolized the pond salt trade in prefectures 
neighboring the production areas of powdered salt, because the central leaders 
worried that the retreat of government regulation in those areas would encourage 
illegal salt trade.450 In order to avoid influencing the price of salt vouchers, the 
central leaders no longer allowed the Xie Salt Sales Bureau to use pond salt vouchers 
to exchange salt. They still encouraged the agency to sell ten thousand mats of salt per 
year because the central government needed hard cash for its military expenditures.451 
More importantly, great number of salt vouchers was still controlled by various 
governmental agencies that still actively participated in the salt voucher market. As 
we have discussed, the State Trade Bureau received 5,000,000 strings of hard cash 
from the central authorities. The bureau exchanged 4,500,000 strings with Shanxi's 
circuit government for salt vouchers. In the following three years, the bureau issued 
this large amount of vouchers to merchants on credit, collecting 350,000 strings of 
cash as interest. In the report that the bureau sent to the central authorities, the bureau 
asked that it be allowed continue its activity in the financial market for the next ten 
years, guaranteeing to submit substantial interest to the central government. The 
policy makers acceded to this request and emphasized that all the interest earned from 
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the salt voucher market should be freely used by the court.452 In the fourth year of the 
Yuanfeng period (1081) the court further required that the mortgages that common 
people prepared to apply for credit from the bureau include salt vouchers. This policy 
further increased the number of salt vouchers that the State Trade Bureau received 
from its intervention into the financial market.453 
After 1077, the central court adopted a policy aimed at shifting the distribution of 
pond salt vouchers from Shanxi's Fiscal Commissions to other agencies. For example, 
in 1079 the central government required the Xihe Regional Frontier Defense 
Financing Office ㏃ࡦ⟉⋣䐟䚺䱢䋑࡙ਨ to buy the whole year's quota of salt 
vouchers from Shanxi's Fiscal Commission. It also required the Intendant to use those 
vouchers in trade with merchants.454 The Defense Financing Office had by 1081 
bypassed other bureaucracies in Shanxi as the major user of the salt vouchers in 
purchase of grain and fodder from Tibetan merchants.455  
The Finance Commission¶s policy that forced holders of salt vouchers to buy the 
salt vouchers at a higher price increased the cost of trade in salt vouchers. Shen Kuo 
planned to fix the voucher's price at its face value. In real market operations, however, 
the government and non-government voucher holders increased the price of the 
vouchers beyond their face value. By doing that, they kept their profit and shifted 
their losses to the buyers of the vouchers. It was common during this period for these 
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agencies to sell or credit the salt vouchers with prices higher than their face value.456 
The Finance Commission however tended to keep tightening the supply of salt 
vouchers. Although the 1077 policy set a quota for each year's supply, the Finance 
Commission delayed the supply even when the salt voucher price was experiencing 
great appreciation. The merchants saw an opportunity. They hoarded vouchers, 
causing them to appreciate in the first to third years of the Yuanfeng period 
(1078-1080).457  
 The central court did not take this problem seriously because it believed that the 
appreciation could reduce the burden of the central government in repaying local debt 
and increase the government's capacity in purchasing grain and fodder.458 The local 
government in Shanxi did, however, feel the pressure caused by the tightening of the 
supply of vouchers. In the second month of 1079, Shanxi's circuit Fiscal 
Commissioner Li Ji complained to the central authorities that the Finance 
Commission should give local government more vouchers to adjust their overly-high 
price. Although the central court criticized the conservative attitude of the Finance 
Commission in issuing salt vouchers, it did not increase the quota for local 
government.459 The appreciation did not become a serious concern of the central 
leadership until the Yuanyou and Shaosheng periods of Zhezong's reign, at which 
point this appreciation caused the inflation of iron cash in Shanxi region. It did not 
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cause this problem in the Yuanfeng period because the Sino-Tangut war broke out in 
the fourth year of that era (1081). The pond salt vouchers depreciated again during 
and after the war.   
The salt voucher market after 1077 witnessed disorderly competition between 
governmental agencies and merchants, intentional inaction by regulative bureaus and 
the central court, and collusion between Shanxi¶s circuit bureaucrats and big 
merchants. The central court did not adopt any policies to address these problems but 
only sought to guarantee its revenues to prepare for warfare. The intended image of a 
unified state that operated through efficient cooperation between bureaucracies and 
broad coordination with the great majority of market actors melted away in the course 
of the actual process of state intervention. By contrast, the bureaucracies and central 
court that pursued their interests through despotic measures emerged as the distinctive 
features of state intervention. All these problems had gone beyond the imagination of 
the New Policy makers, who could do little to accomplish their original plans.    
Explanation 
In this case, the central leaders dealt with the conflicts between government 
agencies in a way differing greatly from the mechanism by which political elites in 
the central government resolved their conflicts. Unification of policy through 
expulsion of opponents from the central court did not occur in this case. Instead, the 
central leaders did not intervene in the clash of opposing views and interests between 
leaders of the various agencies.  
The way in which the emperor treated their opinions showed the limited capacity 
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RIWKH1HZ3ROLF\PDNHUV¶ZRUOGYLHZWRUHJXODWHFKDQJHAs we have discussed, the 
price of pond salt vouchers was influenced by complicated factors in the financial 
market. The New Policy makers however took government agencies to be the only 
reliable forces to regulate prices. They therefore gave the bureaucracies the privilege 
of handling the salt vouchers in the financial market. However, the relevant 
bureaucrats lacked the skill to handle the changing market situation through 
deliberation with the major market actors. They possessed no knowledge to regulate 
price depending on demand and supply. No measures were crafted to regulate the 
market activities of such bureaucrats or to resolve the difficulties they encountered. In 
order to increase revenue, the members of these bureaucracies destroyed the 
price-deliberation mechanism in order to pursue their own interests. The depreciation 
of salt vouchers could not be prevented by those bureaucracies under such conditions. 
 The failure led the central leaders to seek new measures. The expansion of new 
bureaucracies provoked opposition from other agencies. The leaders of the older 
agencies harshly criticized the policies, which in their eyes had given many benefits to 
the State Trade Bureau and Xie Salt Sales Bureau but still failed to stop depreciation. 
The original organizing mechanism that coordinated various bureaucracies faced the 
danger of collapse, and the New Policy makers could not prevent it. When facing 
opposition, their worldview guided them to first judge the personalities and factional 
alliances of the critics. As we have discussed in Part Two, if the policy makers thought 
their critics had deficiencies in these respects, they would punish them. If they 
thought that the critics misunderstood the intentions of the emperor, the policy makers 
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would use different ways to guide them to follow such intentions, such as clarifying 
goals or creating material incentives to guide them. Shen Kuo, Pi Gongbi and leaders 
of the State Trade Bureau and the Xie Salt Sales Bureau did not make any mistakes 
from this perspective. As bureaucrats who focused on concrete policy issues, Pi 
Gongbi and Shen Kuo had little interest in attacking the worldview of the New Policy 
makers. Neither did the issue of factions appear in their discourse. Moreover, Shen 
Kuo and Xie Jingwen, the leader of the Xie Salt Sales Bureau were even taken by 
some as followers of Wang Anshi. The emperor did not take their opinion as betraying 
his intention. 
 Based on the worldview of the New Policies makers, they should be granted 
autonomy to decide their policies. In other words, this worldview did not provide any 
practical measures for organizing these opinions into an autonomous preference 
legitimized by the state.  The leadership lacked knowledge of how to build an 
autonomous authority to organize these bureaucracies, transcend their competing 
interests and make them collectively follow the intentions of the central leaders. The 
central leaders therefore found no practical way to translate them into the organized 
policy preference but only passively reflected their demands. Such a combination also 
meant the central leaders gave up the duty to regulate those bureaucracies to adjust 
salt voucher prices by coordinating the interests of the majority market actors. The 
worldview of the New Policies makers prevented them from understanding how to 
deal with dissenting opinions and the competing interests of various bureaucracies.    
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In the next chapter, we will show how the depreciation resulted in adjustments 
to the fiscal structure of Northern Song state and changes in the mode in which it 
intervened in the market. In short, the focus of policy makers after 1081 shifted from 
adjusting the salt voucher's price in Shanxi to the nation-wide direct predation of hard 
cash. The government monopoly of salt and tea sales spread throughout the country 
during the last five years of the Yuanfeng period (1081-1085). We will discuss the 
mechanisms and consequences of this mode, illuminating how the power of the state 
was manifested in the market.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Regulation and Bureaucracy in the State Monopoly of Tea and Salt Markets 
(1080-1085) 
 
 
The term "state monopoly" as used in this chapter refers to a distinctive mode of 
state intervention, one by which the circuit Fiscal Commission and other government 
agencies used their coercive power to monopolize the purchasing channels for tea and 
salt, and sold them directly to the common people or to merchants. Direct trade 
between merchants and producers was blocked by the government. One method that 
the personnel administration adopted to evaluate the efficiency of bureaucrats in such 
an arrangement was to calculate the profit (᚟)that the officials earned in selling these 
goods. Another method was to calculate the increase of revenue (䃢࡙), taking into 
account both investment (ᵜ)and profit (᚟).460   
This sort of monopoly had appeared in the early Northern Song dynasty in the 
powdered salt market of some prefectures of circuits such as Fujian, Liangzhe, and 
Jiangxi. It flourished after the third year of the Yuanfeng period. Promoted by the 
central and circuit governments, this model spread into most of circuits of the country, 
including Hebei, Jingdong, Jingxi, Jinghunan, Jinghubei, Hedong, Huainan, 
Jiangnanxi, Jiangnandong, Guangnanxi, Guangdong, and Huainan. The Tea Agency 
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established a similar model in the circuits of Sichuan.  
This model differed from the monopoly conducted by the Xie Salt Sales Bureau 
and State Trade Bureau. Although the latter was also called "que mai (ῧ䌓)" by 
contemporaries, this model did not require salt or tea vouchers to obtain those 
commodities Instead, the government that operated the monopoly directly pursued 
cash. Moreover, a monopoly in this sense does not mean the absolute exclusion of 
commercial forces from the salt and tea market. The state allowed them to enter as 
retailers. They could either contract for the salt-selling right (䋧᫢) by paying the 
government a certain quota, or could irregularly buy salt or tea from the government 
to sell.  
In this chapter, we discuss the causes for the prevalence of the state monopoly 
during the Yuanfeng period. We also focus on the relationship between the central 
authorities, bureaucracies and other social forces in the interactive mechanism created 
by this mode. I explain why the New Policies makers failed to achieve their purposes 
to organize and protect small market actors to increase the social productivity. In my 
argument, such failure is caused by the limits of their worldview in explaining and 
resolving the real policy deviations.   
 
Changes in Fiscal Structure during the Yuanfeng Period and the Promotion 
of State Monopolies in the Salt and Tea Industries 
 
The main motivation for the promotion of state monopolies lay in changes to 
policy goals and the new fiscal structure that the central court established for 
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supporting these goals. During the Yuanfeng period, Emperor Shenzong had focused 
on two issues: supporting warfare against the Tangut state and preparing for warfare 
against the Khitan state. Directed by these goals, the central leaders rearranged the 
overall fiscal structure to create new revenues and allow the central court to channel 
these fiscal resources into support of the military effort. The central government 
encouraged local governments to increase their fiscal capacity. More importantly, 
Emperor Shenzong strengthened the court's capacity to control the new resources, 
which were controlled and allocated by the central court depending on the leadership's 
strategic considerations of national security.  
The new fiscal resources first included the surplus fees that governmental 
agencies earned through New Policies such as the rural credit service exemption, 
winery and ferry franchise funds, and state trade policies. In 1082, Emperor Shenzong 
established the Yuanfeng Treasury in Hebei circuit, on the military frontier between 
the Song and Khitan states. The central court required the circuits of Jingdong, 
Huainan, Liangzhe, Jinghunan, Jinghubei and Fujian to turn over the revenues earned 
by government credit institutions. Those revenues were reserved in the Yuanfeng 
national treasury and only the central court could allocate them to local governments 
in case of emergency.461 In 1082, the central court ordered that the State Trade 
Bureau, the Court of Agricultural Supervision, and the Bureau for Land and Water 
Conservancy deliver the grain and fodder to the Government Purchase Bureau in 
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Hebei as fiscal resources for supporting future warfare with the Khitan Liao.462 These 
agencies were created during the New Policies period and their revenues were 
generated by the New Policies.  
Another set of resources was generated by state monopolies in the salt and tea 
industries. The pursuit of these revenues caused a wave of state monopolization in 
these industries during the Yuanfeng period. This wave was collectively promoted by 
Emperor Shenzong, the Grand Counselor, the Finance Commission (renamed the 
Ministry of Revenue after 1082), and the local governments at the circuit level 
including the Sichuan Tea Agency, the Fiscal Commissions of the Jingdong, Jingxi, 
Hebei, Jiangxi, Guangnandong, Fujian, and Jinghunan circuits, and the Government 
Purchase Bureau in Hebei. During the Yuanfeng period, under the promotion of the 
central court, several policies related to the tea and salt monopolies were promulgated. 
 First, in 1081, Vice Fiscal Commissioner Jian Zhoufu led the Salt Bureaus in 
Jiangxi and Guangdong to cooperate in monopolizing the sale of Guangdong salt in 
the Southern Jiangnanxi circuit. This model of selling soon spread to the Jinghunan 
circuit in 1084. The earnings were allocated by central court to the Government 
Purchase Bureau in Hebei as the main fiscal resources for preparing war materiel.  
Second, in 1083 the Supply Commission promulgated regulations for the reward 
and punishment of officials and clerks in the salt monopolies. The salt monopolies in 
the eight southern circuits had been collectively managed by the trans-regional 
bureaucracy Supply Commission and the Judicial Commission of each circuit since 
                                                        
462
 XCB v311 ,7749 
 324 
the fourth year of the Xining period. The central court further extended the rules 
developed by the Supply Commission into other salt monopolies throughout the 
country. The profit from these monopolies, called "powdered salt revenue," was 
frequently allocated to the Shanxi and Hedong circuits for military use.   
Third, since 1080, the salt monopolies had been promoted in the Jingdong circuit 
by the Fiscal Commissioner Li Cha and his successor Wu Juhou. In 1083, Emperor 
Shenzong cited Wu Juhou as an example for other circuits to emulate in gaining 
support for spreading state monopolies. The operational model in Jingdong circuit's 
state monopolies was further spread into the Hebei and Jingxi circuits in 1083. The 
earnings were not only used to support the local expenditure of the circuits; the central 
court also used the revenue to support costs related to local horse purchase policies 
and the military training of members of the mutual security institutions.   
Fourth, in the circuits of Sichuan, the Sichuan Tea Agencies had monopolized the 
purchase of tea since 1076. Merchants were forbidden to directly trade with tea 
producers. After buying the tea, the Tea Agency sold it to the merchants to be sold in 
designated regions in both Sichuan and Shanxi. Meanwhile, in other Shanxi 
prefectures the Tea Agency monopolized tea sales. In these prefectures, the agency 
earned horses and cash through trading with both local and Tibetan merchants. Those 
revenues were specifically used to support the Xihe Regional Frontier Defense 
Financing Office, which was responsible for preparing for Song-Tangut warfare. The 
Tea Agency established regulations for punishing and awarding its officials and clerks. 
Its business scope also extended into other fields, such as salt sales and agricultural 
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credit.  
Lastly, in 1084 the central court allowed Wang Zijing, the Fiscal Commissioner of 
Fujian, to monopolize the purchase of the tea in Jian Prefecture. The government also 
monopolized the sales of the Jianzhou tea in the circuits of Fujian, Liangzhe, 
Jiangnandong, Jiangnanxi and Guangdong. The profit was controlled by the central 
court and was used to support the preparation of war materiel in Hebei and Shanxi 
circuits.   
This nation-wide wave of state monopolization brought the central court more 
cash resources to resolve the fiscal problems in Shanxi. It no longer relied on salt 
vouchers as the major instrument for conducting purchases. Even though the 
depreciation of salt vouchers became serious after 1081, the central court could find 
more flexible measures to resolve the problem.  
 In the fourth and fifth years of the Yuanfeng period (1081-1082), Emperor 
Shenzong ordered the Song military forces to battle the neighboring Tangut state. In 
the sixth month of 1081, Song combat troops of about three hundred and seventy 
thousand men, supported by about the same number of transport troops, arrayed to 
converge on the Tangut capital from the south, southeast and southwest. The first 
campaign ended in the eleventh month of the same year. After a short interval in the 
winter, war broke out again in the spring of 1082 and ended with the defeat of the 
Song.463 
  During the war, the central government loosened its tight control over the 
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issuance of salt vouchers. In 1082, it issued an extra 200,0000 strings of pond salt 
vouchers and allocated them to Shanxi for buying grain and fodder. The sudden need 
to print vouchers even caused a shortage of paper.464 All these activities stimulated 
the circuit Fiscal Commission and other government agencies in Shanxi to depreciate 
the vouchers. This activity continued even after the war because of post-war financial 
crises.465 This depreciation was repeatedly mentioned by both the Xie Salt Bureau 
and the Ministry of Revenue, which replaced the Finance Commission as the main 
department of the central government for making policies related to the salt vouchers. 
The central court worried that the depreciation of salt vouchers would result in their 
rejection by society. If the local government could not buy grain with the salt 
vouchers, this would intensify the JRYHUQPHQW¶V money shortage. As the Ministry of 
Revenue reported in the eighth month of 1082,  
    Recently, we have issued too many pond salt vouchers. The vouchers have 
depreciated and are hard to use to buy materials. According to the original plan, 
we should have issued 2000,000 strings of vouchers for buying war materiel. Now 
we have to reduce the number according to the number of vouchers that each 
circuit has already got. The total amount of reduction is 1000,000 strings. As a 
replacement for the salt vouchers, we are transferring the cash earned from selling 
powdered salt to Shanxi, distributing it to each circuit. The circuit governments 
should use this money to buy grain and fodder from the merchants.466 
 
Nevertheless, we have little evidence of significant discussions about how to 
resolve the depreciation in the Yuanfeng period, in contrast to the frequent debates 
and systematic schemes that addressed this issue before the tenth year of the Xining 
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period. This suggests that the central government gave up its effort to adjust the price 
of vouchers. Increasing fiscal pressure and the impotence of the central government to 
control local debts forced the construction of a new fiscal system after the war.  
   Emperor Shenzong clarified his scheme for resolving the fiscal difficulties of 
Shanxi in 1082.  
        The Secretariat-Chancellery reported that the military conflict on Shanxi's 
frontier has not ceased. It also requested the allocation of a wide range of 
military materiel Emperor Shenzong replied, ³The Qin state (770B.C-207B.C) 
occupied the Guanzhong area in Shanxi. It only relied on its own region, but still 
could unify the world. The world we are ruling now is ten times larger than the 
Qin. We can transfer the revenue from the Eastern and Southern circuits 
[Huainan, Liangzhe, Jiangnandong, Jiangnanxi, Jinghunan and Jinghubei ] to 
support Shanxi. We can also get excellent generals to train troops. [By doing 
this], we can accomplish any goal [in Shanxi].467  
 
   The basic idea was to resolve Shanxi's problems by situating it within a larger 
fiscal framework. Within such a framework, the central court strictly constrained the 
total number of salt vouchers to be used by local governments in Shanxi so that local 
debts would not increase even if the salt vouchers depreciated. Meanwhile, the central 
court covered the fiscal deficiencies caused by depreciation by allocating cash 
resources to local governments.  
 
 Based on such an overall arrangement, the central government redefined its fiscal 
relationship with Shanxi. On the one hand, the central government clarified the quota 
of the yearly routine expenditure (ᒤ䀸)for Shanxi's Fiscal Commissions. The 
expenditure mainly supported the garrisons within the Shanxi region. The central 
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government allowed the Fiscal Commission to manage the funds that were originally 
controlled by other local bureaucracies, so that its revenue could be enlarged. At the 
same time, the central government required the Fiscal Commission to take full 
responsibility for these routine expenditures. No funds from the central authorities 
would be transferred to cover them.468  
On the other hand, the central government promised to take responsibility for 
contingent expenditures in Shanxi such as the cost of adding new garrisons and 
paying for disaster relief. The above quoted material also shows that if necessary, the 
central government would allocate money to the circuits for resolving other 
unexpected financial crises. Iron and copper cash were the main forms of money used 
by the central government; part of this cash come from the "powdered salt cash ᵛ咭
䥒" collected through the government sale of powdered salt.  
A search of the electronic version of the Long Draft of the Continuation of the 
Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government (Xu zizhi tongjian changbian) shows 
that the allocation of money earned by powdered salt to the border areas for preparing 
for war with the Tangut was much more frequent during the Yuanfeng period than it 
had been in previously.469 Before the Yuanfeng period, there was no record of any 
such allocation having occurred.  
Another source of iron and copper cash was the revenue earned by the Tea Agency 
in Sichuan. This cash was used mainly to offset military expenditures in the Xi and 
He Prefectures that could not be covered by the Xihe Regional Frontier Defense 
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Financing Office.470 The central court also allocated this part of its revenue to 
Shanxi's local governments for buying grain and fodder during the Yuanfeng 
period.471 
 
The nation-wide promotion of state monopolies after 1080 can be regarded as one 
outcome of the central court's rearrangement of the fiscal system in the Yuanfeng 
period. The new fiscal structure changed the measures by which the government 
purchased war materials in Shanxi. Through building more monopolies and increasing 
their revenues, the central court turned to reliance on iron and copper cash as the main 
currencies for purchase of war materials, rather than salt vouchers. Previously, the 
central court allowed Shanxi's local governments to issue salt vouchers to borrow 
money from the public. As the main debtor taking responsibility for repaying these 
huge amounts of debt with either cash or salt, the central court was mainly concerned 
with how to regulate the over-issuance of the vouchers in order to prevent 
depreciation. In the new mechanism, the central court earned revenues from the state 
monopolies and re-allocated those resources to local governments. The issue of how 
to strengthen the monopolies' organizational capacity to gain cash therefore attracted 
great attention among central policy makers.    
2. New Policy Perspectives on Market Organization during the Xining Period  
A great proportion of the New Policy makers' intellectual framework focused on 
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how to organize producers, clerks and bureaucrats in the state monopolies in a way 
that could stimulate their enthusiasm for producing and selling salt and tea, 
strengthening their capacity to gain revenue on the market and protecting small 
market actors. From such a perspective, the state could increase its revenue not just 
through regulating the financial market but by building state-owned production and 
sale organizations. The focus therefore shifted from manipulating supply and demand 
in the micro-economic market environment to building the organizational structure of 
state monopolies, such as their personnel administration, revenue quotas, reward and 
punishment regulations, administrative hierarchies and decision-making mechanisms. 
This new perspective differed from the former one to the extent that it believed that 
the main factor determining the advantage of the state in its market participation was 
its capacity to organize state-owned enterprises.  
In this section I argue the New Policy makers were not only concerned with 
designing concrete policies for the economic development of state monopolies, they 
were concerned with the implementation of those policies. Based on their 
understanding of human nature, they tended to build institutional contexts to 
discipline people¶s minds, believing this to be the only way to achieve their policy 
purposes. The fundamental goal for building such institutions was to shape both the 
creativity and conformity of the policy implementers.  
 Scholars like Paul Smith have noticed and defined "bureaucratic 
entrepreneurship" as the key feature of the state monopolies created in accordance 
with the New Policy makers' ideas. The theory of bureaucratic entrepreneurship 
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emphasizes that the central court gave full autonomy and authority to its bureaucrats 
and created material incentives to encourage their innovation to deal with the 
changing market situation.472  
This argument does not, however, give satisfactory interpretation to another 
important aspect of the New Policy makers' thought. As I have argued in Part One, 
Wang Anshi and the other New Policy makers faced a puzzling situation. They had to 
design the way of organizing people that could theoretically achieve two 
contradictory goals: on the one hand, to make the policy participants obey the rules of 
the central leaders, and on the other hand, to promote the innovative capacity of these 
participants so that they could adjust the policy to make adaptive changes. In the view 
of the New Policy makers, it was important to guarantee that policy innovations did 
not lead to deviation from original intentions. By integrating the concepts of dao and 
yi into their logical framework, the New Policy makers proved in theory that there 
existed ways to resolve the puzzle.   
As we have discussed in Part One, Wang Anshi categorized people into three 
types and designed their respective roles in the formal policy making procedure: 1) 
the Emperor, who fully comprehended the SageV¶ yi and had the authority to 
command all things, 2) the bureaucrats who had apprehended the intention of the 
Emperor, which was taken as no different from the yi or dao of the sages, and 3) those 
people who had not realized these intentions. The New Policy makers designed 
different lines of reasoning to shape the creativity and conformity of these people.  
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The policy makers believed that although their policies differed from those 
made by the Former Kings, the yi (intention or conception) that guided these policies 
are consistent with that of the Former Kings.473 Following such logic, they further 
argued that they should employ various measures to enable participants in the system 
to realize the policy maker's intention. The New Policy makers believed that human 
nature gave the participants the potential to apprehend and achieve this intention, 
innovating to deal with changes in the real situation. The policies they innovated 
might be changeable, but the yi that those polices conveyed should be consistent..  
On the other hand, the New Policy makers also admitted that despite their effort to 
make bureaucrats apprehend the intention of the emperor, the majority of people 
could not recognize that intention. Therefore they needed to be led by superior men 
who apprehended the yi of the central leaders. Based on their understanding of the 
human nature, the New Polices makers thought that leaders could guide such people 
through offering them material incentives.  
 
As the first chapter has illustrated, the New Policies makers practiced different 
schemes in order to achieve this goal. These schemes were based on the belief that the 
outcome of policy was determined by the ruler¶s capacity to discipline the policy 
implementer¶s mentality. From such a perspective, the operation of people¶s minds is 
understandable and the consequences predictable. If policy participants deviated from 
the intentions of the policy makers, they could correct such deviation through 
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manipulating the incentives, rather than analyzing and solving the various causes of 
the deviation.  
Moreover, the New Policy makers also designed and put into place a hierarchical 
system to deal with the changes that occurred in the policy implementation process. 
Within such a hierarchical decision-making system, the Emperor and Grand Councilor 
did not decide everything. Instead, they appointed the managers of state monopolies. 
These managers should be those bureaucrats who were perceived to have recognized 
the intentions of the central leaders. Proper appointment would determine policy 
outcome. As Wang Anshi emphasized, ³,WKHUHIRUHVD\WKDWLIZHJHWWKHULJKWSHRSOH
to implement these new policies at the proper speed, then these policies would greatly 
benefit us. However, if we use the wrong people to practice these policies, then the 
SROLFLHVZLOOJUHDWO\GDPDJHXV´474 Wang further clarified this point, arguing that 
"Only those who have apprehended the dao of [the Sages] in antiquity could 
implement the policies of antiquity. This is what I understand as the fundamental 
issue."475  
As we will discuss, there were cases in which the central leaders received 
feedback showing that the operation of state monopolies at the grass-root level 
deviated from the original plan. In facing such problems, the central leaders chose to 
strengthen the autonomy of the managers if the Emperor thought they had grasped his 
intention. Those managers therefore considered how to prove that they had been 
following the Emperor's intention, because only by doing so could they gain more 
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benefits for their agencies. This led to cases where they were not responsive to 
concrete problems. Moreover, in cases where me managers made changes to the 
original policy, the central leaders would consider whether those mistakes had 
betrayed the leaderV¶ intention. The leaders would forgive mistakes that they 
determined were caused by the manager¶s efforts to achieve the intention of the 
central leaders, even if those mistakes had betrayed specific rules.    
   The economic plan of the New Policy makers.  
The plan for developing state monopolies developed from the core idea of 
increasing the production capacity of small producers by offering state protection, 
coordination, patronage and organization. Wang Anshi's economic ideas have been 
summarized in his famous saying, "Using the strength of all-under-heaven to generate 
the wealth of all-under-heaven; taking the wealth of all-under-heaven to support the 
cost of all-under-heaven."476 Wang thought that the main obstacles to this were the 
big merchants who controlled vast resources and manipulated the market. They relied 
on their advantages in markets and production to satisfy their private interest in 
accumulating more resources. They controlled prices and labor forces. All their 
activities were seen as causing great harm to small producers, who could not get 
financial support and were stifled by the engrossing families.477 Wang Anshi 
therefore held that the fundamental resolution of this problem was to have the state 
intervene in the markets to replace these big merchants, organizing and protecting the 
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small producers, increasing their capacity to generate wealth, and increasing the 
state's revenues.  
In such a system of governance, the state should fully consider the economic 
interests of the majority of market actors, and design policies to satisfy their 
interests.478 The central leaders therefore sought to organize the Smallsalt producers 
into industrial units and to improve their working conditions. They forced producers 
to devote their attention to production by punishing illegal trade. They sought to 
LQFUHDVHWKHSURGXFHUV¶ capital through credit policies. They tried to protect the 
economic interests of producers by purchasing their products at a good price.479  
 
As we have discussed, the New Policy makers had realized that deviations would 
appear in the implementation process. They designed measures and decision-making 
structures to correct such deviations. These designs were based on their views about 
dao, human nature and incentive. In the next section, we will discuss how those 
designs implemented in the real historical context, and their impact on the operation 
of state power in the market.  
 
3. Innovation and Regulation of the State Monopolies (1078-1085) 
As we have seen, after Wang Anshi resigned from the position of Grand Councilor 
in 1076, Emperor Shenzong and his bureaucrats collectively promoted the spread of 
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state monopolies in the salt and tea industries during the Yuanfeng period. In this 
section, we focus on three state monopolies, the salt monopoly in Jiangxi which was 
created and managed by Jian Zhoufu in 1081; the salt monopoly in Jingdong which 
was managed by the circuit's Fiscal Commissioner Wu Juhou which Shenzong set as a 
model for other circuit governments from 1082-1085; and the Tea Market Agency that 
monopolized the tea market in Sichuan and Shanxi during the Yuanfeng period. Our 
study traces the historical mechanism by which the alliance between the Emperor and 
his bureaucrats developed. I argue that this alliance relied on the bureaucrats¶ 
successful winning of the Emperor's trust that they had grasped and carried out his 
intention in their efforts to wrestle with concrete problems. The Emperor¶s focus on 
guaranteeing that bureaucrats followed his intention actually limited his capacity to 
regulate in the face of problems caused by the state monopolies¶ intervention into the 
market. The consequence of this mechanism was a despotic method of state 
intervention, which protected the economic interests of state monopolies and big 
merchants at the expense of small producers and merchants.   
 
The intentions of Wang Anshi and Emperor Shenzong in their promotion of state 
monopolies during the Xining period  
State monopolization of the salt industry was not a new development. It had 
existed in the Liangzhe circuit since the early Northern Song dynasty. With the 
advocacy of Wang Anshi and his followers, Lu Bing reorganized the state monopolies 
from 1072 to 1075. This case therefore shows the actual practice of Wang Anshi¶s 
thought. Moreover, the response of Emperor Shenzong to the problems caused by the 
policy also illustrates that he took revenue increase as his priority, rather than 
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improvement of social productivity, even though he firmly believed that those two 
goals could be achieved together by practicing the designed regulative institutions. 
This tendency influenced the development trajectory of the state monopolies during 
the Yuanfeng period.  
In the fifth year of the Xining period, the central court noticed that the local 
government in the Liangzhe circuit could hardly control the illegal trade between salt 
producers and merchants. The state therefore could not monopolize the purchase of 
salt and its revenue seriously declined. The central court appointed Lu Bing as the salt 
intendant in the Liangzhe circuit to resolve this problem. Lu Bing had been working 
as a subordinate of Wang Anshi in the office of the Grand Councilor. He therefore was 
very clear about Wang¶s conception of the goals and organization of the state 
monopolies. Lu Bing implemented several policies to reorganize the monopoly, which 
reveal his attitudes towards illegal salt traders, small salt producers and officials. 
Previously, the small producers in this area did not receive enough funds from local 
government to conduct salt production. Therefore their productivity was low and the 
government could not collect enough revenue. Lu Bing paid great attention to this 
problem. He raised sufficient funds with the help of the Supply Commission and paid 
the producers well so that they had enough capital to improve their productivity. Lu 
Bing also investigated the geographical conditions of various production areas. 
Depending on their differences, he set different taxation standards.480 Lu Bing also 
instituted severe penalties for illegal salt traders. Learning from the Mutual Guarantee 
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institution, he ordered producers to supervise each other¶s daily activities. The 
government also strictly calculated output figures. Lu even conscripted soldiers to 
arrest illegal traders.481 He noticed that the local prefecture and county officials did 
not agree with the policy and were therefore lax in punishing illegal salt trade. He 
therefore imprisoned one hundred officials and eight hundred clerks in a single day. 
He required that the officials in the salterns report their revenues every ten days. He 
even ordered that they increase their revenue month by month.482 
Lu Bing¶s measures raised serious disagreement in the central court. Critics 
worried that he had too strictly punished illegal traders and officials. Wang Anshi and 
Emperor Shenozong however strongly supported Lu Bing, although they saw his 
merits differently. In Wang Anshi¶s view, Lu Bing¶s policy would greatly improve the 
productivity not only of the salt industry but also of agriculture. According to Wang 
Anshi, although the penalties were severe, they were clear and had sufficient deterrent 
effect to make the common people return to their original agricultural work rather 
than dabble in the illegal salt trade.483 These policies would therefore strengthen the 
capacity of society to generate wealth.484 The state¶s revenue could in turn increase 
due to the improvement of productivity.485 Meanwhile, Wang Anshi took reward and 
punishment as the main ways to mobilize bureaucrats and guarantee sufficient 
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revenue collection. Thus he supported the severe punishment that Lu Bing employed 
to motivate local officials.486    
Although Shenzong did not oppose the concrete methods that Wang Anshi 
designed, he did not take those measures to be fundamental in achieving the desired 
goal of increasing the revenue from the salt monopoly in the Liangzhe circuit. His 
major concern was how to make the bureaucrats apprehend this intention, stimulating 
their willingness and creativity to help the state monopolies flexibly respond to 
market changes. The way in which he addressed Lu Bing¶Vpolicy mistakes illustrates 
his priorities.  
In 1074, the central court noticed radical actions by some local officials in their 
management of the state monopoly in the Liangzhe circuitLQUHVSRQVHWR/X%LQJ¶V
dramatic imprisonment of officials and clerks.. For example, one mother murdered 
her son because they could not submit sufficient salt revenue demanded by local 
officials. Wang Anshi had resigned from his position at court during this period. After 
receiving a report on the investigation of such problems, Emperor Shenzong and Lü 
Huiqing discussed their dilemma. Lü Huiqing suggested to Emperor Shenzong that 
the court should not punish Lu Bing even though he had made serious mistakes. Lu 
Bing had collected great amounts of revenue, fulfilling the intention of the central 
leaders. If the court punished him, then other bureaucrats would guess that the 
intentions of the Emperor had changed. If they misunderstood the intention of the 
central court, they would not be willing to implement the policy. Emperor Shenzong 
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agreed with this suggestion.487 
 The Emperor¶s concern was not to strictly address all the mistakes of local 
bureaucrats, even when those mistakes had led policy implementation to deviate from 
the originally designed avenues. As we have discussed, the New Policy makers took 
the protection of small producers¶ interests as an important way to increase state 
revenue. Ironically, then, the actual implementation of policy had caused damage to 
the interests of small producers. However, Emperor Shenzong had clearly realized 
that he could not intercede in every affair, because local bureaucrats needed to create 
and adjust policies to deal with on-the-ground changes. Therefore, no fixed policy 
needed to be strictly insisted upon. Emperor Shenzong still believed that Wang 
Anshi¶s plan was correct, but he preferred to leave free space for bureaucrats to create 
concrete policies as long as they were able to correctly apprehend the intentions of the 
central leaders. This intention includes two parts: the priority on increasing revenue 
and the necessity to protect small market actors. He therefore tried every effort to 
make those bureaucrats apprehend his intention, with central leaders acting as 
regulators and educators helping local bureaucrats apprehend his intention. Although 
he showed his priority to the revenue collection, he believed that the bureaucrats 
could find the way to achieve the goal of protection as well if he had successfully 
made them apprehend his intention.  In Emperor Shenzong¶s mind, only by doing 
this could he maintain a balance between the conformity and creativity of those 
bureaucrats.    
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The dynamics of policy innovation: State salt monopoly cases in the Yuanfeng period   
The momentum of state monopolization in the salt and tea industries did not fade 
after Wang Anshi¶s resignation. The fundamental goal of this movement was to 
achieve the intention (yi) of Emperor Shenzong. As we have discussed, the intention 
of the Emperor was thought to represent the dao of the Former Kings in governing 
society and state, even though such intention was the outcome of Shenzong¶s practical 
considerations to resolve specific political and military problems. Based on such a 
belief, the New Policy makers used the scheme that had originally been designed for 
the attainment of the dao in governance to guide an approach through which they 
achieved the yi of the Emperor. The approach included how they made plans for state 
intervention, produced discourse to justify those plans, built an institutional structure 
to distribute power among bureaucracies, and found measures to adjust to policy 
deviations. The historical process by which they promoted the state salt monopolies 
therefore illustrates how the New Policy makers¶ worldview shaped their policy 
innovation mechanism. Within this mechanism, political trust based on shared 
commitment to the Emperor¶s intention (yi) shaped the interdependent relationship 
between Emperor Shenzong and the state monopoly managers.  
 
     Emperor Shenzong¶Vintention was multifaceted. Apparently, his intention in 
crafting the policies related to state monopolies was to increase the state¶s revenue in 
support of its overall fiscal arrangement. However, historical evidence shows that his 
concerns were broader than the single goal of collecting revenues. 
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In expressing his concerns, Emperor Shenzong admitted that revenue collection was 
an important goal for the state monopolies, but he also showed a desire to address 
other concrete problems depending on various social and political contexts. Those 
problems included the protection of small producers, maintenance of market order, the 
central court¶s redistribution of fiscal resources among government agencies, and 
considerations of national security. He expected the bureaucrats to show their 
apprehension of those intentions, and wanted them to illustrate that their revenue 
collection would not damage other goals of the successful operation of state 
monopolies.   
    Furthermore, the Emperor¶V³LQWHQWLRQ´ not only refers to the Emperor¶s mind, it 
also appeared in political discourse as a way to guide bureaucratic activities. The 
³intention of policy ⌅᜿´ was a term that frequently appeared in the Emperor¶s 
discourse in edicts and government documents. Even without using the word yi, 
Emperor Shenzong also expressed what he intended to do in publicly promulgated 
documents and in his discussions with bureaucrats. The intention of policies therefore 
was not a tacit agreement between the Emperor and his intimate subordinates; such 
trust was not informal or secret. The Emperor publicly rewarded certain bureaucrats 
and set them as examples so as to motivate others to apprehend and follow his 
intentions. On the other hand, the Emperor had no measurable standard for judging 
whether a bureaucrat had grasped his intention. The personal relations between the 
Emperor and the officials, the Emperor¶s perception of the bureaucrat¶s activities, and 
their mutual communication all relied on the Emperor¶s judgment. Once the Emperor 
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identified a bureaucrat who had grasped his intention and showed strong willingness 
to implement it, he would chose to delegate powers of regulation and policy making 
to that bureaucrat.  
Case one: Jian Zhoufu and Emperor Shenzong 
Jian Zhoufu¶s fast promotion through the ranks of government benefited from his 
demonstration of understanding the (PSHURU¶V intentions. Before 1075, he had served 
as the Auxiliary Investigator of the Censorate, a low-ranking office at the central court 
but one that offered the opportunity to be noticed by the Emperor. Jian Zhoufu first 
got Shenzong¶s attention because of his successful handling of a legal case involving 
a eunuch who was in charge of the imperial seal.488 In the first month of 1075, Jian 
further earned Shenzong¶s trust by investigating a treason case which was related to 
Wang Anshi, Lü Huiqing and members of the royal family.489 In 1077, the Liao En 
rebellion broke out in Fujian. The central court thought the rebellion was caused by 
illegal salt trade in the Fujian circuit.490 Emperor Shenzong sent Jian to take charge of 
the salt monopoly there and pacify the rebellion. 491  
The critics of state monopolies took this rebellion as a chance to suggest that the 
Emperor abolish the state monopolies and allow merchants to directly buy salt from 
Small producers.492 Jian Zhoufu understood, however, that the Emperor wanted to 
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keep the salt monopolies. He therefore attributed the prevalence of the illegal salt 
trade not to the state¶V monopoly policies, but to the high price of salt set by the local 
prefectural government. He therefore strengthened the punishment for illegal trade in 
salt but did not cease government sales. Indeed, he suggested to the Emperor that the 
problem could only be resolved by enlarging the scope of government salt sales, by 
which he argued the government could help the common people get more salt. He 
also suggested prices by hiring more people to sell salt. All these suggestions were 
accepted by the central court.493 In 1080, Emperor Shenzong publicly praised Jian 
Zhoufu for having accomplished two main works: increasing revenues from the salt 
monopolies, and pacifying the social and market order through forbidding the illegal 
trade of salt.494 Jian Zhoufu illustrates that the priority to collect revenue and the goal 
to maintain market order could be achieved simultaneously. In facing the critiques 
that the state monopolies would only increase revenues at the cost of the interest of 
small market actors, Jian Zhoufu publicly verified that those two goals were not 
contradictory and could both be achieved during the successful operation of state 
monopolies. Jian¶s discourse resembled the intention of Emperor Shenzong.  
Emperor Shenzong¶s discourse also illustrated his belief that Jian Zhoufu had grasped 
his true intentions.  
One important policy promulgated in 1080 was the establishment of state 
monopolies in Jiangxi circuit. In 1080, Jian Zhoufu was appointed as the Vice 
Commissioner of the Tax Bureau. Meanwhile, he was assigned the work of 
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purchasing grain and fodder in Hebei circuit, on the border area between the Song and 
Kihtan Liao states. In Emperor Shenzong¶s overall worldview, the Kihtan Liao were 
the main enemy. Although in 1080 his attention was still focused on confronting the 
Tangut state in Shanxi, he had already begun to make preparations for future warfare 
with the Liao. After appointing Jian Zhoufu as the main official charged with 
purchasing war materials in Hebei, Emperor Shenzong transfered more fiscal 
resources from other governmental agencies to Jian Zhoufu¶s agency.495  
Soon after he got his new appointment, Jian Zhoufu proposed to the Emperor that 
the government sell salt in Jiangxi circuit. He was not the first to make this proposal, 
however. In the Xining period, former State Finance Commissioner Zhang Dun had 
asked the local officials of Jiangxi to make plans for transferring Guangdong salt into 
Hunan circuit. Zhang Dun had found no chance to send his plan to the Emperor, 
however, because the Emperor had rejected another plan for establishing a salt 
monopoly in Hebei in 1075.496 In 1080, Zhang Dun has been promoted to be the 
Executive Official Participant in Determining Government Matters, removing him to 
the central court. Another official named Jia Dan then noticed Zhang Dun¶s original 
plan and suggested to the Emperor that it be tried first in Jiangxi circuit. Emperor 
Shenzong did not make a decision at that time, but delegated Jian Zhoufu to 
investigate the possibility of implementing this suggestion. Zhang Dun secretly sent 
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his original plan to Jian Zhoufu.497  
The circuit government in Jiangxi had managed the salt monopoly since 
Renzong¶s period. The monopoly only bought local salt with low efficiency, however. 
Jian Zhoufu found that Emperor Shenzong had expressed his concern about that 
problem in 1070. In an edict, Shenzong pointed out that the goal for managing the 
state monopoly in Jiangxi was not only to increase its revenue but also to restore 
social stability, because illegal trade would cause great turmoil for local society. From 
this edict, Jian Zhoufu JUDVSHGWKH(PSHURU¶s intention. He therefore wrote a 
memorial to the Emperor arguing that the establishment of a new state monopoly in 
Jiangxi would mainly be for the purposes of maintaining the social order, increasing 
revenue and preparing for war with the Liao state. In the first memorial which he sent 
in 1081, he outlined how his plan would serve the Emperor¶s intention. As he stated,  
The transport routes to Qianzhou are dangerous and distant, so that little 
Huai salt arrives and the people must endure the lack of it. Guangdong salt is not 
available [through regular government distribution], so smuggling occurs openly. 
[Whereas] Huai salt is priced at nine cash per catty by officials, if Guang salt is 
shipped in, after expenses,its cost will still be one cash cheaper than the Huai salt 
price, the product better, and the transport routes safer. I petition to abolish the 
transport of Huai salt [to Qianzhou] and Nan¶anjun, and divert the 6160,000 
catties of Huai salt to Hongzhou, Jizhou, Junzhou, Yuanzhou, Fuzhou, Linjiangjun, 
Jianchangjun, and Xingguojun [prefectures are in Jiangxi circuit] so they can meet 
their old [government distribution] quota.498    
 
Jian Zhoufu¶V memorial implied that the government¶V sale of salt would achieve 
the Emperor¶s dual intention of maintaining the social order and gaining revenue. The 
Emperor supported his suggestion and ordered him to make a more detailed law on 
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building a state salt monopoly in Jiangxi. Jian Zhoufu first drew up the fundamental 
principles that would guide the concrete regulations. He stated that the intention was 
to eliminate evil and violent bandits while compensating for the shortage of salt.499 
Emperor Shenzong soon approved the regulations Jian compiled.  
 Soon after Jian Zhoufu submitted the memorial, he was appointed as the official 
in charge of the government purchase of grain in Hebei circuit. Shenzong clearly 
expressed that his intention was to prepare war materials in Hebei for future warfare 
with the Liao. Jian Zhoufu memorialized Shenzong to the effect that his state 
monopolies in Jiangxi had gained great revenue that could be directed to serve this 
intention.500 With the advocacy of Shenzong and Jian Zhoufu, the salt monopoly 
model spread further into Hunan in 1083.  
Nowhere in the entire process did Emperor Shenzong directly advise his officials 
how to build the concrete regulations related to the monopoly. With the permission of 
the central court, managers were empowered with the specifics of policy-making., 
Through their communication with the Emperor they repeatedly showed their 
understanding of his intentions. After Shenzong had realized that this innovation 
could attain his goals, he fully supported it. This process illustrates how political trust 
based on a common understanding of the Emperor¶s intentions generated and 
channeled innovation.  
 Case two: Emperor Shenzong and Wu Juhou (1081-1085) 
The process of promoting state salt monopolies in the Jingdong, Jingxi and Hebei 
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circuits also highlights the mechanism of cooperation between Emperor Shenzong and 
the state monopoly managers. In this case, we show how the interaction between 
Shenzong and the circuit level bureaucrats who took charge of the state salt 
monopolies mutually reinforced their intention to promote the state monopolies, 
which enlarged the state¶s control of local salt industries during the later years of the 
Yuanfeng period (1081-1085). 
 As early as 1075, the State Finance Commissioner Zhang Dun had already 
proposed monopolizing salt purchases and sales in Jingdong and Hebei circuits. This 
plan was not approved by central court, however, due to a critique by Wen Yanbo, the 
Manager of the Bureau of Military Affairs at the same organizational level as the 
Grand Councilors. Wen Yanbo delivered Su Shi¶s observations on the potential 
problems that would be caused by monopolization of the salt industry. The key point 
in Su Shi¶s argument was that the state could monopolize the industry, but it would 
fail in the market. According to Su Shi, because Hebei and Jingdong were located in a 
coastal area, the number of the households that had the ability to produce salt was 
large and the producers were dispersed. The cost of monopolizing purchases would be 
very high. Moreover, the government could not gain a price advantage in its 
competition with merchants to buy salt from small producers. Zhang Dun originally 
had planned to sell the salt at price low enough to dominate the market. Su Shi 
however argued that the local market in Jindong and Hebei was too limited to absorb 
the JRYHUQPHQW¶s salt even if the government intended to sell the salt at a low price. 
Moreover, because the government could not earn much profit due to its low price, 
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the capital would be easily used up if sales were slow. The monopoly could not 
function.501 Su Shi¶s suggestion had an impact on Shenzong¶s decision. He formally 
rejected Zhang Dun¶s suggestion in the following year.   
The Song-Tangut war of 1081-1082 caused changes in the overall fiscal structure 
in the Song government. As we have discussed, Emperor Shenzong sought to 
strengthen the capacity of the Circuit Fiscal Commission to earn revenues to cover 
routine expenditures. The central court created new channels to gain more revenue, 
including the state monopoly in Jiangxi which raised money to support Hebei¶s war 
preparations. Emperor Shenzong hoped that other circuits like Jingdong, Jingxi and 
Shanxi could increase their own fiscal resources enough to cover their routine 
expenditures and, if possible, to contribute to the central court¶s fiscal needs.  
Under such conditions, Wu Juhou came to Shenzong¶s notice as an example to 
motivate other circuit leaders. Wu Juhou served as a Prefectural Judge in the early 
years of the Xining period. His loyalty in implementing the New Policies led to quick 
promotion in the bureaucratic system.502 In 1082, Wu was appointed Administrative 
Assistant of the Fiscal Commission in Jingdong circuit. Wu¶V performance in this post 
was controversial, however. He raised several million strings of cash for the circuit, 
but was found at fault in the loss of 3000 strings. The personnel agency suggested that 
the Emperor should punish him, but Shenzong had his own thoughts on this.  
 In his discussion with his Grand Councilors, Emperor Shenzong quoted the 
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³Eight Levers´ chapter from the Rites of Zhou to illustrate his view that an Emperor 
should not be constrained by the regulations on punishment and reward. To the 
contrary, he should find the best way to make his bureaucrats follow the dao. In the 
case of Wu Juhou, Emperor Shenzong thought that he could be cited as an example to 
let other bureaucrats know the Emperor¶s intention that they take responsibility for 
raising revenue. Therefore Emperor Shenzong not only did not punish Wu Juhou, but 
actually promoted him to be the Fiscal Commissioner of Jingdong circuit.503  
Meanwhile, Shenzong publicly punished the Fiscal Commissioner of Jingxi circuit 
and his assistant. According to his formal edict, the Emperor accused them of 
betraying the duty that the new fiscal arrangement had allocated to them, frequently 
asking for financial support from the central court to cover their expenditures. They 
were dismissed from their posts. Emperor Shenzong highlighted the contrast with Wu 
Juhou to show the central court¶s intention and motivate other bureaucrats. Only two 
months after issuing this edit, Shenzong promulgated two edicts rewarding Wu Juhou 
for his success at increasing revenue from the state salt monopoly. In the (PSHURU¶V
public statement, he emphasized that the reward ZDVIRU:X¶V devotion to attaining 
the goals of central court by increasing revenue to support his circuit¶s expenditures. 
According to the edict, Wu Juhou had never requested money from the central court, 
therefore he should be rewarded and promoted.504 
Wu Juhou was intent on showing the Emperor that the decision to promote state 
monopolies had been correct. Two months after the above edict was announced, Wu 
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Juhou reported that he had increased revenue by more than 36,0000 strings by selling 
salt in Jingdong circuit.505 This strengthened Emperor Shenzong¶s confidence that the 
salt monopoly could overcome the market difficulties that Su Shi had predicted. He 
therefore decided to spread the state monopoly into Hebei circuit, reversing his earlier 
decision. In the same month, he ordered the Fiscal Commissioners of Hebei circuit to 
meet Wu Juhou in person and learn how he managed the state monopoly.506  
Throughout the later years of the Yuanfeng period, Wu Juhou continued to show 
that he had been closely following the Emperor¶s intention. Emperor Shenzong also 
continued to set him as sample and publicly praised his loyalty. In the ninth month of 
1082, Shenzong ordered the Fiscal Commission in Jingdong circuit to contribute 
17,2950 strings of cash to the purchase of horses in Hedong circuit. Wu Juhou quickly 
fulfilled the requirement.507 In the same month, Shenzong issued an edict praising 
Wu Juhou for not only supporting the expenditures of his own circuit, but also helping 
the central court to deal with the contingent expense of buying horses. Wu Juhou¶s 
personal rank in the bureaucracy also rose.508 In 1084, Shenzong issued an edict 
asking the Ministry of Revenue to summarize Wu Juhou¶s successful experiences and 
circulate the list to other circuits. In the edict, Emperor Shenzong praised Wu Juhou 
because he did not change the content of the existing laws and regulations but found 
proper ways to supervise his subordinates to implement them, greatly increasing 
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revenues. Shenzong wanted Wu Juhou to report on how exactly he did this. 
 In a memorial that Wu Juhou submitted after receiving the Emperor¶s order, he 
emphasized that the New Policies had followed the dao of the Former Kings. He 
described the intention of the policies as ³organizing people to manage wealth 㚊Ӫ⨶
䋑´ This expression appeared in the Classics, such as the Book of Changes and Rites 
of Zhou. The New Policies makers such as Wang Anshi and Shenzong had repeatedly 
taken the ³management of wealth ⨶䋑´ as their intention in developing the New 
Policies. Wu Juhou argued that these policies were very concrete and complete, but, in 
the implementation process consequences had sometimes deviated from their original 
intention. Wu Juhou thought that this was because the head officials at the circuit 
level did not adopt correct ways to supervise the activities of their subordinates, 
lacking the foresight and experience to prevent such deviations in advance.509 He 
therefore summarized his previous experience to suggest how such outcomes could be 
prevented.  
Shenzong¶s strategy had greatly encouraged the circuit fiscal commissioners to 
enlarge the scope of state monopolies. During the last three years of the Yuanfeng 
period, the movement to build state monopolies in various industries spread 
throughout the whole country. In 1083, Jiang Zhiqi, the Supply Commissioner of the 
six circuits in the southeast, made laws to stimulate prefectural and county 
bureaucrats to increase revenue.510 In 1083, the Fiscal Commissioner in Jingxi 
actively promoted the monopolization of the salt industry, which pained merchants 
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greatly.511 In the same year, the Fiscal Commissioner of Kuizhou circuit in Sichuan 
suggested that the central court enlarge the state monopoly into the local well salt 
industry.512 Three months afterward, Emperor Shenzong adopted the suggestion of a 
Fiscal Commissioner in Fujian and monopolized the purchase and sale of 
camphorated tea in Fujian, Liangzhe, Jiangnandong and Jiangnanxi circuits. The 
monopoly of camphorated tea soon extended into all the circuits except the capital 
area and Shanxi.513 
With Shenzong¶VHQFRXUDJHPHQW:X-XKRX extended the state monopolies into 
other fields such as the iron and wine industries.514 He also minted a great amount of 
iron cash, which increased the depreciation of this currency.515 In order to avoid the 
influence of inefficient salt sales on the monopoly¶s revenue, Wu Juhou consolidated 
the salt tax bureau into the Fiscal Commission.516 The tax and revenue from other 
industries could thus be used to make up for shortages of revenue from the salt 
monopoly. Emperor Shenzong approved all those activities because in his mind these 
would strengthen the capacity of the Jingdong circuits to fulfill his goals..  
   
The cases of Jian Zhoufu and Fu Juhou illustrate the dynamics through which the 
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New Policies were initiated and promoted in cooperation between Emperor and 
circuit leaders. Within this process, the Emperor expressed his intentions and the 
general principles for the concrete policies. The bureaucrats created policies to show 
that they had not only apprehended the intentions but also had the enthusiasm to 
implement them. Through the setting of examples and issuance of promotions and 
rewards, Emperor Shenzong mobilized the bureaucrats at the circuit level to innovate 
policies for achieving his overall goals of preparing for war, stabilizing the market an 
social order and rearranging the fiscal structure. As we have shown, the role of 
Emperor in this process was not despotic because he did not decide everything. 
Neither was the process controlled by the bureaucrats. Although they were 
encouraged to innovate policies, such innovation had to show their adherence to the 
Emperor¶s intention. The alliance between Emperor and the circuit leaders therefore 
formed based on their common understanding of the Emperor¶s intention. The 
formation of such alliances was shaped by their belief in the role of yi in reconciling 
the EXUHDXFUDW¶V conformity and creativity. In next section, we will see how the beliefs 
of the Emperor and circuit leaders shaped the ways in which they addressed 
deviations that emerged during the policy implementation process.   
Regulation in the Case of the Tea Market Agency (1077-1085) 
    In this section, we discuss how the central court and the manager of the Tea 
Market Agency (TMA) interacted with each other to address problems occurring 
during the process of the agency¶s intervention into the tea industry. Based on this 
study, we will answer why certain measures were believed to be more adequate than 
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others for resolving real problems. We will further reveal how this ideology-oriented 
mode of regulation resulted in discrepancies between actual problems and the 
measures for resolving them, as well as the weak responsiveness of the regulators.  
  The riot in Pengkou Market 
   The TMA was created in 1074 for the purpose of buying tea in Sichuan to trade 
for horses with foreign merchants in the Xihe and Qinfeng circuits of the Shanxi area, 
the major staging ground for preparing for war with the Tangut.517 In 1075, the TMA 
began to sell tea in those two circuits as directed by the State Finance Commissioner 
Zhang Dun and the Intendant of the agency, Li Qi. The 400,000 strings of its revenue 
were intended to support the purchase of grain and fodder in the Xihe circuit.518 Due 
to the great cost of transportation, however, the TMA found it was difficult to collect 
as much as 400,000 strings of revenue. It therefore sought to enlarge its intervention 
into the tea markets of both Sichuan and Shanxi. The TMA imposed a monopsony 
(single-buyer) system onto every household of tea producers in Sichuan, forbidding 
their direct trade with merchants. The monopsony included not only the Mingshan tea 
that was previously collected for the horse trade and for selling in the Shanxi region, 
but also the regular tea that merchants within the Sichuan region had previously been 
allowed to sell.519 The TMA ordered that all merchants buy tea from TMA-managed 
tea markets in different localities. After they had bought the tea and paid the tax, the 
local government supplied the merchants with licenses which allowed them to sell the 
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tea in Sichuan and some designated areas of Shanxi.520  
The monopsony system caused dissatisfaction among both the small producers 
and the local bureaucrats. This frustration broke out in a riot on the 13th day of the 
fifth month in 1077. The central court¶s reaction to the riot illustrates how the 
Emperor¶s views on shaping the collective action of bureaucrats influenced the way 
he interpreted and responded to this sudden event.  
The causes of the Pengkou riot. 
Lu Tao, the Prefect of Pengzhou who was the main official to investigate and 
deal with the riot, described its outbreak and explained its causes as follows:  
According to the two petitionary reports of the Pengkou Market Inspector, 
Executive Assistant of the Imperial Library Yin Gu, and the Registrar of 
Mengyang County and Assistant Tea Purchaser Xue Yi, on the seventeenth day 
of this month 60,000 catties of tea were purchased at 3,600 strings of cash (60 
cash per catty). This payment exhausted all the tea-purchase capital and the 
profit [from previous sales]. Thereupon, on the eighteenth day, those clerks 
petitioned the prefecture office requiring that it transfer 6,000 strings in jiaozi 
notes to finance the tea purchase [scheduled for] the nineteenth and twenty-first 
days. On the nineteenth day, just at dawn, the garden households brought their 
tea to sell at the market. But because by 11:00 A.M, the requested notes still had 
not arrived, and moreover it was raining, Yin Gu addressed the cultivators, 
saying: 
    ³We have requested jiaozi notes, and they will arrive soon. If you wait until 
the weather clears, we will weigh your tea for you.´  
 
But the cultivators, suiting themselves, took their tea and proceeded 
directly to the [tea-market] yamen, where they piled it all up. Surrounding Yin 
Gu and the others, they demanded that their tea be weighted. Then they 
addressed the brokers: 
³You all have put goods up as collateral in the government yamen. Now the 
government has no money to buy tea. You brokers had better come up with 
some money to buy a market [session¶s] worth of tea.´ 
 
Yin Gu and the others retreated into the yamen and other places of safety. 
Registrar Xue Yi walked towards the gate of the Hall of the Pure Multitude, but 
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the tea cultivators began to beat the tea-market service personnel and ripped the 
sleeves of Xue Yi¶s gown. Then the cultivators went looking for the brokers, 
intent on fighting with them. But upon seeing that this was the case, the brokers 
all scattered.521 
    
 Lü Tao further explained the background reasons for this unexpected riot. In his 
mind, the causes of the riot were not limited to this occasion. As he explained,  
[One reason for the occurrence of the riot] is because of Liu Zuo¶s request 
that all the tea be quickly bought and sold with thirty percent profit. The 
government owned markets [which received this request] worried that if they 
buy the tea at the full price and [sell it to the merchants after adding thirty 
percent of the original purchase price], the merchants will see no profits in 
transporting and selling this tea. Those merchants will not buy the tea [from the 
government]. The markets therefore need to buy the tea [from the small garden 
households] at a devalued price. They only pay half of the price for per catty [to 
the garden households]. Moreover, because the markets need to buy tens of 
thousands of catties of tea, the inspectors cannot take care of all of the sellers. 
The garden households had already been damaged, and as they had no place to 
petition their requests they had to gather and fight. « 
Currently we are in the season when great amounts of tea planted in the 
interior mountains will be sold by the garden households. Those households fear 
that the government will not have enough funds to buy their tea. They will 
gather and fight as they did before. Our prefecture has confirmed that we have 
been allocateing jiaozi, 11,200 stings of cash and 1000 liang of silver to the 
market in the Pengkou for six times . Because the garden households do not 
want to receive the silver as payment, we have distributed this silver to Jiulong 
county to be converted [into cash]. The markets do not have enough cash for 
two reasons: because they can not sell tea to get funds, and because the TMA 
should have allocated ten thousand strings of jiaozi, but today these funds still 
have not arrived. Even if we can get this amount of jiaozi and fully use them, we 
can still only buy two or three market VHVVLRQV¶ worth of tea.522 
    
In the above report Lü Tao revealed the perspective of the local prefectural 
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bureaucrats about the role and problems of the TMA. From his perspective, the local 
market¶s weak profitability and the rigid profit rate ordered by the TMA motivated the 
bureaucrats in the local market to pander to the interests of tea buyers and squeeze 
down the purchase price. This activity caused the dissatisfaction of the small 
producers. Another important problem that Lü Tao revealed involved the serious 
shortage of funds for purchasing tea. This illustrates that the thirty percent profit that 
the local market earned had been used up immediately as capital for buying tea. The 
profit was used by the Pengkou market in two ways. The TMA required the Market to 
submit its thirty percent profit, but this should refer to the yearly profit. As Lü Tao 
stated in another report,ĀIf the total capital for this year is 1,000,000 strings, the 
original regulation required the local markets to return 1,300,000 strings as profit. It 
did not mean that the local market should buy 100 strings worth of goods in the 
morning and earn 130 strings´523 In contrast, under the new arrangement the TMA 
required the local market to do just so, because otherwise the local market lacked 
enough funds to buy tea. The TMA therefore needed not only to guarantee the yearly 
profit but also increase profit to compensate for the shortage of capital. 
 Lü Tao had also noticed that capital shortages were a major problem in 
government purchasing. As a local official, he imputed the fault to the TMA. He first 
clarified that local officials had allocated the funds to the local market for six times. 
Even though the prefecture and county governments had not followed the order of the 
TMA to use the thousand liang of silver to buy tea, Lü Tao explained that this was due 
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to the rejection of silver by the small producers as an appropriate currency. Lü Tao 
complained that the TMA did not guarantee the arrival of enough funds to support the 
tea purchases. The shortage of funds resulted in worry on the part of the small 
producers, who urgently needed to sell their tea because it could not be stored for long 
time, especially in the rainy season. Therefore they forced the brokers to buy up their 
tea.  
Lü Tao¶s report therefore illustrated a problem that was deeply rooted in the way 
that the TMA operated in the market. The local markets received a fixed amount of 
capital from the TMA, which had no intention of adjusting the funding allocation 
depending on changing market situations, such as the total quantity of tea that the 
producers wanted to sell. Its only concern was to make the local market submit the 
rigidly fixed quota of profit. Although the county and prefecture governments 
reported the real market price every three months, the TMA and its local markets did 
not consider using reports to determine the appropriate price; their main concern was 
how to gain the thirty percent profit.524 In facing the shortage of capital, the measure 
that the TMA used was to decentralize the responsibility of raising funds to the local 
markets. The local markets partly took responsibility to compensate the capital 
shortage. They therefore made great effort to sell their tea and increase their capital. 
In order to sell the tea, they had to rely on merchants to buy it, so they tended to 
damage the interests of small producers.   
Moreover, the local market had no autonomy to adjust the sales price. The TMA 
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imposed strict profit rate requirements on the local market bureaucrats. Once the 
purchase price had been decided, the local officials could not decide the sales price 
because they had to gain a thirty percent profit in everyday sales. The only autonomy 
that the local Market bureaucrats had was to reduce the price of purchase. They 
therefore relied on coercion at expense of a great number of small producers to 
guarantee sufficient capital.  
As we have discussed, in the original plan that the New Policy makers proposed, 
the small producers such as garden households should be protected. The state 
monopolies should gain revenue through strengthening their productivity in the tea 
industry. The real practice of the state monopolies caused entirely different 
consequences, however. As Lü Tao revealed, the reduction of prices by the local 
bureaucrats directly caused capital shortages for producers trying to support their 
production. They therefore had to lower their product¶s quantity and quality.525 The 
amount that the market collected from the tea producers also fell significantly.526 All 
these deeper reasons were beyond the focus of Lü Tao because he mainly attributed 
the cause to bureaucrats anxious to pursue more profit. The shortage of capital and 
strict limitation of power could be taken as the most important reasons. After Lü Tao 
submitted his report, the central court partly rectified the policies related to the TMA.  
   How Emperor Shenzong proposed to regulate the TMA 
 One month after receiving Lü Tao¶s report, the central court abolished the 
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policy that forced the local market in Sichuan to gain a thirty percent profit in its tea 
sales. According to Su Zhe¶s recollection in the Yuanyou period, the central court had 
already decided to fully abolish the monopsony system in Sichuan. Apparently, this 
decision would greatly damage the economic interests of the TMA. The central court 
further asked Li Ji and Sun Jiong to investigate the real situation of the tea market in 
Sichuan. At the suggestion of Li Ji, the Co-Intendant of the TMA, Pu Zongmin, made 
the new policies relate to the state monopolies.  
According to Su Zhe, the managers of the TMA successfully blocked the central 
court¶s intention of ceasing the monopsony system. The measure they used was to 
bestow more autonomy to the bureaucrats in local markets to adjust the price based on 
their evaluation of the market situation. An important feature of Pu Zongmin¶s 
changes is his new emphasis on market price as the necessary reference for market 
bureaucrats to consider their purchases and sales on the tea market.527 The TMA 
managers emphasized that these bureaucrats would make adjustments based on their 
local market price. The TMA also reduced the required profit rate from thirty percent 
to ten percent. These policies would greatly reduce the burden on local bureaucrats 
and give them more free space to adjust the selling price. Such a claim convinced the 
central court not to deprive the TMA of its privilege of monopsony.528 These 
measures could not resolve the capital shortage, however. The local markets were 
only required to earn a ten percent profit on their sales, but the TMA and central court 
did not give them more capital for buying tea from producers. Moreover, a ten percent 
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profit rate was not enough to meet the Emperor¶s goal of increasing revenue, although 
it could ease the burden of producers. Both the central court and the TMA had to find 
a new way to balance the interests of the central court with the goal of protecting the 
smaller producers. As I will discuss, the TMA and central court, guided by the 
worldview of the New Policy makers, collectively promoted a new way of operating 
the TMA in the market. This new way could only satisfy their goals in theory, 
however, not in practice.       
   The riot in Pengkou and Lü Tao¶s subsequent report made the central court think it 
was necessary to clarify its intentions to the bureaucrats. After receiving Lü Tao¶s 
report, Emperor Shenzong promulgated a edict stopping the policy of forcing the 
bureaucrats in local Markets to collect a thirty percent profit on their tea sales. The 
edict also ordered the TMA not to damage the economic interests of either the 
government or private producers.529 The implication of this sentence was that the 
policies related to the TMA should serve the economic interests of both government 
and private producers because those interests should be mutually beneficial in the 
view of the New Policy makers. Lü Tao¶s memorial gave the Emperor the strong 
impression that the current operation of the TMA had damaged the interests of both 
sides because the local bureaucrats focused on chasing the profits of big merchants so 
that they could sell their tea. Lü Tao also revealed that such a mechanism had already 
influenced productivity because growers had to reduce their production due to the low 
purchase price that the local market decided.  
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   The edict was also ambiguous, however, in that it had not made clear to the 
bureaucrats what they should do if they could not satisfy the interests of both sides. In 
other words, the central court did not clarify which goal should receive the higher 
priority. The critics who preferred to protect the small producers believed that the only 
possible resolution was to abolish the state monopolies in Sichuan. After this edict 
was promulgated, calls for abolishing the TMA became influential. Lü Tao 
represented this trend because he had clearly said that if the government wanted to 
protect the interests of small producers, it had to abolish the state monopolies in 
Sichuan. After a short hesitation, Emperor Shenzong was finally convinced by Li Ji 
and other TMA managers that the central court should continue supporting the TMA 
because it would put measures in place to correct the previous mistakes. He therefore 
began to show this intention in a series of edicts beginning in the seventh month of 
1077. In that month, Emperor Shenzong issued an edict dismissing both Lü Tao and 
Liu Zuo (the manager of the TMA) from office. This punishment showed Shenzong¶s 
intention to find a new way of operating the TMA without abolishing it. In the eighth 
month of the same year, Emperor Shenzong issued a ³hand-written edict ᡻䂄´ 
appointing Li Ji as the manager of the TMA. The ³hand-written edict´ was a special 
form of edict that was commonly held by contemporaries to be the most direct 
reflection of the Emperor¶s mind. In this edict, Emperor Shenzong said,  
     The TMA has been established for long time but its institution still has not been 
completed. If we can not employ people whose talent and intelligence are 
complete and bright, even if we give this agency with more power we still will 
waste our time, losing huge profits without any achievements. Recently, because 
some evil people initiated [their own] intention to shake up the policies, the 
policies became even more unstable. Because of our court¶s punishment according 
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to their faults, the policies became slightly more stable. My observation, however, 
is that many people still have not begun to serve their careers, and have neglected 
their duties. If we do not conduct a large-scale reexamination of our policies, in 
the long run the policies will definitely be destroyed. Recently we have appointed 
Li Ji to replace Liu Zuo as the manager of the TMA. Li Ji is courageous and 
resolute. He is therefore reliable. However, his power is still weak and he cannot 
win over the faction that does evil and damages the interests of the public. I order 
that Li Ji¶s appointment be the same as that of Li Qi. He should be concurrently 
appointed as Administrative Assistant of the State Finance Commission. We 
should also give him the power of recommending officials who follow the law and 
impeaching those who break the law. After one or two years, when revenue 
becomes abundant and the policies are organized, we will take back the power we 
have given him. [By doing all this], we can prepare for the costs of the border 
areas [in Shanxi] without relying on the allocation of resource by the State 
Finance Commission.530      
  
   In the above edict, Emperor Shenzong first expressed his determination to 
stabilize the TMA policies. He criticized the existing push to abolish the TMA, and 
named those who fostered such criticism as evil people. Moreover, he also clarified 
his intention in making these policies. As he stated, the TMA should serve the overall 
goal of the central court to generate new fiscal resources for war preparations in 
Shanxi. He therefore made clear that increasing revenue should be prioritized over 
other goals. 
 Shenzong went on to designate the means by which to correct the current 
problems. He praised Li Ji as talented, courageous and resolute, signaling to other 
bureaucrats that he believed Li Ji had apprehended Shenzong¶s intentions and had the 
capacity to realize them. Based on such trust, granted Li Ji the power to repress evils 
and mobilize the bureaucrats. Shenzong further emphasized the use of material 
incentives in the personnel administration, noting that Li Ji should promote those 
                                                        
530
 XCB v284 ,6951 
 365 
bureaucrats who followed the rules and demote those who disobeyed. Shenzong noted 
that Li Ji¶VDXWRQRP\would not be permanent; it would only last until Li Ji showed 
satisfactory achievements. The Emperor himself held the power to decide when and 
how to delegate authority to Li Ji.  
In facing the deviations caused by the TMA, the Emperor could have chosen 
other tactics, such as centralizing decision-making power and personally deciding 
every policy related to the TMA. Instead, he made the choice by following his 
worldview, which echoes the perspective of the New Policy makers on the means 
through which they could achieve their economic plans. As we have discussed, the 
New Policy makers had a complete scheme which in their view was sufficient to 
correct any mistakes because it could shape both the creativity and conformity of the 
bureaucrats.  
Therefore, Emperor Shenzong did not focus on how to correct concrete policies. 
Instead, he believed that the best way to make the state monopoly operate smoothly  
was to manipulate its policy-making structure and incentive mechanism. He admitted 
the great potential that existed within the minds of bureaucrats. For him, once the 
incentive and decision-making structure was complete, the bureaucrats would 
automatically make the TMA operate well.  
After this edict was promulgated, the central court issued several further edicts 
that realized Shenzong¶s design. In the ninth month of the same year, the central court 
approved Li Ji¶s request for independent power to decide on the establishment of 
official posts and administrative affairs. The TMA further gained independence from 
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the State Trade Agency. It therefore would not follow the State Trade Regulation but 
could create its own management rules.531 In the fifth month of 1078, Sun Jiong, the 
Administrative Assistant of the Fiscal Commission in the Qinfeng circuit, requested a 
meeting with the Emperor in person to discuss the reform of policies related to the 
local tea industry. Emperor Shenzong refused his request, ordering him to report 
directly to the managers of the TMA. Shenzong further explained that if he intervened 
into administrative affairs related to the TMA, responsibilities would be unclear and 
the power to make concrete policies would not be unified.532  
 Emperor Shenzong¶s activities showed his rationale for delegating 
decision-making power to the TMA. He told the bureaucracy that he thought his 
intervention would cause D³disarray of opinions´ on state monopoly policy.533 By 
this he implied that opinions related to the TMA should be unified not by the Emperor 
but the manager of the TMA. He trusted that all the policies that the TMA managers 
made would follow the intentions of the Emperor himself. The delegation of power in 
his mind was not to allow the unlimited autonomy of the TMA, but a means by which 
to mold the conformity of the bureaucrats. Based on such conformity, the TMA and 
other bureaucracies cooperated with each other under the leadership of TMA 
managers.  
The TMA managers¶ response 
As the managers of the TMA, Li Ji and Pu Zongmin had apprehended the intention of 
Emperor Shenzong. They also realized that their conduct must demonstrate that they 
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were following the Emperor¶s intention, Li Ji and Pu Zongmin recognized that 
increasing revenue should be their first priority in operating the TMA. The lesson of 
Liu Zuo, who had disastrously set the mandate to collect thirty percent profit, also 
reminded them that the Emperor was deeply concerned with the interests of small 
producers and sought to prevent any turmoil in Sichuan. They needed to convince the 
Emperor that the policy they crafted could satisfy both of these goals. They would not 
repeat the mistake of Liu Zuo, nor could they follow the opinion of Lü Tao, who 
suggested abolishing all the state monopolies. The worldview that the New Policy 
makers held in common provided the theory for them to prove that their policies could 
achieve all these purposes.     
   In the fourth month of 1078, Li Ji submitted a memorial discussing the issue of 
how to regulate the price of tea in the tea-horse trade of the Xihe circuit. Li Ji 
illustrated how a New Policies-style incentive mechanism could guide the market 
bureaucrats to optimize prices. As Li Ji stated,  
        Previously, [the former manager of TMA] Liu Zuo set the price of 
Mingshan tea [produced in Sichuan] in the local Markets of Xihe circuit at 
thirty-seven strings per tuo. [The Prefect of Qinzhou] Lü Dafang employed 
Murong Yuni and reduced the tea price to twenty-five strings and one hundred and 
sixty wen per tuo. The private market price last year was twenty-seven strings. 
From these facts, we find that Liu Zuo only knew of increasing prices but had no 
idea about how to reduce them. Lü Dafang, on the contrary, only knew how to 
decrease the price but had no idea about how to increase it. Therefore we say 
neither of them could accommodate [market changes] in their crafting of policy. I 
hereby submit the following suggestions.  
 
---  The TMA should make a general range of price changes for all the tea 
that the government sells. [Based on this scope, the local market at the prefecture 
level] should adjust this price depending on the market situation. If the price needs 
to be increased, the local markets should investigate and confirm the situation. 
After they have increased the price, they should report to the TMA. The TMA will 
 368 
review those cases. If their adjustment was not at the right moment or if their 
reports are not true, the TMA will impeach them according to the degree of 
severity. If they need to reduce the price, they should report to the TMA and wait 
for the TMA¶s response.      
 
---- The TMA officials can earn great profits benefiting from the high 
price of tea. Liu Zuo represents those who cannot handle the real situation well, 
and destroy the laws. The governmental agency which trades tea to get horses 
sought to decrease the tea price. If the price is low, the Tibetan merchants will be 
happy to contribute more horses because they can also get high profit. Recently 
the court established the law on transactions between different governmental units. 
This law will resolve the abuse of price competition between governmental 
agencies. I will not discuss this in detail. There is another point I need to 
emphasize. If we allow the market bureaucrats to increase the price by themselves, 
it is possible that they will become devoted to increasing prices at the expense of 
decreasing the quantity of tea sold. [In order to avoid this problem], we need to 
decide a fixed quota on their sales quantities and legislate rewards. We therefore 
can make everyone pursue those rewards, and the policies will be accomplished 
without the court expending effort on those affairs. Now we find that the 
quantities of tea sold in the tenth year of the Xining period were much higher than 
in previous years. Therefore we have set a quota based on the data of this year. 
The tea sold in the Horse Barter Market of Qinzhou totaled 5924 tuo. We therefore 
set the quota at 6500 tuo«534    
     Compared with the previous institution that had forced market bureaucrats to 
collect thirty-percent profits without giving them freedom to decide price based on 
market changes, the new system bestowed those bureaucrats with more flexibility to 
handle market changes, and built a new incentive mechanism.In this memorial Li Ji 
held that the key fault of Liu Zuo and Lü Dafang had been that they did not know how 
to adjust their policies related to the tea price according to the changing situation of 
the market. They resolution he proposed was not to centralize pricing authority into 
the hands of central court and the TMA management, however. The TMA managers 
only decided the scope for price adjustment. The bureaucrats at the local markets had 
the autonomy to decide, especially in situations where they thought the price needed 
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to be increased. In such situations, the TMA managers only supervised their decisions. 
The TMA had more power to intervene in price reduction because increasing prices 
was taken by the TMA as more important than reducing them. The profit of each sale 
was not fixed; the bureaucrats could flexibly decide how much profit to seek from 
each sale, while calculating how to achieve or even exceed the annual quotas.  
 In /L-L¶V mind, stimulating the enthusiasm of the local bureaucrats was the 
fundamental way to increase revenue without repeating Liu Zuo¶s mistakes. Li Ji 
mentioned nothing about how to deal with the causes of price fluctuations because he 
thought the economic problems were caused by the political attitudes of bureaucrats 
rather than the operations of the economic system itself. In his logic, if the leaders 
could build an institutional context to discipline the minds of the bureaucrats, those 
bureaucrats had the innate faculty to figure out the best way to adjust prices to the 
proper level. Li Ji further claimed that the means through which the central court 
could raise such enthusiasm was to rebuild the quota and the rewards system. The 
bureaucrats should reach the quotas made by the TMA. If they could exceed the 
quotas, they would be rewarded, or punished if they fell short. Li Ji also emphasized 
that allowing bureaucrats more free space to decide the profit rates in each sale would 
help them avoid Liu Zuo¶s mistakes, because, if they raised the price too high, the 
market would lose interests, they could not sell enough tea, and they would not 
achieve their quota. Based on such logic, Li Ji proved that the goals could be attained 
in theory.  
Li Ji in his memorial showed that he had apprehended the intentions of the 
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central court and further articulated that he had found the correct way to achieve those 
intentions. The worldview that guided his logic was the New Policy makers¶ view that 
material incentives could lead people¶s minds onto the right track enabling them to 
figure out the best way to do business in the market without learning how the market 
was actually operating. Such a view relied on their systematic understanding of 
human nature and dao. In this understanding, the process of creating new policy is 
controllable because in the innovative process people¶s minds are predictable. Li Ji 
believed that government policies should change in accordance with the changing 
market situation. Such a change in could be generated and completed simply by 
stimulating the bureaucrat¶s enthusiasm and creativity, rather than investigating and 
explaning the concrete variables that caused price changes.   
In such a design, the TMA and central court need not regulate the operation of 
local markets based on any explanation of the economic system. Li Ji proved in 
theory that the quota system and the policies of reward and punishment were 
sufficient to build the state¶s adaptation to the changing market.  
During the subequent years of the Yuanfeng period, the policy paradigm that Li 
Ji proposed in the above memorial continued to be applied by other managers in their 
building of the TMA¶s institutions. A new quota system took shape in the sixth month 
of 1083 under another TMA manager, Pu Zongmin. As we have discussed, in Liu 
Zuo¶s quota system, the profit rate had been fixed at thirty-percent or ten-percent.. In 
order to gain more profit to compensate for the shortage of capital, bureaucrats had to 
shorten the time of each transaction and reduce the purchase price to satisfy the 
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interests of buyers. Within such a system, the revenue was counted in two parts: 
investment and profit. The profit rates referred to the profit-to-investment ratio, fixed 
at thirty percent. The central court only needed to set a revenue quota because the 
amount of profit was determined by this quota. This quota system originated from the 
State Trade Regulation and from the Green Sprout Policy which had been widely 
applied in the government-controlled credit system and stimulated the expansion of 
government credit, which caused high financial risks.   
The new quota system for the TMA, however, was very different from the 
previous system because of its abandonment of fixed profit rates. The bureaucrats in 
the markets could flexibly decide the profit for each transaction. Apparently, the 
bureaucrats had great autonomy in deciding price and profit. The central court only 
required that each Market achieve total profit quotas for each year, rather than 
regulating how much profit they could earn from each individual transaction.  
The bureaucrats in the Ministry of Revenue had not realized the essence of this 
new system until 1083, however. Because the old quota system still continued in the 
salt monopolies at that time, the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Revenue continued the 
same quota system for the TMA in 1083. TMA manager Pu Zongmin noticed this 
problem and submitted a memorial pointing out that the revenue quota was not proper 
for the new way of operating the TMA. Because the bureaucrats in local markets had 
earned pricing autonomy, the quota system should aim at stimulating their enthusiasm 
to increase profit. The old system could not achieve this purpose. Pu Zongmin 
presented an example to illustrate his point. If the bureaucrats in the market wasted a 
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great amount of capital to purchase tea but sold it at a very low profit, they would be 
rewarded because they increased revenue. A great amount of capital would be wasted, 
however, aggravating the capital shortage. In contrast, those who saved their capital 
but earned high profit might be punished if the total revenue they earned fell below 
the quota.535  
Extant records illustrate how 3X=RQJPLQ¶V incentive mechanism extended into 
the local Sichuan Markets and became the main focus of both the central court and 
TMA managers in their proposed regulation scheme. The TMA made fixed quotas of 
profit for annual sales, as called for by the regulations. The bureaucrats would earn 
bonuses if the could exceed these quotas. They would also be promoted if they could 
collect a certain amount of profit. The regulations also gave the local Sichuan markets 
clear autonomy to decide the profit rates depending on the changing market price.536        
If comparing this regulation with the problems revealed by Lü Tao, we find that 
it offered no real response to the major difficulty faced by local markets, namely, the 
shortage of capital. By delegating autonomy to the market bureaucrats, the TMA 
managers in fact evaded this major problem. The rationale that guided them was their 
belief that they could resolve any problems in the market by building an institutional 
context to discipline the minds of the bureaucrats. Guided by such a view, they 
overlooked other factors such as the shortage of capital and insufficient knowledge of 
market operation on the part of the bureaucrats. The real practice of policy, however, 
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illustrates that the mode of regulation chosen by the TMA and the central court was 
insufficient to prevent the recurrence of the previous problems in the local markets.     
 
How the TMA managers gained benefits for their agency by showing their grasp of 
the Emperor¶s intention  
     The managers of TMA showed their apprehension of the intention of Emperor 
Shenzong in two main ways. As discussed above, they first theoretically proved that 
they could attain the Emperor¶s goals by innovating reward and punishment 
institutions based on the new quota system. Then, as we will discuss, in the real policy 
implementation process the TMA leaders focused on increasing the profit that they 
delivered to the central court. Emperor Shenzong responded with positive feedback. 
In the fourth month of 1079, Li Ji reported to Shenzong that he had gained 76,7066 
strings of profit after reformed the incentive system of the TMA. In his reply to Li Ji¶s 
memorial, Shenzong praised his work, writing, 
  The previous commissioners who took charge of the reform of Sichuan¶s tea 
monopoly could not figure out the correct way. People had many criticisms, and 
public opinion was shaken. [At this moment] Li Ji can illuminate the intention 
of the law and accomplish this achievement in a short time. We should promote 
him to motivate the other officials.537     
 
   Shenzong wrote this reply on Li Ji¶s original report of his achievements of profit 
and revenue collection. Shenzong¶s attitude made the TMA managers know that the 
best way to show their grasp of the Emperor¶s intention was to show their capability 
to make higher quotas, and after doing this they could obtain better favor for the 
70$¶VLQWHUHVWV. In deciding the quotas for each local market, the managers set the 
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quota even higher than the average profit of each market. Based on those quotas, the 
TMA also kept on increasing its total quota of profit from 40,000 strings (1074) to 
50,0000 strings (1082) and eventually 100,0000 strings (1084). In their regulation of 
the market activity of bureaucrats, their focus was therefore on making quotas for 
each Market and motivating the bureaucrats to achieve those quotas.  
    In its competition with other agencies, the TMA sought to show the central court 
that the satisfaction of the TMA¶s economic interests would be necessary for 
achieving the central court¶s intention. In so doing, the TMA bested other agencies. 
One such case is the TMA¶s competition with the Horse Purchase Bureau (HPB). 
The original policy before 1081 required the HPB to use silver and silk to trade 
for horses from Tibetan merchants. The merchants had no strong interest in these 
trade goods, however, because they wanted Sichuan tea more than any other goods. 
Due to the urgent need for war horses, the central court sent Guo Maoxu, the 
Intendant of the HPB, to investigate this problem and suggest new policies in 1081.538 
Guo Maoxu understood that the intention of the central court was to enlarge the 
quantity of purchased horses.539 He took this as an opportunity to serve the interests 
of his agency. He therefore suggested that the central court endow him with the power 
to take charge of the TMA, allocating its tea and other fiscal resources to support the 
purchase of horses in Shanxi.540 The central course approved his request, but it was 
strenuously rejected by the manager of the TMA, Pu Zongmin, who saw it as a great 
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threat to the economic interests of the TMA. His difficulty was convincing the central 
court that the interests of TMA should be fully considered given how important an 
issue the purchase of horses was for the central court.  
In the eleventh month of 1081, Pu Zongmin submitted a memorial to the central 
court explaining his reasoning. As he reported,  
 I have received an edict from your majesty which requires that Mingshan 
tea only be used to purchase horses, stating that the TMA cannot sell it to get 
other goods until the +3%¶Vannual quota for horse purchases has been reached. 
You also require that all the other kinds of tea that the TMA produces be freely 
mobilized [by the HPB] as resources to trade for horses depending on the 
requests of Tibetan merchants. « [As you majesty knows], our agency has 
been contributing great amounts of revenue every year. For Xihe circuit alone, 
we have cotributed 20,0000 strings cash every year. We also support the 
contingent expenditures of the central court. ... We can only rely on the sale of 
Mingshan tea to get all these fiscal resources. You require us to sell the tea only 
after the HPB has finished its purchase of horses, but the HPB cannot achieve 
its quota until the end of the year. [If we follow this request], then we have to 
stop selling the Mingshan tea, storing all that tea in preparation for the HPB¶s 
purchase of horses at the beginning of the year. Then we will have no chance to 
sell Mingshan tea for the whole year.  
Recently, the central court also required that other kinds of tea be used by 
the HPB to purchase horses. Our agency¶s market activities are constrained by 
these requests. We are worried that we cannot attain enough revenue to support 
your expenditures. Moreover, the Tibetan merchants¶ trades do not only include 
horses; they also buy our tea with their goods such gold, silver, grain, mercury, 
musk, tricholoma, cattle and sheep, then they trade the tea in Tibet. If we cannot 
catch the chance to sell our tea immediately, those merchants will buy other 
goods. This will cause a loss of revenue. We currently have overstock of 
Mingshan tea. The Tibetan merchants do not just want the tea. ... The overall 
need for tea by the HPB is no more than 15000 to 16000 duo. [Given the 
reasons above,] we hope your Majesty might issue a new command to allow us 
sell all kinds of tea. We also hope your Majesty might allow us to sell the 
Mingshan tea after we have achieved the quota of the tea needed for supporting 
the HPB¶s purchase of horses. We hope that the TMA and HPB will not 
interfere with each other. 541   
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   In the above memorial, Pu Zongmin tried to convince the central court that to 
maintaining the fiscal independence of the TMA would be a better alternative for 
serving the central court¶s overall fiscal scheme. Pu emphasized to the Emperor that 
the function of the TMA was to provide cash resources to fully support the 
expenditures of the central court, especially for war preparations and other contingent 
expenditures. In his previous edict the Emperor had made it clear that Pu Zongmin 
had correctly interpreted the central court¶s intention for promoting the development 
of the TMA. Pu Zongmin repeated the Emperor¶s intention, to show that he had 
correctly grasped it. He further stated that the Mingshan tea was the only resource that 
the TMA could mobilize to achieve this goal. If the central court delegated the power 
to the HPB, the TMA would have no resources left to satisfy the goals of the central 
court. He pointed out that if the HPB held the tea for the whole year, the TMA would 
lose its best chance to gain profit on the market, because the merchants would trade 
for other things. Through illustrating how keeping TMA¶s autonomy to sell tea will be 
the best way to serve the intentions of central court, Pu Zongmin convinced the 
central court. His suggestion was approved by Emperor Shenzong.  
   The phenomenon we have discussed in this section illustrates the worldview of 
both the Emperor and the TMA managers in considering their roles and functions. 
Their worldviews guided what they took to be the foremost concern in making 
policies to resolve the real problems they faced. Emperor Shenzong explicitly 
expressed to the managers of the TMA his intention, and made this intention serve as 
a guideline for the TMA. In facing problems and thinking of solutions, the TMA 
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managers considered how to show apprehension of the imperial intention, as only by 
doing this they could gain WKH(PSHURU¶Vtrust and support. Guided by such a belief, 
they continually increased the total quota of profit in order to show that the TMA was 
capable of satisfying that intention. They also convinced the Emperor that the 
resources they sought were necessary to achieve his intention, and that those 
resources must not be be taken away by other bureaus. The case of HPB provides 
another example to illustrate this point. In 1084, the HPB could not attain its horse 
purchase quota. Even though it complained repeatedly to the central court that its 
difficulty lay in the high price of the tea that the TMA produced, the central court 
brushed off such complaints. The result was that the HPB was dissolved by the central 
court.542 The HPB failed because it could not convince the central court that it had 
the capacity to fulfill the intentions of the Emperor. It therefore lost its autonomy.  
     Faced with problems in the real operation of the TMA¶s local market in Sichuan, 
the worldview of both the Emperor and the managers of the TMA guided them to 
abandon the fixed profit rate and instead to adopt a fixed profit quota as the way to 
regulate the bureaucratV¶ activities in the market. The TMA managers convinced the 
Emperor that through rewarding and punishing the bureaucrats based on a quota 
system these officials would figure out a way to deal with price fluctuation, one that 
could not only benefit the economic interests of the state but also increase the 
productivity of other actors in the market. The TMA gained autonomy because its 
managers successfully showed that they could satisfy the intentions of the central 
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court. The TMA bestowed autonomy to the market bureaucrats because both the 
Emperor and WKH70$¶VRZQ managers believed that the main thing they needed to do 
was to build material incentives that could inspire the enthusiasm of the bureaucrats. 
The decision-making power in the market was distributed among different levels of 
the TMA, based on their views on how to shape the collectivity and creativity of 
policy participants.     
Consequences of the regulation  
   The TMA managers and the central court held a coherent worldview that could in 
theory shape the market into a perfect order, maximizing their interests, strengthening 
their productivity and increasing the wealth of both state and social actors. This 
worldview was based on their understanding of human nature and the dao. Within 
such an understanding, the people can be guided onto the correct track by incentives 
provided by the leaders. Once on this correct path, they would bring their talent and 
virtue to its fullest use, applying their creativity to successfully deal with market 
changes and achieve the intention of the Emperor. Led by officials who had grasped 
the intention of the Emperor (or in other words, the dao of the world), the members of 
the state monopolies would collectively guide the state monopolies toward correct 
operation in the market. This process could therefore regulate any deviations that 
appeared in the state¶s intervention in the market, and successfully build a 
coordinative method for operating state power in the market.      
 The actual operation of the local Markets throughout the Yuanfeng period did 
not prove their belief, however. The abuses that Lü Tao had revealed did not disappear. 
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More abuses emerged, due to the TMA¶s over-emphasis on the quota system.  
In the second month of 1086, after the death of Emperor Shenzong, Su Zhe 
submitted a memorial discussed the problems that had plagued the TMA during the 
Yuanfeng period. Su Zhe revealed several major problems which illustrated how the 
regulation was bounded by the worldview described above, leading to despotic 
applications of state power in the market.  
First, the real operation of local markets shows that the incentive system that the 
TMA managers had established could not enlighten the bureaucrats¶ virtue and talent 
in dealing with the market changes. Instead, their limited knowledge of the real 
operations of the market left them incapable of dealing with price fluctuations. The 
pressure imposed by the quota system motivated them to rely on despotic ways of 
garnering rewards and avoiding punishments. As Su Zhe revealed, in the local 
markets the bureaucrats kept on squeezing down the purchase price even though they 
were no longer forced to gain a fixed profit rate. The purchase price of tea in many 
prefectures of Sichuan had dropped to half of the price encountered before the 
establishment of the monopsony system. As Su Zhe explained, the bureaucrats in the 
markets forced producers to reduce the price because the bureaucrats wanted to sell 
the tea easily to the merchants. This phenomenon showed that the bureaucrats had 
little ability to gain profit by following the rules of the market, leaving them to rely on 
administrative enforcement to save costs. They could not figure out proper ways to 
deal with market changes even after they were given more autonomy. Moreover, the 
coordination between purchasing units and selling units was not close. The purchasing 
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units in Sichuan provided much more tea than the markets in Shanxi actually needed. 
This problem made the tea in Shanxi unmarketable, so that local markets had to force 
local people to buy tea. The TMA therefore played a role in destroying the local 
markets in both Shanxi and Sichuan.  
The occurrence of these problems reveals that the bureaucrats lacked adequate 
capacity to handle market information, coordinate internal operations, and make 
decisions to deal with price changes. Although their enthusiasm had been raised due 
to the material incentive system, such enthusiasm could not compensate for the losses 
caused by their low capacity in operating the state monopolies in the market. In 
contrast to the expectations of those who formulated the New Policies, the 
bureaucrats¶ enthusiasm to achieve their quotas motivated them to abuse their political 
power to earn profit. The material incentive system therefore backfired.  
 The Mingshan tea producers had reported these problems to the county 
government in Mingshan, and the county government reported the cases to the 
Chengdu prefecture government, which accepted and heard the cases. After knowing 
of this, the first response of the TMA managers was not to address these actual 
problems, but to send a memorial to the Emperor complaining that the local 
prefectural government in Sichuan should not respond to such problems. In the mind 
of the TMA managers, the prefectural JRYHUQPHQW¶VLQWHUIHUHQFH with their legal 
autonomy was more important than resolving these problems. The central court also 
accepted the TMA¶s position, because in both of their worldviews, regulation should 
follow the administrative hierarchy, in which the TMA had the exclusive privilege to 
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decide policies.543 This situation also occurred after the central court received Lü 
Tao¶s report on local market problems. After receiving the report, the central court 
would first consider enforcing the power of the TMA rather than resolving the 
problems. The occurrence of deviations in the policy process therefore became the 
impetus for power consolidation of the TMA. The real problems continued, however, 
and became more serious.  
Moreover, the quota system limited the attention of both the central court and the 
TMA mangers to the issue of how to satisfy the quotas and intentions of the Emperor. 
They therefore overlooked other problems, making every effort to increase their profit. 
The TMA manipulated ambiguities in the legal definition of profit and included the 
tea tax they collected as part of its declared profit. They also intervene in the trade of 
wine, salt and porcelain. This was all because of their desire to satisfy the central 
court¶s intention. During the Yuanpeng period Emperor Shenzong had noticed all 
these problems because Pu Zongmin had reported those activities to the central court. 
However, Emperor Shenzong believed that making the TMA managers follow his 
intention was much more important than regulating the concrete measures that those 
managers used to achieve such a purpose. The central court therefore gave priority to 
the probem of how to maintain the TMA managers¶ correct understanding of the 
Emperor¶s intention, and continue stimulating their enthusiasm to attain this intention, 
rather than to resolve even those problems that had made the policy¶V implementation 
deviate from its original vision.  
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The mechanism discussed above explains the reasons for the uneven 
responsiveness of policy makers to problems which were caused by the low capacity 
of local bureaucrats to deal with market changes. As we have argued, all these 
problems grew from the inability of the policy makers¶ worldview to explain the 
workings of the economic system or seek resolution to the problems that occurred 
within this system. A theoretically coherent worldview therefore caused unexpected 
consequences in its implementation.   
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CONCLUSION 
 
The Concrete subject continues to lead an independent existence after it has been 
grasped, as it did before, outside of the head, so long as the head contemplates it only 
speculatively, theoretically. So that in the employment of the theoretical method in 
political economy, the subject, society, must constantly be kept in mind as the premise 
from which we start. 
-- Karl Marx544 
 
     This dissertation has examined the political economy of state intervention 
during the New Policies period in pre-modern Chinese history. It touches upon a 
classical issue in the field of political economy which Karl Marx fully elaborated in 
his well known critique of the Hegelian tradition in German political economy: the 
interactive dynamic between ideas and historical context, and its impact on political 
and economic practices. As 0DU[¶V quote implies, the objective world operates 
independently of how it is perceived in people¶s subjective world, and people¶s 
explanations of the world have great limitations. Although my dissertation shows how 
that discrepancy caused a real impact on the operation of state power, I have not 
written it to testify to any abstract philosophical principle. Rather, I have sought to 
show how the distinctive lines of reasoning held by eleventh-century Chinese 
statesmen interacted with their concrete historical context to produce a particular 
mode of governing. Based on a deep inquiry into the New Policy makers¶ intellectual 
landscape and the historical process of state intervention, I have explained how the 
limited facility of the New Policy makers¶ worldview in explaining real economic 
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changes led to their failure in organizing social and political actors to attain their 
policy goals.   
 
We have begun with a thick description of Wang Anshi¶s intellectual landscape. 
Wang Anshi and his contemporary intellectuals faced a dual challenge in their 
thinking about the political order: 1) How to make participants in this order think and 
behave in a correct, consistent and innovative manner to overcome the confusion in 
their minds resulting from a sense of uncertainty in facing the changing objective 
world; and 2) In the process of governing, how to make this correct way of thinking 
accountable and acceptable to others, so that all people could behave in the same 
PDQQHULQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHUXOHU¶VZLOO.  
:DQJ$QVKL¶VWKHRU\RIOHDUQLQJKDVWZRVLGHV7KHUHLVVHOI-cultivation aspect, 
which for Wang was both a personal moral and intellectual endeavor. There is an 
aspect of his theory that seeks external knowledge pertaining to political management 
of the world. He believed that external knowledge and people's innate faculty were 
connected. I suggest that the linkage is made in various ways. There is a dao, which is 
unitary and integrative, and to which all humans are connected by their nature, but not 
all humans realize their nature. Even if they do, it may mean only that they are 
realizing their desire for profit. So goals must in fact be set externally.  
In Wang Anshi¶s mind, the role of the political system loomed large, and since 
the Emperor was at the apex of the political system he was ultimately responsible for 
VHWWLQJJRDOV%XWKRZVKRXOGWKH(PSHURUVHWJRDOV"+HUHWKH³LQWHQWLRQVRf the 
 385 
Former .LQJV´VHUYHGWRDQVZHUWKLVTXHVWLRQ Wang Anshi in his line of reasoning 
did not elaborate the way to judge the Emperor¶s intention. Although he frequently 
corrected the Emperor¶s errors in informal conversations, Wang Anshi never 
challenged the Emperor in front of public audiences or in formally promulgated 
documents. Instead, he claimed to all that the Emperor¶s intention in making policies 
was in accordance with the intention (or the yi) of the Former Kings, and should 
therefore be strictly followed.  
At the same time, the Emperor should not be called upon to decide all 
administrative affairs in the formal policy making procedure. He should give free 
reign to bureaucrats whom he trusted to have apprehended his intentions. Those 
bureaucrats, in turn, established material incentives to lead others who had not 
realized the dao, making them exhaust their talent to fulfill the goals that the Emperor 
intended to achieve. The proposition behind these lines of reasoning was that people 
had the innate faculty to enable them to overcome any difficulties in dealing with 
actual changes and collectively act in consistently correct manners. The policy makers 
could fully enlighten their potential by building institutions to either guide them to 
apprehend the intention of the Former Kings (or the Emperor), or stimulate their talent. 
We might well ask, how should we understand the importance of practical knowledge 
in explaining and resolving economic problems? This question, however, was not the 
concern of the drafters of the New Policies.  
   In the following chapters, this dissertation has shown how political belief 
guided the drafters of the New Policies to deal with encountered policy deviations and 
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the consequences of those processes. The three cases in my dissertation show the New 
Policies makers¶ different ways of responding to the resistance of the political elites, 
government agencies, and low ±level local bureaucrats. I have defined such strategies 
as ³limited regulation´ by which the regulators focused on disciplining people¶s 
mentality rather than responding to actual policy deviations. Such a way of regulation 
originated from the New Policy makers¶ systematic vision of how the world operated 
and the correct way of building an ideal political order. They believed that they could 
overcome any policy deviation by directing the policy participants toward the correct 
way of thinking. In facing practical difficulties, they adhered to certain measures 
without considering the changes in the real situation. The actual behavior of market 
actors and bureaucrats contradicted their expectations, however, and their rigid 
responses seriously weakened the state¶s organizing capacities.   
    
    The Green Sprouts Policy raised great opposition among the political elites at the 
central court. In facing the spreading critiques, the drafters of the New Policies 
rejected the existing deliberative mechanism that incorporated and organized different 
opinions based on their merit in resolving policy problems, even though the Emperor 
tried his best to maintain that mechanism. The worldviews of the critics led them to 
oppose the entire policy because they firmly believed that it would lead to irreversible 
political disorder, undermining social customs and people¶s moral worlds. The 
drafters of the New Policies firmly believed that to tolerate such critiques before the 
public would cause great confusion in the mind of policy implementers. They 
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therefore refused to make any concessions to these critics, publicly refuting the most 
influential critique which was conducted by Han Qi. They took such sharp action to 
educate the bureaucracy as to the ideological position of the central court. The 
reaction by the critics, however, aggravated the cleavage between the two sides. 
Factional lines were constructed by both critics and the drafters of the New Policies. 
The New Policy makers eventually convinced the Emperor that only by purging the 
critics could the center mobilize the entire bureaucratic system to implement the New 
Policies.  
 
The New Policy makers¶ determined attitudes toward the resistance of political 
elites contrasts with their inaction in facing the policy deviations caused by 
government agencies attempting to regulate the depreciation of pond salt vouchers. 
The salt vouchers served as bonds that the local government issued to support their 
spending on behalf of the central government. The large number of these vouchers 
and their multiple uses shaped a financial market in which merchants and government 
agencies influenced the price of the salt vouchers. Due to local over-issuance of the 
vouchers and their manipulation by powerful market actors, their value kept 
depreciating in the New Policies period. In order to resolve this problem, the drafters 
of the New Policies established new government agencies and crafted rules that 
ordered those agencies to adjust supply and demand to regulate prices according to 
market needs. This policy gave those agencies the privilege of control over great 
numbers of salt vouchers. Those new agencies did not follow the rules, however, but 
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only pursued revenue. The circuit governments also kept issuing more vouchers. The 
central policy makers remained inactive in the face of these problems because they 
took those agencies to be following the Emperor¶s intention, and they relied on them 
to increase revenue to support warfare with other states.   
This response illustrates the first dimension of what I call ³limited 
regulation´ The policy makers were not concerned with how to resolve the concrete 
problems they faced, but only stuck to measures intended to enlighten the bureaucrats 
to apprehend the ideological position and intention of the policy makers. Such 
measures included the exclusion of critics, which publicly showed the court¶s 
determination to implement the policies. They also educated the bureaucrats to see the 
coherence of things in the external world at a higher order of abstraction or 
generalization, as manifested in the intentions of the formulators of the New Policies 
in their creation of concrete policies. Once the policy makers thought that the 
bureaucrats had apprehended their intention, they believed that these bureaucrats 
would instinctively figure out the best ways to deal with market problems. They 
would then give the bureaucrats more autonomy, regardless how those bureaucrats 
actually behaved. The limits of their worldview weakened the state¶s organizing 
capacity in its interventions into the financial market.  
 
Chapter Five illustrates how the 1HZ3ROLF\PDNHUV¶ worldview guided the 
Emperor to respond to policy deviations encountered by the local bureaucrats of the 
state monopolies in the tea and salt industries. In facing the local bureaucrats¶ 
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collaboration with powerful merchants and their collective victimization of the 
interests of small producers, the Emperor did not adopt measures to directly correct 
those problems. Instead, he delegated decision-making power to the managers of the 
monopolies who had publicly demonstrated their apprehension of the Emperor¶s 
intention to increase revenue while simultaneously increasing social productivity. The 
Emperor¶s reaction illustrates the New Policies makers¶ design of the hierarchical 
policy making system. In that system, the Emperor set the goal for any policy because 
only the Emperor had the authority to judge which policies represented the intention 
of the Sages. The Emperor would not intervene into small affairs, but chose 
bureaucrats who he believed to have apprehended his intention and delegated them 
autonomy to develop concrete rules. Such a view also guided the managers to 
prioritize their demonstration of their true apprehension of the Emperor¶s intentions. 
    We find that the real causes of deviation from ideal policy implementation lay in 
the shortage of the capital for supporting the monopolies¶ operation, bureaucrats¶ lack 
of knowledge in explaining market changes, and their weak capacity to create new 
channels for selling goods. Although both the central policy makers and the managers 
realized those problems, they had no intention to resolve them. I take their actions to 
represent the second dimension of the ³limited regulation´ because of their narrow 
attention to the quota system and overlooking of other problems. Both the Emperor 
and his mangers made revisions to the quota system while continually giving free 
reign to the local bureaucrats. Such measures originated from their understanding of 
the omnipotence of human nature. For them, if the incentive system could be 
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improved the bureaucrats would find ways to resolve any problems they faced 
Therefore they favored making the best use of the forces of material incentive as 
means of regulating human behavior. They confined regulative power into a limited 
space so as to create conditions under which the knowledge and initiative of 
individuals were given their best scope.  
This limited regulation also built an ideational foundation that validated the 
policy makers¶ pursuit of more revenue. The mangers convinced the Emperor that 
even if they kept on increasing revenue quotas, material incentives and free reign 
could still stimulate the talents of bureaucrats. Guided by such a belief, the Emperor 
and his monopoly managers continually increased the revenue quotas instead of 
resolving the real difficulties for the local bureaucrats.  
The policy process illustrates that the drafters of the New Policies followed an 
unrealistic belief. The knowledge, rationale and capacity of bureaucrats fell far short 
of the ideal imagined by the policy makers, even when they were given both 
autonomy and incentive. Increasing fiscal burdens motivated the bureaucrats to 
damage the interests of small producers and strengthen their cooperation with 
powerful merchants.  
     
History witnesses the emergence and eclipse of choices. The duty of the 
historian is to explain why at some critical junctures, certain choices prevailed but 
others disappeared. In pursuing the answer, I have stoop between idea and reality, 
investigating their interaction and discovering their discrepancies. The work of 
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scholars as the explainers of historical change can only be fulfilled when we trace and 
explain the consequences of ideas in their practice. From such a perspective, history is 
not a lineal process that can be divided into periods with static features.545 Rather, we 
should focus on the critical junctures during which relatively long periods of 
institutional stability ended and the new possibilities of change occurred due to the 
innovative ideas and practices of historical agents.546 We should then explain the 
institutional outcomes that were produced by the interaction between these ideas and 
their historical context. Our examination of a particular critical juncture, such as the 
New Policies period, will enable systematic and contextualized comparisons of 
different critical junctures in Chinese history. We should explain how the distinctive 
interactive dynamics between ideas and temporal and spatial context of each critical 
juncture shape the specific course of state-building. This comparison will lead us to 
study the state¶s fluctuating organizing capacities throughout Chinese history and its 
relation to the dynamic institutional structure that was produced through the practice 
of political philosophy. Our theorized explanation will answer James Madison¶s 
question that was posed in the introduction: how to build a state with a strong and 
sustainable capacity to organize social and political actors to benefit the public good?  
 
                                                        
545
 For the most influential English work on the periodization of middle period Chinese 
history, see Hartwell, Robert ³Demographic, Political and Social Transformation of China, 
750-1550´ Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 42 no (1982), 365-422  
 
546
 Giovanni Capoccia and R Daniel Kelemen, ³The Study of Critical Junctures: Theory, 
Narrative and Counterfactuals in Historical Institutionalism´ World Politics 59 (2007), 
341-69. For the recent discussion on the advantage of longue-duree historical research, see Jo 
Guldi and David Armitage, The History Manifesto, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
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The answer however is restively simple and familiar: knowledge is power.        
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